Apokrisis has quite specifically advocated a Cosmic Goal manifesting as a Thermodynamics with Purpose. This would be Doaism in a nutshell. He just wants to pretend (to himself) that he is oh, sooooo scientific. It's a game that scientists play.

Apokrisis has quite specifically advocated a Cosmic Goal manifesting as a Thermodynamics with Purpose. — Rich

The purpose of thermodynamics is artificial or emergent. It's like having a 12-sided dice with 11 faces having a value of 1 and only one side having a different value. According to thermodynamics, it is only this asymmetry in the structure of reality that creates the entropic imperative in the long run - meaning the entropic imperative is only statistical and results from there being a lot more entropifying possibilities (a lot more possibilities to score '1' given a throw in the dice analogy) in the pool of possible choices than the opposite. So if anything this "purpose" is enforced by the a priori structure of reality.

The purpose of thermodynamics is artificial or emergent. It's like having a 12-sided dice with 11 faces having a value of 1 and only one side having a different value. According to thermodynamics, it is only this asymmetry in the structure of reality that creates the entropic imperative in the long run - meaning the entropic imperative is only statistical and results from there being a lot more entropifying possibilities (a lot more possibilities to score '1' given a throw in the dice analogy) in the pool of possible choices than the opposite. So if anything this "purpose" is enforced by the a priori structure of reality. — Agustino

I really don't need you pseudo-scientific gibberish. The heart of your ideology is pure Daoism. Deal with it.

I really don't need you pseudo-scientific gibberish. The heart of your ideology is pure Daoism. Deal with it. — Rich

You're not speaking with Apo lol...

My apologies.

I really don't need you pseudo-scientific gibberish. — Rich

LOL. Rich did hit the bullseye there.

Not really. The scientific gibberish masquerading for Daoism. The Daoists are able to say it simply and directly because they aren't trying to cover up.

I'm saving your choiced ideology for a summary so everyone can enjoy your poetic verbiage.

The purpose of thermodynamics is artificial or emergent. It's like having a 12-sided dice with 11 faces having a value of 1 and only one side having a different value. — Agustino

That's a spectacularly bad description as it mushes all the different aspects of a dissipative structure ontology together.

But anyway, it should be remembered that teleology at the base cosmic level only needs to be considered a globalised tendency. At the biological level, we could talk about it being a function. Then at a psychological level, we could talk about it as a purpose.

So a continuity is claimed. It is finality all the way down. But constraint at the cosmic level lacks choice. It is what it is. Then when the flow of entropification gets blocked, that is when more local choices start to need to get made. More complex structure must arise to restore the generalised tendency. And this complex structure is free to find any method that works to do the job. That explains the development of intelligence and anticipatory planning. You start to get evolved functionality and even conscious choosing.

Why would i object to being compared to Tao? I've often made that comparison.

That is what it is Cosmic Intelligence. The Mind.

That it's what it is Cosmic Intelligence. The Mind. — Rich

Typical western new age cultural appropriation.

Although it's insightful to say humans live in dao as fish do in water, the insight is lost if we simply treat dao as being or some pantheistic spiritual realm. Dao remains essentially a concept of guidance, a prescriptive or normative term.

Rather than peddling esoteric spirituality, focus on how Taoism is about the naturalness of constraints and the organic emergence they foster. The world has a way.

I don't read about Daoism. I've been practicing it for 30 years. Health practices, arts, meditation, everything. Your ideology is Daoism in a nutshell, Cosmic Purpose, Qi energy, and all. You've done a great job of describing it.

Your ideology is Daoism in a nutshell, Cosmic Purpose, Qi energy, and all. — Rich

Oh you whacky westerners! Align your chakras and boogie on down to your dharma. Everyone in the house go "om". :D

Oh, don't tell me. You read about it? Maybe not? Maybe you actually know something about Daoism?

That's a spectacularly bad description as it mushes all the different aspects of a dissipative structure ontology together. — apokrisis

Wow it does exactly what your whole philosophy does :D

But anyway, it should be remembered that teleology at the base cosmic level only needs to be considered a globalised tendency. At the biological level, we could talk about it being a function. Then at a psychological level, we could talk about it as a purpose. — apokrisis

Yep, and like so globalised tendency, function and purpose are all mushed together into a cute word salad that is taken to be philosophy and deep understanding :B

(Oh and I forgot, finality is added in there too... do you liked mashed potatoes?)

Hey, the fact you don't know stuff is probably less damaging to my self-esteem than you might think.

Hey, the fact you don't know stuff is probably less damaging to my self-esteem than you might think. — apokrisis

You still didn't tell me if you like mashed potatoes... ;)

Yep. So it is vague ... in relation to the definite actuality that it then gives rise to. — apokrisis

But remember, I use "vague" and "potential" in a different way from you. For me, vagueness, is necessarily conditional, as is potential. It is conditional on the nature of time, Time is passing, and because time is passing, there is a future. Potential, along with its associated vagueness is descriptive of the future. You propose an unconditional vagueness. You disassociate vagueness from the passing of time, so that vagueness is no longer dependent on the passing of time, in order to propose an unconditional vagueness. This allows you to posit a "beginning" point where there is no past, only future, such that the potential of the future is unconstrained by any past. But this proposition is unjustified and incoherent, because unless time is passing, the claim of a future or a past is unsupported, not grounded at all. So your proposal of a point of infinite vagueness, pure potential, as a beginning, before time starts passing, is completely incoherent.

Yep. It is defined dichotomously - A and not-A. Or rather it is the prior state when there is neither A nor not-A present. That is, the PNC as yet fails to apply. So it is defined as that which must be capable of yielding the dichotomy and an actuality that is ruled by the PNC. — apokrisis

Why do you have such difficulty recognizing the difference between the principle of con-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. What you have described above, "there is neither A nor not-A present" is a state where PEN does not apply. Yet you say that the PNC "as yet fails to apply". The PNC does apply. When the state has neither A nor not-A present, we can clearly make the valid claim that there is not both A and not-A present, so there is no need for the claim that the PNC does not apply.

