Mathematical objects do not have isomorphism either, for each is it own particular concept. 2+2=4 is not the same as another, different concept of 2+2=4. One mathematical rule is not another.

There is no such thing as a ToE because it violates what an account or theory of something does. Each description we give of something, whether it a state which exists or an eternal concept, is singular are and unique. A ToE if formed on the false premise we can give an account of something be an entirely different thing. The very point of a description, theory or definition is it accounts for one specific thing. None of these things are everything, so a ToE will always fail.

Completeness, if there is anything approaching it, is only defined in a given a specific account. We can have always have a "complete" account in we may fully describe something as we are aware of it, but this will not be exhaustive of everything because there is always another thing; a different rule, another state, a different concept, not given in this description of a thing we know.

Mathematical objects do not have isomorphism either, for each is it own particular concept. 2+2=4 is not the same as another, different concept of 2+2=4. One mathematical rule is not another. — TheWillowOfDarkness

For example, "2+2=4" is not identical to "two plus two is four" but these expressions are still isomorphic under translation. That is why the equality operator needs to be defined explicitly as to clarify when we will still acknowledge these expressions as being equal. The idea in math is that expressions can only be unique up to isomorphism. In the physical world, however, we assume that objects can be really unique.

By the way, in the formalist view, "2+2=4" is a string, i.e. symbolic language only. it is just a string of symbols. It does not represent anything else than that. Seeking correspondence with the physical universe is not the job of mathematics. It is the prerogative of downstream disciplines, such as science, that will institute empirical formalisms, such as experimental testing, to establish such correspondence.

In mathematics, the symbol "2" and "4" are exclusively Platonic abstractions, i.e. language expressions, that live in their own abstract, Platonic world. The world of natural numbers are a model for arithmetic theory, in a sense that all theorems provable in arithmetic theory are true in the world of natural numbers. Furthermore, the physical universe is not even isomorphic with the Platonic world of natural numbers. From the point of view of mathematics, these two worlds are unrelated.

The very point of a description, theory or definition is it accounts for one specific thing. None of these things are everything, so a ToE will always fail. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The ToE is a completely hypothetical theory to which we do not have access, and of which the physical universe is a model. An existing model, i.e. collection of true sentences, always has a theory, if only the model itself. In terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the ToE is the shortest possible summary of the physical universe as model:

In algorithmic information theory (a subfield of computer science and mathematics), the Kolmogorov complexity of an object, such as a piece of text, is the length of the shortest computer program (in a predetermined programming language) that produces the object as output.

Asserting that the physical universe has no theory of which the representation is shorter than the full details of the physical universe itself, pretty much amounts to claiming that the universe is completely random. This amounts to asserting that any digital representation of the physical universe is an incompressible string.

Because of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, there is no proof possible for this view:

We know that, in the set of all possible strings, most strings are complex in the sense that they cannot be described in any significantly "compressed" way. However, it turns out that the fact that a specific string is complex cannot be formally proven, if the complexity of the string is above a certain threshold. The precise formalization is as follows [...]

Hence, the situation is rather as following.

It is not possible to prove that there exists a ToE, because then you would need to produce a copy of it, which is clearly not available. It is, however, also not possible to prove that there does not exist a ToE, because that assertion would be in violation of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem.

There is no isomorphism within the Platonic realm either, each concept is unique.

The formalisation of 2+2=4 as just symbols is different to the concept of two plus equals four, which is turn different from another concept using the symbols 2+2=4, which is in turn different to a translation of two equals two equals four form one language to another.

I'm not speaking about a correspondence to the physical realm, but rather the distinction and identity of different concepts or meanings within the Platonic realm. One concept is never another, is not doing the same thing as another. I'm talking about the necessary distinctions of the platonic realm, which render isomorphism incoherent.

To assign isomorphism in Platonic realm is to tell a falsehood about the distinctions of the Platonic realm. A ToE is impossible because it cannot cross distinction. Whether in the physical or Platonic realm, any proposed ToE is but one distinction of reality. In being the ToE, as opposed to everything else, it necessarily leaves something out. It always fails to cover of something the distinction which are not it.

