This thing which does the willing is excluded from your reality, it is not real, and therefore not approached. That is why recognizing the true relationship between thinking and logic, is important. Once willing is understood as an essential aspect of such a constraint system, then this principle must be extended to all semiotic constraint systems. There is a very clear need to assume a thing which wills such a constraint system into existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not true; I don't exclude the self that does the willing at all. The self is free to think whatever it likes, within the constraints of logic, where 'logic' is taken in the broadest sense as comprising (at least) entailment and association). This doesn't mean that you cannot put any two ideas together, even if there is no apparent association between them, that is if you don't think of any association between them prior to or when putting them together. But the mind is very inventive and can no doubt find an association between any two ideas you like. But there must always be a logic of association. The ideas are associated by virtue of colour, shape, relationship with some common thing, size, whatever, the list is endless. Here's a challenge for you: present two ideas that have no possible association with one another. I bet you can't do it.

So, as I said, the self is free to think whatever it likes within the constraints of logic, and those very same logics constrain every self, just as the self is free to do whatever it wants within the constraints of gravity and the nature of the physical environment. Why should it be necessary that the self wills these logical constraint conditions into existence any more than it would be necessary that the self wills gravity and the nature of the physical world into existence? Why would you think the latter isn't as much a curtailment of free will as the former? Truth is, the very idea of freedom loses all its sense if you think it (or more accurately if youtry to think it: because you can't really think it) in a context of no constraint at all.

You are arguing:

1. Experience doesn't make sense in the same realm of bodies and other objects.

2. It is not bodies or any other object.

3. As a result, the accounts which say conciousness emerged are unsatisfactory because they don't say how the non-conscious turned into the conscious.

4. To have a successful account of conciousness, we need experience to be its own formal cause. Experience must always be present to begat following experiences. This avoids the problem of the non-conscious turning into the conscious.

My points are:

1. It is true experiences cannot be bodies (you are right in point 2. )

2. However, this truth does not impact on accounts of emergence because they don't equate experiences with bodies-- bodies are the different state that conciousness emerges from.

3. Emergence means the presence of a new and different state, not that bodies are experience. Under emergence, the non-conscious never becomes the conscious.

4. Thus, the major charge leveled against emergence is false. It never entails non-conscious states turning into conscious states. Emergence is constituted new states of consciousness following states of body.

5. Experiences are, therefore, "physical" (a state of the world caused by other states of the world) but are not bodies. The requirement of all objects to have consciousness is lifted. "Physical" experiences are there own state, rather than being equivalent to the processes of body.

6. Emergence is constituted by new distinct "physical" experiences following on "physical" bodies which are not experience.

The point of emergence is that experience is not always so. New states of consciousness appear out of previous states which are not consciousness.

If one rejects that the conscious can come out of the non-conscious, then they consider emergence impossible.

7. Semiotic theory holds the account of emergence. New states which are consciousness appear out of those which are not. Experience's place in triad is a particular state of the world with causal relationships to different states of the world. It not always there, but when it is, it is always itself.

If you've convinced yourself of that, I won't bother to argue the point anymore. But now all you've done is defined logic as any type of association. But clearly we distinguish between logical and illogical associations. So you've just gone around in circle, of contradiction, and unreasonable definition, trying to support an untenable position.

So, as I said, the self is free to think whatever it likes within the constraints of logic, and those very same logics constrain every self, just as the self is free to do whatever it wants within the constraints of gravity and the nature of the physical environment. — John

See, this is the mistake I pointed you toward. You want to reduce the constraints of logic, to nothing other than a constraint of the physical environment. But this is completely wrong, the constraints of logic are self-imposed, they are necessary for a purpose, to understand. The constraints of the physical environment are not self-imposed, and they present us with a completely different type of necessity.

Why should it be necessary that the self wills these logical constraint conditions into existence any more than it would be necessary that the self wills gravity and the nature of the physical world into existence? — John

There is a particular type of necessity which exists within the physical wold, it is described by the laws of physics, and such principles. In order to understand the physical world, the thinking being must will into existence rules of thought, laws of logical necessity, which are consistent with the necessity which exists in the physical world around it.

