It seems to me that philosophers of law would tend, as in many other 'philosophies of...' (science, mathematics, ethics), to divide into those that think there is some Platonic entity that is (in this case) the Law (capital L), to which the laws we make are better or worse approximations, and those that regard law as a purely human activity that has no existence other than that which humans give to it by their creation and use of it. No doubt there's still enormous amounts of discussion that can happen within either of the two camps, but it seems inevitable to me that it divide into these two camps on Platonic vs non-Platonic lines.

FWIW I'm a non-Platonist on most things I can think of, including law, ethics, science and mathematics. But that's just my disposition, not an assertion of correctness.

There's another 'philosophy of' that is interesting, and has nothing to do with one's degree of Platonicity. I think of 'The Tao of Pooh', or 'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance'. These are about the philosophical insights one can gather from engaging in a certain concrete activity, whether reading children's stories or fixing a Suzuki. My partner does a great deal of craft, and seems to get great satisfaction from it, which makes me wonder if there is some 'Philosophy of Quilting' from which I would benefit if I could only catch hold of it. The philosophy can also be about how one engages in the activity in order to obtain certain benefits, as a form of praxis. This is particularly strong in Zen (eg 'Zen and the art of archery', or think of all that raking of pebble gardens) but is also used in other traditions.

Curiously, certain of those topics which seem to be addressed by the philosophy of law appear sociological more than anything else. "What is law" is a question that's often addressed by reference to social customs, for example. Other philosophers of law are advocates of natural law, but that would seem to go not merely to law's origin but the reason why it's treated as governing. I have a certain affinity for the legal positivists as they tout the distinction between morality and law. Morality may influence law, I believe, but becomes less and less a factor as legal systems grow more complicated, as ours certainly is, and a practicing lawyer gets used to pointing out to clients that the law in its operation can have little to do with justice; with right and wrong.

When it comes to "What is law" I'm not sure there can be any answer which isn't addressed in greater part by saying the equivalent of "here's how it works" and "here's what it does" in given circumstances. Perhaps that's the case with other professions, disciplines or occupations there are philosophies of.

I think I would just say that your fashion of answering perennial questions in the philosophy of law is itself a particular philosophical disposition. But, on the whole, I don't find distinctions between the philosophy of some practice and the practice to be terribly useful. Rather, it seems to me that in practicing such-and-such we already have some philosophical notions being put into practice -- some of which, I imagine, get challenged in the practice and some of which get affirmed.

Sometimes I wonder if my thoughts go too far on this. But I don't see how you get around having beliefs about the nature of the practice you're doing. Perhaps if these are unexamined then one isn't doing philosophy, but one still has beliefs that fall under what is properly thought of as philosophical.

I think I would just say that your fashion of answering perennial questions in the philosophy of law is itself a particular philosophical disposition. But, on the whole, I don't find distinctions between the philosophy of some practice and the practice to be terribly useful. Rather, it seems to me that in practicing such-and-such we already have some philosophical notions being put into practice -- some of which, I imagine, get challenged in the practice and some of which get affirmed. — Moliere

I accept that it could indicate a philosophical disposition. I suppose that disposition would be that the philosophy of law, if it's not about how the law works and what it does as experienced by those who are involved in the operation of the law and what it does, isn't intended to describe or define law as it exists. It has some other purpose. Perhaps it's intended to address how law comes to be in some very abstract sense--the creation of actual laws is a part of the operating legal system. Perhaps it addresses why we make laws, assuming it's possible to do so without knowing how we make them. Perhaps it addresses why we, generally at least, follow the law in some sense unrelated to the manner in which it's enforced and the risks involved in breaking the law.

The philosophy of law, according to those descriptions, involves pondering such questions as "What is law?" and "What are the conditions of legal validity?" These aren't questions I've been asked to answer in my practice. I might be asked "What is the law (about something)?" but no judge or client has asked me "What is law?" — Ciceronianus the White

A guard against metaphysical infection in the practice of a profession that prides itself on objectivity and facts is not unheard of. And I'm not just talking about the practice of law.

(Hello, C. Good to see you again.)

