Not to put too fine a point on it, but I’m not sure Kant outright rejects what is these days is considered a naive realist point of view, or, which is for practical purposes the same thing, the Hume-ian common sense empiricism of British Enlightenment. Empirical objects may very well exist in the same form as they exist in the mind. The problem isn’t whether or not they do, but the impossibility of proving whether or not they do. While it is true the Kantian speculative epistemology prevents any such knowledge, that doesn’t negate the possibility that the true nature of things and our understanding of them are congruent. Hence the force and power of the Law of Non-contradiction. — Mww

The problem is that the naive realist insists that objects do, totally independent of all minds, exist in the same form (whatever that could actually even mean!) as they do in our perceptions of them. Kant pointed out that we have no justification to believe that or indeed any metaphysics taken as absolute. The way I see it he paved the way for metaphysics to be undertaken as phenomenology as it was in different ways by Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger.

The other issue, which I see as being implicit in Kant, and made explicit in different ways by Hegel, Heidegger and Wittgenstein and others is that to say that objects exist just as we perceive them is to say something incoherent, insofar as we do not know what that could even mean. It could only mean something on a presumption of absolute or objective idealism pace Hegel, where the Rational just is the Real..

Philosophy after Kant could be said to consist in various attempts to find consistent ways to think the real while maintaining the realization that the map can never be the territory, our models can never be, or at least can never exhaustively represent, the real. Even if a model partially represented the real, that it does could never be known with deductive certainty, but rather the question as to whether it does must be groundlessly decided for or against.

Is the purpose of noumena just to serve as a logical placeholder at the boundary of knowledge? That is, if anything were (or could be) known about noumena, then it wouldn't be noumena, it would be phenomena. — Andrew M

PRECISELY!

, because phenomena are derived from sensibility, and noumena are derived from understanding, so one can never be exchanged for the other. The reason we can’t know things-in-themselves is because the human cognitive system doesn’t permit it; the reason we can’t know noumena is because there isn’t anything to know. Things-in-themselves exist and are quite real so don’t need to be thought; objects-in-themselves exist but are not real so must be thought. — Mww

I agree with the distinction, the thing in itself is not precisely coterminous with noumena. The noumenal is like the formal abstraction of things in themselves, presented as an unknown object-X. The noumenal is, in other words, a more general category.

The thing in itself is more specific; the tree for us appears on account of the tree in itself. The naive realist imagines that the tree in itself looks just like the tree for us; but this is incoherent because a thing cannot look (or feel, sound, smell or taste) like anything unless it is being sensed. So,the idea of the tree in itself is a formal (or in another sense, formless) abstraction, something in the general category of noumena.

The problem is that the naive realist insists that objects do, totally independent of all minds, exist in the same form (whatever that could actually even mean!) as they do in our perceptions of them. — Janus

Agreed, that is a major problem.

On the rest.....we see the same thing with different eyes. Nothing remarkable about that.

:cool: If memory serves me, Kant referred to naive realism (and its more sophisticated transcendental realist elaborations) as "transcendental illusions", and understood that as being something which we all cannot help unreflectively falling back into even if we have once seen through it.

If you and I, and by association you and Janus, can agree that the term “perspective” denotes a particular attitude or opinion about a thing, and we each as particular persons all agree as a matter of discourse that the fins on a ‘60 Cadillac were rather extreme.....wouldn’t we have a common perspective with respect to extremism? — Mww

I don't see how agreement constitutes a common perspective. Care to explain? That we agree to refer to things using the same words does not mean that we have a common perspective.

If humans are known with absolute certainty to be entities with the capacity for perspective, then the concept of human perspective cannot be either false nor contradictory. — Mww

I think this is seriously faulty logic. That distinct human beings each have a perspective, does not produce the conclusion that there is one human perspective. That's some sort of composition fallacy, or a category error.

If there is something that is specifically the property of individuals, perspective, and not the property of a group of individuals, then to say that it is the property of the group is contradictory.

If it is true every human ever has or had or will have a perspective, then it follows necessarily there is a human perspective. — Mww

Fallacy of composition, text book case.