Therefore, the so-called dichotomy of A and not-A exists, is present, but it is not attributable to this particular point. We have identified a particular point where neither A nor not-A is present, but this is applicable only to that particular point, as A and not-A are not denied in an absolute sense. So we still have the defining feature of A and not-A available to us, yet this particular point cannot be defined by these. The PEN does not apply, and this point being referred to, potential, or vagueness, must be described according to other principles.

So vagueness, or potential, as I understand it, is not described dichotomously, it must be described by referring to other principles. You want to describe it dichotomously, and say that there is no dichotomy right here at this point, but it "must be capable of yielding the dichotomy". This claim is totally unjustified, produced only by your desire to assign "firstness", or "beginning" to this vagueness. That desire forces you to utilize this particular point where PEN fails to apply, to exclude the dichotomy of PNC, in an absolute way. When PNC has been excluded absolutely you insist that vagueness is prior to it, and you are left with this incoherent claim, that the dichotomy of PNC emerges from the vagueness. This replaces the more intelligible claim that the vagueness of potential is not the beginning, or first at all, it is not prior to the dichotomous A and not-A, it is simply something other than this.

Aristotle saw that reality is a hierarchy of increasingly specified distinctions, or dichotomies/symmetry breakings. Genus begets species by critical divisions. Man is generically animal (and thus not mineral), but also more specifically rational (and thus not irrational or lacking in reason). — apokrisis

As usual, you have things backward again. The terms "genus" and "species" refer to the degrees of human understanding, they refer to concepts. Within the conceptual realm, the more specific "begets" the more general, as Aristotle explained, we move from the more well known, the particular, toward the lesser known, the more general. So "man" is defined as being "animal", such that "animal" is within "man", and what an animal is less well known than what a man is. And what alive is, is less well known than what animal is. The concept of animal (the more general) comes from the understanding of the particular (man). These are not "critical divisions", as they are not divisions at all, but principles of unity. "Animal" is within "man".

And that means that we both know - from reason - that there must be some "stuff", some "material", that gets formed in this way, and yet this material cause becomes the ultimately elusive part of reality. We can't pin it down - see it in its raw formlessness - as it only becomes something definite and "pinnable" if it has a form.

Aristotle was dealing with exactly this issue in discussing the prime matter that must underlie four elements. — apokrisis

Exactly, and as I have been telling you over and over again, Aristotle came to a very decisive conclusion on this issue. There is no such thing as prime matter. It may be useful for physicists to imagine this "raw formlessness", but in reality it is completely impossible, irrational to think that such a thing ever existed, because it is unintelligible. So, when you say it "becomes the ultimately elusive part of reality", this is very true, because it's not real, it's just a dream. Those who are seeking it are running off in the wrong direction, tilting at windmills. "The Impossible Dream".

So Anaximander understood reality in terms of an open flow action that self-organises to have emergent structure. Aristotle then showed what this reality looked like by going over to the other extreme - how we would imagine it as a system, still with hierarchical structure, but now closed and eternal. — apokrisis

Yes, Aristotle showed how Anaximander's understanding looked, it looked impossible. And so it was laid to rest, dismissed for thousands of years until hard core materialists, dialectical materialists, resurrected that impossible dream in the nineteenth century.

Aristotle pushed for a sharper distinction. The Comos became a closed material system. There must be an underlying "prime matter" that is eternal and imperishable, endlessly taking new shape without in fact being used up, or being generated anew. And it was from that assumption that the idea of a creation event - a birth of all this imperishable matter - became a great metaphysical difficulty. — apokrisis

Again, how many times must I tell you? This is unconditionally false. Aristotle proved that the idea that "there must be an underlying 'prime matter' that is eternal and imperishable" is absolutely false. He demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual, that's why he posits eternal circular motions.

We no longer rely on Anaximander's admittedly very material conception of the Apeiron, nor Aristotle's maddenly elusive notion of prime matter, but understand that there is a vagueness beyond both material and formal cause. We can't grant primacy or priority to either material cause or formal cause because they themselves are the dichotomy that emerges from a "pure potential" that is both neither of these things, yet necessarily must be able to break to yield these complementary things. — apokrisis

All you are saying, is that if prime matter has been shown to be the impossible dream, let's posit something else, "pure potential", in its place. But "pure potential" is just another way of saying "prime matter", and Aristotle's argument is directed specifically at the notion of "pure potential'. That is why Aristotle's argument is so effective. As I said it is a double edged sword which defeats both materialism and idealism. He demonstrates how ideas have no actual existence prior to being "discovered" by human minds. The act of discovery is an actualization. So anyone who claims that ideas exist prior to being discovered by the mind must consent to the fact that such existence is purely potential. Then he demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual.

The idealist notion of "pure potential" is just the flip side of the materialist notion of "prime matter". Both are effectively refuted by the cosmological argument. So it is pointless, senseless, and meaningless to dismiss the materialist "prime matter", for the idealist "information", or "pure potential", because these are just the two sides of the same approach, the approach which was refuted by Aristotle.

The formulation of a conservation principle - the law of identity - is the basic step to get formal logical argument going. — apokrisis

I think you are misunderstanding the relationship between the conservation principle, the law of identity, and formal logic. There are two distinct forms of the law of identity. The one employed by formal logic, says that the object referred to cannot be other than what is expressed by the defining statements. Aristotle saw that this principle was abused by sophists, and stated a new form of the law of identity, which says that the object cannot be other than itself.

The first form of the law of identity is what is required to get formal deductive logic going. The conservation principle emerges from the second form, Aristotle's form of the law of identity. This form allows that "sameness" refers to the temporal continuity of the object as "itself". And conservation principles are derived from that assumed temporal continuity. The two forms of the law of identity are not inherently compatible. They must be made to be compatible, by adjusting them. You might assume the descriptive form of identity used for deductive logical, is the one which must be adjusted, because the temporal continuity of the object is the way that nature is. But this is just an assumption, and there is nothing to show that the assumed temporal continuity, and conservation principles, should not themselves be adjusted. Therefore conservation principles, as a starting point for ontology cannot be taken for granted.

