the instrument which grasps relationships — Wayfarer

I would be inclined to go even further, and offer that the rational mind grasps relationships because such relationships are merely the product of its efforts. The rational mind always reasons to a conclusion from that which antecedes, that standing as the simplest and most complete form of relationship.

But then, inclinations are a dime a dozen, so.....

I would be inclined to go even further, and offer that the rational mind grasps relationships because such relationships are merely the product of its efforts — Mww

How are a priori truths the product of the mind? If they were produced, they would be a posteriori as a matter of definition. Instead, they’re recognised.

How are a priori truths the product of the mind? If they were produced, they would be a posteriori as a matter of definition. — Wayfarer

Production of a truth, which must always be in accordance with principles, is necessarily a priori; the production of the proof of a truth, which must always be in accordance with empirical conditions alone, is a posteriori.

But that begs the question of where order arises in the first place. It's natural to assume that the mind is the product of the high degree of material organisation which has developed over the course of evolutionary history. But what is the source of order? Without there being order, then nothing complex, or actually nothing whatever, could have arisen in the first place. That is not a question I presume to have an answer to, but it is one of the basic questions of metaphysics nonetheless. Even big bang theory itself can't account for the order of nature; and I don't want to argue on that account for any kind of natural theology, other than to make the observation. — Wayfarer

What I thought I explained, in the rest of that post, is that the order must come from within, in the sense of immanent within the material existence. This is bottom up causation, rather than top down. Top down doesn't work, because it requires something surrounding the object, or being, acting from the external, inward, and this is inconsistent with empirical observations, which show us that as we divide (reduce) the object, or being, to its most fundamental constituents, the acting force which accounts for its existence as a whole, is always within. So reduction is the proper way to go, but when we get to the most fundamental "particle of matter", or "primary being", we find that the immaterial is necessarily prior to this, as necessary to account for the existence of that most fundamental material thing. So, when that fundamental material body, or object, comes into existence, it is already "designed" to behave in a specific way, and this is inherent, intrinsic to that thing itself, as property of it.

In the case of a living being, the immaterial "soul" is already intrinsic within the most simple living body. That simple body could not come into existence as the specific body which it is, unless the parts are ordered to exist in that way, and the ordering must come from within each part itself, such that the part is ordered to be a part of a whole. Therefore the ordering comes from within the whole, and anything which we can apprehend as a thing, body, or object, is a whole, and it must have an inherent immaterial ordering which is prior in time to it, accounting for its existence as the whole which it is. The immaterial ordering is necessarily within the whole, as the attributes of each of the internal parts of that whole.

The idea of a fundamental material whole, which has no parts (prime matter), has been demonstrated by Aristotle to be illogical. And this "prime matter", as the fundamental building block, the "atom" in ancient science, is the grounding for top down causation. What is assumed is that there are fundamental, indivisible particles of "matter", which are acted upon by external forces, to produce structures. But this is the mistaken presupposition of materialism, which Aristotle demonstrates is untenable. So, we must turn this around, and apprehend the causation required to produce a whole, an object, or body, as coming from within the whole, thereby creating the parts required for the whole, from within. Therefore a true whole always consists of parts, and any apparent indivisibility of a whole is a function of the divider's inability to divide, not an inherent feature of the whole. So a part cannot itself be truthfully represented as a whole. Materialist reduction fails in its representation of parts as wholes.

I'm sorry, that looks like a word salad. For a first step, can you give me maybe an example of a non actual perception of something? My understanding has always been that the whole business of speaking of phenomena and perceptions is to bracket off 'actuality' as something problematic. As in an oasis-perception that might be of an actual oasis or of a mirage, but is always an 'actual' perception that is separate from the oasis in the sense that there might not be an oasis. A 'phenomenological state' is also problematic, but in a more vague way ... a state of phenomena? A state that consists of phenomena - — unenlightened

I'd submit that I've not presented a word salad, but that you're simply requesting a better definition of the word "actual" as I've used it, perhaps suggesting it was superfluous within the sentence. Your example of a mirage presents a question not of whether a phenomenological state is actual, but whether a physical state is actual, as opposed to imagined. So, yes, all phenomenological states are actual in that the exist in some capacity, regardless of whether there is a corresponding physical entity causing the mental state.

