• jorndoe
    3.3k
    Barring self-identity or certain kinds of self-reference:

    • the map is not the territory (Korzybski); maps may be territories in their own right
    • the description is not the described (Krishnamurti allegedly); descriptions might also be described
    • the model is not the modeled (science)
    • the talk is not always the talked about (linguistics); a language may be it's own meta-language
    • thoughts of things are not the things that are thought (Brassier); we may also think about thoughts
    • the perception is not always the perceived (Searle and others)
    • my experience of you is not you (non-solipsism)
    • the experience is not always the experienced (non-idealism)
    • the memory is not the remembered (you know who you are)
    • the smell/look/taste of the food is not the food (you eat food, not qualia)

    Would anyone like to defend and/or object?

    (Regarding self-identity/reference, I guess, in general, "is not" should perhaps be replaced with "is often/sometimes not", you get the gist.)

    EDIT: link, details
  • 0af
    44

    In terms of prudence, common sense, and smooth interpersonal relations, it's hard to disagree. But I do think there are some "speculative" tensions to be explored.

    For instance, what is this territory apart from the map? It could also be thought of as part of the map that insists that this same map is subject to revision.

    Similarly, the sum of all our models of some phenomenon (a single systematic model then) is (arguably) the intelligible structure or essence of that phenomenon. All that's left out seems to be the "qualia" or the sensuality that concept cannot directly convey.

    If this seems thin (and is quite thin from the perspective of practice), that's perhaps because words like "perception " and "description" for instance are typically used so that the perception is not the perceived, etc., so that there's something tautologous going on in those statements.

    Finally, the "speculative" relevance of the tensions mentioned above tend to involve authority and interpretation. For instance, I can't know Hegel-in-himself. I can only know a model of Hegel in my own concept system. In that sense he and anyone else is forced in first-person terms to be "smaller" than me. The same argument can be applied to God, etc. I can only know Hegel/God to the degree that I am Hegel/God. The territory outside the map is just a hole in the map or the map's fragility.
  • Wayfarer
    20.7k
    Not defend, or object, but interpret.

    It's all about not getting caught up in abstractions and then attaching emotions to them.

    There is a Buddhist concept called 'papañca' which is sometimes translated as 'conceptual proliferation'. It refers to the worlds of thought and emotion that persons habitually get caught up in 1.

    Look at a reality TV show (not that I ever do) or a daytime soap opera (ditto). The faces of the participants are a constant melange of emotions - fear, expectation, excitement, suspense, doubt, relief, and the rest. The participants have so much invested in the story that it is pulling them along, and the audience with it. That's a clue to what 'papañca' is about. And I think it's also the intent of some of those illustrative examples in the OP (particularly 1 & 3). They're reminders that talk, language, abstractions, are not reality. The reality is [insert real thing here]. But we get constantly wound up in, and bamboozled by, words, thoughts and emotions. I think that has at least something to do with it.
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