When Dfpolis says we don't need anything more than for an explanation, they are saying we need is experience of the right concept itself-- e.g. the crispness of the apple, the triangularity of various triangles, etc. There is no higher or more foundational order than these necessary concepts. The existence (or non-existence) of human reason/experience has no impact upon these. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Thank you.

I don't think I would say that concepts have an intrinsic necessity. They result from an subject-object interaction between say, a human and a tree. Since both are contingent beings, the concept resulting from their interaction must also be contingent.

The brain processes most data without a hint of consciousness. — Dfpolis

I think what you're calling 'subjective awareness' is what I would call 'discursive awareness' i.e. things which we can bring consciously to mind, or are conscious of being conscious of. But there is a vast ensemble of ideas and knowledge which know tacitly or implicitly or without conscious reflection. Musicians, as you say (I myself am a self-taught jazz pianist) internalise skills in such a way as to perform them without deliberation, which is referred to as the stage of 'unconscious competence' in learning theory. As well as that there are all manner of unconscious or sub-conscious interpretation going on all the time, beneath the threshold of discursive awareness. But that is still 'conscious' in the broader sense as being attributes of a sentient mind.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour.

Still, as an Aristotelian Thomist, I reject the notion that universals are actual outside of the minds thinking them. What exists in individuals is potential universals (aka notes of intelligibility) -- not actual universals. — Dfpolis

But the problem then is how to account for the reality of intelligibles in their own right, rather than as derived from a purely material, neurological process. You say that you accept the logical order is real in its own right, but in what sense is it real? How do you ground it?

I mean, the fundamental dogma of materialism is that 'mind is a product of the brain' and that the brain in turn can be understood in terms of evolutionary biology and neuroscience (which is the default view in secular culture). But in what you're saying, I can't see anything that evolutionary materialism couldn't account for. Whereas the sources I have been quoting do support a form of dualism (although not Cartesian dualism).

From a review of Nagel's Mind and Cosmos:

Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what exists. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.

In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them. A person doesn’t experience patterns, and her experiences are as irreducibly real as her brain waves are, and different from them.

Now, what I am attempting to articulate is how this can be the case, with reference to ideas in traditional metaphysics, namely, the distinction that can be made between the material form of language, numbers, and so forth, and the meaning which they embody. I am trying to argue that the mind, when it comprehends meaning, sees something which can't be accounted for in neurological terms. (I have elsewhere argued that in order for neurology to account for it, it has to appeal to the very thing it is trying to account for, so it must involve itself in a circular argument.)

So while we both generally agree that there is a logical order which can't be accounted for by physicalism, I am trying to develop an argument for how it can be considered real apart from the in-principle account provided by science.

Maritain calls this "dividing to unite." — Dfpolis

Glad you mentioned him. I have dipped into Maritain, because I was interested in his book Degrees of Knowledge, which is sub-titled 'distinguish to unite', although I haven't made much headway with it; very difficult book. But the essay I've been reading recently is his Cultural Impact of Empiricism, in the introduction to which he says:

if it is true that reason differs specifically from senses, the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.

Hence, first, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency between what an Empiricist does -- he thinks as a man, he uses reason, a power superior in nature to senses -- and what he says -- he denies this very specificity of reason.

And second, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency even in what he says: for what the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients, -- sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent.

That is very close to the point that I'm trying to get it - that h. sapiens possesses a faculty which is of a higher order to sense-knowledge, but which is occluded or ignored in a lot of modern thinking.

So I think we agree on the main point, but not on the supporting arguments for it.

The concepts themselves are the ground of knowledge. Each concepts is necessarily expressed so grounding there is something for us to know.

The world has necessarily expressions of conceptual meaning, such that things, be they empirical truths (they express a concept which allows understanding of them) or logical ones. Human experience adds nothing special to them. Our experiences are just moments when we understand some of this necessary conceptual order.

Issues understanding the place of knowledge do stem from moves made by the empiricists, in the sense of philosophers, such as Kant, who equate our experience as the grounding of our knowledge. In claiming our experience is the origin of knowledge, they undercut the underlying conceptual order. We get stuck in a position of being unable to say necessary concepts define knowledge because what is known get reduced to a function of contingent experience. We mistake means of our knowing (our experiences) for the means of what is known (whatever truth we might know or not).

To unpick this equivocation, we have to return to the question of how there are things to know. What is it we need to know about something? How do our experiences of knowledge have understanding?

Once we make the move back to an account of Rationalism, where a necessary conceptual order forms the things we know, something interesting happens in the context of empirical knowledge. Since events of the world are of the necessary conceptual order, rather than just our experiences, empirical observation is not the foundation of knowledge , including of empirical states.

We can know about empirical events we never even observe.

In the context of metaphysics this very important because it reveals an incoherence to certain empiricist objections to realism. If I want to make a claim about the past world I never observe, we find I am no longer attempting the impossible.

Since the necessary conceptual order grounds the meaning of events, I just need the right concept to understand a state present before I exist and observe. I can know, for example, it was true dinosaurs roamed the Earth perfectly well. I just need the concepts expressed by those past living beings

They are all contingent beings, I wasn't suggesting otherwise. My reference to necessity is only in respect to their concept. In any case, the concept or meaning of a contingent state is necessary.

"The green leaves of the tree in my backyard" is a necessary meaning of that contingent state, until such time as it expresses a different meanings or ceases to be as a state. If someone comes along claiming this state doesn't mean "green leaves of a tree in my backyard yard" they will be necessarily wrong.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Yes. My point was that there is no need to invoke the notion of being subjectively aware, as opposed to medically conscious, to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals. The examples I cited were to point out that complex behavior without subjective awareness is part of the human experience as well. Thus, subjective awareness is something over and above what is required for complex behavior.

