It is already apparent that Wittgenstein's idea aims at the construction of a geometrical representation for the logic of propositions, and that his "logical space" is an abstract space like the "phase‑space" of physics or the "sample‑space" of the theory of probability. And this leads immediately to the next and most essential question: what are to be the points of this abstract logical space?
The right answer: to this question has been already given by Stenius (Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', 1960): every point in logical space is the representation of a possible world! (Stenius' answer is not the only one that has been suggested, but none of the others will do as an interpretation of Wittgenstein's position.) Let's call these worlds "logical points". We have thus:
Logical space = the totality of logical points,
The logical the set of logical points which
place of “p" = would make the proposition "p" true.
One point in logical space is designated: it represents the actual world. (Since each possible world is incompatible with every other the designated point is unique.) Of course, we do not know its exact position; but if we know a proposition "p" to be true, we know the designated point to lie in that area of logical space which is the logical place of "p". Thus we have:
"p" is true = the designated point is contained in the logical place of "p".
According to Frege the denotation of a proposition is its truth‑value; according to Wittgenstein the denotation of a proposition is its logical place (= a set of possible worlds). And 'this makes clear, why formula (F) has to be rejected.
I believe the answer is presented in the above quote from the website you referenced. I see now that I'm going to have to delve into Stenius' interpretation of the Tractatus. Dang... — Posty McPostface
Well, it just says that the actual world is represented by a designated point in logical space. But why is this point designated? — litewave
Just think of it as an observer that obtains reality from what they observe, the world. Yeah, it's getting mystical and solipsistic here. — Posty McPostface
My personal opinion is that possible realities branching out and diverging from the actual world kind of fade off and become meaningless. Take it for what's that worth, just an opinion. — Posty McPostface
although upon reflection I fail to see why a particular possible world should be more real than others, or what it would even mean... — litewave
Thus we get 2.172: "The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth." (More below.) — Srap Tasmaner
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