I don't know what you're talking about. You mean a building with different parts? Suppose you knocked a brick off a building. Is it a different building? No, it's the same one, missing a brick. Is this difference abstract? Obviously not.

What is so hard to understand about that? — The Great Whatever

That doesn't explain in what sense two physically different things are the same thing. Are they the same in a concrete sense or an abstract sense?

I don't know what you're looking for when you mean 'in what sense.' Does the example not make sense to you? Do you not understand how a building can be the same building even if it loses a brick?

How about, a functional or social sense?

Is the building not formally the same, but actually different? Of course in order to be able to say that the building is actually different we must say that it is formally the same.

This reads like gobbledygook to me, maybe I haven't read enough Aristotle.

I don't know what you're looking for when you mean 'in what sense.' Does the example not make sense to you? Do you not understand how a building can be the same building even if it loses a brick? — The Great Whatever

There is a concrete difference between the building in the morning and the building in the evening. So what does it mean to say that it's the same building? It isn't physically identical, so it being the exact same building must be some abstract fact.

I wasn't thinking of Aristotle. When we say the building is now different because a brick has been replaced by another, isn't it the case that we can only say that insofar as are referring to the same building? Because it wouldn't make any sense, or would be at least redundant, to say that the different building is now different. I thought I was agreeing with you, from a slightly different angle, not disagreeing.

Why are those the only options?

Obviously it's insane to insist that any object can only remain the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect. What's relevant to its identity can stay the same even if peripheral things are changed.

So in the first place, your contention is misleading, because if we say, for example, that a piece of jade isn't identical physically from morning to evening, and therefore it can't be the same piece of jade unless abstractly, this is wrong insofar as the physical aspects of it relevant to its identity, including its composition and gross physical integrity, are identical.

And in the second place, there is no reason to insist that all differences are either those of minute physical arrangement or abstract.

Why are those the only options? — The Great Whatever

What are the other options?

Obviously it's insane to insist that any object can only remain the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect.

It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect. If there's a non-physical sense of sameness, such that two physically different things are the same, then what is it?

So in the first place, your contention is misleading, because if we say, for example, that a piece of jade isn't identical physically from morning to evening, and therefore it can't be the same piece of jade unless abstractly, this is wrong insofar as the physical aspects of it relevant to its identity, including its composition and gross physical integrity, are identical.

You've claimed that no concrete properties are a necessary part of a thing's identity.

And in the second place, there is no reason to insist that all differences are either those of minute physical arrangement or abstract.

What else is there?

What are the other options? — Michael

It can retain a functional identity, a physical identity more loosely grained than identical in every respect, a social identity, etc.

It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect. If there's a non-physical sense of sameness, such that two physically different things are the same, then what is it? — Michael

Sure it's insane. Such a view would be committed to saying you can't dent a chair without making the chair stop existing, which is an insane conclusion.

Why would you even think that identity of a thing depended on exact physical identity in every respect? Nobody talks about identity in this way.

Sure it's insane. Such a view would be committed to saying you can't dent a chair without making the chair stop existing, which is an insane conclusion. — The Great Whatever

I think you misread. I said "It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect."

It can retain a functional identity, a physical identity more loosely grained than identical in every respect, a social identity, etc.

So we can't make counterfactual claims about a thing's function or social identity? These are the necessary concrete properties?

I think you misread. I said "It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect." — Michael

It's still insane though. As if the only relevant criterion for remaining the same is exactly the same in every respect.

So we can't make counterfactual claims about a thing's function or social identity? These are the necessary concrete properties? — Michael

We're not talking about names anymore, but count nouns like 'building,' which don't denote individuals but properties.

It's still insane though. As if the only relevant criterion for remaining the same is exactly the same in every respect. — The Great Whatever

It's not insane. It's a tautology. If a thing isn't physically the same then it isn't physically the same.

We're not talking about names anymore, but count nouns like 'buildings,' which don't denote individuals but properties.

Then let's use "the White House" as an example rather than just "building".

And with that in mind, coupled with your accusation of insanity, let's address the fact that your position leads you to accept the sensibility of "my mother could have given birth to the White House".