The infinite regress of causality is asymptotic at worst. So it converges on a point. And that point both defines the limit and stands "outside" it. So this is exactly how I have argued for vagueness - as a limit which itself is formally "not real". — apokrisis

The way to avoid infinite regress is not to set an arbitrary limit, it is to find a new approach, one which avoids the infinite regress. So it is clearly a mistake, to take an approach which has infinite regress firmly rooted in that approach, and say that when infinity is approached, this is the limit. That is an irrational, unintelligible approach. It is inherently, self-contradictory because you are claiming infinity as a limit. When something converges on a point, yet never actually reaches that point, to say that this is a limit, is contradictory.

To say that .99999 repeating is actually 1 is contradictory. And to avoid this contradiction is not to insist that the contradiction is actually true, and what is the case. It is to find a new approach which avoids the infinite regress conclusion of .99999 repeating, and the urge to insist that this is actually 1.

This is exactly the problem with your proposed vagueness as a beginning in pure potential. Your approach. using conservation principles, leads necessarily to an infinite past in time. But instead of accepting that this is what your approach leads to, and looking for a new, better approach, to avoid this problem, you designate a random, arbitrary, beginning point, as vague potential. Your justification for this beginning point is nothing more than the contradiction, that .99999 repeating is the same as 1. And if it is pointed out to you, that this is contradictory, you would say sure, because vague potential is where the PNC does not apply.

Yet the very fact that we can get arbitrarily close shows that pi "definitely exists" .... as a formal limit. — apokrisis

Here is that contradiction.

And here is a contradiction of another sort:

But the theory doesn't manifest the observables. They are what we actually measure when we apply the theory in modelling our reality.

...

Instead of there being an observer problem, reality is now viewed as "observer created". It comes down to being able to ask a meaningful question. — apokrisis

When I suggested that the Planck scale limitations are created by the theories which are applied, you said no, the theory doesn't manifest the observables. Then you went right on to the claim that reality is observer created. When it supports your argument one rule applies, but when it supports mine, the opposite of that rule applies.

Thanks for the encouragement. It's a bit difficult to maintain a continued and extensive dialogue with apokrisis for the reasons you mentioned, so I appreciate the encouragement. I assume that on apo's side, it is difficult to maintain a dialogue with me, probably for other reasons.

As I said it is a double edged sword which defeats both materialism and idealism. He demonstrates how ideas have no actual existence prior to being "discovered" by human minds. The act of discovery is an actualization. So anyone who claims that ideas exist prior to being discovered by the mind must consent to the fact that such existence is purely potential. Then he demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure how to here best interpret the term “ideas”—and I have not read Aristotle’s arguments first hand. I so far find it reasonable that at least some platonic ideas (ideals / forms) can be safely presumed to exist prior to any person’s awareness of them. Though not my main interests, basic geometric forms might serve as an easy example—a triangle, for instance. More importantly to me, though, are forms such as that of the Good—which I maintain necessarily exist as actuality even were no human to be consciously aware of this platonic “idea”.

Better expressed: My own present contention is that the Good as form, for example, is both actual and, in an equivocal sense, simultaneously potential. The Good thereby, imo, exists in and of itself as metaphysical actuality while, from the vantage of all actual people, existing only as a potential state of affairs yet to be obtained by any of us. Furthermore, it would hold this status even if no sentience were to be consciously aware of it so being.

For me, this is in no way intended as a defense of idealism. I’m however interested in better understanding the logics of actuality and potentiality from the vantage of a hypothetical global telos.

I’m not sure how to here best interpret the term “ideas”—and I have not read Aristotle’s arguments first hand. I so far find it reasonable that at least some platonic ideas (ideals / forms) can be safely presumed to exist prior to any person’s awareness of them. Though not my main interests, basic geometric forms might serve as an easy example—a triangle, for instance. More importantly to me, though, are forms such as that of the Good—which I maintain necessarily exist as actuality even were no human to be consciously aware of this platonic “idea”. — javra

I think that the point here is that things like "the triangle", and "the good", are human words. Now, there is supposed to be an objective, independently existing idea which corresponds to these words. But what actually exists, in relation to this assumed correspondence, cannot be anything beyond the correspondence established by a human mind, between the word and the human idea. The human mind cannot establish a relationship between the word and the assumed independently existing idea, it only has the ideas in its own mind. Therefore, that the independently existing ideas exist, cannot be known in any sense beyond an ungrounded assumption, and we must maintain this in our representation of reality, that independently existing ideas is a possibility. The next step of the problem is that an eternally existing possibility is not a real possibility due to the principle of plenitude. So eternal, immutable, independent "Ideas" is refuted in this way.

Better expressed: My own present contention is that the Good as form, for example, is both actual and, in an equivocal sense, simultaneously potential. The Good thereby, imo, exists in and of itself as metaphysical actuality while, from the vantage of all actual people, existing only as a potential state of affairs yet to be obtained by any of us. Furthermore, it would hold this status even if no sentience were to be consciously aware of it so being.

For me, this is in no way intended as a defense of idealism. I’m however interested in better understanding the logics of actuality and potentiality from the vantage of a hypothetical global telos. — javra

I believe that this is the way that Idealism in the form of Neo-Platonism and Christian theology gets beyond the cosmological argument of Aristotle. The Neo-Platonists designate independent Forms as having actual existence. This assumption is proven necessary by our experience with the material world. But this produces a categorical separation between human ideas, which according to Aristotle's argument are of the nature of potential, and the independent Forms which are of the nature of actual. In theology the independent (actual) Forms are the divine Ideas, property of God. There is a necessary separation between these Forms, which are independent from, and prior to material existence, and human ideas, which are dependent on the human soul's union with the body.

