I don't really take him seriously as a philosopher. He falls more into the apologist camp, cheerleading for a certain tradition and attacking its attackers, rather than having anything to say for himself. I read his book on how to think about God and just wasn't moved by it.

The comment about the empiricists might have some merit to it, depending on what you make the intellective faculties of the mind to be. My suspicion is Adler wants to equivocate between the obvious point that people can understand and judge (something the empiricists obviously never denied) and whatever specifically metaphysically charged, Aristotelian understanding of this simple fact that he takes it to require. As a mere observation in the differences between an Aristotelian and a modern empiricist (the latter being, surprise surprise, empiricist) isn't very interesting.

Adler included Locke in his criticism of the empiricists, but says that Locke did acknowledge abstract thought, and that the other empiricists criticized him for his inconsistency.

Adler's main point in chapter 2, is to claim that mankind has 2 distinct cognitive powers or faculties... the sensitive and the intellectual.

This is how Adler ends his chapter 2, on The Intellect and the Senses:
"The action of the brain is only a necessary, but not the sufficient, condition for the functioning of the human mind and for the operations of conceptual thought. We do not think with our brains, even though we cannot think without them."

Adler included Locke in his criticism of the empiricists, but says that Locke did acknowledge abstract thought, and that the other empiricists criticized him for his inconsistency. — anonymous66

Fair enough -- but Berkeley, Hume, and Hobbes were all more thoroughgoing in their empiricism than Locke.

Adler's main point in chapter 2, is to claim that mankind has 2 distinct cognitive powers or faculties... the sensitive and the intellectual. — anonymous66

Again, I don't think that claim means much unless situated in some tradition he's trying to defend, which knowing Adler, will be Aristotelian-Thomistic, and will probably come with some metaphysical baggage that the uncontroversial fact that people think won't support.

The duality of the mind seemed to shift more toward passive and active, rather than sensory and intellectual, in the early modern era. The empiricists do recognize a certain duality, with receptive faculties juxtaposed against volitional ones. Whether on the receptive side, the denial of the ability to form abstract ideas ala Berkeley amounts to the assertion that mankind has no intellectual faculties is questionable.

That's Berkeley*.

Didn't Berkeley claim that all perceptions and thoughts are given to us by God, and that this explains why we all see the same world and have the same kinds of thoughts about it?

He claimed that roughly for what we think of as 'external impressions' of the outside world, yeah. We'd also be capable of conjuring images actively out of our own imaginations, and having impressions that were as vivacious as external ones but were spun out of our own minds, as in dreams, hallucinations, and after-images (but these also would ultimately come from God in a way, since he effectively would control the operations of our bodies and brains).

Exactly, because our "bodies and brains" would be, in Berkeley's system merely God's ideas. It's hard to see how, in that context, it could be consistently claimed that our thoughts, dreams and memories, and even our minds, would not also be Gods' ideas.

If I read him correctly, Adler says that Hobbes, Berkely and Hume deny our ability to have self-awareness and our ability for abstract thought. — Anonymous66

I get the gist of his argument, as he is coming out of the A-T tradition, whose current notable exponent is Ed Feser. The above comment all pivots around the rejection of universals and scholastic realism; the philosophical antecedents of the empiricists were William of Ockham, Frances Bacon, and Duns Scotus, who were nominalists. 'Only particulars are real'. This means rejecting the reality of not only universals but any real abstract truths. God is all-powerful but also entirely other, we are totally unable to fathom his mysteries but are abject creatures whose pitiful conception of reason falls short...and so on. It also has the effect of confining all knowledge to the sensory domain (represented in algebraic geometry). Welcome to modernity.

I am sympathetic to all those arguments, however, it's because in many respects Aquinas was the last outpost of classical philosophy and arguably of the perennial tradition in Western thought.

I do agree with Adler that we can reject both nominalism and Plato's forms. We humans do have the intellectual capacity to take particulars and group them into categories that might be referred to as "universals". Our capacity to perform this task doesn't look all that magical to me.

Another point that Adler makes in the chapter is that humans and animals aren't on a continuum when it comes to intellectual abilities. According to him, humans are in a category all by themselves in that we are the only creature that is capable of abstract thought and the ability to think about his own thinking (so animals are sense only, man has senses and his intellect).

He mentions scientific studies done in the 1980's (his book was published in 1985) and suggests they help make his point. I wonder if animal researchers today would agree with Adler's conclusion? I don't think we have evidence that any other animal is able to think about its own thinking, but their intellectual abilities are still being actively studied. (If I read the article correctly, the researchers are saying not that animal's intellectual abilities are non-existent, but rather that they're just different from man's).

Here is a synopsis of Chapter 4: Knowledge and Opinion. (Adler's book: Ten Philosophical Mistakes). All this is from Adler's point of view, this is, as far as I can tell, what he believes about the subject at hand.

All men desire to know- Aristotle. Those who have knowledge about anything are in possession of the truth about it. We could be wrong in our claim to have knowledge, but have some truth. No such thing as true or false knowledge, and that's what distinguishes it from opinion, which can be either true or false. If knowledge turns out to be false, then it was obviously only opinion.

We can be absolutely certain about some things, but there are other things about which are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, but still there Is some doubt. If certitude, then incorrigible and immutable, if even some doubt, then mutable and corrigible.

Given the above, how much knowledge do any of us have? Most would admit to having very little. The history of science shows that its open to change and correction. But, still we wouldn't label the great generalizations of science as opinions.

Adler speculates that there may be a certain types of opinion that could properly be called knowledge (close to knowledge without actually being knowledge). And then there would be another type of opinion, far removed from actual knowledge, that could properly be called mere opinion.

If the criteria for actual knowledge is so extreme (must be certain, incorrigible, and immutable), then it must come down to a small number of self-evident, necessary truths. If self-evident, then we cannot think of the opposite.

Is everything except self-evident and necessary truth to be considered an opinion? Yes and no. If we can relax the standards a bit, and appeal to evidence and reasons, then we can justify a claim that an opinion is actually true. By using "at the time" we are acknowledging it is open to correction or rejection at a later date.

Personal prejudices are mere opinion. Beliefs are mere opinions. "Belief" can be used in a way to suggest that we do both know something and believe it- it signifies we have some doubt.

But "Belief" can also be used in a way that is meant to signify a lack of evidence. If something is self-evident, then it is not a belief. Many, but not all, mathematical truths are knowledge (2+2=4 is given as an example of knowledge).

Personal opinions are mere opinions. But opinions that are known beyond a reasonable doubt because of evidence and reason, are rightly called knowledge.

Knowing is not like eating. When we eat something, we change it. When we know something, it remains as it was. (the observer effect in quantum mechanics is an exception). Apprehension of an object (real or imagined, or a concept) is not equivalent to knowledge. There is nothing true or false about an apprehension.

In another sense knowledge is like eating. Whatever is eaten is independent of the eater, before it is eaten. In the same way, knowledge exists independently of the knower. (more to follow)

The knowable is often referred to as "reality". Reality is that which exists whether we think about it or not. Reality may or may not refer to the physical. But, it must be public, not private. If knowable by one person alone, then it's not knowledge (it most be possible of also being known to others). Adler notes he will use "knowledge" to refer to self-evident truths and opinions when those opinions have sufficient evidence and reasons to outweigh contrary opinions. This is opposed to the concept of "mere opinion."