So, there is no single perspective, but "for us" signifies perspective in general, the fact that all those different perspectives are examples of perspective, human perspective. — Janus

OK, let's start with this then. "For us" signifies that there is such a thing as perspective. Further, "the world" is something created, constructed, from a perspective. The concept "the world" only has meaning from a perspective. Therefore perspective is fundamental to this thing, the world, which is signified by the concept. Furthermore, we could replace "the world" with "existence", to say that the concept "existence" is something created or constructed from a perspective, therefore perspective is fundamental to existence. Do you not recognize that there is no such thing as the thing represented by a concept, without that concept?

Please explain why you believe that such conclusions about the fundamentality of perspective are unwarranted. When "the world", and "existence" are concepts which are created from a perspective, and there is no such thing as the thing represented by a particular concept without that concept, what makes you think that there is such a thing as the world, or existence, without a perspective?

Please explain why you believe that such conclusions about the fundamentality of perspective are unwarranted. When "the world", and "existence" are concepts which are created from a perspective, and there is no such thing as the thing represented by a particular concept without that concept, what makes you think that there is such a thing as the world, or existence, without a perspective? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I have already said the fact that the world of human experience, which is what we all experience, insofar as it is experienced and judged by humans has perspective as fundamental, does not logically entail that the world "as it is in itself" has perspective as fundamental. In fact logically it cannot have perspective at all, inasmuch as it is explicitly defined as the world absent human perspective.

That distinct human beings each have a perspective, does not produce the conclusion that there is one human perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reject that a fact of the matter implicates a logical fallacy. Maybe I just don’t know how to write about it fault-free. Every human ever, otherwise capable of it, reasons; all perspectives are opinions; all opinions are a result of reason; therefore every opinion derived from human reason and expressed as a perspective must be a human perspective.

It appears that you’re treating perspective as an object (there is no one human perspective), whereas I’m treating it as a subject (all perspective is human). We’re both correct.

As I have already said the fact that the world of human experience, which is what we all experience... — Janus

You are making the same unwarranted generalization as Mww, assuming that we all experience the same thing. Quite obviously, we do not all experience the same thing, So there appears to be no basis to this claim that there is one world of human experience. Each person has one's own experience, and no two people have the same experience. There is no such thing as the world of human experience.

As I've told you, over and over now, you're starting from a false premise. Will you please dismiss this false premise, and start from the reality that each person has one's own experience which is very distinct from every other person's experience, then we might be able to properly discuss the role of perspective in relation to reality.

Don’t know that Kant referred to naive realism or transcendental realism; he may have used different terms for those things, because technically speaking, neither of them as such were in vogue in his time. He was more concerned with general common-sense physical empiricism, which he accepted, and purely subjective idealism, which he squashed like a proverbial bug.
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On illusion: absolutely.

“....Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism (....) There is, therefore, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason—not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove....”
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On noumena: because taking from the actual book is so much mo’ better.....

“....The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this—and which is a perfectly excusable one—lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think something in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses....

.....Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception of an object in general—problematically understood and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is nothing. That is, it is a conception without an object, like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not therefore be held to be impossible...”

I would never be so presumptuous as to call your interpretation......er......misguided, but I will say in all confidence that I cannot find anything in each of my three separately translated, physical volumes, that corresponds with it.

In addition......because I’ve never been mellow enough to just let things be......your response to the “if noumena were known they’d be phenomena, being “PRECISELY!!!”, is actually addressed at the end of the first division of Transcendental Logic, where Kant says, “...The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing, therefore is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines...”

There cannot be a figure of two straight lines, hence the self-contradiction; if noumena were known is its own self-contradiction in the same way as a figure of two straight lines, insofar as noumena cannot be known. Both impossible conceptions. And, obviously, an impossible conception stands no chance of being transformed into something knowable. The aforementioned logical illusion writ large.

Writ huge.

Writ bigly. (Sorry.....just trying a little levity in the furtive hope you won’t stomp all over me for proving myself more right than you. Or maybe I just shot myself in the foot by using a Trump-ianesque soundbite. Maaannn.....life is SUCH a bitch, innit????)

On the other hand......and there’s always an other hand......maybe you meant “PRECISELY” in conjunction with noumena being the limit of knowledge, but that’s just as Kant-ianesque wrong, which can be proven just as easily, but I’ve sudden, inexplicably, become mellow enough to let that one be.

In the immortal words of Jon Bon Jovi......have a nice day.