For me, this is in no way intended as a defense of idealism. I’m however interested in better understanding the logics of actuality and potentiality from the vantage of a hypothetical global telos. — javra

With respect to telos, telos is what validates the claim of independent Forms. In the case of human intention, it is seen that the form of the thing is prior in time to the physical existence of the thing, the form is the blueprint which is followed in the creation of the thing. Plato demonstrated, that in nature, the form of all material things precedes the material existence of the thing, and Aristotle followed this principle with a claim of "that the thing will be" only follows from "what the thing will be". In other words, it is essential that "what the thing will be" is determined prior to the determination "that the thing will be". To say that it is determined "that the thing will be", when there is no specific "what the thing will be", already determined, is nonsense. The clear examples which we have, where we can analyze how "what the thing will be" is prior to "that the thing will be", are instances of human intention, telos. So we conclude that in nature there must be a similar telos at work.

I’m in a bit of a hurry right now. So a quick reply to a quick reading of your post (may reply in greater detail later on after a rereading):

I agree with the position that actuality can logically only be a priori to potentiality. So, from my point of view regarding a global telos, the telos must be a priori to all potentiality as an existent actuality—this even though its obtainment by aware agencies (these also being present actualities) can only be appraised in terms of potentiality. I’m hoping that this at least makes some sense—and it is this overlap of actuality and potentially that currently has me further contemplating the matter. Still—though I can’t yet make out if it’s due to the same reasons or not—I’m in full agreement that actuality cannot be birthed of pure potentiality, and that the latter notion is nonsensical.

So, from my point of view regarding a global telos, the telos must be a priori to all potentiality as an existent actuality—this even though its obtainment by aware agencies (these also being present actualities) can only be appraised in terms of potentiality. — javra

If I understand you, you are saying that the actuality which is known to us as a global telos, is understood by us in terms of potentiality.

I’m hoping that this at least makes some sense—and it is this overlap of actuality and potentially that currently has me further contemplating the matter. Still—though I can’t yet make out if it’s due to the same reasons or not—I’m in full agreement that actuality cannot be birthed of pure potentiality, and that the latter notion is nonsensical. — javra

So I believe that this is the difficulty, the gap between what appears to us as potentiality, and the real actuality which lies behind this appearance of potentiality. There is a substantial difference between these two, due to the categorical difference. But when we apprehend the potential as real, like apokrisis does, then it is necessary to recognize the actuality which provides for the existence of this potentiality, which apokrisis does not. When the actuality is not apprehended then one will proceed to make unsubstantiated claims concerning the existence of this potentiality, it's "firstness" etc...

A good place to develop a firm understanding of the relationship between potency and act, is by reading Aristotle's On the Soul. All the powers of living creatures are described as potencies. But these potencies must be attributed to something actual in order to substantiate their existence. The potencies, or powers, exist as the body of the living being, the various different bodies of various living beings, are the various potencies of living beings. So the body as a collection of potencies, must be attributed to something actual, and this is the soul itself. Aristotle provides, as the primary definition of soul, the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This necessitates that the body has no actuality prior to having life, there is no actual body, only the potential for such. And the soul brings, or gives, actual existence to the body.

This is contrary to the principles of emergence which hold that the soul, or life, emerges from the existence of the body, as if it is a potency of the body. But when this premise is taken, then we must look to a prior material existence to substantiate the actual existence of the living body. Since this prior material existence is not living, it can only substantiate the potential for life, not the actual existence of life. So the infinite regress of potential without anything to substantiate the actual, gives way to the infinite vagueness of pure potential, or apeiron.

But remember, I use "vague" and "potential" in a different way from you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Remember that Peirce in fact defined vagueness as that to which the PNC fails to apply. So that is the definition in contention, not something else you might make up for yourself.

It is conditional on the nature of time, Time is passing, and because time is passing, there is a future. — Metaphysician Undercover

That then gets into the metaphysical issue of how existence - the essential elements of time, space and energy - could be created.

Now of course you can argue for the alternative - that existence is simply uncreated and eternal as some sort of always definite brute fact. It doesn't satisfy logically. But that is the other point of view.

However Peirce is very clearly asking the question of how existence could develop. And a logic of vagueness is his answer. And he says without equivocation that Firstness - being vague undifferentiated potential, pure quality without yet quantification - is generative of time and thus essentially timeless. So time (and space, and energy) only properly exist as Secondness.

If you want to talk about time in Firstness, it is by definition vague temporality, the potential for an unfolding temporal progression.

And then modern Big Bang cosmology and tentative quantum gravity modelling takes the same view of time. Time as something historically definite to order events is going to have to be emergent. The Universe did not arise in time. It was the birth of time - as we conventionally or classically understand it.

his allows you to posit a "beginning" point where there is no past, only future, such that the potential of the future is unconstrained by any past. But this proposition is unjustified and incoherent, because unless time is passing, the claim of a future or a past is unsupported, not grounded at all. So your proposal of a point of infinite vagueness, pure potential, as a beginning, before time starts passing, is completely incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I see that you will forever deny the logic of Peirce's position, or that modern physics might say the same thing.

But it is a coherent argument. Or at least it IS an argument ... unlike the brute fact approach taken be eternalism and "uncaused existence".

In fact the brute fact approach is worse than just lacking in a rational basis for its belief. It flies in the face of the overwhelming evidence for the Big Bang now, and the matching understanding in physics that time has to become an emergent feature of a successfully unified theory of quantum mechanics and general relativity.

When the state has neither A nor not-A present, we can clearly make the valid claim that there is not both A and not-A present, so there is no need for the claim that the PNC does not apply. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, just deal with the argument that Peirce actually makes. Vagueness is defined by the failure of the PNC. Generality is defined by the failure of the LEM.

So the vague is where it simply isn't clear what is the case. You can't what is going on and so there is no way to tell if it is contradictory or not. And generality is then where you can crisply tell what is going on, but being completely general, it is not doing any excluding. Everything within its purview is included.

Then the next bit of the argument here is the dichotomy - the developmental story of how the divisions of nature arise in a way that understands them also as a unity of opposites.

So you have a starting and stopping point - vagueness and generality, or Firstness and Thirdness - and then you need the third thing of the interaction that produce the developmental outcome

Logically then - to the degree one believes the dialectic, or dichotomy, or apokrisis, or symmetry breaking is how development happens - this is the reason why the vague has to "contain within it" the possibility of whatever metaphysical-strength dichotomy is then observed to emerge. And equally, generality has to be able to absorb this dichotomy as its unity of opposite.

