Obviously so, in my opinion, since essences only obtain by there being sentient beings who mentally form type abstractions.

I wouldn't say that has any bearing on religious claims, unless we're specifically talking about a religious claim that hinges on essences preceding or occurring simultaneously with existence.

If being precedes essence then becoming must be non-cognitive in some sense, perhaps as valuation a claim on being?

Also doesn't Being face Non-Being in some sort of dialectic as Agamben suggests, and the synthesis of the dialectic is Becoming, but maybe the phrase 'Being vs Essence' is more about the Cogito (ego=essence).

If being precedes essence then becoming must be non-cognitive in some sense, perhaps as valuation a claim on being? — Cavacava

You'd have to explain this and the other post in detail for me to have a clue what you're talking about (although keep in mind that I'm of the opinion that Heidegger is basically garbage and I'm not very fond of continentalism in general).

Existence precedes essence simply because all that essence is is ideas about the necessary and sufficient properties for considering some x (some particular) an F (some type/kind). Or in other words, it's the nutshell (well, or the nut) of an individual's concept of F.

Sartre's metaphysics, at least from what I have read from primary and secondary sources, is actually kind of shallow. It's rooted more in phenomenological observations rather than holism. As such, it seems that Sartre was more focused on what it meant to be a human being from a phenomenological point of view rather than what it meant to be a human being from the biological point of view. It's also influenced by the cultural situation at the time - the world was forever changed and unstable and nobody really know what the fuck was going on or where we were going as a species or even who they were as a person.

From the biological point of view, humans are a type of organism. Normal specimens have two arms, two legs, genitals, a large head, various organs, etc. They are born in a rather gross manner, grow up in around twenty years time, and do various things before they die at ~75 years of age.

But from the phenomenological point of view, a human (or a self), isn't really anything essentially, and the self has to battle against itself when it recognizes the nothingness in which it seems to arise. In this case, there is no essential part of the self that the self can recognize and see as a suitable justification for its own existence. Without God, there is no higher, transcendental power to devote oneself to. And worldly-affairs are imperfect machinations. So a human being is quite literally thrown into the world and finds himself wondering where he is, where he is going, and who he is as a person. He exists, but has no essential properties that he can depend on.

We are embodied (born) with some essential features, which will unfold if we are lucky. If we are unlucky we'll die in the cradle and that will be that. If we grow up and mature, our existence becomes our essence. Existence precedes essence. No existence, no essence.

The details of our existence -- our bodies, our experiences, our nurture, our nature (genetic endowment), our parents, our peers, our teachers, our fortunes and misfortunes, become our essence. Nature and nurture combine to simultaneously make us so alike that we can perceive a "human essence", but at the same time so different that we can't miss our individuality.

Is 'essence' individual or group? Is essence a pool into which we all are submerged? Or is one person's essence unlike all others?

If DNA constitutes 'essence', then the idea is obviously mistaken.

Big 'if', though.

The argument from Aristotle is that all objects are particulars. Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else. When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is. Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence. If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory.

You have to exist first before you put on parfum (essence).

A copper nugget (a natural lump of unalloyed metal) can be hammered into any number of shapes. Is the particular the nugget, the nail, or the knife that is the hammered out nugget?

Molten metal (man-made) can be cast then rolled, hammered, annealed, beaten, cut, etc. What is the essence of a railroad spike? It's spikiness, or it's iron bar form, or it's molten metal form, or maybe its un-smelted ore form? Is the essence of iron a generality that can be transformed into any particularity one wants? If you melt the spike and make a cup out of it, which essence does it have?

Doesn't transformation present a problem for determining 'essence' of some kinds of objects? What is the essence of a river (which we never step into the same one twice)?

I want to find a reasonable critique of Sartre's: ''Existence precedes essence.''

Why is the statement wrong? And could it be proven wrong without using religion?

I think what causes an issue is the 'mutual exclusivity' of essences. if something has the essence of 'human' it can't have any other sort of essence. The issue is that the same object can be seen to have different essences. An object that's seen as a 'tree stub' is a 'barrier' in a war zone; an object seen as a 'knife' is a 'screwdriver' when there's no screwdriver in the house; an object seen as a 'mug' is a 'cereal bowl' when all the other cereal bowls are in the dishwasher. So, essence seems context-specific and dependent on the kinds of activities/functions one takes the object as capable of performing. So essence doesn't seem to be intrinsic to the physical structure 'housing' the essence. -If that makes sense.