I would not call subjective awareness "discursive" because I am not referring to "things which we can bring consciously to mind, or are conscious of being conscious of." "Subjective awareness" does not name things we are aware of (which are on the object side of the subject-object relation), but our act of being aware of such things -- of being a knowing subject.

But that has nothing to do with behaviourism, as such. In fact a behaviourist couldn't even comment on it, unless he was able to show how they manifested as behaviour, as by definition the behaviourist does not concern himself with internal states but only with behaviour. — Wayfarer

Of course. Perhaps "functionalist model" would have been better. My point was and is that we have no need of subjective awareness to explain the kind of complex behavior we see in nonhuman animals -- the same point I was making by pointing to human experiences of automatic behavior.

But the problem then is how to account for the reality of intelligibles in their own right, rather than as derived from a purely material, neurological process. You say that you accept the logical order is real in its own right, but in what sense is it real? How do you ground it? — Wayfarer

In nature intelligibility never stands on its own as some kind of abstract entity.. Substances (ostensible unities) are capable of some acts and incapable of others. So, we can say that each has existence (the indeterminate ability to act) -- everything that is can do something, and if it could not it could never evoke the idea <existent>. It also has an essence, which I define as the specification of its capacity to act -- telling us what it can and cannot do. (Note that this is not the kind of "essence" defined by Aristotle, the kind that defines a species, but can vary between individuals in a species.)

When something acts on our senses is is doing one of the many things specified by its essence and so is providing us with incomplete information on its essence. (Perhaps it's looking like a duck, quacking like a duck and walking like a duck, but not revealing everything it can do.) When we become aware of the object's action on us we are informed by it. (The logical possibility that it could not do what it is doing to us is eliminated -- thus meeting Shannon's definition of information). Thus, our act of awareness raises the physical action of the object on us to the logical order.

So, if it's looking, quacking and walking like a duck its likely eliciting the concept <duck>. Of course it is logically possible that the other acts it can do, the acts it has not revealed to us could give us pause. Perhaps it can also act like a demon, fulfilling Descartes's worst nightmare. So, our knowledge of its essence is incomplete and somewhat conjectural and constructive. Still, we are justified in calling it a "duck," even if it is a very special kind of duck.

But in what you're saying, I can't see anything that evolutionary materialism couldn't account for. — Wayfarer

Of course, I disagree on many grounds that I have argued in detail in my book. Here are a few:

First, there is the fundamental abstraction of natural science which begins by abstracting away all data on the knowing subject as in favor of fixing attention on the known objects of the physical universe. Consequently, natural science is bereft of data on the knowing subject and its correlative intentional operations. As natural science lacks lacks these concepts and data, it cannot possibly connect these concepts to its knowledge of the physical world -- as required to reduce subjectivity to physicality.

Second, as David Chalmers has pointed out, in over 2500 years of materialist reflection, no progress has been made on the "hard problem of consciousness." Indeed, Danial Dennett, a naturalist, has shown at length in Consciousness Explained, a naturalistic model of consciousness is impossible. The relevance of this is that unless one can show what kinds of genetic modifications and consequent physical changes would produce consciousness, any appeal to the mechanisms of evolution is moot.

Third, unless you give subjective awareness and its correlatives independent ontological status, the only rational position is epiphenomenalism, which is to say that, while we have awareness, it has no physical consequences. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, then no mutation that gave us a glimmer of awareness could have a physical effect. Without a physical effect, it cannot impact reproductive fitness. If it does not impact reproductive fitness, the mechanisms of evolution cannot select it. So, evolution cannot explain the advent of awareness.

One response to this is that awareness could be the accidental concomitant of the evolution of some other, selectable feature. That is simply to admit that evolution does not explain the advent of awareness -- that it is an accident of unexplained origin.

Finally, no physical process can separate what is physically inseparable, but distinct in thought. For example, how could a purely physical process form separate representations of action and passion (acting and being acted upon) when they never occur separately?

I am trying to argue that the mind, when it comprehends meaning, sees something which can't be accounted for in neurological terms. — Wayfarer

I agree. My example of the distinction of action and passion forms a prime example.

I am trying to develop an argument for how it can be considered real apart from the in-principle account provided by science. — Wayfarer

I suggest that you look at the difference between formal and instrumental signs in Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic. It shows that physical representations are not the same kind of signs as ideas.

That is very close to the point that I'm trying to get it - that h. sapiens possesses a faculty which is of a higher order to sense-knowledge, but which is occluded or ignored in a lot of modern thinking. — Wayfarer

Again we agree. I am suggesting that awareness is the sine qua non of reason.

the concept or meaning of a contingent state is necessary — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not sure where you are seeing the necessity. Clearly the concepts come to be in the individuals thinking them. If they were necessary, they would always be. Are you a Platonist?

"The green leaves of the tree in my backyard" is a necessary meaning of that contingent state, until such time as it expresses a different meanings or ceases to be as a state — TheWillowOfDarkness

Meaning is a relation between a sign and what it signifies. Since the sign need not exist and the relation is contingent on the existence of the sign, its meaning is not necessary. I do agree that the judgement <The tree in my back yard has green leaves> can't mean anything other than what it actually means. The problem is simply that the judgement need not exist.

I suggest that you look at the difference between formal and instrumental signs in Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic. It shows that physical representations are not the same kind of signs as ideas. — Dfpolis

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