Because you are so busy trying to force a scholastic reading of Aristotle on this Peircean developmental ontology, you keep missing the target. And even missing the degree to which Aristotle was arguing the same story in many places.

As usual, you have things backward again. The terms "genus" and "species" refer to the degrees of human understanding, they refer to concepts. Within the conceptual realm, the more specific "begets" the more general, as Aristotle explained, we move from the more well known, the particular, toward the lesser known, the more general. — Metaphysician Undercover

A hierarchical relation is transitive. It works both ways. That is basic to a systems view - the belief in the reality of both top-down formal/final causality and bottom-up material/efficient causality.

So constraints and degrees of freedom. The whole shapes the parts. The parts compose the whole. You have a developmental ontology ... because this is the basic dichotomy that brings anything, including most especially the Cosmos, into crisp and hierarchically-organised being.

Again, how many times must I tell you? This is unconditionally false. Aristotle proved that the idea that "there must be an underlying 'prime matter' that is eternal and imperishable" is absolutely false. He demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual, that's why he posits eternal circular motions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are just imposing your scholastic version on things as usual. Aristotle - or the way his writings were collated several centuries later - may have seemed to contradict himself at points. But it seems clear enough to me that he was forced towards a hylomorphic duality of prime matter and prime mover as that just is the right developmental/systems logic.

Sure, you need the "eternal mathematic forms" as the ultimate constraints on material action. They somehow do stand outside time - as future finality. But rather than being active drivers of that action (in the way genes organise a body, or intentions organise our behaviour), they are simply passively emergent regulatory principles when we are talking about physics, or the generic Cosmos.

There is a lack of choice - in contrast to the production of choices that define life and mind. So the maths that forms our Universe has the quality of necessity. They certainly fix the inevitable outcomes even before anything has started to happen. But they are not active in the actualisation of those outcomes. They are simply the necessary outcomes that even the most chaotic, free and "choice-endowed" play of material action must in the long run discover.

Then we can understand prime matter as dichotomous to that. It becomes the chaotic starting point - a state that is undifferentiated in being also utterly differentiated. Pure contingency lacking in any habits. A continuity of spontaneity - action that lacks any form.

Or better yet, we can understand it as a vagueness. That removes any lingering notion of "matter" -
substantiality - from the discussion. We can now see that Firstness is just the potential for matter and form. All the apparent contradictions are absorbed by making substantial being fully emergent via the logical machinery of dichotomisation.

There are two distinct forms of the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great. Perhaps you can provide a citation on this point ... if you are suggesting it is based on established authority and not something you've dreamt up on the spot.

That is an irrational, unintelligible approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

Funny. That's how maths approaches irrational numbers. It is how they know they are real.

When I suggested that the Planck scale limitations are created by the theories which are applied, you said no, the theory doesn't manifest the observables. Then you went right on to the claim that reality is observer created. When it supports your argument one rule applies, but when it supports mine, the opposite of that rule applies. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are mixing epistemology and ontology. Epistemically, we humans - as observers - produce both the theories and the acts of measurement. Ontically, in an "observer-created existence", the theory wouldn't be a free choice but simply the way the reality actually is structured as a state of constraint. The observations would be then "acts of measurement" - as in actual wave function collapse.

Better expressed: My own present contention is that the Good as form, for example, is both actual and, in an equivocal sense, simultaneously potential. The Good thereby, imo, exists in and of itself as metaphysical actuality while, from the vantage of all actual people, existing only as a potential state of affairs yet to be obtained by any of us. Furthermore, it would hold this status even if no sentience were to be consciously aware of it so being. — javra

That would seem to fit with my position then. Form stands "at the end of development" as ""emergent necessity". In the end, it restricts free choice as there is only one "right" choice.

It is actual when it is finally realised. And already also definite in potential. The potential seems a state of pure contingency. Yet even before it knows it is constrained, that constraint exists as its definite future. Every free action already faces the inevitably of its eventual consequences.

Remember that Peirce in fact defined vagueness as that to which the PNC fails to apply. So that is the definition in contention, not something else you might make up for yourself. — apokrisis

Yes, this is the definition which needs to be defended. You can define any term any way you like, but if it is nonsense, or contradictory, then it's a rather meaningless definition. As Aristotle demonstrated, due to the nature of time, we can determine certain situations where the PEM does not apply, and this is where the term "potential" is applicable. Does Peirce provide any such demonstration as to the type of situation where the LNC does not apply, to support his definition of vagueness?

However Peirce is very clearly asking the question of how existence could develop. And a logic of vagueness is his answer. And he says without equivocation that Firstness - being vague undifferentiated potential, pure quality without yet quantification - is generative of time and thus essentially timeless. So time (and space, and energy) only properly exist as Secondness. — apokrisis

What exactly is "a logic of vagueness"? If vagueness is where the LNC does not apply, then I assume you are referring to a logic of contradiction. But this is irrational nonsense. It is not logic at all. If we start with a contradictory premise, we won't get far with the logic.

And he says without equivocation that Firstness - being vague undifferentiated potential, pure quality without yet quantification - is generative of time and thus essentially timeless. — apokrisis

Wait, you just said that vagueness is where the PNC does not apply. Now you are saying that it is "potential". But "potential" is already defined by Aristotle as where the PEM does not apply, because of the nature of time. Can you explain why Peirce wants to change Aristotle's definition of potential? Does Peirce have a different understanding of time? Why would Peirce insist that time is generated from potential, or vagueness, when Aristotle clearly demonstrates that the existence of potential is a result of the nature of time. This is demonstrated by the fact that when time is passing there is a future, and future things are indefinite due to potential. Without any time there is no future, and no potential, therefore it is impossible that potential is prior to time. I suggest that you consider the possibility that Peirce is mistaken about this.

