Tractatus is best viewed as a poem. It is elegantly written and tells a story, it describes a framework of ideas. But it is not strictly logical nor does it solve any problems, at least none that are not contrived. — A Seagull

Nowhere is there evidence that Wittgenstein thought of the Tractatus as a poem, and he sure didn't wish us to think of it as a kind of poem. And, the idea that the Tractatus is "not strictly logical" belies all the logic in the book.

:up:

Philosophy/metaphysics shouldn't, cannot have any propositions at all, language is solely used for the natural sciences. Using language to say something philosophical or metaphysical is an abuse of language, you understand — Pussycat

When you "demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions", you presumably do so using language. That does not seem to be a use of language for natural science, though. Is it therefore an abuse of language to show someone they are abusing language?

Ray Monk, Wittgenstein’s biographer, also wrote an essay in Prospect Magazine in which he says:

As [Wittgenstein] himself realised, his style of thinking is at odds with the style that dominates our present era. His work is opposed, as he once put it, to “the spirit which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand.” Nearly 50 years after his death, we can see, more clearly than ever, that the feeling that he was swimming against the tide was justified. If we wanted a label to describe this tide, we might call it “scientism,” the view that every intelligible question has either a scientific solution or no solution at all. It is against this view that Wittgenstein set his face.

What he describes as a ‘language game’, I prefer to call a ‘domain of discourse’, which is a domain of shared meanings within which people can agree or disagree. And one of the underlying problems of modern culture is that it is host to a huge variety of such domains, many of which are incommensurable in Thomas Kuhn’s sense. Calling these 'language games' belittles the concept in my view, as it downplays the sense in which meaning is derived from, and used within, a cultural context with its shared assumptions.

When you "demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions", you presumably do so using language. That does not seem to be a use of language for natural science, though. Is it therefore an abuse of language to show someone they are abusing language? — Pfhorrest

For sure. Which is why W. immediately after writes:

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

Post 6

I want to give credit to K. T. Fann (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy), because I’m using his book as a guide through this, along with, of course, the Tractatus.

The question arises, what are names? Wittgenstein does not mean names like chair, cat, or Socrates. His idea is that a name is a primitive sign, i.e., something that cannot be analyzed any further by means of a definition (T. 3.26). A name is something simple, not complex. For Wittgenstein, this idea comes about by logical necessity.

Wittgenstein never gives us an example of a name, or for that matter, an elementary proposition. He did not think it was his job as a logician to give such examples. However, Wittgenstein was not unaware of the problem. “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 62).”

Remember, Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’ (T. 3.203).” The configuration of names in an elementary proposition conforms to the configuration of objects in atomic facts. There is a one-to-correspondence to the facts in logical space, which is why propositions are pictures of facts. If we use Wittgenstein’s logic, “A propositional sign is a fact (T. 3.14).” This is why all true propositions (all empirical propositions, propositions of natural science) are equal to particular facts in the world.

“In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

“Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

“The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate (T. 3.22, 3.221, 3.23).”

For sure. Which is why W. immediately after writes:

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — Pussycat

Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong, and advises you to throw it all away. He basically says I've given you a demonstration of the wrong approach, now move along and find the right approach. But when you see from the very beginning, that it's all wrong, as Sam26 says, "Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects.", it makes a very boring read.

Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong — Metaphysician Undercover

This is incorrect. Wittgenstein is NOT admitting that it's all wrong. He says at the beginning of the Tractatus, "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive (T. p. 4)."

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them [metaphysical propositions] as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (T. 6.54)."

Wittgenstein's famous last words have caused more problems for those who read the Tractatus than any other passage. Philosophers from Bertrand Russell to present day philosophers have misunderstood the significance of this passage. After all, Wittgenstein seems to have said a great deal about what cannot be said according to Russell. There have been other accusations that Wittgenstein was illuminating nonsense, according to Pitcher in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Ramsey also had some remarks about this passage in the following: "And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense (F. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics (London, 1931), p. 263)!"

