Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

The apparent absence of aliens is pretty good justification.

The apparent absence of aliens is pretty good justification.

There are other explanations for that. For the rare earth hypothesis to work, life like us would have to be vanishingly rare. That requires an extreme violation of the mediocrity principle.

I think there's a better explanation: we're in a simulation, and they're saving computing power. It's just us. There's no other plausible explanation for why every galaxy, including our own, looks absolutely pristine and totally untouched.

I think there's a better explanation: we're in a simulation, and they're saving computing power. It's just us. There's no other plausible explanation for why every galaxy, including our own, looks absolutely pristine and totally untouched. — RogueAI

That’s an interesting analogy. It relates in a way to this understanding that the energy of the universe is finite, and yet objective potentiality is supposedly unlimited. Also to the two main postulates of Quantum Mechanics in relation to Information Theory (as described by Carlo Rovelli): that the relevant information in any physical system is finite; but you can always obtain new information on a physical system.

I think it’s a fair observation that the universe isn’t formulated with this mediocrity principle in mind. Likelihood or probability is not a deciding factor in any of the major leaps in intelligence or awareness in the universe. But in relation to the rare earth hypothesis, as uncle Ben supposedly says: ‘with great power comes great responsibility’. So ‘special’ is a relative term.

If the rare earth hypothesis is correct, it means that intelligent life like us is extremely rare. If that's true, we inhabit a very special place in this universe. Since out current sample size of "intelligent life like us" is 1, we have no reason to assume we're in such a special place. The mediocrity principle implies that we should regard our habitable situation as "average". The rare earth hypothesis violates that. It claims our habitable conditions are/were exceptionally NOT average. Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

Our habitable conditions may be "average" in some sense, but certainly not with respect to their habitability! Your framing of the problem is absurd: we are not dropped into a random spot in the universe, or else we would have found ourselves floating in empty space.

Our habitable conditions may be "average" in some sense, but certainly not with respect to their habitability! Your framing of the problem is absurd: we are not dropped into a random spot in the universe, or else we would have found ourselves floating in empty space.

The habitable conditions here aren't "average" in any sense. If they were, the universe would be teeming with advanced intelligent life. Either the conditions here are/were extremely fantastically rare for intelligent, or there's some other explanation.

You're right when you point out we weren't dropped into some random spots. With all these planets around, we shouldn't be too surprised if it turns out advanced life is really rare and we happened to find ourselves in one of the few spots (anthropic principle).

The problem with the rare-earth hypothesis is that it has to compete with other hypotheses, and it seems more likely to me that instead of assuming we inhabit some very special place, we should assume there's nothing special about us at all. We're one of countless simulations, and the designers just didn't want to bother with anyone except us in this universe.

The mediocrity principle implies that we should regard our habitable situation as "average". The rare earth hypothesis violates that. It claims our habitable conditions are/were exceptionally NOT average. Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

The rarity of our own conditions for being is a self-sorting problem. For these kinds of problems, the mediocrity or Copernican principle causes seemingly absurd conclusions, see the doomsday argument for another example.

Whenever you are using your own existence as the input data for a statistical analysis, you have to consider the anthropic principle as well: no matter how rare the earth is, you can only ask the question once it exists.

The mediocrity principle implies that we should regard our habitable situation as "average". The rare earth hypothesis violates that. It claims our habitable conditions are/were exceptionally NOT average. Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

The justification is in multiplying the probabilities which lead to a technological civilization. You start off with some percentage for habitable planets, factor in some probability of life emerging, then the likelihood of that world being stable enough for life to stick around, then the advent of multicellular life, and finally some form of life that can create sophisticated tech.

On Earth, there's only been one species in 3.5 billion years which matches that. We also have a rather large moon that keeps the Earth from wobbling too much and generates larger tides, which may have played a role. And we have a Jupiter size planet farther out in the solar system which attracts or deflects a lot of large comets and meteors. Also, we don't live too close to the galactic core or a star about to go supernova.

There's a lot of factors that go into us or any complex, idiosyncratic species evolving. And consider one other thing. The principle of mediocrity doesn't change the fact that your birth was a very low probability event. If any one of a trillion things went differently, you probably wouldn't be here. But here you are instead of the countless other humans who could have existed.

The justification is in multiplying the probabilities which lead to a technological civilization. You start off with some percentage for habitable planets, factor in some probability of life emerging, then the likelihood of that world being stable enough for life to stick around, then the advent of multicellular life, and finally some form of life that can create sophisticated tech.

On Earth, there's only been one species in 3.5 billion years which matches that. We also have a rather large moon that keeps the Earth from wobbling too much and generates larger tides, which may have played a role. And we have a Jupiter size planet farther out in the solar system which attracts or deflects a lot of large comets and meteors. Also, we don't live too close to the galactic core or a star about to go supernova.