If you consider a variation of Willow's proposition of contingency, the world does not have to be the way it is, it could have been existing in many different ways, with many different possible laws of nature. The living being, when life came into existence in this world, must have been capable of adapting to any possible world which it might be born into. Therefore its mode of thinking cannot have been fixed by any specific form of logic, it must be free to produce logic according to the necessities (laws of nature) of the physical world it has been born into.

Truth is, the very idea of freedom loses all its sense if you think it (or more accurately if you try to think it: because you can't really think it) in a context of no constraint at all. — John

Yes, I believe that this is a valid point. But the point I am making is that there is a real need to differentiate between the constraints which are imposed on the living being from its environment, and the constraints which are inherent within that living being. These two types of constraint cannot be reduced to one category of similar type constraints. The reason that they are completely distinct is that the external constraints act to limit our freedoms, while the internal constraints are what allow us to maximize our freedom, in relation to the restrictions of the external constraints. Therefore they are completely opposed, and cannot be reduced to two of the same kind. The external constraints limit our freedom, while the internal constraints maximize our freedom.

3. Emergence means the presence of a new and different state, not that bodies are experience. Under emergence, the non-conscious never becomes the conscious.

4. Thus, the major charge leveled against emergence is false. It never entails non-conscious states turning into conscious states. Emergence is constituted new states of consciousness following states of body. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That makes no sense. I get that "emergence means the presence of a new a different state". But it does not follow that non-conscious never BECOMES conscious.. You just said that there is a presence of a new state- presumably the very thing (consciousness) that does not "become". Those are two opposing ideas. One that non-conscious does not become conscious and one where new states come from previous states.

The point of emergence is that experience is not always so. New states of consciousness appear out of previous states which are not consciousness.

If one rejects that the conscious can come out of the non-conscious, then they consider emergence impossible. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This I agree with and hence I am disagreeing with your argument.

7. Semiotic theory holds the account of emergence. New states which are consciousness appear out of those which are not. Experience's place in triad is a particular state of the world with causal relationships to different states of the world. It not always there, but when it is, it is always itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Right, I get this, but as you stated, I don't get how consciousness comes out of non-consciousness. I get how new states come out of new states constructed IN conscious experience. I get how physical things may even begat physical things "prior" to consciousness. I just do not get how physical things beget consciousness, which is the only thing we know which constructs the very world where things emerge in the first place. Prior to this, physical things are "being" or "doing their thing" if you will. But what is this mental "stuff" that is "what it's like to be something" otherwise known as experience?

See, this is the mistake I pointed you toward. You want to reduce the constraints of logic, to nothing other than a constraint of the physical environment. — Metaphysician Undercover

You really need to read more carefully; you're "pointing" me to a "mistake" I didn't make at all, based on something you apparently think I said, that I didn't say at all. I was merely drawing an analogy between the two kinds of constraint.

That makes no sense. I get that "emergence means the presence of a new a different state". But it does not follow that non-conscious never BECOMES conscious.. You just said that there is a presence of a new state- presumably the very thing (consciousness) that does not "become". Those are two opposing ideas. One that non-conscious does not become conscious and one where new states come from previous states. — schopenhauer1

I know that what’s dualism holds, but emergence rejects the primacy of consciousness.

Since consciousness is a new state of the world, it is never the states prior to it. The cause of consciousness can never be the emergent state of consciousness. Instead of “becoming,” where previously non-conscious things become conscious, there is only “emergence” of new states which were never there beforehand.

So it does follow that the non-conscious will never become conscious. My body will never be my experience. The non-conscious states which preceded my experience can never be a state of of awareness— if it were otherwise, it would not be “non-conscious.”

This also holds for all levels of panpsychism where consciousness is emergent. Consider a brick. Does it have states of awareness? Is the object of a brick a generator of consciousness like the human body? If so, the brick is in the same boat as us. Its body will never be its experience. The same is true of atoms. And so on and so on, for any non-conscious object there might be. If an object is “non-conscious,” it cannot “become conscious” because that would mean it was a different (conscious) object entirely.

Emergence entails that a new state (consciousness) is never the prior state (non-conscious).

