• Rich
    3.1k
    Ok, but I do not think that Verlinde, Bohm etc arrived to such conclusions (as far as I know).boundless

    In a way yes, and a way no. How much of it do they perceive, how they may articulate it, how much they can articulate it (considering they both depend upon academic careers) only they know. They, as everyone else lives within constraints. Just recognize that any academic or researcher is subjected to enormous, career ending pressures if they stray too far from the materialist lines that given academic funding.

    IMO will never have a scientific "proof". I am not saying that is wrong BTW, but it is only speculative. It somewhat reminds me some "concepts" of string theory like the idea that particles are mode of oscillation of strings. But as physics is concerned there is no "mind" involved, simply because it is an unfalsifiable concept.boundless

    "Science" had morphed into a huge money making industry that depends upon the supremacy of chemicals over mind. While "science" has no problem fabricated unprovable concepts such as the Big Bang, Laws of Physics, Dark Matter, Dark Energy, Multi World/Multi Universe, Thermodynamic Imperative, Selfish Genes, Space-Time, etc., they do have a persistent problem with the everyday ubiquitous experience of Mind. Fundamentally, money distorts and pollutes any and every endeavor. The more the money involved, the greater the distortion. One in a while something interesting comes out of the corners of scientific research but it is tough to find.

    But as physics is concerned there is no "mind" involved, simply because it is an unfalsifiable concept.boundless

    All fundamental concepts of physics are unfalsifiable. Scientists just don't use the word Mind because that ends funding. They use substitute words such as the Laws of Physics in its stead.

    I do not see any "purpose" in the action of inanimate objectsboundless
    Inanimate objects, other than the manifestation of decay, no longer have the vibrational capacity to create, though in their own way (a super nova for a example) they still do create. It is interesting.

    is a possibility that there is purpose, that the "Universal Mind" created everything, but in a way that there is no visible "purpose", at least as science is concerned.boundless

    Science's alternative explanation is that there was this Big Bang (quite a comical concept if you meditate on it) and then Everything Just Happened By Accident. Even Erik Verlinde mocked this explanation.

    Stephen Robbins provides a coherent explanation of perception, the "hard problem", in a Bergsonian framework here:

    https://youtu.be/RtuxTXEhj3A


    either information or mindsboundless

    Actually memory and mind, which are aspects of the same. But I think you get the point. Science pretty much accedes to the memory/information part, they just can't get themselves to acknowledge themselves, that which is creating all like these theories and ideas. The rest of your summary it's pretty much on the mark. It is very holistic with a very precise ontology based upon memory, mind, and will. The only requirement is that one accept Mind as fundamental as opposed to the scientific explanation in which it magically appears out of no where, and is just an illusion created for no apparent reason or without any theory.
  • Andrew M
    301
    Ok, In some sense this view reminds me Schopenhauer position that the world as an empirical object necessitates the "opening" of the first sentient "eye" in the world. It is certainly interesting.boundless

    I'm not particularly familiar with Schopenhauer's position. However I tend to identify with Aristotle's position that the intelligible world just is the sensory world (as against the various two-world dualisms held by thinkers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant). We represent things from a point-of-view, but those things nonetheless precede their representation (as the existence of the Earth prior to the emergence of humans to talk about it attests).

    But how can, say, the cosmological model fit in such a description? Our "hypotheses" for the past are indeed in the "preferred basis". Do these "hypotheses" remain "true" in your view or they are a sort of "fiction"? (this point was never clear to me, I apologize if this question is obvious. But it is clear that all non-quantum theories work in the "preferred basis branches"... so if such a theory is correct how is the status of "predictions in the past"?)boundless

    Yes, they remain true. I see the bases in QM as similar to the reference frames of relativity. Just as descriptions are indexed to a relativistic reference frame, so they are also indexed to a basis (or a relative state within a basis). Any basis is valid and, if suitable language has been developed, can also be described (e.g., a particle that was detected at a particular position can also be described as having been in a superposition of momenta).

    Anyway I think that your "solution" is a possiblity to avoid the rejection of "simple" MWI by Schwindt's argument. I concur, thereofore, that it is a valid "escape" from refutation!boundless

    Cool! Although, as far as I'm aware, this is the mainstream Everettian view. For example, David Wallace says, "But emergent processes like [decoherence] do not have a place in the axioms of fundamental physics, precisely because they emerge from those axioms themselves."