Put simply, it does not matter how complex or not a string might be, for in being itself, it is distinct from everything else. The problem isn't given in the particular length or cycles a representation might have or not, it is that the representation is never thing it describes. Full detail is the only description to give, whether we speak of a physical state or something in the Platonic realm. There can be no "shorter strings" of description, derivation form outside concept or formalisms. Any thing, physical or Platonic, can only be given by itself. Our descriptions only give an account of this thing when it describes it.

This does no imply randomness. It is not, for example, make 2+2=4 random. Since it is given by the concept itself, it is the nature of that instance of 2+2=4 to have this particular meaning. The same is true of every instance of two plus two equals four. The same is true of every concept of translation between two symbolic languages.

Whether the definitions of the Platonic realm or instances of measurement of the physical universe, there is a reason are present as such: that what each of them are/do. One was never gong to have a world in which an instance of 2+2=4 meant something else than it does. Same for 2x2m pavers one is using in their backyard. If you've got a 2x2 meter paver, it's was never going to be anything else.

There is no isomorphism within the Platonic realm either, each concept is unique.

The formalisation of 2+2=4 as just symbols is different to the concept of two plus equals four, which is turn different from another concept using the symbols 2+2=4, which is in turn different to a translation of two equals two equals four form one language to another.

I'm not speaking about a correspondence to the physical realm, but rather the distinction and identity of different concepts or meanings within the Platonic realm. One concept is never another, is not doing the same thing as another. I'm talking about the necessary distinctions of the platonic realm, which render isomorphism incoherent.

To assign isomorphism in Platonic realm is to tell a falsehood about the distinctions of the Platonic realm. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You reject a very fundamental notion of the Platonic realm:

The interest of isomorphisms lies in the fact that two isomorphic objects cannot be distinguished by using only the properties used to define morphisms; thus isomorphic objects may be considered the same as long as one considers only these properties and their consequences.

It is probably also a rejection of the very concept of abstraction.

Platonic objects are beliefs expressed in language that arise in an abstract world constructed from basic beliefs. It is a core belief in mathematics that such belief objects can be isomorphic. But then again, there cannot be compulsion in matters of belief. Therefore, you do not need to believe it.

The mathematical way of thinking ultimately always rests on arbitrary, speculative beliefs with no justification possible, as its epistemic domain is staunchly axiomatic. It invariably seeks to strip away (real-world) meaning. In that sense, it is not meaningful either. It does not seek to be necessarily useful either, and it is often probably not. It only seeks to ensure that derived beliefs are provable from basic beliefs. Hence, at best, it is consistent.

A ToE is impossible because it cannot cross distinction. Whether in the physical or Platonic realm, any proposed ToE is but one distinction of reality. In being the ToE, as opposed to everything else, it necessarily leaves something out. It always fails to cover of something the distinction which are not it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If we limit the ToE to a compressed digital version of the physical universe, then Chaitin's incompleteness theorem insists that you cannot exclude that it may exist. Such digital file may not leave out anything that would be considered relevant.

The problem isn't given in the particular length or cycles a representation might have or not, it is that the representation is never thing it describes. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Even though I agree that a map is not the territory, depending on what you use it for, the map may not need to be the territory.

Any thing, physical or Platonic, can only be given by itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but according to the formalist philosophy, a Platonic object is its representation. The number 12 is just the string "12". It is equal to itself up to isomorphism. Platonic objects are language expressions only. In that sense, they are different from physical objects, which can consist of matter, energy, and so on.

Our descriptions only give an account of this thing when it describes it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but what is the description of a description if not the description itself?

(essentially unique up to isomorphism ...)

Mathematics never says what physics should be talking about. — alcontali

I thought of this exchange when I read about this disovery - a mathematical discovery, by physicists, for which approval was sought from Terence Tao, the world-leading mathematician.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/185405289@N06/49026515372/in/dateposted-public/

Based on the illustration you provided above and your opening comments, it sounds like your concern with adherents of religion (at least, those who seem to base their convictions on "faith"), is that their religious faith is ungrounded or irrational; i.e., not based on reason or evidence.

