Freedom and Determinism pt. 2

Living with the knowledge that ‘you’ (and I say ‘you’ because language and logic precludes the ability to refer to a conscious agent devoid of free will) are not the determinant of your free choices and actions is an uncanny feeling. It is the selfsame feeling of acting but not acting… a fundamental dissociation between the perception and the will. Today I will further attempt to reconcile the notions of morality and determinism.

The conception of determinism is not dubious. But as regards morality – I feel as though the fundamental conception of morality as an imperative, whether arbitrary or otherwise, is unsound – precluded by the notion of determinism.

I would not go so far as to deny the presence of morality, at least not before I am able to come to an elucidation of what it is – not to mention that to refute morality itself would run counter to what I truly believe it to be – an inevitable retrospective constructive of the pre-determined psyche.

We revisit the conception of what determinism is – that given the current state of reality (whatever that is), there is a law of nature unbeknownst to us, that leads unerringly to a second state in time. This infinitely reducible process leads reality to an inevitably decided ‘end’. This law of nature only makes my argument valid when we omit the possibility that we can ever influence it, nor that we are able to elucidate its workings. As such, it is a kind of ethereal governor – we’ll leave it at that.

If we then define free will as the ability to consciously influence the outcome of reality, determinism necessarily precludes it. As a consequence, ‘true’ free will cannot be reconciled with determinism. However, we continue to make ‘choices’ in the less metaphysical realm and in daily life. How is this possible, you ask? This is because I fundamentally believe the notion of a ‘choice’ is tied to memory, in ignorance of the concept of determinism. Without knowledge of the fact that our actions are pre-determined, we refer retrospectively to our actions as ‘choices’ – and inherent human tendency to extrapolate past possibility to future possibility leads us to believe that since, with a cursory glance over the shoulder, we have made such ‘choices’, that ‘choices’ can be made consciously by ‘will’ in the future, rather than exist only as an essentially retrospective concept.

It is at this point, before I move on to the conception of morality, that I must confront the stalemate generated by the knowledge of determinism and action. It is easy to elucidate why one, wary of the fact that free will does not exist, would freeze at a crossroads, unknowing of what to choose – waiting for fate to illuminate his path. But this stalemate is not logically impossible. Who’s to say that freezing at this ethereal and yet very real crossroads is not the predetermined path for the enlightened? Indeed, the wary may feel anguished, but, I do not pause my pen, even as I am aware there is no alternative. Perhaps this misconception is merely that of positive and negative – active and passive action, but who am I to say?

It is furthermore, clear from this that there are two phenomena from which morality can be borne. The first is the direct manifestation of the law of nature – that despite everything being predetermined, that we ‘believe’ future ‘choice’ is possible (when I have already explained its impediment by determinism). It would be, so to speak, a cognitive glitch that which deceives and preserves our illusion of free will. The second possibility is that of the extrapolation of the misconception of ‘future choice’. If we can see the past and conclude that the future will allow us a freedom of will to make the ‘choices’ that will ostensibly be made, why cannot we similarly be misled into believing that there is an imperative in making those choices? Or better yet, that morality, when actually adhered to, is merely a cameo, a glimpse, an intimation of nature’s predetermined course?

We will, I suppose, never know.