Don’t know that Kant referred to naive realism or transcendental realism; he may have used different terms for those things, because technically speaking, neither of them as such were in vogue in his time. He was more concerned with general common-sense physical empiricism, which he accepted, and purely subjective idealism, which he squashed like a proverbial bug. — Mww

I haven't read much of Kant for quite some time, but I was pretty certain that he used terms which are translated as "transcendental realism" and "transcendental realist", which would make sense, given that he certainly uses a term which translates as "transcendental idealism", and the idea this latter term represents is the dialectical negation of transcendental realism.

Anyway sure enough, searching through the Transcendental Dialectic, I found these two passages:

By an idealist, therefore, one must understand not someone who de­nies the existence of external objects of sense, but rather someone who only does not admit that it is cognized through immediate perception and infers from this that we can never be fully certain of their reality from any possible experience. Now before I display our paralogism in its deceptive illusion, I must first remark that one would necessarily have to distinguish a twofold idealism. I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appear­ances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not deter­minations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility).The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. It is re­ally this transcendental realist who afterwards plays the empirical ideal­ist; and after he has falsely presupposed about objects of the senses that if they are to exist they must have their existence in themselves even apart from sense, he finds that from this point of view all our represen­tations of sense are insufficient to make their reality certain.


Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Transcendental Dialectic’. A369

Thus the transcendental idealist is an empirical realist, and grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need not be inferred, but is im­mediately perceived. In contrast, transcendental realism necessarily falls into embarrassment, and finds itself required to give way to empirical idealism, because it regards the objects of outer sense as something different from the senses themselves and regards mere appearances as self­ sufficient beings that are found external to us; for here, even with our best consciousness of our representation of these things, it is obviously far from certain that if the representation exists, then the object corre­sponding to it would also exist; but in our system, on the contrary, these external things - namely, matter in all its forms and alterations - are nothing but mere representations, i.e., representations in us, of whose reality we are immediately conscious. Now since as far as I know all those psychologists who cling to em­pirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have obviously pro­ceeded very consistently in conceding great importance to empirical idealism as one of the problems from which human reason knows how to extricate itself only with difficulty. For in fact if one regards outer ap­pearances as representations that are effected in us by their objects, as things in themselves found outside us, then it is hard to see how their ex­istence could be cognized in any way other than by an inference from ef­fect to cause, in which case it must always remain doubtful whether the cause is in us or outside us. Now one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object we understand by the repre­sentation of matter and corporeal things; for these are merely appear­ances, i.e., mere modes of representation, which are always found only in us, and their reality, just as much as that of my own thoughts, rests on immediate consciousness. The transcendental object is equally unknown in regard to inner and to outer sense. But we are talking not about that, but about the empirical object, which is called an external object if it is in space and an inner object if it is represented simply in the relation of time; but space and time are both to be encountered only in us.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Transcendental Dialectic’. A372-373

On the other hand......and there’s always an other hand......maybe you meant “PRECISELY” in conjunction with noumena being the limit of knowledge, but that’s just as Kant-ianesque wrong, which can be proven just as easily, but I’ve sudden, inexplicably, become mellow enough to let that one be.

In the immortal words of Jon Bon Jovi......have a nice day. — Mww

A bit of humour in these, oh-so-important matters is always appreciated! :grin:

Now, as to noumena "being the limit of knowledge"; not sure that sounds right, more like 'beyond the limit of knowledge'. I understand that 'noumena' may not be precisely coterminous with 'things-in-ithemselves', but to invoke the dialectic again: I think it's fairly safe to say noumena is the dialectical negation or opposite of phenomena. These are general terms, so it would seem to follow that a particular phenomenon, or 'thing for us' is the dialectical negation or opposite of a particular noumenon, or thing-in-itself.

That's about the best I can do given my current lamentable level of scholarship, but hey, wtf does how I think about it matter in the larger scheme of things? I have no doubt there are other, possibly more informed, interpretations that are beyond my simple ken.

Thanks for your responsive comments.