Does the formal identity 'Obama' signify a totality of processes from birth to death, or the entity that undergoes these processes? — John

I would say that Obama is a name we give to a process that at least encompasses birth to death. Like most human concepts, it has fuzzy boundaries, so in some contexts we may want to extend the domain of reference to include times before or after death - eg a foetus, an embryo, maybe even a parent's sperm or ovum and, at the other end, a corpse, a skeleton or ashes.

When we talk about imagining Obama speaking Mandarin, I would explain that as the activity of visualising a world in which there is a POTUS and that POTUS is exactly like Obama except that he speaks Mandarin.

The objection from the Kripke side seems to be that what we visualise is 'the Obama', not a POTUS almost identical to Obama. My response to that is

'what's the difference?'

What experiment could you do to determine whether the being you visualise is 'the Obama' or just almost identical to him? If there is no such experiment (and I believe there is not) then there's nothing to argue about. The Kripkeans can say that what I am visualising is the Obama, and I can say that I am visualising somebody almost exactly like Obama, and the difference is only the words we choose to use. It's like asking whether Swampman is the 'same person' as the one that got hit by lightning. It is or isn't depending solely on which way you want to define it. The difference is just the choice of words.

Nor is there any point in appealing to common, non-philosophical usage in this matter, because non-philosophers don't trouble themselves with such distinctions. In my experience, they would be perfectly happy with either form of words.

Kripke appears to define Obama to be the actual Obama process in this world, together with all counterfactual and contingent-future visualisations of Obama. By contrast, I define Obama to be solely the actual Obama process in this world (I haven't yet worked out whether it can make sense to me to include contingent-future visualisations. I'm still mulling that over). Hence Kripke's Obama can possibly speak Mandarin, and mine cannot, because it is an Obama-like entity that possibly speaks Mandarin. But the difference is only words. There is no difference of substance.

So Kripke and I can agree that the rigid designator 'Obama' refer to the same ensemble of actual and visualised entities. We just categorise those entities differently.

Nevertheless, I am left wondering:
(1) What problem does Kripke think he is solving by introducing the rigid designator concept, that is not adequately covered by Wittgenstein and/or Russell (subject to minor adaptations for unusual cases they did not consider)?

(2) Under Kripke's approach, it seems possible, on a formal basis, to imagine that Obama is a mountain. I don't know how that can mean anything without having to sign up to essentialism boots and all.

Andrewk said: "Under Kripke's approach, it seems possible, on a formal basis, to imagine that Obama is a mountain."

Way to go TGW. You've got people believing that Kripke was an idiot.

Well... on a formal basis, we can imagine an Obama as a mountain. For any Obama, we might pose that they turned into mountian or suggest they were always a mountain. Any of these positions is a possible state of the world. Rather than idiotic, it's correct.

Kripke sort of denies this though, for he treats any named entity as a state with necessary properties. To suggest Obama might be a mountian would be incohrent to him, because it would break the rule that Obama necessarily had a human body. Kripke's problem is he more or less mistakes the actual for formal-- Obama has a human body, he doesn't necessarily have a human body. Kripke claims the later.

Terrapin pointed out the significant factor: Kripke denied descriptivism in favor of the chain scenario.

I know, but that's also the problem: he treats reference as if it has nothing to do with the actual world. As the only consideration was the formal reference someone has imagined (e.g. I'm talking about Obama who necessarily has a human body.).

Descriptivism is wrong. Reference isn't defined by describing some property of a thing in the world. Mountain Obama is a testament to that-- if I suggest that possible state is true, I'm certainly not describing who I'm referring to.

But this doesn't mean the actual world becomes entirely irrelevant. What I'm referring to is actual in some world, a state of existence which may change or be different to what I think it is in countless ways. I can't just take an idea about what I'm referencing and proclaim it's necessarily true.

It's not insane. It's a tautology. If a thing isn't physically the same then it isn't physically the same. — Michael

No. "Same" does not have to mean "exactly the same in every respect."

Then let's use "the White House" as an example rather than just "building". — Michael

Then yes, you can say "what if the White House were blah blah blah," including something other than a building.

