:cool:

my answer would be to look at others (like Tarski or even Godel) for any kind of elucidation at such attempts. — Wallows

The point about Heidegger, in particular, is that he really was 'a philosopher of the human condition'. I think of the other two as far more academic specialists in their orientation.

How do we tell the difference between an as yet unverified physical model and a hypothetical metaphysical model? — VagabondSpectre

There's a massive debate raging in contemporary physics about exactly this problem. It's about whether string theory and the 'multiverse' concept are, in fact, scientific at all ¹. There are a lot of heavy hitters on both sides, and the average lay person (includes me) can't even understand a lot of it. Whereas, traditional metaphysics (as preserved in, for example, neo-Thomism) is at least intelligible. But the issue is, it is exactly that kind of traditional metaphysics that is generally rejected by secular-scientific culture.

I think of the other two as far more academic specialists in their orientation. — Wayfarer

Well, yes; but, they attempted at answering the unsolvable in their own way (through logic). But, if logic fails to produce a valid "methodology" at such attempts, then I don't see how you're going to solve the problem in any other adequately sophisticated formal system. Hence, the seventh proposition of the TLP?

adequately sophisticated formal system — Wallows

And, I'll just point out that this is gibberish. Q.E.D?

The point about Heidegger, in particular, is that he really was 'a philosopher of the human condition'. — Wayfarer

I'm afraid you'll have to expand on why you think that is. I don't think I'll ever get around to reading Heidegger as there's so much ambiguity around his treatment of philosophic terms and stipulations. Am I missing out on something big here?

Makes me wonder to what extent the physics/metaphysics distinction is bunk to begin with.

The physical - the material - is only so because that's what our senses make of it. Where the limits of our senses end is not the limit of the external world. And many things which are beyond our traditional senses are not beyond the limits of scientific apparatus. We may call those things metaphysical (e.g: the position of an electron), but we may be making a very slippery distinction in doing so.

In the end we follow the evidence (un-intuitive, abstract, and "metaphysical" though some of it may seem). Presumably, reality is reality; physics, metaphysics, and all. It's all the same system.

Kant pointed out we have an unavoidable tendency to wonder and speculate about the "ultimate" nature of things. We cannot achieve any such knowledge via empirical inquiry or pure reason. Diverse metaphysical ideas might entail different ethical stances, so metaphysics may of practical significance. — Janus


Yes, someone commented that transcendentalism starts with the assumption that we need metaphysics. We need a theory about what the universe is and some justification for that theory. Are you saying that that need is related to ethics? — frank

I would be more inclined to say that the notion of transcendentalism comes from an intrinsic human need to wonder about, to search for, the ultimate nature of things; which is where metaphysical thinking springs forth. That this need has been ubiquitous, or all but ubiquitous, in humans of all cultures seems undeniable.

Likewise ethical concerns are socially and culturally ubiquitous, and it seems inevitable that an inquiring mind will, sooner or later, come to ask for justifications of dominant cultural mores instead of just accepting them without question.

If some set of metaphysical beliefs becomes predominant in a culture, then it will come to constitute a worldview or paradigm, and it seems inevitable that any cultural mores must be consistent with such metaphysical paradigms or become transformed or lost altogether, depending on the degree of inconsistency. If a new paradigm evolves then it would seem to be reasonable to expect that cultural mores would change or adapt to become consonant with the new paradigm.

You're probably right. If I go digging for justification for my ontology, it may be that this is tied to a conflict over who is in charge of our over arching mythology.

So anti-realism is neutral territory. Its residents don't feel the need to fight about it. Where the separation between Church and State is firm, that neutrality is defended by law.