My understanding of this passage is the following: By examining the propositions in the Tractatus, the reader comes to understand that he/she must transcend the propositions (metaphysical propositions) in order to see the world aright. Once this is done, one can then discard the process because Wittgenstein will have accomplished his purpose - that of showing you the way. Once you see enough of what is nonsensical, hopefully, you will have a clear picture of what can be said and what cannot be said - i.e., what propositions have sense. So, the question now becomes, how do the propositions of the Tractatus show us the truth contained therein? One might answer the question this way - just as music and art show us something important, so do the propositions in the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein defines for us which propositions have sense, and which do not. He demonstrates both in the Tractatus. There is a difference between saying and showing. Once we understand the difference between those propositions which have sense, those that refer to states-of-affairs, then we are able to have a clear view of those propositions that are senseless, viz., those that go beyond the limit of language according to the Tractatus.

This is incorrect. Wittgenstein is NOT admitting that it's all wrong. He says at the beginning of the Tractatus, "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive (T. p. 4)."

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them [metaphysical propositions] as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (T. 6.54)." — Sam26

So, isn't there a contradiction between 'the truth of these propositions', at the beginning, and 'the propositions are nonsensical', at the end? I interpret that Wittgenstein thought, at the beginning of the work, that he was representing the truth with his propositions, but due to the problems he encountered with the nature of a proposition, he realized that apprehending this as "truth", was a mistake.

So, the question now becomes, how do the propositions of the Tractatus show us the truth contained therein? One might answer the question this way - just as music and art show us something important, so do the propositions in the Tractatus. — Sam26

I would say that music and art give us something meaningful, without giving us truth. A proposition gives us truth or falsity, by definition, so to allow that the so-called "propositions of the Tractatus" tell us something important or meaningful in the way that art and music does, we would need to characterize them as something other than propositions. Under accepted definition of "proposition", such things get rejected as nonsensical, i.e. of a different category.

Wittgenstein defines for us which propositions have sense, and which do not. He demonstrates both in the Tractatus. There is a difference between saying and showing. Once we understand the difference between those propositions which have sense, those that refer to states-of-affairs, then we are able to have a clear view of those propositions that are senseless, viz., those that go beyond the limit of language according to the Tractatus. — Sam26

The problem though, is at the end he is recognizing his own propositions as nonsensical, according to the quote you presented above. Therefore this difference between saying and showing, and the difference between propositions with sense, and those which are senseless, which he has demonstrated with senseless propositions, is itself senseless. And so, from these principles proposed, there is nothing to indicate that any propositions might have any sense. This is the problem with trying to ground sense, or meaningfulness in truth. It is a backward attempt at classification. In reality, truth must be grounded in meaningfulness, as a type of meaningfulness, and meaningfulness cannot be characterized as a property of truth.

Such is the deficiency of the epistemology which claims that if a statement cannot be judged for truth or falsity (as a proposition), it must be meaningless, or senseless. This epistemology does not proceed from a proper understanding of what a meaningful expression is, because a meaningful expression might give us meaning in the way that art or music does, or some other way, without being a true or false proposition. Now we have to reject that original premise that meaning is grounded in such true/false statements, and accept that meaning is really based in other statements, or expressions like art and music, which all appear to be meaningless, or senseless from the perspective which premises that an expression must be true or false to be meaningful.

It seems to me that much of what W says, or at least the gist of it, is correct when limited specifically to descriptive propositions, words being used to indicate something about how the world is; but, as you rightly point out, words can also be used to do a lot more than that, they can mean things other than “the world is such-and-such way”. Talk about what words mean, like this message or the Tractacus itself, falls outside that limited scope of describing the world, but still clearly has nother kind of meaning.

@Sam26 Do you think W sees himself as doing a sort of reductio ad absurdum? Putting forth a bunch of “propositions” and elucidating their consequences until the original propositions are shown meaningful by themselves?

Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong, and advises you to throw it all away. He basically says I've given you a demonstration of the wrong approach, now move along and find the right approach. But when you see from the very beginning, that it's all wrong, as Sam26 says, "Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects.", it makes a very boring read. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't admit that it's all wrong, he says it is 'senseless', which is a different thing than 'wrong'. Philosophical propositions, as well as "elucidating" propositions referring to the nonsensicality of those, are neither right or wrong, they are just senseless: they don't make sense as language is normally supposed to do. But they do convey meaning. In the Tractatus, there is a difference between meaning and sense, really hard to tell, and besides, it's all lost in translation. Bedeutung und Sinn. Sense and Meaning, or otherwise. I mean, in english, sense and meaning may be taken to be the same, but in the Tractatus, they are most definitely not. See also "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" by Frege. Wittgenstein sort of responds to Frege with the Tractatus, there is a reference to him therein. In order to understand the Tractatus better, we should see it in its historical reference.

It seems to me that much of what W says, or at least the gist of it, is correct when limited specifically to descriptive propositions, words being used to indicate something about how the world is; but, as you rightly point out, words can also be used to do a lot more than that, they can mean things other than “the world is such-and-such way”. Talk about what words mean, like this message or the Tractacus itself, falls outside that limited scope of describing the world, but still clearly has nother kind of meaning. — Pfhorrest

You are correct, I think, the Tractatus conveys a meaning but with it being senseless. "sense", in the Tractatus has to do with the facts, descriptive propositions like you say, on "how" the world is, the propositions of natural science. All the propositions in the Tractatus are senseless, huh, in that sense.

I think I would say that non-descriptive sentences still have a sense, but not in the sense of “sense” that W means.

It seems to me that much of what W says, or at least the gist of it, is correct when limited specifically to descriptive propositions... — Pfhorrest

But Wittgenstein applies this to the entirety of the world, so it's really incorrect. What sense does it make to say that if we change what the person said, it would be correct?

He doesn't admit that it's all wrong, he says it is 'senseless', which is a different thing than 'wrong'. — Pussycat

When a person makes what are supposed to be truth statements about the world, then later admits that those statements are really "senseless", then I think we can conclude that the person has come to the realization that those truth statements are really not truthful at all, and therefore wrong.

Post 7

More on what can and cannot be said according to the Tractatus.

You can think of it this way. First, you have the world, and that includes all that we can talk about sensibly. Next you have what’s beyond the limit of the world, and that’s what cannot be spoken of, the mystical.

Language is a mirror image of the world, and the terms sense, senseless, and nonsense are related to saying, i.e., propositions. Within the boundaries of language (saying) we say things with sense. If we attempt to talk about the limit or the boundaries of language, then we are saying things that are senseless. However, if we attempt to go beyond the boundary, then the result is nonsense. The failure to understand these three categories (sense, senseless, and nonsense) results in misunderstandings of the Tractatus. Early interpretations failed to understand the distinction between senseless (sinnlos) and nonsense (unsinnig), and this can be seen in the first translations of the Tractatus. The distinction between senseless and nonsense was lost on many who first read the Tractatus.

An example of senseless propositions are the propositions of logic, they say nothing (T. 6.11). However, they are not nonsensical for they show “…the formal logical properties of language and the world, i.e., they show us the limit of language and the world (T. 6.12, and K. T. Fann, p. 23).

According to Wittgenstein the propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions (propositions of natural science). They are attempts to say what cannot be said (for the most part). Wittgenstein believed that most of the propositions of philosophy are not false but nonsensical. They are attempts to say how reality is. Philosophical propositions are similar to asking if the good is more or less identical with the beautiful (T. 4.003).

Wittgenstein also believed that the reasons for why we misunderstand the differences between these propositions (those that make sense, vs those that are senseless, vs those that are nonsense), is that we misunderstand the logic of our language, viz., the logic displayed in the Tractatus.