If you want to talk about time in Firstness, it is by definition vague temporality, the potential for an unfolding temporal progression. — apokrisis

Again, you should recognize that it is nonsense to speak about the potential for anything if time is not passing. So clearly time is prior to potential. It is a mistake to posit potential as firstness, and time as secondness, because potential is unintelligible without time. Or is that Peirce's intent, to render potential as unintelligible? But what kind of irrational move is this, after Aristotle worked so hard to make potential intelligible?

So the vague is where it simply isn't clear what is the case. You can't what is going on and so there is no way to tell if it is contradictory or not. And generality is then where you can crisply tell what is going on, but being completely general, it is not doing any excluding. Everything within its purview is included. — apokrisis

But what you describe here is an epistemic vagueness. it isn't clear what is the case, you can't tell what's going on. What you are referring to is a deficiency in the human capacity to understand. But just because the human being cannot determine what's going on doesn't mean that there isn't a definite "what's going on". This is the point I've been trying to make to you, Peirce sees the human inability to determine what's going on as proof of real ontic vagueness, where the LNC does not apply.

This is the irrational principle which got us involved in this discussion in the first place. If it appears to the human being that the PNC does not apply, then we ought to conclude that the human being has produced a faulty description of the situation. We need to revisit the situation and determine where the faults in the description are. We can never prove, and therefore know that the situation is such that the PNC does not apply because it is always possible that we have faulty descriptions. The human being may simply be lacking the capacity to properly describe the situation.

Since the claim that the PNC does not apply is the claim that the situation is unintelligible, then we should always assume that if it appears like the PNC does not apply, this is due to faulty human descriptions. Then we will seek to understand the situation in an intelligible way. To adopt as an ontological principle that there is a situation in which the PNC does not apply is to say "I can't understand this situation, so I am going to designate it as unintelligible, and quit trying". This is irrational. And so Peirce's definition of vagueness is irrational.

Because you are so busy trying to force a scholastic reading of Aristotle on this Peircean developmental ontology, you keep missing the target. And even missing the degree to which Aristotle was arguing the same story in many places. — apokrisis

As I've been demonstrating from the beginning, the Peircean ontology of vagueness, as presented by you, is irrational. To claim as an ontological principle, that an aspect of the universe is contradictory, is irrational unless you can explain how this contradictory aspect is somehow intelligible. I refer to Aristotle's understanding of "potential", as a demonstration of how potential violates the LEM, but it is still described by A as intelligible in relation to a proper understanding of time.

You haven't shown any such thing. You, or Peirce, simply have an irrational desire to assign vagueness the status of firstness. It is irrational because you are simply saying this:
"I can't understand firstness, because it is where it appears as if the PNC does not apply, therefore I'll designate it as the unintelligible "vagueness", and I won't have to worry about trying to understand it because I've designated it as impossible to understand."
Instead of persisting, and trying to develop the means to understand firstness in descriptions which are not contradictory, you simply quit, saying it is impossible. That's what designating firstness as vagueness does. It says that it is impossible to understand firstness. If a person accepts this principle, then that person will never attempt to understand firstness, it has already been designated, without justification, as impossible to understand.

Sure, you need the "eternal mathematic forms" as the ultimate constraints on material action. They somehow do stand outside time - as future finality. But rather than being active drivers of that action (in the way genes organise a body, or intentions organise our behaviour), they are simply passively emergent regulatory principles when we are talking about physics, or the generic Cosmos. — apokrisis

You seem to be contradicting yourself here. You say that there are eternal forms, which stand outside of time, then you say that they are "emergent". It is impossible that anything emergent is outside of time and eternal. Clearly, if you are following this ontology of vagueness as firstness, it is impossible that there are forms outside of time, and what you are really trying to say is that there is no such thing as eternal forms, and that you really believe they are emergent.

Or better yet, we can understand it as a vagueness. That removes any lingering notion of "matter" -
substantiality - from the discussion. We can now see that Firstness is just the potential for matter and form. All the apparent contradictions are absorbed by making substantial being fully emergent via the logical machinery of dichotomisation. — apokrisis

What do you mean by "all the apparent contradictions are absorbed"? You have already defined vagueness as where the principle of non-contradiction does not apply. So we can only conclude that contradiction is abundant in this vagueness or firstness. How can any principle of firstness which allows for the abundance of contradiction within firstness, be in any way a rational ontological principle?

Great. Perhaps you can provide a citation on this point ... if you are suggesting it is based on established authority and not something you've dreamt up on the spot. — apokrisis

Check your favourite, SEP, you'll see that they distinguish numerical, and qualitative identity. I do not agree with some of their descriptive principles, but at least they distinguish the two distinct forms of identity.

Funny. That's how maths approaches irrational numbers. It is how they know they are real. — apokrisis

Yes, that's very "funny", isn't it. When something appears to be irrational in mathematics, instead of attempting to understand the reason for this, and addressing the nature of this problem, they simply assume a contradiction, and on the basis of this contradiction they claim that the irrationality is something real. That's exactly what Peirce does with vagueness. Vagueness is the appearance of irrationality. But if he simply assumes contradiction, then the vagueness becomes real and the problem appears to dissolve. At what cost do we assume that the irrational is real, to dissolve the problem? I'll tell you. We do this at the cost of accepting contradiction. Accepting contradiction dissolves the problem. But this is the act of allowing into our reality, the impossible. This is a mistake, to allow that the impossible is real. The problem isn't dissolved, it is hidden underneath an even bigger problem. Perhaps if the bigger problem, accepting contradiction, is so big, we won't even notice that it's a problem.

Lots of material here. Not sure if all my replies will be worth debating if there are disagreements, and I’m confident enough that there will be. Most is an exchange of perspective. I'm mainly interested in the notions of actuality and potentiality as applies to a global telos.