    The idea here is that things do not need to be fundamental nor precisely-defined in order to be real. Wallace often gives an example with tigers. They are real even though the Standard model doesn't mention them.

    Mmm interesting! I cannot say if it is a valid counter-argument, but maybe it is. Just for curiosity, is it based on some papers?boundless

    Yes, it's based on Carroll and Sebens' derivation which uses math from Zurek's envariance paper. Sean Carroll discusses it on his blog - here's a summary quote:

    What if the amplitudes for the two branches are not equal? Here we can borrow some math from Zurek. (Indeed, our argument can be thought of as a love child of Vaidman and Zurek, with Elga as midwife.) In his envariance paper, Zurek shows how to start with a case of unequal amplitudes and reduce it to the case of many more branches with equal amplitudes. The number of these pseudo-branches you need is proportional to — wait for it — the square of the amplitude. Thus, you get out the full Born Rule, simply by demanding that we assign credences in situations of self-locating uncertainty in a way that is consistent with ESP.Sean Carroll - Why Probability in Quantum Mechanics is Given by the Wave Function Squared
  • boundless
    33
    In a way yes, and a way no. How much of it do they perceive, how they may articulate it, how much they can articulate it (considering they both depend upon academic careers) only they know. They, as everyone else lives within constraints. Just recognize that any academic or researcher is subjected to enormous, career ending pressures if they stray too far from the materialist lines that given academic funding.Rich

    Agreed. Of course we are conditioned by our education, environment etc. What I meant is that they knew that physics is based e.g. on quantitative predictions. And while they of course had a strong metaphysical component in their thought, they were well aware about the difference between the two.

    "Science" had morphed into a huge money making industry that depends upon the supremacy of chemicals over mind. While "science" has no problem fabricated unprovable concepts such as the Big Bang, Laws of Physics, Dark Matter, Dark Energy, Multi World/Multi Universe, Thermodynamic Imperative, Selfish Genes, Space-Time, etc., they do have a persistent problem with the everyday ubiquitous experience of Mind. Fundamentally, money distorts and pollutes any and every endeavor. The more the money involved, the greater the distortion. One in a while something interesting comes out of the corners of scientific research but it is tough to find.Rich


    Well, again in some aspects I agree and in others not. "Multi World" for example is IMO metaphysics. For example in the string theory version the idea is that all that is predicted to be possible, happens. To me thinking that this is scientific is very problematic, to say the least. In some senses I agree with what you say about "Laws of Physics": of course there are "regularities" but at the same time we need not to thin them as "things". The "Big Bang" is simply the "beginning", i.e. we see that our measurements suggest that the universe had a "start time". So it is an inference of our theories. Of course not all physicists might agree, but it is a "scientific concept", IMO. The same can be said for Dark Matter and Dark Energy. Especially for "Dark Matter" we see that if GR is right at cosmological scales, then we have to admit its existence. Alternative theories are, to my knowledge, at least, inelegant (and also they have difficulties to "reproduce" the same results of GR where it works well). Regarding "Selfish Genes" I do not know much, but IMO it is a speculative approach, and even not so "well accepted" by biologists. I do not know anything about Thermodynamic Imperative, instead. Finally "space-time" is at least a very useful concept. However here I agree that there is some tendency to reify it.

    All fundamental concepts of physics are unfalsifiable. Scientists just don't use the word Mind because that ends funding. They use substitute words such as the Laws of Physics in its stead.Rich

    Physicists do not use the world "Mind" because it is not a concept that can be treated quantitatively. I cannot even imagine a formula about "mind". But again, I am not saying that your view is wrong ;) By the way as I said before "laws of physics" is a meta-physical concept, not a physical one in my view!

    Inanimate objects, other than the manifestation of decay, no longer have the vibrational capacity to create, though in their own way (a super nova for a example) they still do create. It is interesting.Rich

    Actually in a different way I wondered about the capacity of inanimate processes to maintain themselves. For example a star is a system that has a tendency to maintain its identity due to internal processes of energy production. Again, I might even agree that a latent form of "mind" is present in them, but it is not useful as science is concerned.

    Science's alternative explanation is that there was this Big Bang (quite a comical concept if you meditate on it) and then Everything Just Happened By Accident. Even Erik Verlinde mocked this explanation.

    Stephen Robbins provides a coherent explanation of perception, the "hard problem", in a Bergsonian framework here:
    Rich

    I wasn't familar with Verlinde view. Interesting!