Maybe you can provide an alternative by, first, getting rid of that 'exclusivity' clause. And conceive of essence as something hierarchial or multi-oriented? Hierarchical: for some object to have the essence of 'human' it must have the essence of 'animal', for it to have the essence of 'animal' it must have the essence of 'organism', for something to have the essence of 'organism' it must have the essence of 'living'... all the way up to 'object'. And an object can instantiate any 'essence' that shares some properties with the set of 'essences' that it's initially understood as instantiating. So.. tree-stubs can be seen as 'barriers' because both 'barriers' and 'tree-stubs' share some set of properties in common. Multi-oriented: Objects can have 'multiple' essences -- essence can be instantiated so long as the physical structure has the capacity to perform the functions characteristic of that essence.


In both cases - neither precedes the other. Existence and essence are always found together -- for something to exist it must have an essence. For something to have an essence it must exist.

Yes it does, and Sartre summed up why adequately enough...

There's a problem with this argument.

"All objects are particulars."

I agree with that.

"Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else."

I agree with that.

"When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is."

I agree with that, too.

"Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence."

I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place.

"If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory."

This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with).

I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's how I define "essence", basically as what the object is. It is the traditional way, from Aristotle. Each object has it's own particular properties, and this is its essence, referring to exactly what it is. In a different way, we use "essence" as the essential properties of an object, for classification. So in abstraction we separate essential from accidental properties to produce the essence of "a book" for example. But any particular book, to be the book that it is, it is necessary that all its properties are essential, this is the essence of that particular book.

I am not saying that the object exists as what it is, prior to its own existence, I am saying that its essence exists prior to its existence. So the argument is that the something which the object will be, and this is its form or essence, must be prior to the thing itself. It's a simple principle, well adopted by determinism, what the object will be when it comes into existence is predetermined. But we can ditch the determinism when we give reality to this form or essence which must precede the object, and analyze the existence of this pre-existent form.

This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with). — Terrapin Station

I think that what is the case here, is that you disagree with the idea of separate forms. Because of this you deny the argument which demonstrates the necessity to assume separate forms. You will probably continue in your refusal to understand the argument because it proves wrong, what you currently believe.

I am not saying that the object exists as what it is, prior to its own existence, I am saying that its essence exists prior to its existence. So the argument is that the something which the object will be, and this is its form or essence, must be prior to the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, that's just a claim--it's not really an argument. Aside from that, it's contradictory. If essence is "what an object is," then it's contradictory to say that "what an object is" obtains prior to the object existing. An object has to be--that's what "is" refers to, for it to be what it is. An object can't be something prior to that object coming to be. That would be the case just as well under strong determininsm. "What object x is prior to object x existing" is simply incoherent nonsense.

But we can ditch the determinism when we give reality to this form or essence which must precede the object — Metaphysician Undercover

No you can't. At least not if what essence is is what the object is.

I think that what is the case here, is that you disagree with the idea of separate forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

What would be the motivation for positing additional subsistents (or whatever you want to call them), one per particular, that existents then fulfill by existing? In other words, why in the world would anyone believe that?

First, that's just a claim--it's not really an argument. — Terrapin Station

Sure, all definitions are claims, you have to start somewhere with your argument, it's called a premise. If you don't like what I refer to as the essence of a particular thing, then don't accept it. That's fine, we don't really have anything to discuss here then.

If essence is "what an object is," then it's contradictory to say that "what an object is" obtains prior to the object existing. — Terrapin Station

No, that's not true at all. There's a difference between an object's essence and an object's existence. This difference allows us to talk about non-existent things. We refer to what that thing is, without the thing existing. So if I'm planning to build a house, I can talk about that house even though it doesn't exist. You are just attempting to make syntactical difficulty by not respecting tense, in the sense of "what will be".

An object can't be something prior to that object coming to be. That would be the case just as well under strong determininsm. — Terrapin Station

That's right, an object can't be anything prior to coming to be. That's not what we're discussing. What we're discussing is the essence of that object. The essence of the object is known to be separable from the object itself, that's what we do in abstraction, separate the essence from the existence of the object. Since we know that the essence of the object is separable through abstraction, there is nothing inconsistent, nonsensical, or incoherent, about the proposition that the essence of the object has existence separate from the object prior to the object's existence.

"What object x is prior to object x existing" is simply incoherent nonsense. — Terrapin Station

It isn't what "object x is prior to object x existing", it is what object x will be. You're just making a misrepresentation so that you can say that it's nonsense. But clearly it's not nonsense to speak about the house I will be building, before it's built. if you don't have respect for the fact that we can speak about an object prior to that object's existence, then we clearly have nothing more to discuss.

What would be the motivation for positing additional subsistents (or whatever you want to call them), one per particular, that existents then fulfill by existing? In other words, why in the world would anyone believe that? — Terrapin Station

I think it's quite obvious to anyone with formal training in philosophy, that we understand things by understanding the form, or essence of the thing, what the thing is. That's what comes to the mind as a visual image, a form of the object. If there wasn't something particular about each thing, its essence, which we could abstract, and hold within our minds, how would we ever individuate between one object and another?