Therefore, that the independently existing ideas exist, cannot be known in any sense beyond an ungrounded assumption, and we must maintain this in our representation of reality, that independently existing ideas is a possibility. The next step of the problem is that an eternally existing possibility is not a real possibility due to the principle of plenitude. So eternal, immutable, independent "Ideas" is refuted in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

If ideas are taken to necessarily be human representations of their referents, then I would understand this position of “[human] representations of reality”. However, this to me seems at odds with at least some Platonic Forms. To me, representations are phenomenal in constituency (either perceivable via the physiological senses or perceivable via imagination in like manners: sights, sounds, smells, proprioceptions, etc.). This while some Platonic Forms, such as that of the aesthetic, for example, are of themselves articles of awareness only in so far as being purely sense-ual and, hence, noumenal: thereby more aligned to faculties such as those of understanding (of sense/meaning)—albeit, this despite the aesthetic as Form being most often apprehended through concordant awareness of the phenomenal. Here, my position is that our awareness of at least some Forms—though they may find representation via words or other symbols—cannot constitute representations of what actually is. For example, an awareness of the aesthetic is itself non-representational … and any representation of what is experienced (though it may help to convey the essence of meaning from one person to another) will in no way of itself embody the given experience (if one for whatever reason cannot experience what another experiences as aesthetic, no amount of phenomenal representation will convey the noumenal reality that is experienced by the other).

All the same, can you further explain the argument from the principle of plentitude: why it precludes any eternally existent possibility from being a real possibility? This to me is tied into what I express toward the end of this post regarding a global telos.

But this produces a categorical separation between human ideas, which according to Aristotle's argument are of the nature of potential, and the independent Forms which are of the nature of actual. In theology the independent (actual) Forms are the divine Ideas, property of God. There is a necessary separation between these Forms, which are independent from, and prior to material existence, and human ideas, which are dependent on the human soul's union with the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I can feel at home in certain discussions of theology, these independent Forms to me will hold even when addressed atheistically (i.e. when contemplated in the absence of Deity or deities, angels , and the like). The independent Forms in my view are occurring limitations which bind that which can be. To again use the aesthetic as example, this particular independent Form (here presuming it to so be) will limit, constrain, and form that which in essence is sense-ual attraction and aversion—this from the most base variants of this Form which can be found in the lower lifeforms to more refined and elevated variants of this same Form which can be found among mankind. As Form, the aesthetic emanates through the phenomenal in relation to observers and, in its most refined state, is purely noumenal: the former phenomenal variants being the allegorical shadows on the wall in Plato’s cave; the latter noumenal variants being the Form’s non-representational pure nature—which is sometimes accessible to humans. Given that all beings hold attractions and aversions, all beings are then limited, constrained, and formed by an intrinsic sense of the aesthetic; because no sensation-based attraction or repulsion could manifest devoid of this limitation on what can be, the limitation of the aesthetic is a priori to any potential attraction or aversion of individual beings. (This is quite the mouthful and not at all well substantiated, I’m well aware.)

I bring this perspective up, however, both to offer the possibility that independent Forms need not be theistic in their nature and, for me more importantly, to say that (at least some) independent Forms, as universals, are that which actively in-forms all beings’ identity—thereby making the actuality of the Forms minimally concurrent with the actuality of the beings whose identity is thus brought about via these universal Forms. Else argued, to me, the independent Forms are never fully severed from the beings thus formed—even if these beings hold no conscious awareness of these Forms; e.g. a cat may hypothetically sense sense-ual attraction toward some stimuli (say, some patch of colors) and aversions to others—this being the cat’s aesthetics—even though the cat has no comprehension of what aesthetics are. Yet, the greater the awareness of the beings in-formed by aesthetics, the more the beings can approach sense-ual understanding / awareness of this Forms’ noumenal, true (or pure) non-representational nature. E.g., all life will hold affinities and aversions to phenomenal stimuli but only humans can hold awareness of non-carnal beauty (here taking beauty to be a more refined aesthetic) … and, at times, even reapply this sense of beauty back to carnal bodies: e.g. a straight guy’s appreciation of the beauty to a male nude figure, like Michelangelo’s David, without any sense of sexual desire or any aversion due to this same issue of sexuality (top scores if a straight guy can at times likewise hold appreciation of non-carnal aesthetics when considering the female nude, I’d think).

In overview, imo universal Forms cannot be severed from anything which they any way in-form … this even when that which is thereby in-formed holds no conscious awareness of the universal Forms’ most likely noumenal nature.

Needless to add, these are perspectives on this issue.

The important part regarding the global telos as both actuality and potentiality:

Plato demonstrated, that in nature, the form of all material things precedes the material existence of the thing, and Aristotle followed this principle with a claim of "that the thing will be" only follows from "what the thing will be". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm so far in full agreement with this.

To me the global telos is also something which can eventually become fully actualized on a global scale by all sentience. In this way, the factual global telos also serves as a global end-state of being. I know this perspective can easily be ridiculed as unusual. Still, when comparing this outlook with theistic worldviews, it can readily approximate notions such as “closer proximity to God / G-d”, “to Brahman”, “to Nirvana”, “to Moksha”, and so on. Even when one addresses this global telos in a purely atheistic manner, it is for me the universal noumenal Form (as both global telos and global end-state of being) on which all other universal Forms are contingent—via which, again, all presently actual individual beings become bound, or limited, and, thereby, given their present actual form.

Then, as to the relation of actual and potential: This global telos is both actual as real telos and as an eventual, predetermined, global end-state of being (apo’s Heat Death; my hypothesis of an “unbounded awareness”)—as well as not yet manifest as an actualized, global end-state of being. So while it is thus actual as global telos (and as a metaphysically determinate end-state of being), because it is not yet manifest, it is also only a potential future manifestation whose realization is contingent upon numerous givens—including (in at least the metaphysics I uphold) the free-willed intent of all conscious agents so desiring it to become manifest. (Hence, it’s a given to me that we’re in no danger of it becoming manifest anytime soon, nor in any number of millennia from now.)

In this manner it is both an actuality that is a priori (akin to the Kantian sense; not necessarily in a temporal sense) to all other forms … while also being as end-state a potentiality forever awaiting to be realized.