Law is what you must deal with, what you must comply with or evade (legally of course). It's the problem you want to resolve, the thing you want to take advantage of, something you'd like to see repealed, in the here and now. — Ciceronianus the White

It sounds just like a tiger, or a mountain. Approaching from the depths of ignorance, it looks to me as if law is already philosophy, in the sense that it is the formalisation of social relations, etiquette ossified. 'Pass the port to the left' - 'drive on the right'.

Your claim understandably makes the law into a material affair (reification) but the fact is, there is no 'must' about it, one can very easily break the law, and it is the inherent fragility of its every stricture that is it's essence. The laws of physics are what one must comply with or evade and they rule with or without formal statute; not so the laws of men, which are arbitrary in nature.

Lawyers may be like tigers. I know some who are like mountains, of a certain substance.

I guess I was assuming it was understood Law or the law is something humans create or do. So, I don't think it's like a tiger or a mountain strictly speaking. Sometimes, though, we encounter tigers or mountains and they present certain problems or opportunities for us as Law/the law does, though of different kinds, and we think and act as we think appropriate to resolve the problems or take advantage of the opportunities.

I'd say the law is unlike philosophy if only because it's something that is enforceable in the sense that its violation may result in monetary penalties or incarceration, and decisions rendered in civil proceedings may likewise be enforced by collection of damages, injunctions, etc. This tends to make it a greater influence on our conduct than philosophy. Certain philosophical positions and issues are, I think, routinely ignored by us in our daily lives, without recourse by philosophy or philosophers.

And while I'm quite aware of the fact that legal decisions may be arbitrary, and even some laws may be, I'd say that in the main the law isn't arbitrary in the sense that laws generally are not randomly adopted, or adopted by chance, but have ends in view which relate to things we actually do and are intended to regulate what we do, prohibit what we do, or allow us to do things we want to do depending on the circumstances. They're grounded in something very real, human conduct, desires and aversions, and their purpose is determined by what those making and enforcing laws want to achieve regarding those things.

I think it quite possible to think about Law and the laws and say certain things regarding them, and if that's philosophy of law, so be it. But I think if that's not informed by the actual way in which the law operates, conclusions drawn will be insignificant or trivial and will not serve to define or describe the law, which is an operating system.

I'd pretty much go along with that. I tend to think that philosophy of [x] is neutered without experience with the [x]. So in philosophy of science you have an intense interest in the history of science. Many philosophers of science have also done science. But to say that the law is nothing more than

. . . what you must deal with, what you must comply with or evade (legally of course). It's the problem you want to resolve, the thing you want to take advantage of, something you'd like to see repealed, in the here and now. — Ciceronianus the White

is the philosophical position I'd say you've marked out. If someone were to define law without some knowledge of the law, be it in practice or in its history, then I'd probably not think their position was well founded. But that wouldn't invalidate their position, but rather their method -- they could have, after all, stumbled upon a good answer. They just don't have good reasons for it.

Consider: a scientist may say that science is nothing more than what scientists do. But other scientists may disagree with that, on philosophical grounds. Because there is experience involved we can hope that there is some kind of knowledge to draw from, though it is quite possible that the scientists are philosophically naive and making some basic errors of judgment because of a lack of familiarity with philosophy.

And my neighbor may say the same thing, but without said experience or knowledge of either philosophy or science, in which case the answer may be right but there's no reason to follow along with their reasoning.

A guard against metaphysical infection in the practice of a profession that prides itself on objectivity and facts is not unheard of. And I'm not just talking about the practice of law. — Caldwell

I wondered whether that's the case, but don't feel knowledgeable enough in those professions to address the philosophy which is "of" them.

Good to see you again, too.

They're grounded in something very real, human conduct, desires and aversions, and their purpose is determined by what those making and enforcing laws want to achieve regarding those things. — Ciceronianus the White

Well we agree, I think; I called that 'social relations'. I say it is arbitrary in the sense that we could reward homicide instead of punishing it, or we could regard it as a merely regrettable foible.

Consider: a scientist may say that science is nothing more than what scientists do. — Moliere

There's a sense in which this is true of any practice: medicine is what medics do. But it's unhelpfully circular. I think it is worth trying to distinguish medicine from quackery, science from crack-pttery, law from tyranny and mafia codes.