The objection from the Kripke side seems to be that what we visualise is 'the Obama', not a POTUS almost identical to Obama. My response to that is

'what's the difference?' — andrewk

The difference is the two have different truth conditions. For example, what you say is truth condition of the counterfactual could be fulfilled by supposing that some impostor heard about Obama, was jealous of his political power, so took on his name and killed him to take his place, all while knowing Mandarin. This is the sort of scenario that verifies an individual like B.O. who is president, has the same name, etc. speaks Mandarin. But it's not a scenario in which Obama speaks Mandarin; it's one in which his impostor does.

By contrast, I define Obama to be solely the actual Obama process in this world — andrewk

You can't 'define Obama.' He's a real-live person that already exists how he does.

(1) What problem does Kripke think he is solving by introducing the rigid designator concept, that is not adequately covered by Wittgenstein and/or Russell (subject to minor adaptations for unusual cases they did not consider)? — andrewk

Proper names are rigid designators, so to treat them as such gives them a correct semantics. I've already explained in detail how the truth conditions of non-rigid designators like definite descriptions differs from that of rigid designators in all sorts of modal contexts.

Honestly, just read the fucking book, it's really short and easy. Read the modal, espitemological, and semantic arguments in Naming and Necessity.

Not to be rude but it's genuinely frustrating that people would rather argue ad nauseum about stupid shit rather than actually go to the source of what they're arguing about where all of this is laid out clearly, and have their misunderstandings be dispelled in a couple hours of reading.

If you want to know "what problem Kripke thinks he is solving," if you really want to know, read the goddamn book and stop speculating about something you can easily research yourself.

(2) Under Kripke's approach, it seems possible, on a formal basis, to imagine that Obama is a mountain. I don't know how that can mean anything without having to sign up to essentialism boots and all. — andrewk

Kripke himself would deny this, but this is an additional consideration not inherently tied to the notion of rigid designation. I'm just saying I disagree with Kripke on this point, and we can indeed imagine Obama is a mountain. If you can't, well I'm sorry, you have a worse imagination than the pages of a children's picture book.

The difference is the two have different truth conditions. For example, what you say is truth condition of the counterfactual could be fulfilled by supposing that some impostor heard about Obama, was jealous of his political power, so took on his name and killed him to take his place, all while knowing Mandarin. This is the sort of scenario that verifies an individual like B.O. who is president, has the same name, etc. speaks Mandarin. But it's not a scenario in which Obama speaks Mandarin; it's one in which his impostor does. — The Great Whatever

I agree that in that situation Obama does not speak Mandarin. That's because the real Obama in that imaginary scenario is the one that was killed, and that one does not speak Mandarin. As I understand it, for Kripke as well as for me, there can only be one process in any visualisation that corresponds to a given rigid designator. In the situation you have described, that process is the person that was killed by the impostor. So on my interpretation, as in Kripke's, the impostor is not Obama.

So that scenario fails to differentiate between the two forms of words, as they both lead to the same conclusion.

That's because the real Obama in that imaginary scenario is the one that was killed, and that one does not speak Mandarin. — andrewk

The point is that your view cannot say this, because as you've just gone through explaining, you cannot tell the difference between these two scenarios. So this:

In the situation you have described, that process is the person that was killed by the impostor. So on my interpretation, as in Kripke's, the impostor is not Obama. — andrewk

Is wrong. You have no criterion by which to say which of the two is Obama, because you've stipulated that stipulating such a thing is impossible.

your view cannot say this, because as you've just gone through explaining, you cannot tell the difference between these two scenarios — The Great Whatever

There is only one scenario - lookalike impostor murders American presidential candidate named Barack Obama with Kenyan father, takes his place, and nobody notices. There are two ways of describing it - Kripke's and mine. You seem to be claiming that there is a difference - other than choice of words - implied by the two descriptions of the single scenario. You have not explained what that difference is.

You have no criterion by which to say which of the two is Obama, because you've stipulated that stipulating such a thing is impossible. — The Great Whatever

I don't need to say which is Obama because in my description, we only talk about which one is like our world's Obama in almost every respect, and that one is the murder victim.

What practical difference is there between Kripke's and my descriptions of this scenario?

I don't need to say which is Obama because in my description, we only talk about which one is like our world's Obama in almost every respect, and that one is the murder victim. — andrewk

But they're both like Obama in most relevant respects. Just change the scenario however you want.

