So to come back to BC's quote at the top, one must surely want to say that there are facts of human nature if only that they are social constructers that are not, or not entirely social constructs. And at the same time, one has to accept that whether a Jew or a Negro is fully human is a matter of constructive dogma. Have the postmoderns won, or is there still a use for the scientific view? Is it worth trying to disentangle the construct from the concrete?

Saying there are facts of human nature doesnt' change the fact that many of those facts are constructed by human choice of classification and that our views and notions of those facts are always mitigated by the human constructs of language, culture, and society.

As to races, they are a separate human construct even from the human construct of biological and anthropological classification as humans are not scientifically classified by the color of the skin or width or breadth of their eyes. So, to say the races arent different, is not only recognizing human constructs in the classification of the races, it is respecting the materially-supported "constructs" of Science, Biology, and Anthropology that reject the notion that racial classification is actually scientific..

The narrative Cold War babies heard was that our nature had brought us to the brink of self-destruction. The whole 20th Century is an emotional argument for post-structuralism.

I think that what we are at any moment is one tiny manifestation of the human potential. Manifestations are shaped many things, positive and negative.

Is it worth trying to disentangle the construct from the concrete? — unenlightened

It must be, or we're back where this all started: staring at amorphous shadows projected on cave walls.

When it comes to the "post-modern" rejection of scientific truth, I believe it is mostly born from a layman's understanding of what science actually is, how and why it works, and hence the nature and value of scientific truth.

For example: disagreement between prominent fields of study/research groups/individual scientists is often taken by layman observers as a sign that science as a whole is questionable because there is no absolutely unanimous consensus among scientists (anything short of absolute certainty is fertile ground for a stubborn rejection). Another severe point of confusion afflicts scientific fields of study which become too complex for most individuals to follow and comprehend. The well-founded conclusions of a complex theory can be easily dismissed by an individual if they misunderstand it and it's implications. The genetics of race is a great example of this: On one side of the layman spectrum there is a growing movement of "race realism" whose understanding of the actual genetic differences between races is non-existent, and yet they constantly talk about differences between the mean IQ of various races as an important point of understanding. On the other end of the spectrum, everyone is so afraid that if we discover genetic differences between races it would lead to racism that to even broach the topic might be taken as offensive, likely made more paranoid by the growing movement of race realists obsessed with IQ test scores.

People also misunderstand the nature of "scientific truth" to begin with (and they conflate different scientific truths with one-another). They expect that if scientists believe something to be true then science must forever agree with them or else science is unreliable and useless. They don't understand that science doesn't claim to begin and end with ultimate and immutable truth, but that it instead tries to close in on truth from a distance by slowly improving itself.

The very fallibility of science which is the basis for the post-modern rejection of it is the same humility and virtue that has made science so powerful (the humility which so much human thought severely lacks). Science admits that it's not perfect, and looks for it's own faults in order to improve them. It is this constant self analysis, constant testing, and willingness need to question it's own foundations which has driven it reliably forward.

The post-modern dogma which surrounds science isn't so unique in my view. We have always looked to possess immutably true and perfect knowledge, and in our wanton expectation often fool ourselves into thinking that we've found it. That lofty expectation, this god-shaped whole, is what I think mainly drives the dogmatic post-modern rejection of science.

On the other end of the spectrum, everyone is so afraid that if we discover genetic differences between races it would lead to racism that to even broach the topic might be taken as offensive, likely made more paranoid by the growing movement of race realists obsessed with IQ test scores.

There are no genetic differences between the races.

The post-modern dogma which surrounds science isn't so unique in my view.

There is no post-modern dogma concerning science. To what post-modern thinkers and which of their theories are you referring?

I'm skeptical that you're yet informed enough to understand what genetic differences between individuals actually means or look like let alone between races. But let's try anyway...

Genetic differences between individuals can loosely be approximated by comparing their shared genetic markers (all races share mostly the same genetic markers) but more importantly by comparing the prevalence of individual genetic markers within a given individual. For instance if we imagine that some "height genetic marker" exists, and we look at two individuals, the shorter individual will have fewer instances of that specific genetic marker repeated in their genome overall, and the taller individual will have more instances of that specific genetic marker.

So if we look at larger groups, what we might do is take the mean prevalence of a certain genetic marker and compare it to the mean prevalence of that genetic marker in another group.

If we compared say, the mean "height gene prevalence" of the Bantu people (very tall) with the mean prevalence of that same gene in the Pygmy people (very short), guess what we would see? A massive difference (if indeed we've identified an actual "height gene").

