• 013zen
    74
    We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”Sam26

    Nicely put :)

    I agree with this, too.
  • Sam26
    2.5k
    Sorry, I'm falling behind. I'm in the middle of a move, and I'm recovering from a virus.

    I've made a couple of misstatements that I have to also correct, as @Fooloso4 pointed out.

    I have no problems with the way the thread is going.

    Sorry Banno, but I think we disagree on the nature of objects. It's pretty clear what Wittgenstein had in mind, at least partially clear.
  • Fooloso4
    5.4k


    I am glad you took my remarks in the spirit in which they were intended. Of course, down the road I might see the need to revise my views. It would not be the first time! I think that anyone who thinks he has got it all right has got it wrong
  • schopenhauer1
    9.9k
    Perhaps this is how one should think about these objects. The analysis of language demands that there are elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are about possible atomic facts, consisting in combinations of names. These names name elementary objects

    Of course this is muddled, hence the PI.
    Banno


    I think I brought this a while ago, but we are finally getting to the crux of Wittgenstein's (assumptions on/glossing over) metaphysics. He asserts objects, makes little value in explaining them and then plows forward. I don't believe that's how it should work. There should at least be supplementary material if it doesn't fit into his case (Tractatus' argument). That is to say, "objects" in everyday speech can be taken for granted; "objects" in programming have a specific definitional use (and it's a logical entity of sorts, not a physical thing in the world, but has analogies thereof in programming-jargon). However, I dare pose that in the philosophical world of argumentation and grand-treatises, such important terms should not be glossed over and made so ambiguous so readily. Whether they are psychological, "real" or whatnot should be a matter of importance, as it contributes to clarity as to how the grand view the author is positing is constructed (is it facts or objects- the implications are enormously different!).
  • Sam26
    2.5k
    Post 12

    Trying to be clear about objects, so a step back.

    We know this, viz., that objects, which make up the substance of the world, can be arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). This is basic to what an object is. You move from object  to atomic facts  to complex facts. Logic dictates this for Wittgenstein. Objects contain the possibility of arranging into any potential fact (“If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the beginning (T. 2.0121).”). Whether the fact obtains depends on the arrangement of the objects in an atomic fact. Objects by themselves are mere potentiality, like any building block, but also unlike any building block we are familiar with.

    My understanding of Wittgensteinian objects leads me to believe that they are the fundamental components of objective reality, i.e., they’re real things that combine. They combine to form states of affairs (T. 2.01). If states of affairs are objectively real, it would seem to follow that objects are real, at least in some sense. Otherwise, what would be combined to form states of affairs? They also seem real because they can occupy logical space. Obviously, Wittgenstein’s objects don’t exist, but Wittgenstein’s theory of objects is a theory that postulates them as real.

    You must be careful about what you say about objects because you can’t ascribe external properties to objects, only internal properties (T. 2.01231). One such internal property is that they are simples, but it’s not the only internal property. Other internal properties include the ability to combine with other objects to form atomic facts, and that they make up the substance of the world of facts.

    Keep in mind that to have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture theory you need not have a perfect understanding of objects or names. After all, we’re not trying to write a doctoral thesis.
  • Fooloso4
    5.4k
    so a step back.Sam26

    Your step back is a step forward. We are in agreement.

    ... arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs).Sam26

    As you go on to say, objects contain the possibility of arranging into facts, but as stated it might be taken to mean that something arranges them. Objects arrange themselves. Facts are the result of such arrangements.

    Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...Sam26

    What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them?
  • Sam26
    2.5k
    Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
    — Sam26

    What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them?
    Fooloso4

    I'm thinking along the lines of what Wittgenstein said, viz., "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." In other words, it's only as they combine with others that we get atomic facts, otherwise we just have Witt's substance. Or it's only when they combine with other objects that they're actualized into atomic facts or complex facts. That's my take.

    This is going much further into the Tractatus than I intended, but it's interesting.
  • Fooloso4
    5.4k
    "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)."Sam26

    I take him to be saying that combining with others is what it is to be an object, and that there is no object that cannot combine with any other object.
  • Sam26
    2.5k
    Both are true, I believe. As I pointed out in post 12, one of the internal properties of objects is that they can combine with other objects. Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains.

    The purpose of the post above "Taking a step back..." was to clarify my earlier statements, in which I used a couple of terms in a different sense than Witt. This caused you to think I meant one thing when I meant another. My error. I think we're pretty close to interpreting objects in the same way.
  • Fooloso4
    5.4k
    Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains.Sam26

    Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact?
  • Sam26
    2.5k
    Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact?Fooloso4

    No, I wouldn't go that far. My intention was not to go this far into the meanings of these Wittgensteinian concepts and their place in the world. It's beyond the scope of this thread.
  • Gregory
    4.6k
    I dont understand why Wittgenstein thinks language has anything to do with abstract thought. Language is both noise and an understanding of the noise in HOW it relates to thoughts. Thoughts are what philosophy is about and language is just a tool. I know Wittgenstein had an aversion to normal philosophy, but i find his attempt to turn abstraction into language to be lame
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