Though the metaphysics are notably different, I see this relation between actuality and potentiality as holding fast both for a physicalist notion of the Heat Death as global end-state of being as well as for the non-physicalist metaphysics I’ve just touched upon … wherein the end-state is that of what for brevity I’ve so far termed “unbounded awareness” within this thread (including in the OP).

TMK, the conclusion that a global telos is both an a priori actuality and a temporal potentiality remains wherever a global telos is postulated. It is this stated conclusion that gets me interested in the logics of actuality and potentiality.

Then, as a generalized metaphysical hypothetical: Why can it not be logically viable that an eternally present, a priori actuality is coexistent with the temporal potentiality which it as a priori actuality brings forth? Otherwise expressed, given that the global manifestation of the end-state (as global telos) is itself contingent upon multiple unpredictable factors (such as the freewill of all coexisting agents), then this temporal potentiality of a manifested end-state will itself be contingently eternal: the moment in which the globally manifested end-state occurs forever remains indeterminate until all the proper events occur which will result in the end-state’s manifestation.

I maintain this possibility. In which case, one simultaneously has an eternal a priori actuality and a contingently eternal temporal potentiality as a consequence of a global telos. (But this seems to contradict what you say Aristotle argued to be.)

A good place to develop a firm understanding of the relationship between potency and act, is by reading Aristotle's On the Soul. All the powers of living creatures are described as potencies. But these potencies must be attributed to something actual in order to substantiate their existence. The potencies, or powers, exist as the body of the living being, the various different bodies of various living beings, are the various potencies of living beings. So the body as a collection of potencies, must be attributed to something actual, and this is the soul itself. Aristotle provides, as the primary definition of soul, the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This necessitates that the body has no actuality prior to having life, there is no actual body, only the potential for such. And the soul brings, or gives, actual existence to the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Though I’ll skip the details, I can very much relate to this understanding.

This is contrary to the principles of emergence which hold that the soul, or life, emerges from the existence of the body, as if it is a potency of the body. But when this premise is taken, then we must look to a prior material existence to substantiate the actual existence of the living body. Since this prior material existence is not living, it can only substantiate the potential for life, not the actual existence of life. So the infinite regress of potential without anything to substantiate the actual, gives way to the infinite vagueness of pure potential, or apeiron. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, agreed. It’s what I was looking for with the OP: some process that, while not life / anima, is yet not altogether nonlife / devoid-of-anima. I acknowledge, maybe a bit too Quixotic even for my eccentric tastes. Hind sight is always 20/20, or so they say.

That would seem to fit with my position then. Form stands "at the end of development" as ""emergent necessity". In the end, it restricts free choice as there is only one "right" choice. — apokrisis

I’m in no way surprised by this. For my part, the main disagreements between us so far concern there being vagueness (potential) devoid of a ready existing a prior global telos. Without the ready existing telos, the apeiron could only remain apeiron, as MU has so far argued.

If the apeiron were not perfect potential but, as you sometimes state, “fluctuations of potentiality” (which to me indicates some notion of time and of separateness, however chaotic) and there would already be a ready existent, a priori, global telos, then I could understand how the metaphysics you endorse could logically get off the ground.

All other disagreements as regards the metaphysical seem to me secondary to this one.

So you are presuming that motion, change or action needs a cause and can't instead be spontaneous?

I'm instead making the opposite presumption. Fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraint. The problem that existence has is in developing regulating habits.

The initial conditions are an everythingness of spontaneity that is utterly unruly. There is nothing standing in the way of motion, change and action. Then out of that constraints develop. Chaos is transformed into definite actions having definite directions.

So one view sees stasis, a lack of action, as the obvious de facto state. Nothingness seems quite natural. Any first action must have a cause - the atomist's "first swerve".

The other instead sees flux as the basic unavoidable condition. If constraints are lacking, then of course there is nothing to prevent a chaos of fluctuation. What is stopping spontaneity? Constraints need to develop to produce an orderly state where cause and effect now operates and time flows smoothly towards its completely constrained and tamed Heat Death future.

Now of course you can argue for the alternative - that existence is simply uncreated and eternal as some sort of always definite brute fact. It doesn't satisfy logically. But that is the other point of view — apokrisis

Hi, apo. I generally like your thermodynamic theory to the degree that I understand it. It's fresh. It has a dark beauty.

Now to my question. Why this association of brute facticity and uncreated and eternal? As I understand the argument for brute fact, it's really about human reasoning. It doesn't matter if existence was always here or whether it sprang from nothing. Both could be understood as brute facts, depending on the theory which included them.

You write a vagueness as origin. Would this not be a brute fact? It's really just the old question of infinite regress. Either the chain of whys stretches forever of this chain terminates in a "just because" or "I don't know." Since I think brute fact is logically necessary, I don't think it's a flaw in a metaphysical vision to acknowledge an "irrational" origin.

Do you reject the idea that there is brute fact at the origin of your own vision? If so, how and why?

Here are some other versions of the same general idea:

When the existence of each member of a collection is explained by reference to some other member of that very same collection, then it does not follow that the collection itself has an explanation. For it is one thing for there to be an explanation of the existence of each dependent being and quite another thing for there to be an explanation of why there are dependent beings at all. (Rowe 1975: 264)

...

Peter van Inwagen (1983: 202–04) argues that the PSR must be rejected. If the PSR is true, every contingent proposition has an explanation. Suppose P is the conjunction of all contingent true propositions. Suppose also that there is a state of affairs S that provides a sufficient reason for P. S cannot itself be contingent, for then it would be a conjunct of P and entailed by P, and as both entailing and entailed by P would be P, so that it would be its own sufficient reason. But no contingent proposition can explain itself. Neither can S be necessary, for from necessary propositions only necessary propositions follow. Necessary propositions cannot explain contingent propositions, for if x sufficiently explains y, then x entails y, and if x is necessary so is y. So S cannot be either contingent or necessary, and hence the PSR is false. Thus, if the cosmological argument appeals to the PSR to establish the existence of a necessary being whose existence is expressed by a necessary proposition as an explanation for contingent beings, it fails in that it cannot account for the contingent beings it purportedly explains.
— SEP

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#Obje1UnivJust