• Sam26
    2.4k
    By the way I added more to my previous response.

    No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. Again, it's just part of the inherited background. The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong, since when do we need to justify that we have hands, unless it's in a very special context, like waking up from an operation. What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?
  • Richard B
    363
    No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands.Sam26

    But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here.

    In my example, I am not speaking in front of skeptical philosophers who are doubting the external world. I am a job applicant who is being ask if I have two hands because the job requires two hands to operate the machinery. I can answer yes or no. If one of my hands was amputated due to an injury the answer is"no". In this circumstance, this can be counted as a statement of knowledge.

    The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrongSam26
    .

    Not in general, it depends on the circumstance.

    What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?Sam26

    Agree here that the use of "doubt" is questionable in Moore's context. But why could we not say that Moore is justified in saying "I know I have two hands." by just showing the audience such objects.

    In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground? Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."

    Is not this the case with Moore when he shows the skeptical philosopher his hands thus demonstrating the absurdity of doubting such a thing?
  • Sam26
    2.4k
    But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here.Richard B

    Yes, it does seem that way, but here it's important to note the relationship between knowing and doubting (very important), which Wittgenstein points out. So, when trying to separate those beliefs (they are arational beliefs) which are bedrock, and not part of any epistemological justification, it's crucial to ask oneself, "Does it make sense to generally doubt this belief?

    In the case of Moore's propositions there are very few contexts that we doubt, for e.g., that we have hands. It's something we have, it's part of the inherited background of being human (at least for most), and we sure don't doubt that we are human, unless you're a skeptical idealist. Again, similar to the inherited background of chess, viz., the rules, pieces, and the board. How can we doubt the inherited background our lives?

    If we take my e.g., "The orange juice is sweet," we do come to know this in various ways, by tasting it is the most common (sensory experience), but asking someone is another way of knowing (justification through testimony). Does it make sense to doubt that the orange juice is sweet? Yes, we may be asking ourselves or others if it's ripe, or if it's sweet enough and not sour. So, this proposition is not the same as Moore's propositions, viz. called variously, hinge, bedrock, foundational, or basic propositions (I don't believe they are propositions in the normal sense, which is why they have a special name attached to them. It has to do with how they function in our epistemological language-games, viz, as the very building blocks of our epistemological language.).

    Moore is demonstrating his knowledge of his hands, and it's this knowledge, demonstrated by proof, that is supposed to rebut the skeptic. Wittgenstein, of course, argues against this. Wittgenstein points out that much of our certainty (I call this certainty subjective certainty, as opposed to objective certainty, the latter is knowledge) is arrived at in the course of our lives, as we act within this reality. I don't in many cases arrive at some of these beliefs through some logical process, which is the point. It's through our interaction with the world that this subjective certainty comes out. Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.
  • Sam26
    2.4k
    I think I will make OC my first video. Making videos going from the Tractatus to OC is something I'd like to do, and I will continue to work on it, but I'm going to concentrate on OC. Besides there are many videos that cover the T. and the PI, but not as many on OC.
  • Richard B
    363
    Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.Sam26

    I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. If other people would start challenging me on this, I would think they have gone mad, or psychologically manipulating me for some reason. Additionally, if one would say, “Well I could imagine that you have been drug and your hands have been amputated, yet you feel certain that you have hands.” My response could be, So what, just because you could imagine such a thing does not make it possible, it could be that I am immune to such drugs and hallucinations. Lastly, why are we calling something “knowledge” as something that excludes possible doubt. This seems too unnecessary of a high bar for a concept that is use in everyday life. It seems Wittgenstein could not cure himself of this philosophical view of “knowledge.”
  • Sam26
    2.4k
    I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands.Richard B

    Of course, but I'm not saying that the statement, "I believe I have hands," is any better. The beliefs Wittgenstein is referring to in many cases, are the beliefs that are shown in our actions. When I sit in a chair, open a door, pick up a pencil, etc., all of these actions reflect beliefs. This is why some philosophers refer to them as animal beliefs, and why I sometimes refer to these bedrock beliefs as pre-linguistic. Not all bedrock beliefs are pre-linguistic, but many are.
  • Sam26
    2.4k
    The following is what Googles AI chat service, called Bard, said about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I thought is was pretty good.


    "Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, On Certainty, are a series of reflections on the nature of knowledge and certainty. In these notes, Wittgenstein argues that there are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions, which Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world.

    "Wittgenstein argues that hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action. For example, we cannot doubt that we have bodies, that the world is external to our minds, or that the past is real. These propositions are so basic to our understanding of the world that they cannot be doubted without undermining the very possibility of knowledge itself.

    "Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language. His work has been praised for its insights into the nature of knowledge and the limits of skepticism. However, it has also been criticized for being too vague and unconvincing. Nevertheless, On Certainty remains an important work of philosophy that continues to be studied and debated today.

    "Here are some of the key points of Wittgenstein's argument in On Certainty:

    "There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions are called "hinge propositions."

    "Hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action.

    "Hinge propositions are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world. Without them, we would be unable to make sense of anything.

    "Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language."
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