Dualism cannot gasp this idea because it begins with the primacy of consciousness. The subject (be it a human, brick or atom), is first and foremost a being of awareness. It can’t consider, for example, that I was originally two cells with no experience at all. If I was given without consciousness at any point, the given states would simply not be me (at least that’s how the story goes).

This is why dualism read emergence as a question of “becoming.” To maintain the primacy of consciousness, the “non-conscious” must have really been conscious all along. Any object which causes consciousness, therefore, must retroactively “become” an entity of consciousness (despite the contradiction). It’s the only way to avoid entities existing prior to and outside their own conscious states.

I just do not get how physical things beget consciousness, which is the only thing we know which constructs the very world where things emerge in the first place. Prior to this, physical things are "being" or "doing their thing" if you will. But what is this mental "stuff" that is "what it's like to be something" otherwise known as experience? — schopenhauer1

That's the primacy of consciousness which the emergent account rejects. Under emergent consciousness, there is no "construction" by consciousness. Our world is not made be consciousness at all. Some states of the world are consciousness. In some instances we might say a conscious state is involved in a casual relationship, but that's it. Otherwise consciousness means nothing for the world.

The "mental stuff" is the existence of a conscious state. "What is it like" is searching for the being of consciousness-- not descriptions of "red," but the existence of being aware of "red." As such this has no description because any description is just words. No matter how I describe experience (even if it's in the first person), it will still only be a description. My telling of the red I saw will never be my seeing of red.

Part of the emergence account is the acceptance that the "mental stuff" or "what is it like" has no description. In "material objects (i.e. things observed in the world)", it has no form. It's it own thing-- experiences which exist. We can't get any closer than such pointers in language. The being of experience is felt, not described.

The "mental stuff" is the existence of a conscious state. "What is it like" is searching for the being of consciousness-- not descriptions of "red," but the existence of being aware of "red." As such this has no description because any description is just words. No matter how I describe experience (even if it's in the first person), it will still only be a description. My telling of the red I saw will never be my seeing of red. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, so it's about as "silly" as panpsychism isn't it? There is this mental stuff which just "exists" but it emerges from non-consciousness at point X time. There is a genie that comes out of the bottle when the right combination of emergence stuff happens..What is it, then that the world is before mental stuff? That too cannot be described with any certainty except mathematical models and thus we are stuck with a genie that came out of mathematical models. It has no efficacy or about just as much cache as panpsychism.. It explains nothing and its only appeal is it seems to conform to our naive common sense version of "first non-conscious' and then "conscious". It really says little, if anything about what mental stuff is other than the strangest most unique property in the universe- one that allows for all other properties to be known, that gives sensation, that allows for thought, imagination, and the other cognitive abilities that animals have and even gives us the ability to understand all other properties is simply like a particle or a force or any other physical process. The otherness of consciousness is not taken serious. Where panpsychists might overmine this idea, emergentists deflate it.

The "silliness"(if we are to call it that) of panpsychism is insisting consciousness emerges out of all existing states. It's a question of over quoting the number of existing states of consciousness, not an issue with a lack of explanation of "mental stuff."

It really says little, if anything about what mental stuff is other than the strangest most unique property in the universe- one that allows for all other properties to be known, that gives sensation, that allows for thought, imagination, and the other cognitive abilities that animals have and even gives us the ability to understand all other properties is simply like a particle or a force or any other physical process. The otherness of consciousness is not taken serious. Where panpsychists might overmine this idea, emergentists deflate it.. — schopenhauer1

Precisely. The emergentist is the one that respects the "otherness" of consciousness. For them it is enough for mental stuff to be a unique property of the universe.

Sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., why would we insist that consciousness was anything else? If you call recognising consciousness as a unique property expressed by some states the world "deflating it," the emergenist is certainly guilty. For them consciousness doesn't have to be anything more-- there's nothing more about to describe or explain.

It's the dualist who doesn't recognise consciousness as unique. They are always insisting it is more than the existence of sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., as if consciousness needed to be something else.