    Thanks for the video ;)

    Actually memory and mind, which are aspects of the same. But I think you get the point. Science pretty much accedes to the memory/information part, they just can't get themselves to acknowledge themselves, that which is creating all like these theories and ideas. The rest of your summary it's pretty much on the mark. It is very holistic with a very precise ontology based upon memory, mind, and will. The only requirement is that one accept Mind as fundamental as opposed to the scientific explanation in which it magically appears out of no where, and is just an illusion created for no apparent reason or without any theory.Rich

    Yeah, I am actually drawn to "panpsychism" and related ideas (after having read Spinoza's theory of psycho-physical parallelism). For example the simple fact that the universe has regularities suggests that some "latent mind" is a reality, IMO. I agree that physicists nowadays tend to be too much skeptical or even "a-priori" contrarian to this sort of ideas. As I said elsewhere this is IMO a mistake. They tend to refute these ideas too quickly.

    I'm not particularly familiar with Schopenhauer's position. However I tend to identify with Aristotle's position that the intelligible world just is the sensory world (as against the various two-world dualisms held by thinkers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant). We represent things from a point-of-view, but those things nonetheless precede their representation (as the existence of the Earth prior to the emergence of humans to talk about it attests).Andrew M

    Actually the term "dualism" has a lot of meanings. For example the Kantian version the "a-priori forms" are simply about how our mind works. Aristotle IMO it is still a dualist since he makes a distinction between the sensory world and "the real world" (again, it is not directly what Aristotle thought but it is heavely implied!). Schopenhauer's view ws very similar to Kant's. By the way only a naive realist would assert that the "percieved world" is the same as the "real world". I think that we are agreeing, and interestingly QM in its various interpretations seems to suggest the same!

    Yes, they remain true. I see the bases in QM as similar to the reference frames of relativity. Just as descriptions are indexed to a relativistic reference frame, so they are also indexed to a basis (or a relative state within a basis). Any basis is valid and, if suitable language has been developed, can also be described (e.g., a particle that was detected at a particular position can also be described as having been in a superposition of momenta).Andrew M

    Again interesting! The problem I have with MWI is that there are too many worlds. I find it very problemtic. But again it does not mean that some ideas are very sound!

    Cool! Although, as far as I'm aware, this is the mainstream Everettian view. For example, David Wallace says, "But emergent processes like [decoherence] do not have a place in the axioms of fundamental physics, precisely because they emerge from those axioms themselves."

    The idea here is that things do not need to be fundamental nor precisely-defined in order to be real. Wallace often gives an example with tigers. They are real even though the Standard model doesn't mention them.
    Andrew M

    Yeah, I agree. They are not "real in themeselves", so to speak. But of course they are real (reality seems to have layers).

    Anyway I also agree that decoherence is emergent, and in fact the "purest" MWI does not even have that axiom. But again, this does not mean that decoherence cannot be addes to the formalism (and adding decoherence is not as adding "particles" etc).

    Yes, it's based on Carroll and Sebens' derivation which uses math from Zurek's envariance paper. Sean Carroll discusses it on his blog - here's a summary quote:Andrew M

    Thaks! I will read!
  • Rich
    3.1k
    IMO. The same can be said for Dark Matter and Dark Energy. Especially for "Dark Matter" we see that if GR is right at cosmological scales, then we have to admit its existence.boundless

    This is the whole point. It highlights in bold the enormous bias of science. The intention of science is to clearly externalize space and most especially time (duration) so science built a whole ontology around so-called space-Time without any call to do so. And when it falls apart science literally, out of thin air, science creates an invisible universe composed of dark matter and dark energy.

    Physicists do not use the world "Mind" because it is not a concept that can be treated quantitativelyboundless

    Have you ever seen the Laws of Physics quantified, or Evolution, it Thermodynamic Imperative quantified? These are all placeholders and substitutes for Mind, a word that is verboten because science does not want to admit to it. Scientists have free minds seeking the truth but we don't. We are deterministic robots while they are seekers of truths (like Dennett) and this are are immune to illusions and are able to see through the illusions to help us along. This sleight of hand actually works!

