Hinges are about lived truths, — Sam26

Wittgenstein wrote that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Where does Wittgenstein write that those propositions which are exempt from doubt are "lived truths"?

Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition. — RussellA

Revisiting on hinge propositions, they could still be doubted in theory since doubts can be methodological like that of Descartes, or psychological.

A man who lost his hands in the war or work will doubt he has hands, even if he now has robotic hands.
Folks living in Paris in Texas USA could doubt if Paris in France.
Folks who believe life could be simulation could doubt if the Earth exists.

I guess you could doubt them, you just exit the language game when you do. — frank

When we exit the language game, we are in the philosophical game where we discuss about all types of propositions if they make sense.

In order to doubt anything, one must rely on that which is beyond doubt. In other words, one cannot exit all language games and still be capable of doubting. — Joshs

Descartes doubted everything including even his own existence. But one thing he could not doubt was the fact that he was doubting. The fact that he was doubting proved that he was thinking, and therefore cogito ergo sum.

Where does Wittgenstein write that those propositions which are exempt from doubt are "lived truths"? — RussellA

I have heard about "lived experience", but not "lived truths". What is "lived truths"?

Maybe I am misunderstanding the point here. It seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time...When Descartes starts doubting away in the Meditations, he doesn't stop writing in French. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As a starting position, Wittgenstein in On Certainty did write that some propositions are exempt from doubt.

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

You point out that in ordinary language we do doubt the meaning of some words all the time, so where in ordinary language are those propositions that are exempt from doubt?

In the Meditations, Descartes was discarding all beliefs that were not absolutely certain. He was not discarding all words about which he was not absolutely certain. I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris without doubting the meaning of the words "I can doubt ever getting a good meal in Paris". I can use words whose meaning I am certain about to express ideas about which I am not certain.

We may doubt the meaning of some words all the time but we never doubt the meaning of all the words all the time.

As an example consider the sentence "it seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time."

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, the sentence as a whole would be meaningless to me, making it impossible for me to respond to it. But I am responding to it, meaning that in practice I am certain as to the meaning of the words used.

If I doubted the meaning of every expression within the sentence, language as a means of communication would be impossible.

For example, in the sentence "Inaonekana kwangu kwamba hatuelewi na kutumia vibaya maneno kila wakati." there is not a single expression whose meaning is exempt from doubt in my mind

But we know that language does work in enabling communication, therefore there must be some expressions within our language exempt from doubt, as Wittgenstein wrote.

It may be the case that in a sentence there are words whose meaning I am not certain about,
but in that situation I can refer to a dictionary, which may then remove any uncertainty as to its meaning.

If I find the meaning of a word uncertain, I would reach for the Dictionary, not stop writing.

I have heard about "lived experience", but not "lived truths". What is "lived truths"? — Corvus

That was my question to @Sam26 who wrote "hinges are about lived truths".

Folks who believe life could be simulation could doubt if the Earth exists. — Corvus

True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists.

True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists. — RussellA

They believe that doubts are also simulation.

They believe that doubts are also simulation — Corvus

I cannot doubt that I doubt, even if I am a simulation.

I cannot doubt that I doubt, even if I am a simulation. — RussellA

There is your certainty. We don't normally make claims using hinge propositions in daily life. We only discuss about them in the philosophy games (as opposed to the language games).

It seems that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a world but never specifies exactly where this world exists. — RussellA

He does, very specifically: The world is all that is the case. Show us where he retracts this, if you like. But it seems to be his starting point. And of course, what is the case is what is true - true sentences. So the world is what is said by true sentences.

Asking where the world exists is inappropriate. Games of "where" occur within the world.

My understanding is that in a sentence such as "here is one hand and in the hand is a mug and in the mug is an elephant", not only is every part a hinge proposition but also every part can form a T-sentence. — RussellA

Well, there's your problem.

In a T-sentence, what does "true" mean? — RussellA

Very little. "S" is true iff S holds under an extensional, compositional interpretation. A rigid and tight definition. It is not substantive, and not only a correspondence or coherence theory. As it stands it does not assume metaphysical realism, nor systematic consistency of beliefs.

@Banno @RussellA @Josh

OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional hinges. Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," Which gets to my point that we do treat hinges as true in a practical sense, i.e., a lived certainty. In other words, I act in a way that shows their truth. The act of opening a door shows my certainty that there is a door to be opened, and it shows my certainty that I have hands. This practical certainty is a very practical truth.