Cicero's emphasis on enforcement is interesting, because it does not distinguish the legal system from the Mafia at all.

Good points. I was just using that as an example, but you're right to point out the very human concern with spelling out the nature of some practice, rather than just reaching for truisms that are unhelpfully circular.

I might be inclined to agree with the definition of law if it's no different from the mafia. :D But that's a thread too far astray to say more than that.

I agree with your method, though -- the distinction between something useful and something that appears useful is, itself, worth looking at, exploring, and attempting to define on purely pragmatic grounds.

If someone were to define law without some knowledge of the law, be it in practice or in its history, then I'd probably not think their position was well founded. But that wouldn't invalidate their position, but rather their method -- they could have, after all, stumbled upon a good answer. They just don't have good reasons for it. — Moliere

I think there's more involved than that. I wondering whether philosophy of "law" has anything to do with the law. I suppose it might in a very vague, very general sense, which I think involves speculation regarding why there are laws, which I wonder is of much value. Also, treating "Law" as something apart from, perhaps superior to, the law seems to me misguided.

Cicero's emphasis on enforcement is interesting, because it does not distinguish the legal system from the Mafia at all. — unenlightened

I think this is the kind of concern which arises only when we treat "Law" as unrelated to the law, and I think that's also the case with the claim that the law arbitrary because it doesn't reward homicide.. I suppose we could consider whether the law is like the Mafia, or why we prohibit homicide, but I don't think the law is being referred to except in a very superficial sense. These seem more in the nature of ethical issues, and I'm assuming, perhaps wrongly, that philosophy of law is intended to be something different from ethics.

Well, to be honest, I am at a disadvantage in that philosophy of law, specifically, isn't something I'm familiar with. I've been thinking mostly by analogy to the philosophy of science, which I am familiar with. I don't know to what extent those two overlap or could be treated as the same.

Scientists often express a lack of need for the philosophy of science. The problem there is that science involves reasoning, some of which has even changed over time in terms of what is acceptable or not, and it basically amounts to saying that the present philosophy of science as enshrined in the institutions of science are all you need. For a paycheck they are correct. But if one were to wonder something along the lines of "How does science work?" or "To what extent does scientific knowledge elucidate reality?" or "Does science prove that God does not exist?" or any number of questions which people do actually ask and feel they have answers to then you'd at least be pondering things which philosophy ponders, or answering philosophical questions without any philosophy.

Sure it's possible to do. But why settle for beliefs arrived at badly?


I'm not sure to what extent this would apply to the philosophy of law, though.

it seems to me that in practicing such-and-such we already have some philosophical notions being put into practice — Moliere

Am I alone in having a viscerally negative reaction to this sort of thinking?

On the one hand, I think philosophy, much like science, begins in everyday efforts at reasoning in everyday situations. Do this more reflectively, more systematically, and you're doing something else, despite the origin, because you've changed the context, the goals, all sorts of things.

I've also thought it ridiculous for philosophers to claim everyone is always taking philosophical positions, or that they're implied. It seems like an attempt at self aggrandizement, like the undergraduate who comes home for Christmas break and lectures his parents on their metaphysical assumptions.

(Are philosophers more prone than other sorts of scholars to worry that what they do is pointless? Do they feel more need than others to assert the importance of what they do?)

I hope this doesn't sound like a personal attack. It's not remotely. Just something I think about now and then. I'm hoping you can make such claims seem more reasonable than they seem to me now.

Am I alone in having a viscerally negative reaction to this sort of thinking? — Srap Tasmaner

Probably not :D

On the one hand, I think philosophy, much like science, begins in everyday efforts at reasoning in everyday situations. Do this more reflectively, more systematically, and you're doing something else, despite the origin, because you've changed the context, the goals, all sorts of things — Srap Tasmaner

I'd like to hear more from you on this argument. While I don't think there is a single point at which basic reasoning becomes philosophy, I would be interested in hearing what you believe philosophy to be as opposed to what the philosophy of is such that it seems ridiculous to claim that those engaged in some activity obviously do not have philosophical beliefs.

For me, as I said before, It's something that I'm open to saying I might be over-extending, but it's a belief that I can't unsee either.