There's a lot of factors that go into us or any complex, idiosyncratic species evolving. And consider one other thing. The principle of mediocrity doesn't change the fact that your birth was a very low probability event. If any one of a trillion things went differently, you probably wouldn't be here. But here you are instead of the countless other humans who could have existed.

Yes, the odds of this particular me existing are very remote. Everything had to work out right. But this particular me is pretty "average" and "mediocre", so there's a false equivalence there.

Like I said before, Rare Earth Hypothesis is fine, except for the fact it has to compete with other plausible hypotheses. If Rare Earth hypothesis stipulates that advanced intelligence is the product of countless events that have to go just right, the "specialness" problem still remains: why should we believe the conditions that made us possible are so atypical? This is a problem because there's a competing theory that doesn't violate the mediocrity principle and still answers the Fermi Paradox: this is all a simulation. Why shouldn't that be the preferred solution to the Fermi Paradox? It makes far less assumptions.

You seem to agree that we must of necessity occupy some very special place in the universe (a habitable place in a universe that is nearly everywhere uninhabitable), but then plow on with your pet theory anyway. But if we were living in a simulation, what would that have changed? In the simulated universe (even if it is only a small, generic chunk of it that is being simulated) we would be just as lonely. And the Rare Earth hypothesis would have the exact same status in a simulated universe as in a real one, because of course what is true of an actual thing must also be true of its simulation.

The debate around Rare Earth hypothesis has nothing to do with us being "special" (whatever that means) - it is simply about how common inhabitable planets are in the universe, which is an empirical, scientific question (even if we are not in a good position to answer it now or possibly ever).

You seem to agree that we must of necessity occupy some very special place in the universe (a habitable place in a universe that is nearly everywhere uninhabitable), but then plow on with your pet theory anyway. But if we were living in a simulation, what would that have changed? In the simulated universe (even if it is only a small, generic chunk of it that is being simulated) we would be just as lonely. And the Rare Earth hypothesis would have the exact same status in a simulated universe as in a real one, because of course what is true of an actual thing must also be true of its simulation.

The debate around Rare Earth hypothesis has nothing to do with us being "special" (whatever that means) - it is simply about how common inhabitable planets are in the universe, which is an empirical, scientific question (even if we are not in a good position to answer it now or possibly ever).

The Rare Earth hypothesis doesn't have to do with US being special, it has to do with the conditions and/or planet that made us possible being special. We're just intelligent ape-like creatures. But Rare Earth asserts the conditions that made us possible are VERY special. So special, it only happens maybe once in a galaxy of 100 billion stars.

So the question is: why should we believe we're the product of a fantastic lottery when there's a much more pedestrian explanation of things?

So the question is: why should we believe we're the product of a fantastic lottery when there's a much more pedestrian explanation of things? — RogueAI

Well for one, the "explanation" isn't really one. It's just a convenient way to bypass the question. It's like a god of the gaps.

For another, a hypothesis involving a simulation is not simpler, because we have to add a complexity penalty for assuming multiple levels of "reality".

Lastly, it doesn't solve the mediocrity issue since we'd still have to ask why this specific simulation is being run. For example, the designers could just as easily simulate evidence of aliens as they simulate the absence of it.

Well for one, the "explanation" isn't really one. It's just a convenient way to bypass the question. It's like a god of the gaps.

No, it's an explanation:
Why do we see no aliens or evidence of them?
There aren't any. We're in a simulation. It would take too much computing power.

You might not agree with it, but that IS an explanation to the Fermi Paradox. It begs other questions, but so does any explanation.

For another, a hypothesis involving a simulation is not simpler, because we have to add a complexity penalty for assuming multiple levels of "reality".

Except we're already doing simulations, and it seems likely they're only going to get better and better. I don't think there's a violation of multiplying entities (simulated worlds/layers of reality) because those simulated realities/worlds already exist, albeit in a crude form. Simulation theory is plausible. It's even likely, if you buy Nick Bostrom's argument.

The idea that Earth is a very special place (so special life like us only comes along once in a galaxy or so) doesn't seem plausible. Those are really long odds. There aren't similar long odds in the simulation theory.

Lastly, it doesn't solve the mediocrity issue since we'd still have to ask why this specific simulation is being run. For example, the designers could just as easily simulate evidence of aliens as they simulate the absence of it.

It doesn't violate the mediocrity issue, that's the point. Simulation theory doesn't assume any specialness. Quite the opposite: we're one of countless simulations being run. There are plausible reasons why simulation designers would want to save on computing power.

Why do we see no aliens or evidence of them?
There aren't any. We're in a simulation. It would take too much computing power. — RogueAI

What's the predictive value? "God did it" is an explanation in the colloquial sense of the word. But it has no predictive value, so it's not an explanation in a strict sense.

The same is true for any kind of simulation hypothesis. It explains every possible observation, and thus explains none of them. It's not clear, for example, why one configuration of universe would be easier to simulate than another. You don't need to actually simulate the minds of alien civilizations to make it look like they are there.