The person's mind synthesizes the phenomenal object that subsequently appears to him.
— Andrew M

Yes, the mind synthesizes the phenomenal object, However, there is some controversy on the Kantian rendition of appearance. Some say it means what a thing looks like, others say it is mere presence, like, e.g., I made my appearance at the family reunion. I favor the latter, because to say what a thing looks like presupposes the very attributes conceptions are supposed to give it. This relates because “subsequently appears” is temporally misplaced; if there is an affect on sensibility, then the mind is aware of an appearance of something. This affect, or appearance, is also called sensation by materialists, and occurs antecedent, not subsequent, to any synthesis. — Mww

So on your view, would it be more accurate to say that the mind subsequently determines what first appears in the senses?

Also where you say 'if there is an affect on sensibility, then the mind is aware of an appearance of something' is that 'something' the thing-in-itself?

If so, does Earth also refer to the 'raw' thing-in-itself (that appears phenomenally) or only to the phenomena (as a separate thing)?

What I'm getting at here is whether the Earth is thought of as a presentation of things-in-themselves or a re-presentation of things-in-themselves. (Albeit a synthesized or 'cooked' presentation or representation.) As an analogy, you could present at the family reunion in a clown costume but it's still you, or you could send a robot replica as your representative, which is not you.

As space and time are pure intuitions, that is, not derivable from any object of experience but belonging to any object of experience in particular, so too are the categories pure conceptions, that is, having no object of their own, but belonging to all objects of thought in general. Re: Wayfarer’s triangle, the category of quantity makes the thought of lines possible, the category of quality makes the thought of flat possible, the category of relation makes the thought of arranging lines in a certain shape possible, henceforth conceived as a triangle. Lines, flatness, arrangements are all mental images, called schema. — Mww

Got it.

Noumena are NOT things-in-themselves of the world, they are objects-of-themselves of the mind. — Mww

So to clarify, what is the relationship between schema and noumena? Are abstractions like triangle and number schema or noumena or both?

That would be the blind spot — Wayfarer

Didn't we already go over that ? ;-)

PRECISELY! — Janus

I think our opinion has been overruled...

I think our opinion has been overruled... — Andrew M

Ah, but has it been justifiably overruled?

Didn't we already go over that ? ;-) — Andrew M

We went over it, but I still regard it as an open question.

So to clarify, what is the relationship between schema and noumena? Are abstractions like triangle and number schema or noumena or both? — Andrew M

Found another snippet on Platonic realism, from Augustine, again.

If you look at something mutable, you cannot grasp it either with the bodily senses or the consideration of the mind, unless it possesses some...form…If this form is removed, the mutable dissolves into nothing…Through the eternal Form every temporal thing can receive its form and, in accordance with its kind, can manifest and embody number in space and time…Everything that is changeable must also be formable…Nothing can give itself form, since nothing can give itself what it does not have.”

He's talking about 'the principle of intelligibility' i.e. things are only intelligible because of their form which emanates from the divine intelligence and then manifests as particular beings.

//ps//At least I got forms back into it.//

sure enough, searching through the Transcendental Dialectic, I found these two passages — Janus

As much as I’d like to have a good reason (I spend all my time and draw all my quotes from the 1787 B edition, in which none of that appears) for not being familiar with those terms, I can come up with nothing but poor excuses (I know the 1781 A edition just as well as the B, but being interested only in the philosophy, as soon as he called them psychologists I found no use for any of it).

At any rate, thanks for the enlightenment.
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Justified, yes; over-ruled, not necessarily.

would it be more accurate to say that the mind subsequently determines what first appears in the senses? — Andrew M

If the mind determines what first appears, we would know everything of every experience. The simplest way to look at it might be that the mind determines if an appearance relates to experience. In other words, the mind doesn’t determine what first appears (phenomena = undetermined object), but rather, determines the relationship of what first appears, to something else. The determinant faculty is judgement, in affairs with empirical content.
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if there is an affect on sensibility, then the mind is aware of an appearance of something' is that 'something' the thing-in-itself? — Andrew M

I suppose one could say that a “thing-“ that affects sensibility necessarily brings the “in-itself” with it, but the claim is that we can never know the thing-in-itself even though knowledge of a thing is quite possible. Therefore, it must be that “thing” and “thing-in-itself” are distinct, and therefore separable, or, that which is known, is nothing but a representation of the thing-in-itself, in which case there is no need to separate the thing from the -in-itself.

