Neuron A correlates to one colour experience and neuron B correlates to another colour experience, tested by directly stimulating neuron A and then neuron B and asking the subject if they see the same, different, or no colours, and them confirming that they see two different colours.

In (1) John's eye reacts to the 700nm light by stimulating neuron A via the optic nerve into the brain.

In (2) Jane's eye reacts to the 700nm light by stimulating neuron B via the optic nerve into the brain.

In (3) the visor reacts to the 700nm light by emitting 450nm light, and John's eye reacts to the 450nm light by stimulating neuron B via the optic nerve into the brain.

In (4) the visor reacts to the 700nm light by stimulating neuron B via a wire into John's brain.

So what is the relevant difference between:

1. People born without eyes and born wearing a visor that discharges electricity into their optic nerve
2. People born with eyes and born wearing a visor that discharges electromagnetism into their eyes which discharges electricity into their optic nerve

My issue is that you appear to argue that (1) is direct perception because they don't have to assess the veracity of the visor's output but that (2) is indirect perception because they do have to assess the veracity of the visor's output, but there appears neither a causal nor a normative justification for this inconsistency. Either they are both direct perception or they are both indirect perception.

Hallucinations are not delusions. When I eat shrooms I very much experience and am very much aware of the kaleidoscope of colours that I am seeing (and very much know that the colours I am seeing are an hallucination caused by the fungus).

If you're going to define "experience of" and "aware of" in such a way that nothing is experienced and we're not aware of anything when we dream and hallucinate then it's no surprise that you don't understand and misrepresent indirect realism.

Suppose in touching the apple I knock off one atom. The apple has changed. Is it the same apple even though it has changed or should I give it a new name because it has changed. — RussellA

It is still the same apple even if with some of its atoms are missing or altered. It is called identity through time. With time change in the universe, everything changes. But the identity of the object remains same, as long as it can be remembered by the perceiver.

When you were born x number of years ago, you were a newborn baby, Now you are a grown up adult, I guess? You now look totally different in height, weight and looks from when you were a newborn baby, but you are still you. You changed through time, but you remember you are you. You are still you.

What is more, you don't need to change your name, or give you a new name. No, you don't keep giving new names to objects, unless there are necessary reasons for it.

Hallucinations are not delusions. When I eat shrooms I very much experience and am very much aware of the kaleidoscope of colours that I am seeing (and very much know that the colours I am seeing are an hallucination caused by the fungus). — Michael

I'd just describe your experience as a visual distortion, not a true hallucination. Someone going through withdrawal where they try to pick off non-existent bugs crawling on their skin I'd think of as a hallucination.

I don't actually think the room spinning if I drink too much, but I wouldn't say I hallucinated it either.

Austin's point, as far as I can tell, wouldn't deny the true hallucinations, but would deny that they were very common. That is, the bulk of your claimed confusion is non-existent, easily understood and described through common language.

He'd also deny Z, where it represents X (the verdical) minus Y (the delusive)., to suggest there is a portion of any experience A that contains some truth and some added mental baggage. To allow that, slips into Locke, distinguishing between the primary and secondary qualities.

Why he denies this, as I was saying to @Banno appears dogmatic. That is, he just denies it necessary to understand the world as we commonly (and a tremendous emphasis is placed on the common man, unconfused by silly philosophical problem creation) perceive it. The minute you break the world down into what there really is (veridical) and what you only think there is (delusive), you fall into the trap of making such silly (per his view) things like "the ship I see isn't the ship there is. "

Austin does, if you buy in, preserve meaning in our ordinary discourse, but I'd argue it does so at the expense of presenting an unexamined view under the guise of a mocking anti-philosophicism (my created term), where he sort of says this has been over thought to nonsense where we can't even say we saw a ship that everyone sees plain as day.

So, my question is if we admit a distinction between the noumenal core reality and the phenomenonal perception with its generated distortions, and the noumenal is defined as beyond knowable, isn't the attempt to identify and describe the mental baggage (Z, as I've described it) futile? If we can't know what is veridical, we can't know what is delusive.

Does this not warrant the sort of move Austin makes just to create boundaries so we can speak normally. I like Wittgenstein's approach better where meaning falls to use, making the swirl in your head irrelevant.