Certainly, an argument as you've demonstrated in the illustration above is circular and unfounded.
However, I would like to submit that this is not the sort of reasoning imbibed by all religious people, and in fact, the dichotomy between the sort of circular reasoning you've outlined above and evidential inference is not primarily between theists and non-theists, spiritualists and naturalists - however you want to delineate the line between those with religious "faith" and those without.

Circular reasoning is not exclusive to people who claim religious faith. Indeed, to illustrate a Christian perspective, the Bible itself lends itself to reasonable and evidential assessment. In other words, a strong case can be made that the Bible does not promote the kind of "leap" of faith that it is commonly stereotyped with.

Before I offer some examples, I will briefly touch on the notion implied by your illustration - that basic belief in God is predicated on "nothing." This stance is questionable, and there are strong philosophical arguments for the epistemological soundness of "warranted belief in God" (see, Alvin Plantinga's, Warranted Christian Belief). However, I will leave this debate aside for the purposes of this post and simply focus on delineating an evidential appeal to the particular faith of Christianity.

Consider the following passages:

1 Peter 3:15: "But in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect"

Luke 24:38-39: "And He said to them, 'Why are you troubled, and why do doubts arise in your hearts?
See My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself; touch Me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have.'"

Acts 2:32: "God has raised this Jesus to life, and we are all witnesses of it."

Just on the basis of these two passages, you can see an appeal to reason and historical fact.
In the passage I listed from 1 Peter, the phrase, "make a defense" comes from the Greek, ἀπολογίαν (apologian), which basically means "a verbal defense (particularly in a law court); from the same as apologeomai; a plea."
In courts of law, appeals to reason and evidence are essential. Thus, according to this passage, it seems clear that the apostle Peter is urging followers of Jesus (or people of that particular "faith") to be prepared with a reasonable explanation for their faith.

Similarly, I list the passages from Luke and Acts to demonstrate the Biblical claim of a historical, falsifiable event. The claim is this: Jesus resurrected bodily from the dead, and there were many eye-witnesses to the account. If the New Testament Biblical writers would have asserted that Jesus rose spiritually from the dead, it seems there would have been no way to scrutinize the claim on the basis of evidence.

However, this is not the case, according to the Biblical testimony. Thus, the significant claims of Jesus and his followers are up for debate, but they are steeped in evidential appeals.
If, after considering the many sources of evidence, including the eye-witness scriptural accounts, I am convinced of there reliability, I can espouse a "reasonable faith."

In this way, it can also be suggested that most things we accept as fact are similarly based on a combination of evidence and "faith." I cannot say that I know for certain that George Washington existed and presided over the United States as its first president. But, I do take that to be a true, because I think the evidence is reasonable.

This view of the relationship between faith and reason encapsulates many paradigms commonly stereotyped as factual, including non-theistic propositions such as evolution and naturalism.

With these ideas in mind, I will attempt to demonstrate how your initial statement about faith can be reasonably countered. Within your argument, you include several denominations of Christianity; this is where I will focus my formulations. I think a charitable version of your argument would look something like this:

1. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
2. faith in the Christian understanding of God has no evidential basis.
3. Therefore, it is irrational and misleading. (1,2 MP)

As I've demonstrated above, faith in God can have a strong basis in evidential reasoning. Thus, my counter to your argument is the following:

4. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
5. faith in the Christian understanding of God has a strong evidential basis.
6. Therefore, faith in the Christian understanding of God is rational and evidentially sound. (4,5 MT).

appealing to the "Faith Argument", that i find stupid and misleading — Gus Lamarch

The False Argument of Faith

I do not agree with you. Faith can have a very strong beneficial quality. As we stumble about blind and confused, faith can provide a great deal of support in life.

A lot of good points everyone's making; I hope I can add a couple more.

In the spirit of arguing against old worn-out paradigm's I submit the following.

1. This business about a belief in unicorns is a red herring. Unicorns may in fact exist in another world. The absurdity of unicorns is no less absurd than our own conscious existence that cannot be logically explained. Cognitive science says consciousness operates together in an illogical manner (conscious and subconscious cognitive abilities). How do we square that circle?

