You interpret him as 'arguing against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis.' He doesn't say that put it in those terms. You interpret it in those terms because of the framework in which you interpret it.

Would you say the term participatory realist still describes him? Bitbol clearly identifies that scientific knowledge depends on the conditions of participation of observers in the manner of phenomenology. Would we say he is something of a transcendental idealist?

Bitbol isn’t saying that our experience is random but shaped or perhaps constrained by a reality we simultaneously co-create as we experience it. Or something like this.

I’d be interested in whether you employ a working conceptual definition of “reality” I’m assuming you would found it in experience. I am sympathetic to the notion that experience is irreducible but it still leaves the question, what is expedience? Experience seems to be an interaction - do we ever have it without a relationship with an other of some kind?

As Bitbol argues in “Is Consciousness Primary?* consciousness is not an object among objects, nor a property waiting to be discovered by neuroscience. It is not among the phenomena given to examination by sense–data or empirical observation. If we know what consciousness is, it is because we ourselves are conscious beings, not because it is something we encounter in the natural world.

yes this much I get. But:

Experience seems to be an interaction - do we ever have it without a relationship with an other of some kind? — Tom Storm

Can we ever say we experience experience? Isn’t consciousness always in relationship to something else?

Not always. Of course we are always in a relationship of 'otherness' in respect of our regular social existence. But I think the contemplative aspect of philosophy is intended to foster awareness of consciousness as it is in itself. This is the meaning of the Sanskrit term 'nirvikalpa' which means 'without discriminative awareness'. It is true that this kind of insight is not discussed or recognised in much analytical philosophy. But I think the phenomenological school approaches it, with its practice of 'epochē' - which is not a term denoting a concept, but denoting a state of awareness, 'suspending judgement about what is not evident'.

In ordinary thought, we are constantly naming and so objectifying whatever we experience - 'this is X, it means Y' and so on. This happens at a subliminal level of awareness because we're enculturated to think this way. We constantly classify, divide and define - that is the work of discursive reason. So becoming aware of that process requires a metacognitive insight. In my view, that is an important task of philosophy.

We may say that there's 'the spiritual' and 'the physical', and that these somehow have to be re-united. But what I'm suggesting is more radical than that. We have to retrace our steps to where this 'mind-body' divide was made in the first place instead of trying to re-unite what perhaps ought not to have been divided in the first place. That's the subject of another essay on Michel Bitbol, Phenomenology Meets Buddhism.

I think the contemplative aspect of philosophy is intended to foster awareness of consciousness as it is in itself. This is the meaning of the Sanskrit term 'nirvikalpa' which means 'without discriminative awareness'. It is true that this kind of insight is not discussed or recognised in much analytical philosophy. But I think the phenomenological school approaches it, with its practice of 'epochē' - which is not a term denoting a concept, but denoting a state of awareness, 'suspending judgement about what is not evident — Wayfarer

What you say may be true of Eastern practices, but I think Tom makes a good point with regard to the phenomenological vantages of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Consciousness is essentially intentional: it is always consciousness of something. Even when I reflect on my own experience, that reflection is itself an intentional act directed toward a lived experience. There is no “bare consciousness” floating free of intentional structure. Even so-called pure self-awareness is structured as a temporal flow of retention, primal impression and protention, in which each phase is related to others. Consciousness is not a thing in itself but a dynamic correlation between noesis (subjective act) and noema (intended object).

Husserl would insist that even after the most radical phenomenological reduction, consciousness remains relational. It is always correlation, never an isolated substance. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is embodied, not secondarily but fundamentally. The self is not first and then related; it is constituted in relation, it is world-involving. There is no pure inward gaze that escapes the fleshly intertwining of body and world.

You interpret him as 'arguing against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis.' He doesn't say that put it in those terms. You interpret it in those terms because of the framework in which you interpret it. — Wayfarer

Again, I need to clarify that the "terms" you objected to are the words of Google AI Overview, not from my own "framework". I haven't read anything by Bitbol, so I depend on You and Google to interpret his attitude toward Consciousness and Matter. If you say that he doesn't "argue against the material basis of consciousness", I'll accept that. But, personally, I think Consciousness derives from both Abstract Causation (agency ; constraints) and Concrete Matter (container)*1. :smile:



*1. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter
a 2011 book by biological anthropologist Terrence W. Deacon that explains how life and consciousness arise from physical matter, arguing that "absences" or constraints are key to this emergence. The book traces the development of this unique causal power from simple thermodynamics to self-organizing systems, proposing that meaning and subjectivity are legitimate, physically potent components of the world, not just byproducts. It integrates physics, biology, neuroscience, and philosophy to bridge the gap between the material and the mental.
Deacon argues that life and mind are not mystical additions to the physical world but are emergent properties of specific, complex physical dynamics. He proposes a new scientific framework that can account for subjective experience, meaning, and purpose as legitimate physical phenomena, suggesting that "we are made of these specific absences".
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=how+mind+emerged+from+matter

Would you say the term participatory realist still describes him? — Tom Storm

Since I haven't read anything written by Bitbol, I'll defer to :smile:

Can we ever say we experience experience? Isn’t consciousness always in relationship to something else? — Tom Storm

Good question. An act of Awareness is a two-party event : knower & known ; subject & object, sender & receiver. But the point of transformation from physical processing of incoming Information to extracting ideas, feelings, meanings, and qualia, remains a mystery : the Hard Problem.