The reason why certain groups of people share characteristics is because their genes are clustered around the same average, and if that average is very different from that of another group, then overall there can be noticeable differences in the average characteristics of those people. The reality of gene marker prevalence is what makes traits heritable while also having a chance to be pronounced with variable degrees of strength (some offspring may get more repetitions of a specific genetic marker, others might get less, but it will cluster around the same average)

Saying there are no genetic differences between races is like saying there are no genetic differences between individuals...

Saying there are no genetic differences between races is like saying there are no genetic differences between individuals... — VagabondSpectre

Is there a statistically significant difference? Either way, the term wasn't invented to talk about genetics. It's about appearance or culture. Appearances can definitely fail to testify to bloodlines.

Skin tone, height, hair color, eye color, body mass are some examples of statistically relevant differences that come to mind and are immediately apparent.(between some but not all "races". the real question is where to draw arbitrary lines in-bewteen or around continuous groups, sort of like the color dilemma)

There is no post-modern dogma concerning science. To what post-modern thinkers and which of their theories are you referring? — Thanatos Sand

Thomas Khun's theory that scientific knowledge does not progress, that it instead just shifts from one arbitrary paradigm to another without ever making any objective gains. As far as I understand it, he argues that the way scientists are socialized into their various fields reduces them to producing inevitably useless bodies of knowledge which contribute nothing of lasting or cumulative value.

Genetic differences between individuals can loosely be approximated by comparing their shared genetic markers (all races share mostly the same genetic markers) but more importantly by comparing the prevalence of individual genetic markers within a given individual. For instance if we imagine that some "height genetic marker" exists, and we look at two individuals, the shorter individual will have fewer instances of that specific genetic marker repeated in their genome overall, and the taller individual will have more instances of that specific genetic marker.

The one who isn't informed enough is clearly you, since these differences can occur between two different people of the same race. Try not making "arguments" that undermine your already erroneous ones.

So if we look at larger groups, what we might do is take the mean prevalence of a certain genetic marker and compare it to the mean prevalence of that genetic marker in another group.

If we compared say, the mean "height gene prevalence" of the Bantu people (very tall) with the mean prevalence of that same gene in the Pygmy people (very short), guess what we would see? A massive difference (if indeed we've identified an actual "height gene").

And you undermine yourself again since Bantu and Pygmy arent' separate races. You should try to support your erroneous argument, not unintentionally refute it.

The reason why certain groups of people share characteristics is because their genes are clustered around the same average, and if that average is very different from that of another group, then overall there can be noticeable differences in the average characteristics of those people. The reality of gene marker prevalence is what makes traits heritable while also having a chance to be pronounced with variable degrees of strength (some offspring may get more repetitions of a specific genetic marker, others might get less, but it will cluster around the same average)

None of this supports your erroneous notion of genetic differences between the races. It's almost entirely irrelevant to anything that could support that.

Saying there are no genetic differences between races is like saying there are no genetic differences between individuals...

No, as you've helped show above, saying there are no genetic differences between races is a true statement. Saying there are no differences between individuals is ridiculous. I'm surprised you didn't say it above.

Thomas Khun's theory that scientific knowledge does not progress, that it instead just shifts from one arbitrary paradigm to another without ever making any objective gains.

Kuhn never said scientific knowledge didn't progress. You need to read his book again if you ever read it a first time.

I think that racial categories are much more complex than just "black/white/asian/etc...". For instance, the Pygmy people are ethnically different from the Bantu people and the results of those genetic differences are stark and undeniable. Do you deny that there is an observable difference between the average characteristics of the Pygmy and Bantu people which stems from differences in their average genetic makeup?

I think that racial categories are much more complex than just "black/white/asian/etc...". For instance, the Pygmy people are ethnically different from the Bantu people and the results of those genetic differences are stark and undeniable. Do you deny that there is an observable difference between the average characteristics of the Pygmy and Bantu people which stems from differences in their average genetic makeup?

You erroneously said there are genetic differences between the races. The Pygmies and Bantus are not different races. So, what you wrote doesn't support your claim at all.

You erroneously said there are genetic differences between the races. The Pygmies and Bantus are not different races. So, what you wrote doesn't support your claim at all. — Thanatos Sand

They're different ethnic groups, different "racial" groups... If you want call them different sub-groups of the same race go ahead but you're blatantly obfuscating my point...

They're different ethnic groups, different "racial" groups... If you want call them different sub-groups of the same race go ahead but you're blatantly obfuscating my point...

Sorry, different ethnic groups are a very different thing from different races. So, I didn't obfuscate your point, it was already self-obfuscated. You really need to educate yourself on this stuff; you're a bit lost here.

