• javra
    525


    Hm. It’s not that the philosophy of mind is directly formative of the psyche it seeks to explain. Rather, the ontology I subscribe to facilitates the significant possibility that there can be such a thing as formless awareness; this at what I hope is readily understood to be a metaphysical level of being—for both the physical and the mental are endowed with form(s). This would be a perfectly selfless being/awareness devoid of first personhood—due there being nothing other relative to it by which first personhood can be established. In using this significant possibility as a premise of what is metaphysically ontic, then it can be inferred that all selves are, if one likes, fragmented or divided parts of this formless awareness in various proximities to this ideal state of being. An ant would be further away from it than a human. But this gets complex very quickly in any number of different ways.

    Information as I’ve tried to express it is then virtually the same as Heraclitean notions of logos (better translated as “reason in the form of causes and motives” than as “word(s)”). And the formless awareness addressed could be compared to Neoplatonism’s “the One” or the Eastern concept of Nirvana—neither of which are minds—as well as to Aristotle’s first (teleological) cause.

    To be very clear, I’m not trying to argue my case. Only want to illustrate how this outlook doesn’t suffer from the dilemma you’ve address—illustrated by the analogy of space, time, and matter being created by the theories one upholds (that is, if I've understood your criticism correctly). The data points remain the same regardless—in terms of psychology, physics, and everything in-between. But yes, the metaphysical explanations for them will often be considerably modified from the typical physicalist paradigm(s). (I nowadays prefer the term of a “dual aspect neutral monism” for this perspective since it tends to better convey to others what the ontology implies.)
  • javra
    525


    We share many views in common. Best of luck with your endeavors.
  • Galuchat
    435
    We share many views in common. Best of luck with your endeavors. — javra

    I've noticed, and cheers.
  • unenlightened
    2.4k
    It’s not that the philosophy of mind is directly formative of the psyche it seeks to explain. Rather, the ontology I subscribe to facilitates the significant possibility that there can be such a thing as formless awareness; this at what I hope is readily understood to be a metaphysical level of being—for both the physical and the mental are endowed with form(s). This would be a perfectly selfless being/awareness devoid of first personhood—due there being nothing other relative to it by which first personhood can be established. In using this significant possibility as a premise of what is metaphysically ontic, then it can be inferred that all selves are, if one likes, fragmented or divided parts of this formless awareness in various proximities to this ideal state of being.javra

    It's certainly not direct; I didn't mean to suggest it. If anything, the cycle is negative, such that for example, Freud has an insight into the psyche - " sexual repression leading to hysteria, bla, bla..." which transforms the psyche as it becomes well known, to the extent that sexual repression is so much reduced that hysteria ceases to be a thing, and Freud is left looking like an idiot. This is why psychology is more like a fashion show than a science, with every generation having a new, and properly scientific approach, and the previous approach is exposed as ill founded in some way. What you describe here is the ontology of 'mindfulness', currently being industrialised as the cure for ADHD, anxiety, depression, and other complaints of the age. Expect an outbreak of radical instability of personality to follow, already evidenced by renewed interest in exorcism. :sad:
  • javra
    525


    I’ve never, never, liked Freudianisms. Anything that is remotely worthwhile in Freud can be found in William James’s “Principles of Psychology”—a lengthy book which incorporated Darwinian evolution with James’ honest accounts of what we’d term spiritual accounts, of course staying true to all experiments known at the time concerning both physiology and established accounts of behaviors. My favorite Freudianism to criticize is his Oedipus/Electra complexes; cuz if the kid were to have only one parent of the opposite sex then they’d be chasing their parent all day long for tail. Besides, it’s a damned blatant justification for pedophilia no one ever seems to want to address (the preadolescent kids want to have sex with their parents, apparently). Freud is what you get when you mix atheism, mythologies, an authoritarian complex, and good decade’s worth of cocaine use. But Victorian people lapped up his talk—doctors miraculously curing “hysteria” with dildos and orgasms (telling I think)—because it spoke a lot more to being human than did the Behaviorism that quickly took over academia. Which is not to diminish the data on classical and operant conditioning. Cog.sci . is one form of psychology I hold esteem for: as with any other science, it theorizes, but all these are checked and balanced by needing to remain aligned to the empirical data acquired.

    As to everything from exorcisms to New Age-isms that go haywire and the like, all this is detrimental when—and because—it forsakes the physical logos of the world as though it weren’t there (this to continue using the terminology I’ve previously made use of in this thread). Sorry, you may not like gravity and might want to fly off of tall structures because of some novel insights … but evolution as we know it will still have its say (the biological too is an aspect of the world’s physical logos).

    You raise complex topics that I don’t want to belittle—for they’re quite pertinent. Nevertheless, I don’t believe that insisting on physicalism can serve as a remedy to them. Should of worked by now, I would think.
  • unenlightened
    2.4k
    You raise complex topics that I don’t want to belittle—for they’re quite pertinent. Nevertheless, I don’t believe that insisting on physicalism can serve as a remedy to them.javra

    Amen to that, bro. So then one is left with an irreducible moral and aesthetic component to psychology, I think, in answering any question of the 'proper functioning' of the human psyche, or a supposed irreducible human nature. Which will be the less debilitating the more it is explicit in a theory.
  • javra
    525
    So then one is left with an irreducible moral and aesthetic component to psychology, I think, in answering any question of the 'proper functioning' of the human psyche, or a supposed irreducible human nature. Which will be the less debilitating the more it is explicit in a theory.unenlightened

    Couldn't agree more.
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