Wittgenstein's pragmatic view handles different kinds of hinges "I have hands," "The Earth has existed for a long time," and "2+2=4." Their truth is seen in how we live them, whether through actions, practices, or the rules of the game.

OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges — Sam26

205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

§205 is about grounds. You understand that to mean that it is about hinges. Look at §204:

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

Hinges must be both propositional, and an act.

Hence, they are not propositions that set out how things are in the world, but propositions that set out how we are to talk about the world. They are the rules that set up and constitute our language games. They don't represent the world; they set the terms on which representation takes place.

I made an error/typo in the first sentence. It should read, "OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges, but again, he's talking about traditional propositions[/quote]

So the world is what is said by true sentences. — Banno

Hence, they are not propositions that set out how things are in the world, but propositions that set out how we are to talk about the world. They are the rules that set up and constitute our language games. They don't represent the world; they set the terms on which representation takes place. — Banno

How does Wittgenstein overcome what seems to be a circularity?

1) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute our language game.

2) Within this language game there can be representations of the world.

3) The world is what is said by true sentences.

Removing any reference to "world"

4) Hinge propositions are the rules that constitute a language game that can represent what is said by true sentences.

It seems that such a language game is self-referential.

Moreover, we can't forget OC 206, where Wittgenstein points out that if someone asked, "but is that true" (referring to hinges), we might respond "yes," — Sam26

There is a difference between asking is it true that "here is one hand" and asking "is it true that here is one hand".

Asking is it true that "here is one hand"
See OC 204
"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because it is a rule that constitutes the language game. The end is not a certain proposition that strikes us as true, it is our acting.


Asking "is it true that here is one hand".
See OC 206
If someone asks us "is it true that here is one hand", we may answer "yes, but I cannot give you any grounds". The expression "here is one hand" in this instance is not being used as a hinge proposition. It is not being used as a rule that constitutes the language game but is being used as a part of the language game.

To my understanding, "here is one hand" can be used both as a rule that constitutes a language game and as an expression within a language game. The first is not truth-apt, but the second is.

I've not been able to follow that post.

True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists. — RussellA

Problem with hinge proposition is vagueness of its definition. There are other propositions that I don't doubt at all, and they are not hinge propositions. For example,

If I won the lottery jackpot last night, I have 24 million pounds in my bank account today.
I didn't win the jackpot.
Therefore, I don't have 24 million pounds in my bank account today.

Above is not a hinge proposition, but it is the absolute true fact (which is verified via the logical reasoning and reality), and I don't doubt it at all. It is exempt from doubting.

There are many ordinary propositions such as above which are exempt from doubts, especially when verified by sense perceptions, personal experience or logical reasoning on the reality.

You don't follow the post where I referred to OC 205, 206? I'll try to clarify.

I understand that you want to use OC 205 to support your position, viz., that hinges are not true or false. My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." OC 206 refers to a response about hinges, and 205 refers to traditional propositions. In other words, hinges (the ground) are not yet true or false in the same way traditional propositions are true or false. He then points out in 206 that despite not being able to call the ground true or false, you can still say they're (hinges) true (206). This indicates to me and others that truth can be ascribed to hinges, just not in a propositional sense. They're like subjective truths that we all hold firm or as indubitable.

What would it mean to say one is certain or one has a conviction, which Wittgenstein points out over and over again, about hinges other than you believe they're true? This is a bedrock truth that cannot be doubted or falsified, which is why they're not like traditional propositions, which can be falsified.

Our differences go a little deeper because my idea of a belief is that it goes beyond propositions. In other words, our actions show our beliefs apart from language.

Above is not a hinge proposition, but it is the absolute true fact (which is verified via the logical reasoning and reality), and I don't doubt it at all. It is exempt from doubting. — Corvus

Wittgenstein defines what we call the hinge proposition as being a proposition that is exempt from doubt.

OC 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For Wittgenstein, if "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt, there is no reason why "here is no hand" must also be a hinge proposition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Similarly, "here is the Jackpot", "here is no Jackpot", "here are winnings" and "here are no winnings" must also all be hinge propositions and therefore exempt from doubt.

These hinge propositions may be combined into language games:
1) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
2) "here is the Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"
3) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are winnings"
4) "here is no Jackpot" and "here are no winnings"

Your particular case is 2) "I didn't win the jackpot"

It is true that your proposition "I didn't win the jackpot" is exempt from doubt.

But I assume that combining two hinge propositions doesn't form a single new hinge proposition.