I first read Berger and Luckmann's book, Social Construction of Reality, in a comparative religion tutorial, decades back. I railed against it: do we hang the stars in the sky, I said. I found the idea of humans 'constructing reality' preposterous. But I didn't understand it, at the time, and since then have come to recognise it for the profound insight it is. I think it's connected to Husserl's ideas of 'lebenwelt' and 'umwelt' - that we live in a world of 'constructed meanings', which is the basis of 'our world' far more than the brute facts of geology and physics.

Some concepts are constructed - 'property' for example - and others are... what? Found, I suppose. 'Gravity' kind of imposes itself on us as inescapable, whether one has the concept or not. — unenlightened

I find the axis along which to make that division, in the distinction of the 'conditioned and unconditioned'. 'The conditioned' is what is socially-constructed, the 'reality of consensus', of what 'everyone knows to be true'. The 'unconditioned' is the unmediated experience of peak experiences, artistic engagement, meditative awareness, and so on.

How are they very different? Can you offer some definitions?

You would agree then, there are evident genetic differences between ethnic groups?

Kuhn never said scientific knowledge didn't progress. You need to read his book again if you ever read it a first time. — Thanatos Sand

What did he say about it then? Care to offer a correction?

As far as I know he said that science doesn't progress toward certainty because each time we have a revolutionary change we just exchange one uncertain paradigm for another.

↪Thanatos Sand How are they very different? Can you offer some definitions?

You would agree then, there are evident genetic differences between ethnic groups?

There are three human-constructed races: Mongolid, Negroid, and Caucasoid. There are no genetic differences/separators between these races. There are many ethnic groups within each race; they do have genetic differences between them.

Kuhn never said scientific knowledge didn't progress. You need to read his book again if you ever read it a first time.
— Thanatos Sand

What did he say about it then? Care to offer a correction?

As far as I know he said that science doesn't progress toward certainty because each time we have a revolutionary change we just exchange one uncertain paradigm for another.

He said that while there is progress, it isn't just determined by the truths of scientific practices and scientific observations, as some had claimed, but was also influenced by shifts in modes/practices (paradigms) that were also determined by human bias and flawed power systems and ideologies. He did not deny scientific progress itself.

My thinking on the topic goes somewhat in reverse. Rather than defining social construction by finding its negative, I think it's more interesting to look at what counts as the social and its constructs primarily. If there is something concrete, then that's all well and good -- but we can still try and understand the social on its own regardless of the differences between the social and, say, the physical.

When I think of and speak of social construction I'm actually less interested in distinguishing it from physical reality as I am in distinguishing the social from psychic reality -- Searle is a good example here of someone who clearly explains that he believes social reality is constructed out of psychic reality, and I think it's a commonly believed conception -- that changing beliefs, attitudes, feelings, perceptions, knowledge, and whatever else we may designate as belonging to the set of psychic existents is how we change our social reality. (writing anymore on that, I think I'd get way off topic).


So I'd begin with a list -- what are the social constructs? I'd include things like...


Money, laws, institutions, marriage, war, the state, businesses, unions, guilds, non-profit organizations

. . . as obvious, non-controversial sorts of things. But I'd also include things like...


houses, knives, sewing machines, boats, electrical power. . .

and other sorts of goods and services which, under capitalism, are commodities. That is, many, many, many things are the product of social activity. And then there's another class of social constructs, the sorts more associated with justice, like. . .


gender, race, class, sex, orientation, nationality, ethnicity, age,

. . . which are just as real as houses and money, but are also the result of social activity.



I think the primary motivation for understanding something as socially constructed is that it is, by the same methods of being built, capable of being re/un-built. In order to do so, though, one must actually understand the mechanism of social construction itself.

But, then, it seems to me that the question is more -- can we have a scientific understanding of social reality? Or, perhaps better formulated, is such an understanding worthwhile?

That while we may be made of atoms, what we do together doesn't change how the atoms behave. But, seemingly (and it may be an illusion), what we do does change social reality. It seems to me that in order to have a scientific view, in the sense of the concrete, or in the same sense as chemistry, of the social it would require our sense of social agency to be illusory (or, we may have to loosen what we understand scientific understanding to mean, too -- in the manner of the "soft" sciences, still empirical but not in as much control or taken into a lab, but more embedded with a historical way of understanding)

(Y)

I Like Searle's concept of social vs objective ontology. Our ability to create reality by declaration, as a social function.

Some concepts are constructed - 'property' for example - and others are... what? Found, I suppose. 'Gravity' kind of imposes itself on us as inescapable, whether one has the concept or not. — unenlightened

But surely 'property' also imposes itself upon us as inescapable; one can't willy nilly ignore that things belong by law to certain entities, without suffering from the consequences (if caught).

