• BlueBanana
    873
    There's this thought I think about sometimes about finding a new, undiscovered island, regarding which I won't go into greater detail here.

    But let's say the island in question has a large area. Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of square kilometers. This is, of course, practically impossible but whatever. Would the currently existing states just say, "sure, you happened to drift ashore first, keep the land"? I doubt that, even though isn't that how they got their land in the first place as well? Someone went somewhere and said, "this land belongs to me now".

    If there was only one other country arguing about the ownership of that newly-discovered land (and a logical argumentation was a valid way of solving the disagreement), it would of course all be so simple. If they wanted the land, I could claim I claimed it to be mine first. If they argued that I had no right for the land, I could turn that against them, which would be fine by me - I'd keep the land as a natural reserve anyway so it being a no-man's-land would be a victory for me.

    There is more than one country in the existence, though, and both of the previous arguments can't be used simultaneously. But how about owning something only in respect to someone or something else? You never claim to own the land in respect to the countries that don't claim it either, but claim its ownership in respect to any such countries that also try to own the land in question.

    The moral questions regarding owning something in general become so messy. Let's take selling stolen things for example. Now both the original and the new owner have some right to own the thing in question. This too gets solved by the new model: the new owner only owns the thing in respect to the thief. Legally speaking the thief claimed to be selling the ownership to the thing in general, but was actually selling something else, the ownership in respect to themselves, which is a lot simpler to deal with.

    I'd love to put my idea to a test so I'd value hugely any examples of any situations where the model could or could not be applied as well as any questions.
  • mcdoodle
    1.1k
    A human is as they are with other humans. The Crusoe myth is as wrong as the early Wittgenstein solipsist myth. When I wake I find my mother is there. There are always others. The Other is always there. How else would I be I?
  • Wayfarer
    20.8k
    There's such a thing as 'squatters rights', which is persons claiming ownership over vacant land they occupy for some period of time. Squatters rights were quite important in Australia, as it was only settled from the late 18th century onwards, and vast tracts of agricultural land were settled by squatters. At the time, Australia was officially 'terra nullus', i.e. empty land, as there was no recognition of native title until around the 1990's when a case was brought and won by Eddie Mabo. After this, aboriginal ownership of vacant land became recognised.

    As to the morality or otherwise of ownership generally, there is a saying that 'possession is 9/10 of the law', which can be interpreted in many ways. But I suppose one salient point is that ownership (of anything) is fundamental to law generally. One can imagine that property disputes regarding cattle, land ownership and acreage would historically have given rise to the necessity of arbitration and laws generally.
  • andrewk
    2.1k
    I'd love to put my idea to a test so I'd value hugely any examples of any situations where the model could or could not be applied as well as any questions.BlueBanana
    Two examples you might find interesting to contemplate:

    1. I believe Antarctica is not 'owned' by any country. I think there's an international treaty under which a small number of nations have restricted control of certain portions of it, but that only extends to making certain scientific uses of it - nothing like the total control and permission to exploit that ownership is usually understood to imply. I don't know much about it, but it may be relevant to what you're asking.

    2. I think there's some sort of international agreement that nobody can own the Moon, or any part of it. That may repay looking into.
  • Pseudonym
    1.2k


    It sounds a lot like Kant's views on property. Kant considered that because there was a connection between property and agency (humans being a tool-using species), there would entail a contingent right to it, but the consequence of that right would be that it imposed a concomitant duty on others. Thus, he concluded, such a right could only be asserted by negotiation with those others upon whom it placed a duty.

    As only those who had an interest in the land would be obliged by any duty created out of your right to own it, only they would need to be involved in the negotiation of that right.

    The problem with this approach, as people like Rawls have pointed out, is that those upon whom a concomitant duty is placed by your claim, are not necessarily the same group as those who would have to suffer the consequences of your claim, and so the excersice of such claims is not necessarily just.

    Consider that, as a consequence of your agreement that you own the land in respect of those who also wish to own it, you decide to fell all the trees. Such an action allows the topsoil to wash away which cannot be replaced. A hundred years later, someone (maybe a descendant of a party who did not lay claim to the land orginally) wishes to farm there, but cannot. Your right to the land has infringed on future rights to it (by use) without negotiation.

    This gets into the very difficult territory (for Kant anyway) of duties to future generations. The failure to resolve which is what puts me off Kant.

    I prefer an Aristolean approach, where property is an expression of virtue. That which comes into your possession and the nature by which you possess it are only justified insofar as they are an extension of your expression of virtue. By this approach, you could justify your ownership morally by the virtue of your intension. This isn't quite so crazy as it sounds. It's the ethical justification behind confiscation, for example. So in your model, you would own something in respect, not of others claims, but of other competing uses of the property.
  • BlueBanana
    873
    A human is as they are with other humans. The Crusoe myth is as wrong as the early Wittgenstein solipsist myth. When I wake I find my mother is there. There are always others. The Other is always there. How else would I be I?mcdoodle

    Of course you are in respect to the other people, but are non-living objects? I'd say not (but then again they are objective as well). The question becomes, what do we make of non-living but also not-objective and non-physical things, such as abstract man-made concepts?
  • BlueBanana
    873
    Interesting - can the treaties or agreements be interpreted, therefore, to "own" the land (but mayhaps only in respect to their parties)?
  • andrewk
    2.1k
    I'm afraid I don't know. I'm hoping somebody that knows about international law will chime in here. I'd like to know the answers too.
  • TimeLine
    2.7k
    Native Title in Australia overturned the legal doctrine of Terra Nullius with the Mabo v Queen case that changed our understanding of traditional land ownership.



    Outer Space Treaty clearly outlines that sovereignty over any celestial bodies - including the moon - cannot be made, furthered by the Moon Agreement which ameliorates details vis-a-vis property in outer space, but the agreement has had a poor response rate and only a minimal number of states ratified, certainly not the major states that play a role in international space exploration anyway. These treaties are binding only for those who agree meaning that a number of states could contravene the provisions laid out in such treaties and whilst such acts may not be recognised as legally binding, there is really nothing that can stop them since it is merely an agreement. For instance, the Bogotá Declaration.

    Look at Chevron - a multinational corporation - who not only ruined the livelihoods and lives of the indigenous population of Ecuador, ruined the environment and other extensive damaged told everyone to sod off. This renders an important distinction between the national and international legal landscapes. Launching space rockets, for instance, is regulated at national level and international regulations are based on an agreement and ultimately their cooperation. Like Chevron, private organisations by wealthy moguls could potentially claim territories of the moon without really breaking the law.
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