If you are experiencing a duck, you are in the phenomenological state of having that experience. That's how I use the term. I just use the term to describe the experience your are having while you're having it.

You see, when I get my ducks in a row, or my pawns if you like, I don't have to talk about phenomena or perceptions or brains, I don't see these things, I see a row of ducks. I think you are confusing yourself with all this terminology - you're certainly confusing me. I say my seeing a duck involves me and a duck. — unenlightened

Sure, and when I talk about ducks, I don't talk about their molecular construction or their cellular structure, or whether the color of the duck is something my brain imposes on the duck, or whether it has other inherent qualities, nor do I discuss what is matter, unless the conversation somehow deals with that, and then I do.

This is also a very confusing thing to suggest. I thought that was where the pawns were. A row of squares and a row of pawns - eight pawns in a row, not eight pawns and a row

The row is not located because it is the location - of the pawns. Why do philosophers do this shit all the time - whenever the cat is on the mat, some philosopher will get all agitated looking for 'on'. How can the cat be on the mat unless there is an on? Where is it? — unenlightened

I don't know the limits of this holism you're presenting. If the entity we're speaking of is "eight pawns in a row," such that we cannot say there is a definable separately existing row, then I'm not following how we can say there are separately existing pawns either, as the "pawn" is simply a description of the arrangement of the molecules. Where is the row? It's nowhere because it's an arrangement. Where is the pawn? It's nowhere because it's an arrangement. Where are the eight pawns in a row? It's nowhere because it's an arrangement. Have I missed something?

Downward causation doesn't necessarily act in the same way as upwards in any case. I think, in classical philosophy, the idea of a final cause, 'that towards which a thing tends', is not 'causal' in the material or efficient sense. It's the reason for something to exist in the sense of the purpose it intends. IN that sense, fire is the cause of the match, in that matches are only made in order to generate fire; but from the perspective of efficient causes, then matches obviously cause fire. — Wayfarer

Intentions aren't always realized. What one intends does not always come to fruition, so a final cause, or an effect in the future is not the cause of the present behavior. What one intends exists in the present and drives behavior forward in time. What one intends is not in the future pulling the behavior forward towards it. Intentions are simply ideas in the present about a possible future, not a given future.

I can intend to become Superman, but if there is no Harry Hindu Superman final cause in the future, then my cause, or intent is in the present driving me forward to a final cause that doesn't exist, except in my mind in the present.

Chess can be realised physically, but it is not itself physical. It’s a set of rules which can be represented by many different physical forms - but change one rule, and it’s no longer chess. And chess can be played with no pieces whatever; I read once that the Arabs used to play chess without boards whilst crossing the desert on camels, although I can't imagine ever pulling off such a feat myself. — Wayfarer

It's neither physical or non-physical. The "non-physical" rules apply to moving "physical" pieces on a "physical" board. It would have been impossible for a human being to realize chess without some kind of interaction with the world. "Physical" and "non-physical" become incoherent in a reality where mind and world interact causally.

If the mind is causally connected with the rest of the world that does practice some form of conservation, then why wouldnt the mind? Thinking is hard work. Responding without thinking is easier. — Harry Hindu

The two are different categories.

Conservation is a temporal invariance in the first place.

Where does seeing your food go after supper?
The experience thereof came and went, the occurrence started and ended, was interruptible.
Temporal and process-like.

The conservation of the food isn't interruptible, and the food persisted throughout your experiences thereof, much like body persists sufficiently (structurally) throughout mind.
Spatial and object-like (left to right, top to bottom, front to back; we eat food, not experiences thereof).

I guess it's all interrelated in whatever ways, and the synthesis is where we might infer that, say, your mind depends on your body.

The two are different categories.

Conservation is a temporal invariance in the first place.

Where does seeing your food go after supper?
The experience thereof came and went, the occurrence started and ended, was interruptible.
Temporal and process-like.

The conservation of the food isn't interruptible, and the food persisted throughout your experiences thereof, much like body persists sufficiently (structurally) throughout mind.
Spatial and object-like (left to right, top to bottom, front to back; we eat food, not experiences thereof).