I've also thought it ridiculous for philosophers to claim everyone is always taking philosophical positions, or that they're implied. It seems like an attempt at self aggrandizement, like the undergraduate who comes home for Christmas break and lectures his parents on their metaphysical assumptions.

(Are philosophers more prone than other sorts of scholars to worry that what they do is pointless? Do they feel more need than others to assert the importance of what they do?) — Srap Tasmaner

Well, I think there is a difference between doing philosophy and some activity. My thinking is more along the lines that if you have beliefs about whatever it is you are doing then you'll have beliefs which fall squarely within what counts as philosophical. And it seems to me that as people do things they also come to believe things about what they are doing -- so you'll have an engineer who believes that engineering is organized around such and such to such and such ends by such and such means. "Engineering" means something, and it is possible to count what is a part of engineering from what is not engineering or what is good engineering from what is bad engineering. Sometimes these are set up by the discipline itself -- there are collective rules which hold as a kind of grammar between engineers. They are widely agreed upon. And sometimes it's more a matter of taste.


But in either case we're dealing with the nature of the activity or what good it is for or how it should be done which are the sorts of questions that philosophers investigate.

The only way out of that is simply to not have beliefs about these things. But I don't know how you'd come to extirpate beliefs about what you're doing without engaging in some kind of philosophy. To me, at least, coming to believe such-and-such about what I am doing just comes naturally. So at one point, for instance, I had a certain set of beliefs about science, and as I came to do philosophy of science I changed those beliefs. But my starting beliefs were common sorts of answers to questions in the philosophy of science -- that science comes to approximate reality, that it is the best way to truth, that it is characterized by its methodology above all else.

So, yes, I could do science without questioning such beliefs. But I don't know what else I'd call those sorts of beliefs other than philosophical beliefs -- because there certainly isn't a science of science, for instance. And the debate on what is a good answer to various questions about science take on all the tools which philosophers develop.

They don't do it absent some kind of knowledge, mind. But it's not like in answering what the scope of scientific inquiry is means I'm doing either just science or just history.


For other activities I don't see why I'd not have beliefs of the same sort.

I hope this doesn't sound like a personal attack. It's not remotely. Just something I think about now and then. I'm hoping you can make such claims seem more reasonable than they seem to me now.

No worries. I hope I don't come across as having such thin skin that you worry about it too much just by expressing a philosophical belief or asking a question. Hopefully we'll both feel we have a better understanding of one another and ourselves by the end of it all.

I'm enjoying this thread, sincerely.

But I have to say, as a whole, with regard to the OP it feels a lot like : 'I've heard of these couples who sleep *with other couples* - that's crazy right?
So bizarre, can't imagine. But, just pretending, If me and my wife were to do something like that, not that we would, but it would go something like this...

There's a lot of philosophy of law being done against 'philosophy of law' I mean

I don't know what your saying, alas. It seems to have something to do with reactions to unusual sexual practices.

I'm simply wondering what philosophy of law is, and suggesting that as it seems it isn't about the law, it's about something else, probably ethics. I suppose there could be something like "meta-law" but again that would seem to be addressed to ethical issues, I think. If it's supposed to be about law, though, it should take into account what the law is in practice.

Unless, of course, we must first encounter the "not-law" in order to understand the law. Perhaps that's the philosophy of law.

I would have assumed that philosophy of law dealt with the different ways of grounding law: divine law, natural law, positive law, etc. That's not the basic subject matter? Well, maybe it's not basic.

I've only read the OP though, and unlike @Ciceronianus the White I know nothing about the topic.

That could be the subject matter of philosophy of law. In that case, though, I think the philosophy of law would be derivative of some pre-formed philosophical position, e.g. belief in God, belief in some kind of Platonic Form of law which the law seeks to emulate. It brings premises along with it, and becomes a kind of special pleading. Unless it considers first the law in its actual operation and makes reasonable inferences from such an analysis.

But such is always the case or at least should be. We carry with us foundational principles we adhere to and from that we create a consistent world view. How is it that the subject of ethics creates less a challenge to you than your question of what is law? Belief in God, for example will similarly shape the ethical theory you accept.