Personally, I think the “-in-itself” signifies a real, physical existence completely independent of us. Nothing completely independent of us can comprises an appearance, for such would never be met with perception, and at the same time serves as a parsimonious support for the claim that we can never know with certainty what it truly is. The “thing” of “thing-in-itself” can nonetheless still be the real as yet undetermined phenomenon.
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does Earth also refer to the 'raw' thing-in-itself (...) or only to the phenomena ? — Andrew M

It may be safe to say Earth refers the to the raw thing-in-itself, for “refers to” simply denotes a conformity of relation, where the manifold of conceptions understanding brings to the table supports the intuitions imagination initially assigned to the thing way back at its perception. In effect, our knowledge claim is grounded in this conformity, which we call experience, not knowledge of the thing that made its appearance.

It is just as safe to say “Earth” refers to a particular phenomenon as well, but only when examined at a much lower level than conception from which the name arises. Everything of empirical content passing through the human cognitive system is at one instance a phenomenon. But once experienced, reason pretty much rockets right through this part, relying more on the faculty of judgement than the faculty of imagination for its conclusions.
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As an analogy, you could present at the family reunion in a clown costume but it's still you, or you could send a robot replica as your representative, which is not you. — Andrew M

Differences in perspective. To another, the appearance is of a clown, and the judgement will be with respect to a clown and clown will be cognized. Even with knowledge beforehand of the person presenting the clown, if clown as disguised person is observed, induction is the only means to claim knowledge of the person, and we all know the inherent dangers of inductive reasoning. In effect I know it is me with absolute certainty; any one else has the certainty only of clown.
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what is the relationship between schema and noumena? — Andrew M

I must admit to not being aware of one. Schema are pure a priori conceptions, but they can be reproduced as empirical objects. Noumena are not, so cannot. Our kind of rationality is the only one we have on which to base any philosophy of knowledge at all. But our kind of rationality does not have to be the only one there is. Another kind of rationality may very well incorporate noumena specific to its methodology, in fact, it must, otherwise it would be indistinguishable from human rationality, hence would not be another kind after all. We cannot deny noumena, but we also cannot claim anything with respect to what they might be.

Finally, as an aside.....one opinion cannot over-rule another, if the opinions reside in separate subjects.

I suppose one could say that a “thing-“ that affects sensibility necessarily brings the “in-itself” with it, but the claim is that we can never know the thing-in-itself even though knowledge of a thing is quite possible. Therefore, it must be that “thing” and “thing-in-itself” are distinct, and therefore separable, or, that which is known, is nothing but a representation of the thing-in-itself, in which case there is no need to separate the thing from the -in-itself. — Mww

Nice job speaking about something very difficult to speak about!

I think a little differently about this; for example, I would not say that the "in-itself" is necessarily brought along with the affect. I would say everything about the affect is collaborative, a relation between the thing, the percipient and the world conditions. "In -itself" then refers to everything about the thing that is not collaborative in this specific sense, that is not related to any percipient. I agree that thing and thing-in-itself are are therefore distinct because the thing is specifically related to perception and the thing-in-itself not; however they are not separate entities, but are separate functions or conceptions of the one indeterminate "entity". (This is OK provided you allow that indeterminate entities can be coherently spoken about).

Personally, I think the “-in-itself” signifies a real, physical existence completely independent of us. — Mww

I personally agree with this. Some philosophers would identify this as a kind of transcendental realism, though, and that's where this kind of talk gets real tricky real fast. :wink:

.

You spoke before of naive realism. Are you suggesting the modern rendition naive realism, is the same as the Enlightenment rendition transcendental realism in A369?

Real tricky real fast is well-spoken, no doubt. Kant speaks here of “outer appearance” and elsewhere as just appearance by which one can assume he means inner, which seems to be an entirely different kind; “effect in us” in juxtaposition to “affect on us”........and on and on.

I wish I knew if there were margin notes, or scribbles somewhere, about why he changed this section so drastically from A to B.

Anyway......it was fun.

Therefore, it must be that “thing” and “thing-in-itself” are distinct, and therefore separable, or, that which is known, is nothing but a representation of the thing-in-itself, in which case there is no need to separate the thing from the -in-itself. — Mww

But there are not two things - there’s simply ‘how things appear to us’ as distinct from ‘how they really are’. The whole point of making the distinction is to draw attention to something inherent about knowledge.