Dualism is reductionist. The emergentist says: "Hey, I found these unique states of the world. They are awareness, sensation, imagination and understanding, etc.,etc." How does the dualist respond? By suggesting the unique state of consciousness is not enough for consciousness, as if consciousness had to be defined by some other sort of presence. The dualist does not take the otherness of consciousness seriously. They suppose there is some way to make it disappear, to reduce it to something else, at which point we will have a "full account of consciousness."

You really need to read more carefully; you're "pointing" me to a "mistake" I didn't make at all, based on something you apparently think I said, that I didn't say at all. I was merely drawing an analogy between the two kinds of constraint. — John

Perhaps, based merely on the quoted passage, but then you went on to criticise the basis of my categorical distinction. What you wrote was not an analogy, but a criticism of the distinction itself. To attack the principle by which a distinction is made, is not to make an analogy, but to question the validity of the distinction itself. This is what you wrote:

Why should it be necessary that the self wills these logical constraint conditions into existence any more than it would be necessary that the self wills gravity and the nature of the physical world into existence? Why would you think the latter isn't as much a curtailment of free will as the former? — John

Since the distinction I was making, was that logical constraints are the same type of constraint as moral principles, ethics, and legal systems, and these are artificial (willed into existence), while gravity and other constraints of the physical world are natural, it was evident that you had not grasped the point.

Do you recognize the difference between artificial things and natural things, the former being dependent on the human will for existence, the latter not? If you recognize that some things are created by the human mind, and some things are not, why would you ask me such a question as in the quoted passage? Clearly, it is necessary to assume that certain forms (constraints) are willed into existence, to account for the existence of artificial things. Do you not agree, that the constraints of logical systems, along with the rules of language, political and legal systems, as well as moral and ethical principles, all belong in this category, as artificial, constraints which have been willed into existence?

Precisely. The emergentist is the one that respects the "otherness" of consciousness. For them it is enough for mental stuff to be a unique property of the universe. — TheWillowOfDarkness

NO, my point is that they do NOT treat it is unique. They UNDERMINE it to be just another physical process. But that seems unjustified based on how unique it is compared to say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle.

Sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., why would we insist that consciousness was anything else? — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, we would not. Rather, it is fantastically different in nature than other physical processes. You are being unintentionally patronizing here by stating the obvious- that this stuff exists.

If you call recognising consciousness as a unique property expressed by some states the world "deflating it," the emergenist is certainly guilty. For them consciousness doesn't have to be anything more-- there's nothing more about to describe or explain. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And that is precisely their problem. There is more than just saying that it exists. Again, it is unique compared to other processes. If this is the case, emergentists are essentially dualists, and then they are one step away from unintentionally saying that there is this mystic mental stuff that is part of existence. No self-respecting emergentist wants that, yet ignoring mental stuff to explain only models, implicitly seems to embrace this.

It's the dualist who doesn't recognise consciousness as unique. They are always insisting it is more than the existence of sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., as if consciousness needed to be something else. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, rather dualists are saying that sensation, imagination, understanding, etc. etc. are not the same as physical processes because the sensation of "red" is not the same as the wavelength hitting rods and cones UNLESS it IS the same (pace panpsychism). Rather dualists (which I personally do not identify with), will say that mental stuff is tied with physical stuff but is not the same. Again, I am not arguing this, just stating some of its ideas.

Dualism is reductionist. The emergentist says: "Hey, I found these unique states of the world. They are awareness, sensation, imagination and understanding, etc.,etc." How does the dualist respond? By suggesting the unique state of consciousness is not enough for consciousness, as if consciousness had to be defined by some other sort of presence. The dualist does not take the otherness of consciousness seriously. They suppose there is some way to make it disappear, to reduce it to something else, at which point we will have a "full account of consciousness." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Actually, I would argue that dualists do the opposite- they overmine consciousness as being so other, it does not fit in any physical framework. It is tied to physical processes but are not constituent in its nature of the physical processes. Again, I am not advocating dualism. However, without being a dualist, I am saying emergentists, are doing the opposite of dualists by simply overlooking how different mental processes are than physical processes. By simply saying mental processes exist, and emerge out of non-mental processes, there has to be an explanation of how this is so, and so far, from you at least, I see no explanation, just a "just so" story and moving forward with semiotics, formal causes, and all the rest.