2. In Christianity, Jesus had a consciousness. His consciousness is assumed to be irrational, just like our consciousness. Dying for someone else, is irrational. Love can be irrational. Any metaphysical phenomenon is considered outside of the domains of logical existence. This is one reason why Christianity is so relatable. It's not solely an a priori logical concept. It's also partly an a posteriori irrational experience. A phenomenon.

My point is that rather than fear the irrational, one should embrace the irrational as evidence in support of their personal relationship in the Christian faith.

If the non- believer or skeptic wants to argue that all of life is rational, that their own conscious existence is rational, and that the world ex-nihilo can be completely explained rationally with no mystery or paradox, ironically, it will only serve to diminish their case in support of any alternative rational belief system. As if irrationality could or does not exist. Ask the skeptic if he/she can rationally explain their own existence. If they can't (which we know they can't) then where's their argument?

In the end, the concept of Faith has, of course, other secular or rational/irrational implications. Faith in one's abilities, faith in one's employees, faith in one's creativity, faith in one's loved ones...

But what is the concept of rationality and pure reason? What is it's sole purpose? Does it explain everything? Why did Kant conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason? What is abstract metaphysical phenomena? And finally, someone explain consciousness!

Perhaps you are experiencing a delusion right now. If you met God, how would you know it wasn’t a delusion? You would need to have faith in your experience or faith in yourself. — praxis

I've heard this point a lot in 'faith' arguments. I see where you are coming from. However, what I find most interesting is how do we know that our lives aren't just a delusion? How do we know we are not dreaming? What if death is the passage of 'waking up' from this state of delirium called life?

People use this point to counter arguments for God or faith in God, but I think taking this position calls forth questioning faith in life at all. There have been moments in my life where I have stopped in my tracks and have pondered about how insane life is. People wake up, go to work, work tirelessly for this thing called 'money,' use this money to buy things, then go home to sleep. People also wonder about arguing people on concepts and associations of things in life. Sometimes people go to war over resources. Sometimes people bomb things to prove a point. It is absurd, to say the least--referencing Albert Camus here. What I am trying to get at is the fact that life to an outsider would seem just like a dream. Dreams are bizarre, but so is life, and just about every part of it if you really ponder about how odd it really is.

To get to the point, it appears taking this position as a counter to people that defend their faith in God, religion, or something higher than just human mammals walking around till we die, in my opinion, this counter is not the most effective method in arguing against people of faith in religion/God. I think a better question is to ask: what leads people to believe or have faith in the existence of God? What leads people to be so ardently obedient to God? (referencing the Abraham example here). Are we programmed to believe or reject faith in God? Is there a possibility that certain events can trigger one into this state, and is it designed this way on purpose from a supernatural force or not? I find these questions very interesting when it comes to faith.

Anyhow, thanks for this awesome post. I love thinking about the delusion premise/argument about faith and life in general. Cheers!

I don't see any problem with someone saying that they believe in X because of faith or gut feelings or intuition. That just seems honest to me. The problem would be if they say that their faith justifies YOUR belief in God or whatever.

I see now I have said something like this before, here.

I suppose if one factors in Pyrrhonism, every belief is faith-based in way or another. The only difference then between faith-based beliefs and justified beliefs is in spirit and not in letter, if that makes any sense.

Your problem is you are trying to use rationality in which is an emotional argument. It will fail every time. Its not that they don't understand, they don't care.

People desire the emotions that a God brings them. So they justify whatever supports this. If you wish to persuade people against religion, you need to provide them an alternative argument that supports most of what they emotionally want.

These emotions are generally:

1. A desire and reason to do good
2. A clarity that there is good and evil
2. That there is greater purpose then oneself in life
3. A desire to feel worthwhile

A lot of atheists completely misunderstand the situation, and either disdainfully dismiss these emotions, or outright ignore them. If you don't fully understand the person you're chatting with, you will have an incredibly difficult time persuading them. Lose the mentality that the person before you is stupid, because that picture entails that's what you think of them. Gain the mentality that emotions are a large part of our processing, and that we are inherently beings that rationalize our desires, and rarely use rationality to create our desires.

emotional argument — Philosophim

What on earth is an "emotional argument"? :chin:

we are inherently beings that rationalize our desires, and rarely use rationality to create our desires. — Philosophim

Does this have something to do with Hume or someone else, I forget? Reason is slave to the passions kinda belief?