That's right, an object can't be anything prior to coming to be. That's not what we're discussing. What we're discussing is the essence of that object. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there's an object with an essence, than the object is something (an object with an essence).

Since we know that the essence of the object is separable through abstraction, there is nothing inconsistent, nonsensical, or incoherent, about the proposition that the essence of the object has existence separate from the object prior to the object's existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I still suggest that using the term "existence" in these two different senses is counterproductive. I would say, instead, that the essence of the object has being separate from the object prior to the object's existence--i.e., esse in futuro. This also avoids the objection that the essence of the object must itself be an (existing) object; the mode of its (real) being is not actual, it is potential.

Of course, for someone who denies the reality of abstractions, this particular argument will carry no weight anyway.

If there's an object with an essence, than the object is something (an object with an essence). — Terrapin Station

Yes, all objects have an essence. That's what makes any particular object intelligible to us, its essence. And each particular object has a particular essence, which makes it the particular object which it is. The argument is meant to demonstrate that the essence of the object necessarily precedes the existence of the object.

I still suggest that using the term "existence" in these two different senses is counterproductive. I would say, instead, that the essence of the object has being separate from the object prior to the object's existence--i.e., esse in futuro. This also avoids the objection that the essence of the object must itself be an (existing) object; the mode of its (real) being is not actual, it is potential. — aletheist

I agree that it may be confusing to some, to conceive of two distinct categories of "existence", but I don't see how using "being" instead of "existence" helps. In fact, the ancient Greeks contrasted being with not being. Then there was "becoming", and becoming was excluded from reality by logic and the law of excluded middle. This gave great fuel to sophistry. So Aristotle allowed for exceptions to the law of excluded middle, such that becoming could be allowed entrance into logical reality. In Latin, "existence" became the more general term, such that being and becoming are different modes of existence, just like actual and potential, and this allows that there are existents which are immaterial as well as existents which are material.

So I think that the move to insert "being" instead of "existence" is a step in the wrong direction due to the fact that being is often opposed to non-being. Then becoming is of a different category from being, and this is a category which does not consist of opposing terms. If we have being and non-being, as well as existence and non-existence, and also becoming, then it all gets more complicated than necessary..

Yes, all objects have an essence. That's what makes any particular object intelligible to us, its essence. And each particular object has a particular essence, which makes it the particular object which it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, so it is something at that point--an object with an essence. So when you say "an object can't be anything prior to coming to be" that means that it can't be an object with an essence prior to it coming to be. Again "is something" is the same thing, in conventional English, as "being something."

Yes, now do you see the point? An object is always an object with an essence, so the essence is separable from the object. Now go back to the argument, where you originally engaged me, to see why it is necessary to conclude that the object's essence exists prior to the object itself.

Yes, now do you see the point? An object is always an object with an essence, so the essence is separable from the object. Now go back to the argument, where you originally engaged me, to see why it is necessary to conclude that the object's essence exists prior to the object itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

??? I was explaining in slightly different words why the idea you're suggesting is a logical contradiction.

Well you sure haven't succeeded. Where's the contradiction? You clearly refer to "an object with an essence". Do you, or do you not agree that the essence of the object is something other than the object itself?

What is an essence?

What is an essence? — Banno

The properties that make a thing a certain something. What is the essence of an electron?

Mass, charge, spin, and whatever else distinguishes electrons from other particles.

What makes a cat different from a dog?

Biological species are less exact, but the genetic and phenotypic properties of a feline that are unique. The big difference between an electron and an animal species is that the first might not be made of simpler parts, while the second is made of many simplers. But that still results in unique properties such that we can classify animals.

Thanks, March.

So you are saying they are what we use to group things into sets or classes?

I suppose so.

You know, the funny thing is that it never didn't? What is the nature of a thing? To the ancient Greek, the nature of a thing is what it is upon completion, or when it has fully matured. So, the idea that it is good to follow nature, which is to say, to attain the maximal potential of the thing it is. This ties into the notion of phenomena, and noumena. The ideal is the thing which things are approximating, their perfect form, their true natures.

So, you can see that the essence of a thing, or its nature is only realized at the end of a process of becoming. It was never otherwise.

It's similar to the measurement problem. I'm not sure there's any proof this way or that. There's lots of biases to go around. You're no one unless you have a bias. You are your bias. :)

Where's the contradiction? — Metaphysician Undercover

The contradiction is in:

(1) That is an object with an essence

&

(2) The object hasn't come to be yet.

(1) is the object being something--an object with an essence. So (2) contradicts (1).

Do you, or do you not agree that the essence of the object is something other than the object itself? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm an anti-realist on essences. Essences are merely a way we think about objects--basically they're our conceptual abstractions, our universals/type categories. So yeah, that's different than an object itself, since objects themselves have no essences.