Incidentally in hylomorphic dualism, what is really known is the form, because the form is something like an archetype. I don’t think Kant comments much on that, I’d like to look into it.

Understood, and agreed in principle. The basic premise remains that if we grant a distinction between how a thing appears to us and how it actually is regardless of us, we tacitly grant the possibility of a difference, however remote such possibility may be. My take on speculative epistemology is that the human cognitive system does not avail the subject in possession of it, and by means of it, to determine what the difference may be. It’s like being stuck on one side or the other of a mathematical equality, insofar as we have no means to make the jump across the operator in order to prove the universality and absolute necessity the meaning of the operator demands.

On the other hand, and by far the less controversial, is just to assume what appears to us and what is irrespective of us, to be the same under any condition, right up until it is shown that it isn’t.
(Did you know Kant used “quanta” in the modern sense 100 years before Einstein? I don’t mind saying that Kantian epistemological dualism is remarkable similar to preliminary quantum mechanical interpretations, albeit the latter being rather more extended, with respect to the ubiquitous “observer effect”. Re:, in the former nothing is known until it is experienced; in the latter nothing exists until it is observed. A stretch? Perhaps, but not negligible, methinks.)
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On form(s).

Kant does use the concept of form repeatedly, and grounds his theoretical metaphysics with:
“....That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. (...) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation....”

But as to an archetypal conception, Kant went more with Platonic “Ideas”, rather than forms. He exposes them up with......

“...Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences, like the categories....”

......and subsequently honors him and them with.....

“....Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the achetypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect....”
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On dualism, Kant spent more time elaborating Cartesian rational dualism at the expense of Berkeley, than the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle and Aquinas, mostly, I think, in order to expound on the idea that all dualism is intrinsic to reason rather than the granting the necessity of invoking any divine influence. I personally have little experience with Aquinas, and hold with no supernaturalism of any kind, so am at a loss in discussions of his philosophy.

Are you suggesting the modern rendition naive realism, is the same as the Enlightenment rendition transcendental realism in A369? — Mww

Taking what seem to be the relevant parts of Kant's account there: "The transcendental realist regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility)."

So, I would say that is in accordance with what I understand to be contemporary naive realism.

As is this: "The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding."

except for the last bit about "pure concepts of the understanding"

I wish I knew if there were margin notes, or scribbles somewhere, about why he changed this section so drastically from A to B.

Anyway......it was fun. — Mww

Yes, it is intriguing as to just why he either changed his mind, or felt that what he said in A could be liable to misinterpretation. Fun indeed!

Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the achetypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect....
~ Kant, on Plato — Mww

:up:

Differences in perspective. To another, the appearance is of a clown, and the judgement will be with respect to a clown and clown will be cognized. Even with knowledge beforehand of the person presenting the clown, if clown as disguised person is observed, induction is the only means to claim knowledge of the person, and we all know the inherent dangers of inductive reasoning. In effect I know it is me with absolute certainty; any one else has the certainty only of clown. — Mww

I agree that induction is not useful here. However hypothetico-deduction can be. For example, on the hypothesis that the clown is you, one prediction is that you and the clown won't be observed at the reunion at the same time. So it's a testable and explanatory hypothesis.

It would seem that a similar approach can be taken with things-in-themselves. For example, while we may not be able to observe non-Euclidean spacetime, we can construct a model that posits it and use it to make predictions about what we do observe.

I must admit to not being aware of one. Schema are pure a priori conceptions, but they can be reproduced as empirical objects. Noumena are not, so cannot. Our kind of rationality is the only one we have on which to base any philosophy of knowledge at all. But our kind of rationality does not have to be the only one there is. Another kind of rationality may very well incorporate noumena specific to its methodology, in fact, it must, otherwise it would be indistinguishable from human rationality, hence would not be another kind after all. We cannot deny noumena, but we also cannot claim anything with respect to what they might be. — Mww

OK, though I'm still not clear on what noumena specifically refers to. Are they ideas that are beyond human capability to understand (or even conceive of)? Just as things-in-themselves are beyond human capability to sense?

What would be examples of noumena?

Finally, as an aside.....one opinion cannot over-rule another, if the opinions reside in separate subjects. — Mww

Agreed. I appreciate that you and Janus are referencing the source material here and pointing out when interpretations differ.