The point being that anything 'socially constructed' has no less reality than anything not. That race is 'socially constructed' does not mean, for example, that the institutional or cultural reality of race is any less felt than the force of gravity. Reality is on the side of the social, not set against or beside it.

The point being that anything 'socially constructed' has no less reality than anything not. That race is 'socially constructed' does not mean, for example, that the institutional or cultural reality of race is any less felt than the force of gravity. Reality is on the side of the social, not set against or beside it.

Of course Gravity has more reality than the socially constructed notion of race. The laws of Gravity have been confirmed through testing and retesting as real outside our perception of the universe. So, while the term "gravity" is a construct and, as Godel showed, our math is still a constructed language, Gravity is tied to a definition extremely more static and rigorous than that of "race. And what is felt is irrelevant here, since reality isn't solely predicated on subjective perception. And no, reality is not on the side of the social, it is on the side of the real, even when the concept "real" is a construct itself.

I'm not sure what it means for anything to have 'more' - or 'less' - reality than anything else. Nor do I have any idea what kind of distinction that between reality and the real is. I simply mean to complicate the distinction in the OP between that which is 'found' and that which is 'constructed'. To put it in it's terms, that which is 'constructed' may well also be 'found'; even if found as constructed. Finally, by 'felt reality', I simply mean that if you're about to be lynched by mob because you're black, it will do little good to plead that 'race is a social construct'.

[quote↪Thanatos Sand I'm not sure what it means for anything to have 'more' - or 'less' - reality than anything else.][/quote]

If you don't know what it means for anything to have more or less reality than anything else, than you should probably stop using the words "real" or "reality" since you have no definition for them and you refuse the standard ones:

"Definition of real
1
:  of or relating to fixed, permanent, or immovable things (such as lands or tenements)
2
a :  not artificial, fraudulent, or illusory :  genuine real gold; also :  being precisely what the name implies a real professional
c :  having objective independent existence unable to believe that what he saw was real"

Therefore, non-artificial things or non-illusory things like the Empire State Building are more real than the Easter Bunny. There is no point of the word "real" if some things aren't more real than others. It's definition shows they are.

I simply mean to complicate the distinction in the OP between that which is 'found' and that which is 'constructed'. To put it in it's terms, that which is 'constructed' may well also be 'found'; even if found as constructed.

I don't know what you mean by these terms. But something can't be found unless it was real, so again, you embrace the notions of more or less real, even when you erroneously reject them.

If you don't know what it means for anything to have more or less reality than anything else, than you should probably stop using the words "real" or "reality" since you have no definition for them and you refuse the standard ones: — Thanatos Sand

As far as I can see, the very standard definition you've cited contrasts the real with the artificial or the illusory, and at no point does it invoke a scale or gradation of realness. To argue for the reality of the social, is just to argue for the fact that the social is neither 'illusory, artificial, or fraudulent'. Or at least, no more or less so than gravity. Finally, if you don't know what the terms 'constructed' and 'found' refer to, I suggest you consult the OP, where they are used.

Finally, by 'felt reality', I simply mean that if you're about to be lynched by mob because you're black, it will do little good to plead that 'race is a social construct'. — StreetlightX

That's really nice. Well said.

Happily we also have this point:

I think the primary motivation for understanding something as socially constructed is that it is, by the same methods of being built, capable of being re/un-built. — Moliere

So if we believed race and the inherent inferiority of one race to another were part of the natural order, there wouldn't be much room for the idea that lynchings should stop; or, having had such a heterodox idea, it would surely be more difficult to convince people to change their behavior.

If you don't know what it means for anything to have more or less reality than anything else, than you should probably stop using the words "real" or "reality" since you have no definition for them and you refuse the standard ones:
— Thanatos Sand

As far as I can see, the very standard definition you've cited contrasts the real with the artificial or the illusory, and at no point does it invoke a scale or gradation of realness.

Of course it does, since it notes what the real is and what it isn't, therefore it implies a gradation from those things closest to what it established as real and those which are closest to what is not real. So, it didn't need to invoke that scale it already implied.

To argue for the reality of the social, is just to argue for the fact that the social is neither 'illusory, artificial, or fraudulent'. Or at least, no more or less so than gravity.

And based on the standard definitions of "real" I gave, that would be a bad argument, since what is "social" is much less fixed and permanent than Gravity.

Establishing a binary does not entail establishing a gradation. Between apples and not-apples, it is not necessary that there are degrees of apples between the two. In any case, your 'objection' simply relies on a different use of words. A triviality.

↪Thanatos Sand Establishing a binary does not entail establishing a gradation.

Of course it does, unless you're claiming there's nothing between the two points of the binary and there were no directions implied by the binary, and both of those claims would be erroneous.

So, the only objection relying on a different use of words, and a triviality, is yours.