We can't define Sentience mechanically, but we know it when we see it. Yet even more puzzling is the transition from bare animal Sentience (feeling ; sensation) to human Sapience (thinking ; reasoning). :smile:

PS___ I suppose that to "experience experience" is what some call a "Mystical" Experience (direct unmediated engagement). But I have no personal experience with such intimate mindfulness. So again, I'll defer to .


Conscious experience is often distinguished from mere unconscious processing, such as reflexes or autonomic nervous system functions, which occur without awareness.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=what+is+conscious+experience

I'm not trying to assert the existence of something called 'pure consciousness'.

Go back to the quote from the OP:

Consciousness is not an object among objects, nor a property waiting to be discovered by neuroscience. It is not among the phenomena given to examination by sense–data or empirical observation. If we know what consciousness is, it is because we ourselves are conscious beings, not because it is something we encounter in the natural world.

What I'm saying, is that @Gnomon's analysis tends to make consciousness (or the mind or self) 'an object among objects'. Any 'theory of consciousness' will tend to do that, because theories themselves are grounded in the objective stance. But 'if we know what consciousness is', it is not because of objective analysis, but because we ourselves are conscious beings. And that knowledge, as Descartes said in his second meditation, is the indubitable reality of our own existence (cogito ergo sum). But then, Descartes also set in motion the classical 'mind-body' division, which underlies many of the arguments about 'whether consciousness can have a material basis'. In doing so, he set up the very division which Husserl sought to address in his many writings on Descartes.

Apropos of which, and not coincidentally, I've had another essay published by Philosophy Today about this very topic, called Descartes' Ghost ('friend' link).

But the point of transformation from physical processing of incoming Information to extracting ideas, feelings, meanings, and qualia, remains a mystery : the Hard Problem. — Gnomon

But again, this is because of the way we've set out the question, appropriating terminology and observation and trying to meld them together into a 'theory'. But the reality of one's own existence is not theoretical on that sense, it is lived.

Incidentally 'theoria' in ancient philosophy meant something very different. It was the 'contemplation of first principles': In Book X (1177a12–18) Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes the contemplative life:

“The activity of reason (nous), which is contemplative (theōrētikē), seems to be superior in seriousness and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own proper pleasure.”

In keeping with Aristotelian ethics where "virtue is its own reward".

I suppose that to "experience experience" is what some call a "Mystical" Experience (direct unmediated engagement). — Gnomon

I suspect that what happens during long and arduous contemplation is precisely nothing. There is no 'mystical experience' to be had. In Zen Buddhist training, one is strictly admonished from either chasing 'spiritual experiences' or treasuring any that might happen (where they're called 'makyo', meaning literally 'the devil's cave'.)

I suspect what happens instead is that one starts to be become intimately and directly aware of one's own experience, in a way that one does not when constantly distracted, entertained and amused, as we all are.

Incidentally, regarding Terrence Deacon. I most admire Terrence Deacon, I think he's a real trail-blazer, although how big an impact he's having in mainstream academia, I'm not sure. But in any case, I don't think his 'constitutive absences' are at all compatible with a thoroughgoing physicalism (or naturalism for that matter.) The very title of his book could be parodied as 'Incomplete Naturalism.'

Husserl would insist that even after the most radical phenomenological reduction, consciousness remains relational. It is always correlation, never an isolated substance. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is embodied, not secondarily but fundamentally. The self is not first and then related; it is constituted in relation, it is world-involving. There is no pure inward gaze that escapes the fleshly intertwining of body and world. — Joshs

That's exactly what I was trying to get at. Thanks.

What I'm saying, is that Gnomon's analysis tends to make consciousness (or the mind or self) 'an object among objects'. — Wayfarer

That sounds strange to me. I don't view Consciousness as an object, a thing, a substance ; but as a process, and an action. I suppose what gave you that odd "object" idea is my understanding that Human-type Consciousness is not fundamental to reality, but emergent from the creative process of evolution.

Of course, it's possible that God-type Consciousness is a priori to everything in the world. But I don't know anything for sure about that*1. Since I view the hypothetical First Cause --- or "Programmer" as I like to call it --- as non-intervening, the physical universe can run the program-of-evolution automatically & mechanically, without any twiddling of dials by the "Developer". However, you could say that the Mind of God is embedded in the evolutionary program in the form of natural Laws, which are causal constraints, not conscious thoughts .

Descartes' cogito ergo sum may not refer to divine cognition, but to the fact that in order to know my self, I must have the power of knowing : consciousness. So, in that sense, C is fundamental to human thought, but not necessarily to God-like creativity. About which I know nothing specific : just guessing, based on limited human imagination & creativity. The bottom line is that God-Consciousness is way over my head. So, all I know about Universal Mind is analogies & metaphors derived from glimpses of human experience & inference.