    "laws of physics" is a meta-physical concept, not a physical one in my view!boundless

    Yes, but materialist science uses the term all the time. They never use the word Mind. This is not an accident. The allowable nomenclature is clear.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.4k
    The first two paragraph was actually my point. Especially "recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future". This is why I think such a "self" cannot be said to an "actual self". To be an "actual self" (and so to speak not only "in potentia" - I am using Aristotelian terminology) one must experience the "flow". What I meant is that without the "experience" of change, there would be absolutely no self-awareness - and therefore nothing that could be rightly called as "self".boundless

    So I'd say we agree on this point, and what would be left would be to work out finer details, such as the relationship between the self, and the flow of time. What I proposed, is that the self desires to position the flow as external to the self, and this would alleviate the tinted glass problem. It places the soul at the eternal, unchanging now of the present, with all change occurring around it, giving the soul the "clear" perspective of all material existence.

    Now, the problem I alluded to is that this perspective is just assumed. We realize that to avoid the tinted glass problem we must give the soul this perspective, so we assume that this perspective is a real possibility, and we attempt to locate ourselves there. This perspective gives us "the point in time". The point in time is a non-temporal division between two periods of time, which allows true contiguity between the two periods. As I said, it is assumed, so it is artificial. We just assume that periods of time can be separated from each other by inserting a point.

    Special relativity however denies the reality of that perspective. It posits vagueness with respect to the division between past and future, and makes the point in time, which crisply divides one duration from another, unreal, inconsistent with physical reality. So special relativity adopts other principles which deny the soul this perspective, forcing us to look for another means to avoid the tinted glass problem.

    With what you are saying in the third paragraph, I am paradoxically in agreement. In fact to be aware of oneself as a "timeless" point one must clearly have been before self-aware. But we saw that self-awareness arises when AFTER there is the awareness of change. So in this case, to be aware of the "static now" requires, paradoxically, that one has been aware of change. If there is a "substantial self" then maybe it could actually be self-aware "timelessly" only after having "learned" self-awareness from change. Hope it made senseboundless

    Yes, this demonstrates that you understand exactly what I was saying. The self apprehends change. It recognizes that to understand change it must provide itself an observation point. So it assumes the soul to occupy the eternally unchanging position of "now", as an immaterial entity, with non-temporal and non-spatial existence. This is the purely non-dimensional point. It cannot be temporal because all time exists on both sides of that point, and there is no duration at the point. At this assumed point, we traditionally would have produced a "state". The state is represented by a statement of what is assumed to be, at this moment in time. States are subject to the fundamental laws of logic, non-contradiction etc..

    Again, relativity theory messes this up, because with relativity, the state at an particular point in time, is dependent on the frame of reference. Assumed states, are dependent on the non-temporal moment in time for their staticity, and without that required moment in time, the statements cannot adequately describe reality. So, the self desires to posit that moment of division between future and past, as the pure observation point of temporal existence, but relativity has stipulated that this observation point is unreal, and has forced the tinted glass problem back upon us.

    Yeah, I can agree. There is however IMO a problem with this theory. We assumed that in all this it remained the same. So I was wondering does it interact in some way with "matter", or is it only a "detached" observer? If it interacts however it can change, and therefore the self does not strictly remain itself as time passes. But conversely if it does not change, how can it "learn" to be self-aware and to search to find a "a-temporal" perspective?boundless

    This is a complex issue which you raise, and this issue forces the need to assume a third aspect, and this is matter itself. The traditional concept of matter, as derived from Aristotle describes matter as the potential for change. It is the underlying substance which does not change when change is occurring. So for example, we take wood, and give it all different forms, the underlying thing, "wood" stays the same. It is the "matter". In this case "wood" is determined as the thing which stays the same (matter), while its form changes. We can go further though, and say that wood itself is just a form of the underlying molecules, which are the matter. Then we could separate out the molecules of the wood, and wood is no longer wood, this form has changed, and in this case the molecules are the underlying thing which doesn't change (matter). We can proceed to atoms, then the molecules would be a changing form, and the underlying atoms would be the unchanging matter. In modern physics, "energy" has replaced "matter" as the underlying thing which doesn't change (law of conservation). The concept of energy is much more versatile, because unlike matter which is the underlying substance of an objects, energy is transferrable from one object to another.

