Dasein is basically a person who is able to recognise themselves as a subject authentically — TimeLine

Not sure how you intended your entry into the conversation in terms of tone, but I'll assume and hope it was friendly. — t0m

That said, I googled and found on the first page Dreyfus criticizing Taylor Carmen's view of death or dying as the closing down of Dasein's possibilities. If memory serves, I just saw that idea in Innwood's Heidegger dictionary last night, too. As you may know, Kojeve fused Marx and Heidegger in his famous lectures. And of course Feuerbach, a German philosopher, may have influenced Heidegger, especially as a critic of Hegel and metaphysics generally. — t0m

I don't think this is a faithful reading of Heidegger at all. Heidegger would be quite appalled by the humanism and anthropocentrism that emanates from that. Like for example: — Agustino

That's not what Heidegger meant. Dasein is more fundamental than merely human or person or any such a designation. — Agustino

It was meant to be nothing but a statement of fact. — TimeLine

And Carman, therefore suggests that death is 'the constant closing down of possibilities, which is an essential structural feature of all projection into a future. He adds:
Such things die by dying to us, or rather by our dying to them as possibilities. Our possibilities are constantly dropping away into nullity, then, and this is what Heidegger means when he says — what might sound otherwise hyperbolic or simply false — that 'Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists' (295). To say that we are always dying is to say that our possibilities are constantly closing down around us. — D

Anthropocentrism? Are you saying that Heidegger is not talking about being? — TimeLine

So, Dasein is not existence? Yeah, this is getting a bit awkward. — TimeLine

Yes, he problematized the question of the meaning of being. That's prior to the possibility of any sort of anthropocentrism, and by reducing it to anthropocentrism and humanism you destroy that priority. — Agustino

Yes, but it doesn't refer to the humanness of existence. It is true that only the human can be Dasein, as far as we know, but that doesn't mean that the phenomenon of Dasein is tied to the humanity of man. — Agustino

Yes, but it doesn't refer to the humanness of existence. It is true that only the human can be Dasein, as far as we know, but that doesn't mean that the phenomenon of Dasein is tied to the humanity of man. — Agustino

On another angle, though, there is this unavoidable humanism left in Dasein, this 'essence' despite what Heidegger imagines. What is left is 'man' or 'woman' or a kind of reappropriation. I fear there really is no escape. — TimeLine

Oh sorry, that's what Derrida said. But of course, you know better. — TimeLine

This past, as that to which I run ahead, here makes a discovery in my running ahead to it: it is my past. As this past it uncovers my Dasein as suddenly no longer there; suddenly I am no longer there along such and such things, alongside such and such people, alongside these vanities, these tricks, this chattering. The past scatters all secretiveness and busyness, the past takes everything into the Nothing. The past is not some occurence, not some incident in my Dasein. It is its past, not some 'what' about Dasein, some event that happens to Dasein and alters it. This past is not a 'what' but a 'how', indeed the authentic 'how' of my Dasein. This past, to which I can run ahead as mine, is not some 'what', but the 'how' of my Dasein pure and simple. — Heidegger

Dasein is authentically alongside itself, it is truly existent, whenever it maintains itself in this running ahead. This running ahead is nothing other than the authentic and singular future of one's own Dasein. In running ahead, Dasein is its future, in such a way that in this being futural it comes back to its past and present. Dasein, conceived in its most basic extreme possiblity of being, is time itself, not in time. — H

I really don't see how anthropocentrism can ever be avoided. — t0m

Therefore, [man] is
the empirical existence in the World of a Future that will never
become present. Now, this Future, for Man, is his death, that
Future of his which will never become his Present; and the only
reality or real presence of this Future is the knowledge that Man
has in the present of his future death. Therefore, if Man is Concept
and if the Concept is Time (that is, if Man is an essentially tem-
poral being), Man is essentially mortal; and he is Concept, that is,
absolute Knowledge or Wisdom incarnate, only if he knows this.
Logos becomes flesh, becomes Man, only on the condition of being
willing and able to die.

...
For History to exist, there must be not only a given reality, but
also a negation of that reality and at the same time a ("sublimated")
preservation of what has been negated. For only then is evolution
creative; only then do a true continuity and a real progress exist in
it. And this is precisely what distinguishes human History from a
simple biological or "natural" evolution. Now, to preserve oneself
as negated is to remember what one has been even while one is
becoming radically other. It is by historical memory that Man's
identity preserves itself throughout History, in spite of the auto-
negations which are accomplished in it, so that he can realize him-
self by means of History as the integration of his contradictory
past or as totality, or, better, as dialectical entity. Hence history is
always a conscious and willed tradition, and all real history also
manifests itself as a historiography: there is no History without
conscious, lived historical memory.

...
Man's Freedom is the actual negation
by him of his own given "nature" — that is, of the "possibilities"
which he has already realized, which determine his "impossibili-
ties" — i.e., everything incompatible with his "possibilities." And
his Individuality is a synthesis of his particularity with a uni-
versality that is equally his. Therefore Man can be individual and
free only to the extent that he implies in his being all the possi-
bilities of Being but does not have the time to realize and manifest
them all. Freedom is the realization of a possibility incompatible
(as realized) with the entirety of possibilities realized previously
(which consequently must be negated); hence there is freedom
only where that entirety does not embrace all possibilities in gen-
eral, and where what is outside of that entirety is not an absolute
impossibility. And man is an individual only to the extent that the
universality of the possibilities of his being is associated in him
with the unique particularity (the only one of its kind) of their
temporal realizations and manifestations. It is solely because he is
potentially infinite and always limited in deed by his death that
Man is a free Individual who has a history and who can freely
create a place for himself in History, instead of being content, like
animals and things, passively to occupy a natural place in the given
Cosmos, determined by the structure of the latter.

Therefore, Man is a (free) Individual only to the extent that
he is mortal, and he can realize and manifest himself as such an
Individual only by realizing and manifesting Death as well. — Kojeve

Here it is again:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/189_s08/pdf/Carol%20White%20forward.pdf — bloodninja