I suppose if one factors in Pyrrhonism, every belief is faith-based in way or another. The only difference then between faith-based beliefs and justified beliefs is in spirit and not in letter, if that makes any sense? — TheMadFool

First of all: no one really believes in Pyrrhonism. Pyrrho is a character of philosophical joke or a way of putting sticks in the wheel of absolute rationalism. It should not affect anyone with common sense (even if they are rationalists).

That said, even if we admit that the basis of all knowledge is in some kind of belief, not all beliefs have the same kind or degree of justification. Belief in the flat Earth is less justified than belief in the law of gravity. This is due to a unanimously accepted criterion: that empirical evidence carries weight in justifying a belief.

The problem with justifying a belief lies in the ability to rely on beliefs that meet certain requirements. We call these beliefs 'knowledge'. I do not believe that belief in God is counted among them. In any case, not if it is based on "faith" .

no one really believes in Pyrrhonism — David Mo

I do but, sure, I'm a no one.

Pyrrho is a character of philosophical joke or a way of putting sticks in the wheel of absolute rationalism. It should not affect anyone with common sense (even if they are rationalists). — David Mo

Are you absolutely certain? Between 0% and 100%, what is the level of your certainty in the statement you just made?

That said, even if we admit that the basis of all knowledge is in some kind of belief, not all beliefs have the same kind or degree of justification. Belief in the flat Earth is less justified than belief in the law of gravity. This is due to a unanimously accepted criterion: that empirical evidence carries weight in justifying a belief. — David Mo

Agreed but is there a kind of justification that guarantees with absolute certainty the truth of anything, anything at all?

The problem with justifying a belief lies in the ability to rely on beliefs that meet certain requirements. We call these beliefs 'knowledge'. I do not believe that belief in God is counted among them. In any case, not if it is based on "faith" . — David Mo

You lost me there. My fault, not yours. Anyway, the problem is no justificatory scheme is rigorous enough to ensure complete certainty. That's Pyrrhonism for me.

This post is interesting but I think it is probably an old one resurrected. It managed to get me thinking.

It seems to me that the problem with the idea of faith is when it is used by others as an argument. As a psychologist construct, along with will it is a driving force for any motivation in life whatever system of belief we adhere to.

The problem is when people use the notion of faith to try and impose their system of beliefs on others. This can be done by religious and political believers, who wish to impose ideas on others. It comes down to wishing to coerce others into believing without questioning and this is very dangerous as it suggests that people should not question for themselves but have faith.

It can be a basis for indoctrination, especially in the young because it involves manipulating of emotions with the dismissal of appeals to reason.
In particular, one can be made to feel guilty for questioning.

I am inclined to think the use or misuse of the idea of faith in its intention of overriding rational questioning may stem from a subconscious certainty of belief in the person who introduces faith as a basis for argument.

What on earth is an "emotional argument"? :chin: — TheMadFool

Yeah, I need to clarify that. What I should have typed was, "An argument motivated for an emotional outcome". Such things only need rationalizations to support. Certain feelings, like social ties, may cause us to do "irrational" things. Take family for instance. Lets imagine an adult person you know has a severely abusive mother that utterly devastates them emotionally whenever this person visits their parent.

Telling a person in such a situation that they should never speak to them again, might be "rational" from an outside perspective. After all, you would do the same with a stranger. But most people will not respond positively to this if they are looking to justify their emotional bond with their mother. You could give every reason in the world why the person is wrong in seeking to have a relationship with their mother, if you do not address this emotional bond that is the true motivation of a person's actions.

For many people, religion is not a rational belief, but an emotional belief that is built by the bonds of family, friends, ideals, and "God". These are strong motivators that a person will continually seek to rationalize, while ignoring "rational" arguments that destroy them.

Saying to a person, "Faith is not a rational argument" misses the point. Its not the faith in the technical aspects of a God that people often hold. Its faith in the emotional bonds, that are expressed through particular statements and rules. Saying, "Ha, there's a contradiction on page 5 and 10 on the bible!" is worthless. The bible is simply a rationalization tool to support the emotional framework. It doesn't need to be air tight. People didn't start believing in God because of page 5 or 10. They believed due to the emotional feelings and social bonds it gave them.