“Religion, ethics, art, and the realm of the personal are, like metaphysics, concerned with what cannot be said—that which transcends the world (K. T. Fann, p. 23, 24).”

attempts to say what cannot be said — Sam26

This phrase seems to have two possible interpretations: attempts to say things about what kinds of things are not able to be said, vs attempts to say things which attempts are doomed to fail because the things one is attempting to say cannot be said. I think here you mean the latter, but it’s interesting that the possible interpretations of this phrase mirror the differences between senseless and nonsense.

This phrase seems to have two possible interpretations: attempts to say things about what kinds of things are not able to be said, vs attempts to say things which attempts are doomed to fail because the things one is attempting to say cannot be said. — Pfhorrest

In other words, it attempts to go beyond the world of language. Language, in terms of making sense, is language that describes the world. So ya, your latter interpretation.

The Tractatus is a lot like any other work – the technical development that was lying around at the time was taken for a key to the universe. This time, it was the truth-functional propositional calculus.

Seen in retrospect it's a profoundly silly thing, but then I guess most things are.

The Tractatus is a lot like any other work – the technical development that was lying around at the time was taken for a key to the universe. This time, it was the truth-functional propositional calculus.

Seen in retrospect it's a profoundly silly thing, but then I guess most things are. — Snakes Alive

Yes, but this - the truth-functional propositional calculus as you put it, applies only to matters of fact and the natural sciences, not to everything.

Even as an account of the natural sciences it's dumb, and the 'everything' beyond this shades in and out of intelligibility with language, and so does 'science' anyway. It's not a plausible account of how words work, and is best read as a reflection of the theoretical prejudices of the moment.

I think the question of intelligibility is interesting, but how words come to mean things, and what they mean or can mean, is a complicated topic not seriously addressed by the Tractatus. The analytic obsession with the conditions on sense-making was a good one, but clearly the answers given in the 20th c. are primitive and silly.

The first rule of Tractatus Club is 'Do not talk about Tractatus Club'

First, you have the world, and that includes all that we can talk about sensibly. — Sam26

What can be sensed one can talk sensibly about.

."What can be sensed one can talk sensibly about. " is not sensible talk, because one cannot sense 'what can be sensed' but only what is sensed.

But there is a further limitation, that one can only talk sense of that which is named. Thus naming as a process (of ships or persons), becomes a senseless ritual that makes sense. The Titanic couldn't sink until it was named.

So, in all, is there something you praise the Tractatus for?

Is everyone bored, like MU? :wink:

We haven't even scratched the surface of all that is in the Tractatus, not that I'm going to go into that much depth.

Is there anything praiseworthy? Yes, its originality, and based on Wittgenstein's premises it follows logically. It also led to Wittgenstein's critique of the work, and to a better way of looking at how language functions. I also like the idea of propositions picturing facts or states-of-affairs, because I think it is true of many propositions (although not in the way of names connecting to objects). There is much in this work, i.e., many novel ideas, besides his picture and truth-function theories, that could be thought through. What I mean is that there are a lot of side issues that he touches on that might deserve a look at. What I find interesting, is where his thoughts led him in the end. And, ya, we might find some of his ideas silly today, but that's true of many subjects that are over 100 years old.

So Wittgenstein said 1) that the world can be experienced more than the self. However, he also said 2) the sense of the world is outside the world. So which of these applies to younger W and which to the mature dude?

Yes, but this - the truth-functional propositional calculus as you put it, applies only to matters of fact and the natural sciences, not to everything — Pussycat

Not so. If other kinds of claims can be assigned truth values on some other grounds than empiricism, then they can be manipulated through truth-functional logic just the same. The logic doesn’t care what the truth values mean or where they come from.

As an aside, studying language really has nothing to do with the philosophy in the language, unless you say W was just doing what John Stuart Mill tried to do.

I don't know if it's the first document to use truth tables, but those are a really great device.

I think that the idea of knowing when to be silent is good – it's just that here it's too obviously tied to present theoretical prejudices.

Is everyone bored, like MU? — Sam26

Someone else like me? I'd better change then.

If you say questions such as the "difference between contingency and necessity" are meaningless, you have still formed a concept. It's not pure meditation yet, if that is your ultimate goal