    That was a big digression, to explain that "matter", and now "energy" are the concepts which account for our assumptions of temporal continuity. The assumption of this underlying thing, which stays the same from one moment to the next, as time passes, is what validates the belief that time is continuous, and all the "laws" of nature which we produce. Now let's put this together with the previous points. The self assumes an immaterial observation point at the "now" in time. From here it observes changing forms and notes in statements, particular states at particular times. It also observes continuity, aspects which stay the same from one moment to the next, and this feature is assigned to "matter", inertia and energy. So this concept, the underlying thing which stays the same as time passes, "matter", is the way that the self relates the assumed unchanging eternal point of the now, its observation point, to the changing forms. Matter partakes of both features. It persists at the present, as an eternally unchanging thing, yet all the changing forms, as time passes are said to partake of matter, being material forms, subject to the laws derived from the assumption of temporal continuity.

    In my opinion, this concept which accounts for the underlying thing which does not change, "matter" or "energy", can be reduced to the passing of time itself. If we put aside special relativity, for the moment, we can assume that the passing of time is the underlying thing which does not change throughout all physical changes, and this provides the potential for change, the exact criteria for the Aristotelian concept of "matter". Once we take this step, we have the three aspects clearly individuated. The soul takes its observation point as eternal, and distinct from the passing of time. The changing forms of physical existence are apparent to it. The changing of those forms is made intelligible by noting the consistency in the passing of time. How we, as human beings interact with the changing forms, is now tied up with how time passes. This is how the eternal "now" relates to the changing forms of physical existence. This is the existence of the self, the interaction between the eternal now and the changing physical forms, which is the passing of time. How this is possible is the secret which will be unveiled when we discover the principles to unscramble the vagueness of the present moment which is disclosed by relativity theory, thus removing the tinted glass.

    If you refer back to my earlier post I described this as objects passing a plane. And if we assume that bigger objects take longer to pass that plane than smaller objects, this necessitates the conclusion that the point, which is the now of the present, is not a point at all, but it must have some dimension, the plane has breadth. That is why there is a trend now in the philosophy of time, toward a two dimensional time, we must give the present breadth. Within this breadth, interaction can be accounted for.
  • Andrew M
    301
    Aristotle IMO it is still a dualist since he makes a distinction between the sensory world and "the real world" (again, it is not directly what Aristotle thought but it is heavely implied!).boundless

    I'm curious where you find Aristotle implying this. Aristotle rejected Plato's realm of Ideal Forms and instead located form in the natural world (see hylomorphism and also immanent realism).

    Again interesting! The problem I have with MWI is that there are too many worlds. I find it very problemtic. But again it does not mean that some ideas are very sound!boundless

    OK, though isn't that a problem with our expectations of how the world should be rather than a problem with the Everettian interpretation itself? Or do you think there is more to it than that?
  • boundless
    33


    Apart from the consideration on Dark Matter, Big Bang etc I think that your objections are against how "scientists" present science itself. In my opinion, much of the concepts you are criticizing are either "speculative" or "metaphyisical". The problem IMO is that amongst scientists there are a lot "physicalists", i.e. who believe that only the "physical" is real. This is not my view, of course. But at the same time it seems to be the "metaphysical position" prevalent among scientists. This conditiones clearly how science is presented etc. For example many "materialist" use the term "phyisical laws" as a "figure of speech", i.e. they do not "reify" it. They use this term because it has less "metaphysical" connotations than "mind" (and therefore methodologically it is "more suitable" to use the term "phyiscal laws" than other terms - the contention is probably due to the fact that the "materialists" confuse the methodological with the ontological, so to speak!).


    Regarding Aristotle, I admit that I was not clear. What I meant it is that Aristotle introduced a dualism between "the substance" and "the accidents" regarding "things in the sensible world". Of course Aristotle, as far as I know, was a direct realist and therefore he thought that we see reality as it is. The problem is that when epistemological concerns are appreciated, then there is another level of "accidents", i.e. how things appear to us in contrast to how things are in themselves. IMO Aristotle disinction between "substance" and "accidents" was the foundation of the distincion between "primary qualities" and "secundary qualities" of Galileo (and Descartes, Locke...). This introduced the "indirect realism" which then influenced Kant etc. For Plato the "changing world" was without substance, a world of accidents, so to speak. The epistemological concerns that began in the 17th centrury were due to Aristotle, rather than Plato (of course Aristotelism can be considered a "form" of Platonism, hence the saying of Whitehead "western philosophy is a series of footnote of Plato's philosophy").