I guess it's all interrelated in whatever ways, and the synthesis is where we might infer that, say, your mind depends on your body. — jorndoe

Are you asking where the actual food went after supper, or where your experience of the food went after supper? Your experience of seeing food left the same time the actual food left. So it seems to me that they are both (the thought of eating food and the actual eating the food) come and go at the same time, or else you would be hallucinating when there isn't any actual food. But your thoughts come and go just like eaten food.

The arrangement of ducks is a physical thing to the extent we are discussing the ducks' location. Location in space and time is part of what it means to be physical. The white pawns on a chess board are in the starting position a2, b2, c2... h2 (if you're familiar with chess notation). The row is located at a2 through h2. Their location in space and their relationship to one another strikes me as a physical attribute no different from other physical attributes. The duck similarly is a duck because its molecules are ordered in such a way as to make it a duck. The duck, according to you, is a thing and it's in the lake, despite the fact that the duck is nothing more than an arrangement of molecules. But I ask: how do you draw a distinction between ducks and rows in terms of the former being a thing and the other being an arrangement? Under analysis, it appears that if rows are simply non-thing/arrangements, then ducks would be that as well, considering the word "duck" simply describes how certain molecules are arranged in relation to other ones.

A phenomenological state, on the other hand, is an actual perception of something that is separate from the duck and it's separate from the brain. It's not just a row inside the brain, but if it is, show me where it is. Why can you point to rows and ducks but not phenomenological states if they are just different examples of the same thing? — Hanover

The way I see it, a duck is more than an arrangement of molecules: it’s an arrangement of temporal relations between molecular, chemical and atomic relations. A ‘row of ducks’ is an arrangement of value/potential relations between temporal arrangements. When we point to a row of ducks, we’re pointing to a physical manifestation of these value/potential relations, or a collapse of potential information. And when we physically move three ducks into a row, the value/potential we perceive in our own temporal arrangement relates to the value/potential we perceive in these three temporal arrangements to manifest an event which results in an observable row.

I don't know the limits of this holism you're presenting. If the entity we're speaking of is "eight pawns in a row," such that we cannot say there is a definable separately existing row, then I'm not following how we can say there are separately existing pawns either, as the "pawn" is simply a description of the arrangement of the molecules. — Hanover

Yes, if you want, you can talk about a pawn of molecules, a molecule of atoms, an atom of quarks. Take the holism or the atomism as far as you like according to convenience. What I seek to forbid is talk of a definably separately existent pawn in addition to, or district from, the molecules. Likewise with rows. the pawn is where the atoms are located and how they are arranged. It really isn't that onerous a stipulation, you just have to keep tabs on where the abstractions are abstracted from and put them back where they belong. As in physics class, you have to state your units, and not mix them up. If we are saying pawns are for this purpose the units of existence, then we can talk about lines or diamonds or whatever pattern of pawns, or we can have a different conversation about ducks and pawns of molecules. But don't have the both kinds of talk at once.

So we'll go with molecules as being our unit. All molecules have mass and occupy space. Is "arrangement" as you use the term simply the location descriptor of the molecule? Since my unit is molecules, do I tell you I have a particular group of molecules with mass X in the form of a pawn located at e4 should I want to describe what is going on on my chessboard? It would seem my description of "in the form of a pawn" is reducible to a variety of geometric spatial measurements. That is, they are just descriptions of location.

If "arrangement" is just a way of describing location, how does that respond to the question of this thread, which is to determine what are immaterial minds? The fact that we cannot describe matter without reference to spatial coordinates is a definitional truth, but I don't see how we can then say that somehow explains how my brain makes me conscious of external events.

I agree that it's incoherent to speak of matter without reference to it being in space and it having location, but what you seem to be urging here (if I'm following) is that since location cannot be defined without reference to some physical object, that location itself is an emergent property of matter. And since we've now identified this particular emergent property, we can now bootstrap a more complex emergence theory as it pertains to phenomenological states and say they arise from brain states.

Is this a correct understanding?

If it is, my objection is as noted, which is that location isn't as much an emergent property as it is definitional because, among other things, it is not possible to even conceive of an object occurring in the absence of location.