Except we're already doing simulations, and it seems likely they're only going to get better and better. I don't think there's a violation of multiplying entities (simulated worlds/layers of reality) because those simulated realities/worlds already exist, albeit in a crude form. Simulation theory is plausible. It's even likely, if you buy Nick Bostrom's argument. — RogueAI

We're not doing anything close to simulating human intelligences. But the source of the complexity is that we either need to assume the simulation designers are (were) human, live in a galaxy with a large number of alien civilizations, and run ancestor simulations. Or we need to assume we are the random product of some entirely alien species. Both sets of assumptions are complex.

The idea that Earth is a very special place (so special life like us only comes along once in a galaxy or so) doesn't seem plausible. Those are really long odds. There aren't similar long odds in the simulation theory. — RogueAI

But despite the mediocrity principle, single rare events do happen, so I am not sure how you conclude it's "long odds".

It doesn't violate the mediocrity issue, that's the point. Simulation theory doesn't assume any specialness. Quite the opposite: we're one of countless simulations being run. There are plausible reasons why simulation designers would want to save on computing power. — RogueAI

But doesn't this contradict itself? I'd the designers want to save computing power so badly that they need to save the relatively tiny extra power required to simulate aliens, why are they running so many simulations? Are they running all their simulations without aliens? Wouldn't that defeat the purpose of running all these?

We're just intelligent ape-like creatures. — RogueAI

I'm interested in the supporting dogmas for this assertion.

If the rare earth hypothesis is correct, it means that intelligent life like us is extremely rare. If that's true, we inhabit a very special place in this universe. Since out current sample size of "intelligent life like us" is 1, we have no reason to assume we're in such a special place. The mediocrity principle implies that we should regard our habitable situation as "average". The rare earth hypothesis violates that. It claims our habitable conditions are/were exceptionally NOT average. Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

There is no violation of the principle.

We are exceptional in our local neighborhood (compared to Mars, Venus ... and perhaps the entire galaxy), but this represents an "average density" in the wider universe.

The rare earth hypothesis is simply postulating the density of life, more specifically technological life, through space and time is so low that it's unlikely any two civilizations ever meet. Rare earth hypothesis generally goes hand-in-hand with supposing faster than light travel is either impossible or then a rarity on-top of rare-earth.

Since the universe is very big (and faster than light travel may indeed be impossible) then if the density of life and technological civilizations is low enough we will simply never encounter them.

In terms of the basic math, an analogy is sampling a single atom from the atmosphere, let's say we sample krypton, if we then keep sampling and don't find any krypton for a while we can suppose it's a rare element. Now, of course it's very unlikely the first single atom we sample from the atmosphere is krypton, far more likely it will be something abundant like nitrogen. So, sampling krypton as a first atom in the atmosphere is indeed a violation of the mediocrity principle and extremely unlikely.

The difference with earth is that we can only sample a planet that is not only livable but has developed life and intelligence and so there's no statistical option to sample an unlivable planet for where we live; that we live on a livable planet does not provide us statistical information on the density of livable planets, only epistemological information that livable planets are possible and at least one exists.

The statistics come in when we start considering other planets and don't find much evidence of life much less technological civilizations elsewhere. If the density of life and technological civilizations is low enough then this solves the problem: if we suppose we live in an average case of a technological civilization density of 1 part per billions of spherical light-years, then we shouldn't expect to encounter other civilizations. Since the known universe is 70 billion light years of space and may go on for many hundreds, thousands, billions of billions, or infinite of light years more, then even with a low probability density of life and technological civilizations emerging there is zero statistical problem that they do emerge, and we happen to be one of them.

The exceptional hypothesis in contradiction with the mediocrity principle is the supposition that we are the single technological civilization in the entire universe; but there is no violation with the supposition that the density is so low we don't encounter others.

The problem with a high density of technological civilizations is that once encounters with other civilizations is probable it's basically impossible to avoid fine-tuning the density to some sweet spot where we see no evidence. If other civilizations are likely in the galaxy then it's difficult to craft a scenario where technology isn't simply all over the place by now and unavoidable (galactic radio beacons playing broadcasting some civilizations Mozart for hundreds of millions of years already, not to mention galactic wars, large scale experiments, signature of powerful ships going all over the place etc.); just basic extrapolations of our activity so far on a galactic scale, and so we are likely forced to conclude in such a scenario that we are an exception and not a mediocre example of how a civilization behaves (that all other civilizations keep quiet, don't get out much, or then all agree to keep us in quarantine, etc.).

A materialist explains life as a consequence of a string of random events - and we don't really know what they are. Why should we expect life to be common? Further, given life - why think INTELLIGENT life is common? Humans evolved through a series of accidents - we were not inevitable.

On the other hand, theism entails teleology: that the universe was designed to produce life. If life were common, especially intelligent life, that would be more consistent with teleology and theism.