But there are not two things - there’s simply ‘how things appear to us’ as distinct from ‘how they really are’. The whole point of making the distinction is to draw attention to something inherent about knowledge.

Incidentally in hylomorphic dualism, what is really known is the form, because the form is something like an archetype. — Wayfarer

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle inverted Plato's ontology. For Aristotle, what is fundamental, and thus primarily known, is the particular. Hylomorphism is not a dualism, it is an abstraction over particulars. What is known about particulars (by way of experience) is isomorphic to how they (really) are.

Yeah....but it is odd. Naive realism from a psychological perspective emphasizes cognitive bias; naive realism from a philosophical perspective denies representationalism. If that be true, and one rejects naive realism from a philosophical point of view because he holds with representationalism as absolutely necessary, then by definition he could be deemed a naive realist from a psychological point of view.

What a tangled web we weave.........

What would be examples of noumena? — Andrew M

There are none. The prerequisite for noumena is a kind of intuition, and by association, a kind of understanding, we don’t have. They are nothing but logically or intelligibly possible conceptions, but can never be conceived as something cognizable. And if we cannot cognize a thing, we have no means to give an example of it.

Hidden in the weeds of Kantian epistemic speculation is the contra-distinction to it. If the theory expounds how it is that we know things, it is well advised to give at least some account of how it is that we do not know things, because, obviously, there are things we don’t understand, hence cannot know. The primary tenet of the theory is that reason itself must be curtailed from its own cognitive extravagances, called illusion, and one of the ways that curtailment may arise is to curtail the understanding, from which all cognition evolves. Kant may have invented his brand of noumena for no other reason than to provide an argument sufficient to do just that. If that should be the case, it follows logically that the reason we cannot know some things is because understanding is attempting to wander into territory in contradiction to that which the positive nature of the theory had already proclaimed as valid.

Another reasonable conjecture, mine own, to be sure, may be that given the times, where publication and even professorships required the blessing of a beneficiary, in Kant’s case in his critical period, Fredric II, King of Prussia, and, given the religiosity of the general population at the time, perhaps the mental restrictions attributed to noumena were a subtle nod to the....er......”Supreme Author of the Universe”. An Omni-everything outta be able to conceive noumena, right? Just because we weakling human agents can’t think beyond ourselves shouldn’t restrict supersensible beings.

Hylomorphism is not a dualism, — Andrew M

I believe it is, I think this is based on a faulty grasp of the kind of duality involved. Forms only manifest as particulars, but the forms are what grasped by the active intellect so as to enable us to determine what a thing is.

They are nothing but logically or intelligibly possible conceptions, but can never be conceived as something cognizable. And if we cannot cognize a thing, we have no means to give an example of it. — Mww

I really think this is mistaken also. The root of ‘noumenal’ is ‘nous’, so the noumenal are ideal objects, things that are known by reason or by nous. What is not intelligible is matter - here again is the snippet from Augustine:

If you look at something mutable, [i.e. any particular] you cannot grasp it either with the bodily senses or the consideration of the mind, unless it possesses some numerical form…If this form is removed, the mutable dissolves into nothing…Through eternal Form every temporal thing can receive its form and, in accordance with its kind, can manifest and embody number in space and time…Everything that is changeable must also be formable…Nothing can give itself form, since nothing can give itself what it does not have.”

Kant diverges from this, but there are still echoes of it in what he says.

The idea, greatly elaborated in Neoplatonism, is that the forms are really ideas in the primordial intellect of which individual types and things are emanations or instantiations. And I believe that it’s a philosophically sound intuition.

I accept your comment as stated. While I understand the Greek origins of noumena, and Kant’s intimate knowledge of the classic Greek metaphysicians, I am nonetheless responding to my interrogatives from the way Kant used the Greek concept in his own way. That is to say, it may very well be the case that my interpretation of noumena is mistaken from the Greek perspective, or even St. Augustine’s, but I’m not arguing from there. I would certainly appreciate a critique of my interpretation, but it would seem rather apropos to receive that critique from the same context from which the interpretation was initially given.

I will say, with respect to your quoted passage, that any particular indeed may not be grasped by the bodily senses, which are passive recipients of affectations, but “considerations of the mind” can be simply Kantian a priori manifestations, which *DO* allow “grasping” the particular, all without the need for noumena.

Test for Echo?