Therefore, my "analysis" indicates that ongoing Creativity (directed Causation) is essential to the evolving world. But, modern Cosmology indicates that the physical universe has existed for eons without any sign of internal Consciousness, right up until just an evolutionary blip ago. But intentional Causation (energy + law) was essential to the process from the get-go. The Bible says that God described Himself as "I am" (L. "sum"), indicating that God is not only self-existent, but self-conscious. Yet, for me, lacking direct mystical communication with God-Mind, it's just a theory. :smile:


*1. "I know that I know nothing" (or "All I know is that I know nothing") is a foundational concept in Western philosophy, derived from Plato’s "Apology" regarding the trial of Socrates. It signifies that true wisdom lies in recognizing the limitations of one's own knowledge, prioritizing intellectual humility over the false pretense of expertise.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=socrates+know+nothing

But the point of transformation from physical processing of incoming Information to extracting ideas, feelings, meanings, and qualia, remains a mystery : the Hard Problem. — Gnomon
But again, this is because of the way we've set out the question, appropriating terminology and observation and trying to meld them together into a 'theory'. But the reality of one's own existence is not theoretical on that sense, it is lived. — Wayfarer

That the transformation from sensation to sentience occurs is not in question. But scientists & philosophers want to know how & why Mind happens. Hence, the Problem, and various theories to resolve it. :smile:

I suspect that what happens during long and arduous contemplation is precisely nothing. There is no 'mystical experience' to be had. — Wayfarer

That's not what I was led to believe, back when I did a short & easy, technology assisted*1, experiment in meditation. Could it's lack of arduosity explain why what happened was "precisely nothing". :sad:

Meditation-induced mystical experiences are profound, altered states of consciousness characterized by feelings of oneness, intense joy, and ego dissolution, often occurring during deep, thought-free states.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=meditation+mystical+experiences

*1. EKG machine to determine when I entered Alpha & Theta brain waves. And Float Tank isolation, where my monkey mind still found external things to focus on.

Incidentally, regarding Terrence Deacon. I most admire Terrence Deacon, I think he's a real trail-blazer, although how big an impact he's having in mainstream academia, I'm not sure. But in any case, I don't think his 'constitutive absences' are at all compatible with a thoroughgoing physicalism (or naturalism for that matter.) The very title of his book could be parodied as 'Incomplete Naturalism.' — Wayfarer

Deacon's book definitely influenced me, in my amateur philosophizing*2. So, I don't really care about his impact on stuffy, stilted academia. Yet I agree with your suggested alternative title, implying that our current understanding of Nature, especially human nature, is missing something. :wink:


*2. Why does Deacon describe nature as incomplete? Because information seems non-physical (it is actually physical, just not material), . . . .
He reifies this absence and says cryptically that "a causal role for absence seems to be absent from the natural sciences." . . . .
We can agree with Deacon that ideas and information are immaterial, neither matter nor energy, but they need matter to be embodied and energy to be communicated. And when they are embodied, they are obviously present (to my mind) — in particular, as those alternative possibilities (merely potential information) in a Shannon communication, those possibilities that are never actualized.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/deacon/

His work is considered crucial for breaking down Cartesian dualism (mind vs. matter) and fostering a deeper understanding of how intentionality and meaning emerge from physical processes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=terrence+deacon+impact+on+science&zx=1771795007235&no_sw_cr=1

Note --- In my thesis, Information is "physical, not material", just like Energy. Hence, my suggested parallels, under the heading of Causation.

I suppose what gave you that odd "object" idea i — Gnomon

What I'm trying to say is that you're 'taking an objective view' - treating consciousness as an objective phenomenon, from the outside so to speak. The point I'm laboring, obviously not successfully, is that we know consciousness by being it. Our own consciousness is the most fundamental fact of existence. You touch on that, in your response, only to immediately dismiss it again.

modern Cosmology indicates that the physical universe has existed for eons without any sign of internal Consciousness, right up until just an evolutionary blip ago — Gnomon

You know the essay I wrote on that, Mind Created World, acknowledges this right up front - but maintains that 'consciousness is fundamental' - not as some mysterious Ingredient X in the constitution of the Universe, but as the basic prerequisite for any grasp of the meaning of existence whatever. And therefore that the Universe known to exist by us prior to our existence in it, is still known through the forms of understanding that we bring to it. Kant 101.

Anyway - I'm going to log out of this version of thephilosophyforum now that I'm active on the new platform. I've got too many spinning plates to look after. Ciao.

There is no pure inward gaze that escapes the fleshly intertwining of body and world.

Eastern mystics would beg to differ. When the outward flow is stilled, one (the self) does not vanish. Because it is not the flow of consciousness/experience which brings us into this world and sustains it. The biosphere as a whole in concert with the physical correlates sustains it. The system has to be considered as a whole with an allowance for what is beyond the veil, so to speak (the component we are not aware of).

I was going to say that, but I thought better of it. Samadhi is out-of-scope for Western philosophy. It’s generally filed in the cabinet alongside religion. It's also not something that Michel Bitbol requires for his philosophical analysis.