This is perhaps why "I didn't win the Jackpot" is not a hinge proposition, even though exempt from doubt, as it is a combination of hinge propositons.

As I understand it:

A hinge proposition enables a language game.

A hinge proposition must be exempt from doubt in order to ground the language game.

A language game is contingent because it describes how the world is.

In the mind of the user of the language game, it would be wrong to say that this language game either represents or corresponds with the world. It would be more accurate to say that this language game "is" their world, meaning that there is no other world outside the language game itself.

In other words, we use the language game to understand the world, and this world is nothing other than the language game itself.

In other words, we use the language game to understand the world, and this world is nothing other than the language game itself. — RussellA

Like the formal logic cannot capture or cope with the whole reality, language alone cannot capture or understand the world. Free reasoning based on inference and sense perception must be accompanied for the full capture and proper understanding the world.

Like the formal logic cannot capture or cope with the whole reality, language alone cannot capture or understand the world. — Corvus

Yes, but perhaps for a different reason.

There is language and there is the world.

For the Direct and Indirect Realist, there is a world that exists independently of any human observer. It would seem that for the Direct and Indirect Realist, language alone cannot fully capture or understand the world.

But for Wittgenstein, what is the relation between language and the world?

It seems to me that for Wittgenstein, language "is" the world.

It is not the case that the proposition "here is one hand" is a representation of a world or corresponds to a world, but rather the world is embodied in "here is one hand".

In a sense, a similar concept to that of the Indirect Realist who doesn't perceive a representation of the colour red but directly perceives the colour red.

374. We teach a child "that is your hand", not "that is perhaps (or "probably") your hand". That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question, 'whether this is really a hand' never occurs to him. Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is a hand.

There is nothing the other side of a world embodied in language.

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition not because it is needed to enable a language game that can represent or correspond with a world, but because the world is embodied in the hinge proposition.

What are the implications? We can only understand the world using language. But if the world is our language, and language cannot understand itself, then this inevitably puts a limit on our understanding of the world.

What are the implications? We can only understand the world using language. But if the world is our language, and language cannot understand itself, then this inevitably puts a limit on our understanding of the world. — RussellA

You need more than language for accurate understanding the world i.e. rational thinking and inferring with the observations on the reality.

Language alone can misled folks into the muddle rather than truths on reality. Think of the sad cases where some unthinking folks just read what the internet shady websites says, and accept whatever they say on the topics of even logic, and then just blindly trust them. and even taunt the others' correct ideas.

We need critical thinking and rational inference on the reality coming to our own conclusions on the world. Language is a representational and descriptive tool of the world. Language alone cannot reveal the whole structure of the world.

You don't follow the post where I referred to OC 205, 206? I'll try to clarify. — Sam26

No. I couldn't make sense of Russell's post - the confusion is legion - but nothing to do with you.

Your confusion towards propositions is apparent. I suspect it derives from too much veneration of propositions and beliefs.

A proposition is one action amongst many. You can show that there is a hand by using it to pick your nose or by saying "Here is a hand"; much of a muchness.

Almost all beliefs are beliefs that... That is, they are propositional.

What makes a hinge proposition different is that for the purposes of the game in which it is a hinge proposition, it is taken to be true. Your seem to want something more, but what, remains unclear.

In other games, the hinge may be doubted.

In other games, the hinge may be doubted. — Banno

A hinge is never doubted, or it wouldn't be a hinge.

yep. And being a hing proposition is a role taken on in the course of setting up a language game. While playing the game it cannot be doubted. And some games are always being played.

Language alone cannot reveal the whole structure of the world. — Corvus

But is what Wittgenstein believed?

Is it not the case that Wittgenstein believed that our language "is" our world, where the world is embedded in language through the hinge proposition?

My point is that OC 206 says, "If someone asked us 'but is that true [referring to a hinge]?' we might say 'yes' to him..." — Sam26

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true.

Is it not the case that Wittgenstein believed that our language "is" our world, where the world is embedded in language through the hinge proposition? — RussellA

It is an interesting idea of W, but not sure if it is 100% correct. I feel the world has nothing to do with language or hinge proposition. The world is totally separate from us, existing on its own never saying anything at all. It is doubtful also if the world would listen to us if we said something to it i.e. the world has nothing to do with language. We just use language to describe it, and communicate with others.

If we lived alone like Zarathustra in a cave somewhere on the remote mountain, then we wouldn't need language at all, and still live ok hunting, cooking, watching the stars at night and enjoying the sunshine during the day.