This applies in more than just religion. Sports, politics, and even beliefs in "ideologies and frameworks". Many people hold to their philosophical beliefs to satisfy emotional needs rather than rational needs. Its just the way people work. The adage of "People being rationalizing beings first, rational beings second" has been said in many forms and many ways over the centuries. Its a well worn hat. =)

Yeah, I need to clarify that. What I should have typed was, "An argument motivated for an emotional outcome". Such things only need rationalizations to support. Certain feelings, like social ties, may cause us to do "irrational" things. Take family for instance. Lets imagine an adult person you know has a severely abusive mother that utterly devastates them emotionally whenever this person visits their parent.

Telling a person in such a situation that they should never speak to them again, might be "rational" from an outside perspective. After all, you would do the same with a stranger. But most people will not respond positively to this if they are looking to justify their emotional bond with their mother. You could give every reason in the world why the person is wrong in seeking to have a relationship with their mother, if you do not address this emotional bond that is the true motivation of a person's actions.

For many people, religion is not a rational belief, but an emotional belief that is built by the bonds of family, friends, ideals, and "God". These are strong motivators that a person will continually seek to rationalize, while ignoring "rational" arguments that destroy them.

Saying to a person, "Faith is not a rational argument" misses the point. Its not the faith in the technical aspects of a God that people often hold. Its faith in the emotional bonds, that are expressed through particular statements and rules. Saying, "Ha, there's a contradiction on page 5 and 10 on the bible!" is worthless. The bible is simply a rationalization tool to support the emotional framework. It doesn't need to be air tight. People didn't start believing in God because of page 5 or 10. They believed due to the emotional feelings and social bonds it gave them.

This applies in more than just religion. Sports, politics, and even beliefs in "ideologies and frameworks". Many people hold to their philosophical beliefs to satisfy emotional needs rather than rational needs. Its just the way people work. The adage of "People being rationalizing beings first, rational beings second" has been said in many forms and many ways over the centuries. Its a well worn hat. =) — Philosophim

I see. A plausible theory you have there. It makes me wonder though whether there are any categories of people who are exceptions to this pattern of behavior? Philosophers, for instance, would immediately cease to be philosophers with such an attitude, no? I was tempted to cite the ever present phenomenon of back and forth between philosophers as a counterexample to your claims but then debates involve two people at a minimum; individual philosophers stick to a certain worldview that may suffer from the malady you described as rationalization.

Nonetheless, there's an attempt to reason, no matter how contrived or affected, even in rationalization, right? Commendable in spirit then, if not in letter.

By the way, was Socrates committing the cardinal sin of rationalization?

All knowledge is based on faith. — Keenan

A priori knowledge is not based on believing your senses. So there is some knowledge that is not based on faith.

"Many know, manier don't, that to beleive is stronger than to know."

Belief and faith are somewhat different. Belief does not necessarily involve a supernatural element. Faith in a god does.

God may or may not exist. It is not proven or disproven, and therefore individuals are at liberty to beleive either way, and nobody can ask them to do the opposite.

However, any claim about the NATURE of god is pure fantasy. And insisting on the believability of the fantastic claims abou the nature of god is stating nothing more than mere superstitons.

Your argument fails because you have to balance the claims of the NT with all the other miraculous claims of the ancient world. The NT was written by Christian believers. The NT is generally reliable except the virgin birth, the giving of authority to the apostles, and the resurrection. It makes perfect sense to say these were made up after Jesus's death by his followers

Are you absolutely certain? Between 0% and 100%, what is the level of your certainty in the statement you just made? — TheMadFool

Agreed but is there a kind of justification that guarantees with absolute certainty the truth of anything, anything at all? — TheMadFool

There is no absolute certainty outside the formal sciences.
In any case, my certainty about almost everything is not quantifiable. I am not speaking in mathematical terms.

There is no absolute certainty outside the formal sciences. In any case, my certainty about almost everything is not quantifiable. I am not speaking in mathematical terms. — David Mo

:ok: But then why did you refer to Pyrrho as a "joke"? To my knowledge, Pyrrho is all about uncertainty, expressible mathematically as confidence levels regarding the conclusions of arguments with values less than 100%.