    Regarding Everett's interpetration. Yes in a sense I agree, it is a "issue" of "preference" on my part. But the same could be said for preferring SR (Special Relativity) over LET (Lorentz ether theory). Both give the same results and in their limits of validity can be considered two different "interpretations". But when GR came, SR was much more compatible with it (altough interestingly http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/ here there is a serious proposal to make an extension of Lorentz theory to gravitation*.). In the same way I believe that MWI is a less "reliable" description of reality than other interpretation. Of course this is a "metaphysical/interpretative" reason. But it is the same reason why before the introduction of GR, SR was to be preferred over LET.

    *Actually the reason of this proposal is the "non-locality" of Bohm's theory. Bohm theory is compatible with LET and not with SR (in its usual form. See for example https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.4102), therefore the idea is to extend LET in order to make a theory of gravitation compatible with Bohm's theory.


    Thank you for the insightful response!
    I will reply as soon as I can ;)
  • Andrew M
    301
    Of course Aristotle, as far as I know, was a direct realist and therefore he thought that we see reality as it is. The problem is that when epistemological concerns are appreciated, then there is another level of "accidents", i.e. how things appear to us in contrast to how things are in themselves.boundless

    Yes, though this is a perfectly natural and ordinary distinction. For example, the straight stick appears bent when partially submerged in water. But it's something else entirely to say that the straight stick is itself merely an appearance. This kind of "Plato's Cave" conclusion was just what Aristotle rejected.

    IMO Aristotle disinction between "substance" and "accidents" was the foundation of the distincion between "primary qualities" and "secundary qualities" of Galileo (and Descartes, Locke...). This introduced the "indirect realism" which then influenced Kant etc. For Plato the "changing world" was without substance, a world of accidents, so to speak. The epistemological concerns that began in the 17th centrury were due to Aristotle, rather than Plato (of course Aristotelism can be considered a "form" of Platonism, hence the saying of Whitehead "western philosophy is a series of footnote of Plato's philosophy").boundless

    So I read it in the other direction. I see these philosophical innovations as a rejection of Aristotle's natural empiricism (where distinctions arise naturally in one's ordinary experience of the world) and instead as a reintroduction of Plato's dualism in different forms.

    I also see the ordinary language philosophers as a corrective to that kind of thinking. For example, Wittgenstein's private language argument and Ryle's regress argument against indirect realism.

    Of course this is a "metaphysical/interpretative" reason. But it is the same reason why before the introduction of GR, SR was to be preferred over LET.boundless

    What interpretations would you suggest should be preferred to MWI for that reason? Note that MWI requires the least number of postulates of any interpretation and is also a local theory (so is naturally compatible with SR).
  • Rich
    3.1k
    What interpretations would you suggest should be preferred to MWI for that reason? Note that MWI requires the least number of postulates of any interpretation and is also a local theory (so is naturally compatible with SR).Andrew M

    It just seems like whenever materialist/determinist theories are in trouble, science makes up invisible matter, invisible energy, and now who knows how many invisible universes (has anyone actually calculated the number of invisible universes that have been created?). Is invisible, unmeasurable, unknowable stuff the new paradigm of science? If so, does that make room for God?
  • Andrew M
    301
    Is invisible, unmeasurable, unknowable stuff the new paradigm of science?Rich

    Fair enough, let's see what the theory of quantum mechanics says. There are two postulates that are shared by all the different interpretations. They are:

      [1] The world is described by a quantum state, which is an element of a kind of vector space known as Hilbert space.
      [2] The quantum state evolves through time in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, with some particular Hamiltonian.

    Note that there are no invisible worlds postulated there.

    Now here's the evolution of the wave function for the double-slit experiment with a detector at the slits and an observer that reads the result. The first quantum state is the particle being emitted. The second quantum state is the resulting superposition when the particle is detected.

      [1] (A particle is emitted; detector says "ready"; observer sees "ready")
      [2] (A particle travels through the left slit; detector says "left"; observer sees "left") + (A particle travels through the right slit; detector says "right"; observer sees "right")

    You can see that there are two worlds described by the wave function. How do you interpret that as one world without adding a postulate to make one of the worlds disappear? Or, if you do add a postulate, what is the principled motivation for doing so?
  • Rich
    3.1k
    You can see that there are two worlds described by the wave function.Andrew M

    Bohmian mechanics avoids this entirely by positing a real quantum potential and wave perturbation. MWI exists to preserve determinism, as does Relativity, with the embarrassing consequences that 95 % of our very own universe has become invisible and an uncountable number of new universes are created with every observation. It would be interesting to know exactly how much invisibility has now been created by modern scientific explanations, all done with a straight face as if there was a difference from this and mysticism.
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