NO, my point is that they do NOT treat it is unique. They UNDERMINE it to be just another physical process. But that seems unjustified based on how unique it is compared to say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle. — schopenhauer1

Sure, the Mind is just another physical process like life, creativity, knowledge, morality, and, a bit more prosaically, information and computation.

You think consciousness is amazing, but I think Life is also amazing, and we know that Life is a physical process. It is a physical process we are beginning to understand rather well, but if you look at the physical theory that explains it, there is no mention of "say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle". It is a theory of replicators subject to variation and selection. But look - a "physical" theory of abstract objects!

To claim that "just another physical process" undermines anything, is simply vacuous.

It is a theory of replicators subject to variation and selection. But look - a "physical" theory of abstract objects! — tom

Yes, a theory or replicators and much much more. A very rich and informed theory. That is still physical processes. Where at the end of the explanation of physical processes (which can be millions of pages in scientific research and academic knowledge), there is no leftover thing called "experience" to be explained. The physical remains the physical. Mental can be tied to physical through causality, but how it is that there is this experiential mental leftover from the theories is not explained, and perhaps cannot be simply through research.

You think consciousness is amazing, but I think Life is also amazing, and we know that Life is a physical process. It is a physical process we are beginning to understand rather well, but if you look at the physical theory that explains it, there is no mention of "say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle". — tom

I see you haven't read that little bit which Wayfarer recently referred. If so, perhaps you wouldn't be so sure that we're starting to have a good understanding of life. In the study of biology, each significant advancement has proven to expose us to a vast new realm of unknowns.

And I guess I need to remind you, there is no adequate "physical theory" which explains life, that's why people turn to abiogenesis, as a default hypothesis.

You think consciousness is amazing, but I think Life is also amazing, and we know that Life is a physical process. It is a physical process we are beginning to understand rather well, but if you look at the physical theory that explains it, there is no mention of "say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle". It is a theory of replicators subject to variation and selection. But look - a "physical" theory of abstract objects! — tom

Except biologists themselves would say it is physics regulated by something further - symbols or information.

The two are of course related in some fashion. But you seem to be talking right past that issue - questions like how a molecule can be a message.

Yes, I believe that this is a valid point. But the point I am making is that there is a real need to differentiate between the constraints which are imposed on the living being from its environment, and the constraints which are inherent within that living being. These two types of constraint cannot be reduced to one category of similar type constraints. The reason that they are completely distinct is that the external constraints act to limit our freedoms, while the internal constraints are what allow us to maximize our freedom, in relation to the restrictions of the external constraints. Therefore they are completely opposed, and cannot be reduced to two of the same kind. The external constraints limit our freedom, while the internal constraints maximize our freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see the point you are trying to make; but I don't see it is contrary, in regard to the questions of inherency and categorizations of constraints at least, to what I had said at all.

So, there are constraints from the environment and constraints form "within'. I tend to be a monist though, and to think that ultimately the 'internal' and the 'external' are not two separate realms at all. The distinction between the internal and external environments is a useful one to be sure; but I think it has no ultimate ontological force.

I haven't been attempting, then, to reduce physical constraints like gravity and the nature of materials to the same category as logical constraints like association and entailment, but just to point out what you seem to be admitting despite apparently not wanting to; that both kinds of constraints are inherent, are things which we just find ourselves thrown under, as it were, which means that neither are created ex nihilo, so to speak, by us.

And I disagree that external constraints, unlike internal constraints, limit our freedom but do not at the same time enable it. If there were no external constraints then there could be no freedom; one could not do anything of any significance because anything we did would be of equal value, that is of nil value, to everything else we might do. Both internal and external constraints both limit and enable our freedom; what could freedom be if there was nothing to be free from or free in relation to?

I tend to be a monist though, and to think that ultimately the 'internal' and the 'external' are not two separate realms at all. The distinction between the internal and external environments is a useful one to be sure; but I think it has no ultimate ontological force. — John

This is why you've been denying the distinction I've been trying to make then. Tell me, do you believe that there is a difference between casting your gaze outward, toward a bigger and bigger space, and looking inward toward a smaller and smaller space? If you believe that there is a real difference between these two directions, how can you say that the internal/external distinction has no ontological value?