Its not that they don't understand, they don't care. — Philosophim

My point with this discussion was to prove that even if you construct a rational argument against the "argument of faith" people will not care, because the "loop" of "faith because of god, because of faith" is an answer to its own question. It's dogmatic, and with everything dogmatic, the best is to avoid.

Faith is not an valid argument.

Ultimately, I agree with you. Many of us have been driven around the bend with people who have imposed their systems the so called name of truth.

Here I am ,trying to disentangle myself from the many layers of thinking and emotions,especially guilt, arising from oppression of those who claim authority on the basis of the faiths which they proclaim as ultimate and beyond questioning.

I hope that the scope of this website is forward
Perhaps we need to awaken more, with a real spirit of questioning rather than rest in the comforts of conventional thinking and logic with a view to moving into a future unknown, but different from the known certainties of the past.

...every belief is faith-based in way or another. — TheMadFool

Don't buy into that. It's an ad hoc fallacy used to defend religious fervour. Your belief in the device on which you are reading this and their belief in an invisible friend are not of the same order.

But then why did you refer to Pyrrho as a "joke"? To my knowledge, Pyrrho is all about uncertainty, expressible mathematically as confidence levels regarding the conclusions of arguments with values less than 100%. — TheMadFool

What is known about Pyrrhon is basically through Diogenes Laertius, who doesn't mention mathematics at all, much less the mathematical probabilities of truth - this is a concept that comes much later than Pyrrhon. If you read what Laertius says (the ninth book of the Lives of Illustrious Philosophers) you will realise that he is full of "striking" anecdotes that present him as a character of integrity, but rather as an extravagant one. That is why I said that it is like a "joke" among philosophers.
As Theodosius (quoted by Laercio) says in his time, nothing is known about Pyrrhon's "disposition", so Pyrrhonians should be called "pyrrhonist-like".

Don't buy into that. It's an ad hoc fallacy used to defend religious fervour. Your belief in the device on which you are reading this and their belief in an invisible friend are not of the same order. — Banno

Thanks for the advice. Very kind of you.

Although Pyrrhonism's objective is eudaimonia, it is best known for its epistemological arguments, particularly the problem of the criterion, and for being the first Western school of philosophy to identify the problem of induction and the Münchhausen trilemma. — Wikipedia

Gave me a fright when I found out Pyrrhonism was first to mention in enough detail the trio underlined above. Do I really not know anything?

What is known about Pyrrhon is basically through Diogenes Laertius, who doesn't mention mathematics at all, much less the mathematical probabilities of truth - this is a concept that comes much later than Pyrrhon. If you read what Laertius says (the ninth book of the Lives of Illustrious Philosophers) you will realise that he is full of "striking" anecdotes that present him as a character of integrity, but rather as an extravagant one. That is why I said that it is like a "joke" among philosophers.
As Theodosius (quoted by Laercio) says in his time, nothing is known about Pyrrhon's "disposition", so Pyrrhonians should be called "pyrrhonist-like". — David Mo

:up: Your explanation was to the point and helpful. I find it more interesting to know how the philosophy of given philosophers affected their lives. Practice what you preach, something I haven't got the hang off till date. :up:

Faith is not an valid argument. — Gus Lamarch

Of course its not. Its not an argument they are giving you Gus. Pointing that out to them misses the entire point. Appealing to faith means, "I don't care about your rationality, this is what I believe".

Your picture will not do anything but make them roll their eyes at you. They get the argument. You can never change what a person believes by appealing to rationality, when a person abandons rationality as a reason for their belief. What you've been missing is people of faith are presenting you with rationalizations for their faith. You can dismantle rationalizations, but that does not dismantle faith.

If you want to get people to not believe in God anymore, you need to address the emotional and societal ties that bind that faith.

Appeal to faith is a pretty well-known fallacy, and there's not much you can do in response. — Pfhorrest

Atheists don't commit the appeal to faith fallacy...

Because they typically don't know that they too are using faith.

There's not much one can do in response here either.