I'd like to hear more from you on this argument. While I don't think there is a single point at which basic reasoning becomes philosophy, I would be interested in hearing what you believe philosophy to be as opposed to what the philosophy of is such that it seems ridiculous to claim that those engaged in some activity obviously do not have philosophical beliefs. — Moliere

I think you begin to do philosophy not when you think about things, but when you think about how thinking about things is done, could be done, should be done. Not even all use of reason need be philosophy, but reasoning about reasoning is probably where it starts.

If I tell you I think that girl in our homeroom likes you, am I doing philosophy? No. If you ask why I think that, are you doing philosophy? No. If I give my reasons for so thinking and why I count them as
reasons? Still no. But if, at this point, you stare off into space and say aloud, "How can you ever be sure what another person is thinking or feeling?" Ho ho! Now the world's in danger of acquiring another philosopher. (The staring off into space and talking to yourself out loud is a dead give away.)

I want to contrast that with how someone might say, "You never can tell what someone else is thinking." That's just a ready conclusion from experience, not much different from saying, the peaches you buy at a roadside stand are always better.

Figuring out whether a girl likes you is not a philosophical exercise. Figuring out how people figure out things like that -- hard to say. We're at least in the circle of psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, behavioral economics, all that sort of thing. We're edging into philosophical territory, and that's good enough for me most of the time. I'm interested in all these ways of thinking about reasoning. I'm tempted to say that once there's a normative dimension to your reflections -- here's how people should figure these sorts of things out -- then we're definitely doing philosophy. I'm not sure that's a good enough answer though, because you can always instrumentalize: if you want to get the right answer more often than not, then you'll reason this way.

Honestly, I'm pretty conflicted about this. Sometimes I'm inclined to take reason to be the subject matter of philosophy. Other times I've thought philosophy is not defined by subject matter at all, but by approach. (Ryle has a line about this somewhere, to the effect that people think philosophy is ordinary thinking about quite peculiar stuff -- minds, free wills, essences, meanings, and other such will'o'wisps -- but in fact it's peculiar ways of thinking about quite ordinary stuff.)

How do you see things?

One thing I'm not being clear enough on is that there is certainly a difference between doing something and doing philosophy. The distinction isn't useful to me not because there is no difference between the two, but rather because there are philosophical beliefs that are at play in the doing. We can do such and such without doing philosophy, but I believe that in doing such and such we have philosophical beliefs in play.

Take your example, for instance -- that someone likes you. Already we have to have some kind of theory of mind at work for that to make sense, which is the sort of thing philosophers investigate. We probably also have some kind of thought, though at this point it's pre-theoretic, about what it means to like someone or be liked.

I see philosophy as being defined, to a large extent, by the philosopher themself. What counts as philosophy and what counts as good philosophy are oftentimes bounded by the philosophy which someone is proposing. So there is something of an existential element to defining philosophy, where we choose the path we walk down -- but upon choosing, the other paths are lost and while we can recognize that other paths were available we have to develop what we decided and continue on.

But such is always the case or at least should be. We carry with us foundational principles we adhere to and from that we create a consistent world view. How is it that the subject of ethics creates less a challenge to you than your question of what is law? Belief in God, for example will similarly shape the ethical theory you accept. — Hanover

It may be that we carry with us beliefs that influence in some sense in all we do. But in my reply to Erik I said that philosophy of law would become a kind of special pleading "unless it considers first the law in its actual operation makes reasonable inferences from such an analysis." I have hopes that preconceptions may have less of an effect if that's the starting point.

I see philosophy as being defined, to a large extent, by the philosopher themself. What counts as philosophy and what counts as good philosophy are oftentimes bounded by the philosophy which someone is proposing — Moliere

Are you "doing" the philosophy of philosophy, in making this statement? Is "doing" the philosophy of law similar, then? Are philosophers of law simply expressing their opinion of what law is, or their opinions regarding what it is that is done by those people who make the laws, enforcement them, or practice law? If that's the case, I would think an understanding of the law and how it operates would be necessary if such opinions are to have any validity.

Yes, and I'm drawing from the history of philosophy in making said statement. But I believe I have said that an understanding of the [subject matter] is important to have a well grounded philosophy. Yes? Otherwise you'll just be drawing opinions out of nowhere.

I would agree, as to both philosophy of law and "philosophy of philosophy."