And I disagree that external constraints, unlike internal constraints, limit our freedom but do not at the same time enable it. If there were no external constraints then there could be no freedom; one could not do anything of any significance because anything we did would be of equal value, that is of nil value, to everything else we might do. — John

That's only true under your assumed principle that there is no ontological difference between internal and external. The fact though, is that we assign values to potential acts, therefore activities have values assigned to them prior to even existing in the external world. So even if there were no activities in the physical world, this would not deny the existence of values, which are assigned to potential activities. This is what the concept of energy, the capacity to do work, signifies, a value is assigned based on what can be done, potential activities. Lack of external constraint would not leave freedom without value, it would allow unlimited possibility, and this is extremely valuable.

Lack of external constraint would not leave freedom without value, it would allow unlimited possibility, and this is extremely valuable. — Metaphysician Undercover

But unlimited freedom or possibility to do what? As soon as you do anything at all your doing of it is constrained by the fact that it cannot be all the things you are not doing, and once it is done you are constrained by the fact that you have done that thing and no other, and all the consequences that inevitably flow from that.

No, rather dualists are saying that sensation, imagination, understanding, etc. etc. are not the same as physical processes because the sensation of "red" is not the same as the wavelength hitting rods and cones UNLESS it IS the same (pace panpsychism). Rather dualists (which I personally do not identify with), will say that mental stuff is tied with physical stuff but is not the same. Again, I am not arguing this, just stating some of its ideas. — schopenhauer1

This is a strawman.

Under emergence sensation is not the same as a wavelength hitting rods and cones. Rods and light are only objects involved in the causation of experience. Experience itself is a different state. A "physical state of the world" which is experience-- mental stuff is a physical state of the world itself.

For emergence, mental stuff is physical stuff, just not the same physical stuff as bodies and their environment (e.g. rods, cones and light). Experience is a unique existing state.

If this is the case, emergentists are essentially dualists, and then they are one step away from unintentionally saying that there is this mystic mental stuff that is part of existence. — schopenhauer1

In the sense you are thinking, yes. Emergenists have (at least) a dual-aspect monism. Mental stuff is consciousness. Other states never are. The mind and body are always distinct, but part of the same realm. (existence, causality).

The emergentist isn't one step away from saying that mental stuff is part of existence. They claim it outright. Existing experiences emerge out of non-conscious objects. The presence of experience in the world is the intention of their entire position.

Here the only thing you get wrong is the "mystical." Since experience is an existing state, there is nothing strange about it's presence as a unique object. To be more than non-concious states is what the existence of experience entails. There is no "mystery." The uniqueness of consciousness is its nature. If consciousness exists, that's what we get.

...once it is done you are constrained by the fact that you have done that thing and no other.. — John

That's the point then, once it's done, the act has been externalized, and you're constrained by that external fact, prior to this you are not constrained by the internal possibility. You can decide to do something, then change your mind and decide not to, as long as the act has not been externalized, you are not constrained.

Now we are faced with this fundamental principle, that the internal is prior, and the external is posterior, that is, unless you still deny such a distinction. But I suggest that it is a very important distinction in relation to the passing of time. This principle conflicts with emergentist claims that inner possibilities are derived from external constraints. That is impossible, because for each external constraint which exists, the internal possibility for that constraint is necessarily prior to it. Therefore, if we want to seek a constraint which is prior to possibility, which limits possibility such that possibility is not infinite, we need to look for a constraint which is inherent within the internal possibilities. Such a constraint, actuality, or form, is radically different from the external forms or constraints which we know, being inherent within, and prior to possibility itself.

A "physical state of the world" which is experience-- mental stuff is a physical state of the world itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Oh, so you are saying that it is another state altogether- sounds familiar. So, instead of outright dualism, it is a hidden dualism. Gotcha.

For emergence, mental stuff is physical stuff, just not the same physical stuff as bodies and their environment (e.g. rods, cones and light). Experience is a unique existing state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Now you are just stretching what physical stuff is. How is it that mental states have everything classically given to mental states, and relabeling it as "physical stuff" doing anything different except simply relabeling what used to be called one thing another? Fine, everything is "physical stuff" that does not dismiss the fact that the mental states are different than other other types of physical stuff in very unique ways.