Then yes, you can say "what if the White House were blah blah blah," including something other than a building. — The Great Whatever

You can say it, but you're speaking nonsense.

No. "Same" does not have to mean "exactly the same in every respect."

So are you saying that in some respect it's the same building but in some other respect it's a different building?

Let's consider some variations of the grandfather's axe paradox.

1. You have an axe. After some time you replace the head. After some more time you replace the handle. Do you have the same axe you started with?

2. We each have an axe. After some time, I replace the head of my axe with the head of your axe and you replace the head of your axe with the head of my axe. After some more time I replace the handle of my axe with the handle of your axe and you replace the handle of your axe with the handle of my axe. Do you have the same axe you started with?

3. We each have an axe. After some time, I replace the head and handle of my axe with the head and handle of your axe and you replace the head and handle of your axe with the head and handle of my axe. Do you have the same axe you started with?

4. We each have an axe. After some time, I give you my axe and you give me your axe. Do you have the same axe you started with?

1 and 2 seem identical. 2 and 3 seem identical. 3 and 4 seem identical. Therefore 1 and 4 seem identical. At least when it comes to the physics of the scenarios. The only difference seems to be in the way they're phrased. So if the answer to 1 is "yes" and the answer to 4 is "no" then whether or not it's the same axe is determined by linguistic/conceptual factors, and so being the same axe is a linguistic/conceptual imposition.

Of course, you can avoid this by answering "no" to 1 as well, and argue that being the same axe depends on being made of the exact same physical stuff, but then you can't make counterfactual claims about the physical constitution of that axe (as anything made of something else necessarily isn't that axe).

In my view there are two issues here:

(1) whether something, independent of how we think about it, is literally the same a la logical identity/identity of indiscernibles/A=A identity.

(2) whether per individuals' conceptual abstractions, they consider something "the same x."

That makes these Ship of Theseus issues quite simple/straightforward and not at all perplexing.

Per (1), as soon as anything about x has changed, and on my view even as soon as any time has passed, x is not literally the same x.

Per (2), it's just a matter of what someone requires, with respect to their conceptual abstractions, a la necessary and sufficient criteria, and relative to their knowledge/awareness of changes, to call the thing in question "the same x."

So the answer to whether something is the same x, a la (2), can vary per individual, and there are no correct or incorrect answers in that regard, as what they're telling us is something about what their particular conceptual abstractions are, in conjunction with telling us something about their knowledge/awareness of changes.

Why do you say that statement is contingently true? — Mongrel

The thread has moved on a lot and I don't have enough time to keep up with such a fast-paced exchange.

But, going back, forgive me if this is the sort of point that means I just don't understand, I do think there is some illumination missing for me. 'This table is made of clay.' To me that is contingent upon who is speaking, in what location, when, and what contextually they mean by 'clay', which has a rather imprecise meaning to it. So what is necessary about it?

I see that the end-point is attempting to arrive at a logical formulation that expresses natural language as if it were an expression in modal logic. 'There is something and it's a table and it's one and only (one table and it's in a certain location) and it's made of clay,' with the addition of the word 'necessarily' in there somewhere which has a relation to 'in all possible worlds'. I've just not grasped that this makes sense. I can see in my mind's eye the symbolic logic that's its purported counterpart and I'm happy manipulating that; I don't grasp how that happens in the flow of natural language.

I'm with you on all of that, mcdoodle.

And I also think that we never fail to make big boo-boos when we attempt to conflate logic and natural language. That's also the problem with, for example, the Gettier objections to knowledge as justified true belief--the objections hinge on a conflation of logic with natural language and how people actually think about things.

This is why Logic 101 profs will always hammer on not trying to see formal logic as analogous to natural languages . . . it's one of those wise pieces of advice that folks tend to forget.

I'm with you on all of that, mcdoodle. — Terrapin Station

Well, blimey :)

'This table is made of clay.' To me that is contingent upon who is speaking, in what location, when, and what contextually they mean by 'clay', which has a rather imprecise meaning to it. So what is necessary about it? — mcdoodle

I think it would have to be truth-apt before it could be necessarily true. We would have to know what table the statement is about.