The emergentist isn't one step away from saying that mental stuff is part of existence. They claim it outright. Existing experiences emerge out of non-conscious objects. The presence of experience in the world is the intention of their entire position.

Here the only thing you get wrong is the "mystical." Since experience is an existing state, there is nothing strange about it's presence as a unique object. To be more than non-concious states is what the existence of experience entails. There is no "mystery." The uniqueness of consciousness is its nature. If consciousness exists, that's what we get. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Notice I put "mystical" in quotes. Yes it exists, but I disagree that it is not strange in its uniqueness among all other existent things. No other process, semiotic or otherwise, seems to be like this process in its uniqueness- sensation, imagination, cognition, etc. This is not just unique like one process is unique from another, but it is different in its apparent nature in that it has its "what it's likeness" that is leftover and is not explained where other physical processes do not have this explanatory gap. It is in causality (or may be the ground of causality if you think that), like other physical processes, but how it is that this mental stuff exists once other processes are in play, is not explained. Why the genie? What is this "stuff" other than saying that it is a state of existence. It does not seem entailed in the physical processes themselves like almost all other processes are. All other physical processes create simply more combinations of physical stuff.. molecules become more complex molecules.. That makes sense. Molecules become the sensation of red, that does not make sense other than positing a dualism of mental stuff that is simply not explained as to why it is entailed from molecules when all other stuff is not.

This is not just unique like one process is unique from another, but it is different in its apparent nature in that it has its "what it's likeness" that is leftover and is not explained where other physical processes do not have this explanatory gap. It is in causality (or may be the ground of causality if you think that), like other physical processes, but how it is that this mental stuff exists once other processes are in play, is not explained. Why the genie? What is this "stuff" other than saying that it is a state of existence. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. It's state unique to any other-- it is "what it's likeness": the existence of being aware which is not captured in any description. This is the "stuff" other than just being a state of existence. It's a "what it's likeness" rather than a rock or limb.

Being a "what it's likeness," which is not captured in any description, IS how the state is distinct and unique. It doesn't need to be anything else.

That makes sense. Molecules become the sensation of red, that does not make sense other than positing a dualism of mental stuff that is simply not explained as to why it is entailed from molecules when all other stuff is not. — schopenhauer1

No... that's the strawman again. Molecules do not become the sensation of red. Certain instances of molecules generate a new state (consciousness) which is not molecules.

Now we are faced with this fundamental principle, that the internal is prior, and the external is posterior, that is, unless you still deny such a distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the perspective of our experience, as considered, in some contexts, for example perception, the external seems to be prior, and in other contexts, for example volition or thought, the internal seems to be prior. But, in any case, whatever we choose to do or to think, it seems obvious that we are free only within the range of what it is logically and/ or physically possible to do or to think. I just cannot see how that could be sensibly denied.

Exactly. It's state unique to any other-- it is "what it's likeness": the existence of being aware which is not captured in any description. This is the "stuff" other than just being a state of existence. It's a "what it's likeness" rather than a rock or limb. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So it's a brute fact. Cool philosophy man.

Being a "what it's likeness," which is not captured in any description, IS how the state is distinct and unique. It doesn't need to be anything else. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Really? That's it? I guess everyone can close the books on the mind. Case closed. I'm glad that was figured out in a sentence.

No... that's the strawman again. Molecules do not become the sensation of red. Certain instances of molecules generate a new state (consciousness) which is not molecules. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Right, certain things cause this "red" thing which is unique in the fact that it is a what it's like experience, something that is radically different than any other physical phenomena. If you cannot see how this is so radically different that pit is not like other physical phenomena of nature- even other very unique phenomena.

Right, certain things cause this "red" thing which is unique in the fact that it is a what it's like experience, something that is radically different than any other physical phenomena. If you cannot see how this is so radically different that pit is not like other physical phenomena of nature- even other very unique phenomena — schopenhauer1

When you say that the quale "red" is unique, do you mean unique to you, to humans, to all animals?