get a deeper understanding of one another's perspectives. — Moliere

I agree. Although I hope it doesn’t prejudice the way we view each other.

Just because someone is drawn to Nietzsche, but repulsed by Aristotle, might mean nothing more than they don’t really understand one (or both) of them. It might not mean they are anti-essentialist.

I think aesthetics have an influence on the ideas that are produced, rather than being a byproduct. — Moliere

Yes, but I would say, if the ideas are the focus, the ideas can reshape the aesthetics as much as the aesthetics might have pushed one towards a certain idea.

I will add that, even in translation, late antiquity is a sort of golden age for style, and style helps, even if it doesn't make bad philosophy good. Philosophy is known for its often abstruse and unclear style, your Hegels and Kants. Even when clearer, it can be quite dry, as Aquinas often is. However, the later Greeks and Latins, who are unfortunately quite out of style themselves, had a developed culture of oratory and rhetoric that seems to come through in their writing.

For instance, in On Prayer Origen writes:

Good is one; many are the base. Truth is one; many are the false. True righteousness is one; many are the states
that act it as a part. God’s wisdom is one; many are the wisdoms of this age and of the rulers of this age which come to nought. The word of God is one, but many are the words alien to God.

The same idea can, and often was, delivered in much drier scholastic terms. This is pithy though.

It's not all high oratorical style either, they have a knack for slipping between this and the conversational, or even conspiratorial. Saint John Climacus is a master of passing between these modes. In Cicero, style arguably becomes a vice (as for Nietzsche).

They also tend to spice up their tractates with interesting appeals to literature, poetry, history, myth, and Scripture. Virgil's poetry, for instance, is liberally employed by Saint Augustine, who still considers him "Our Poet."

I don't know what happened as the centuries progressed. I suppose feudalism meant an end for the need for the sort of formal education that existed in antiquity and the heavy focus on public speaking as the key tool for public life. Or maybe it was that the audience narrowed, often to other experts. But it definitely led to a decline in style, one that humanism brought back with guys like Erasmus.

I'm not really sure what happened in between that "rebirth" and German idealism to make style what it was then...

So, I guess I like people who can write in this way, not so much inspiringly, although that helps, but interestingly. Charles Taylor is a good example. He doesn't strike any high oratorical notes, but despite having great density of ideas he nonetheless writes more like a great historian, the opposite of dry or abstruse. William Durant's philosophy stuff is like this too, and he is also pretty pithy.

This can make a big difference. I don't know if I'd ever recommend reading Gibbon to learn about Rome, but he's worth reading for the prose and Enlightenment era philosophy splashed liberally within his commentary. Whereas I sometimes struggle with works when reading them feels tedious.

That said, I don't really like polemical works, even when I agree with them. They certainly aren't the same thing, style (even oratorical) and polemic. Nagel, Lewis, and Frankfurt are good in this way, as recent examples. Augustine is a master. Chesterton is too good at it for his own good.

Do you think that aesthetics in philosophy is a thing? Should it be?

Do you have a sense of your own taste?

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?

Is there such a thing as bad taste in philosophy? If so, what should one do if we encounter bad taste?

Likewise, is there such a thing as good taste in philosophy such that it differs from "the opposite of bad"?

How do you feel about your own personal aesthetic choices? Do you think about how to choose which philosopher to read? How do you think about others choosing different philosophers from you? Is that the sort of thing one you might be "more right about"? — Moliere

Yes I think as a atheïst I'm looking for a sort of non-religious theodicee, like the first philosophers, that is an 'arche' or way to envision the world as one continuous whole.

I find that I side mostly on the side of the tragic/sensual/empircal and dislike most spirituality, metaphysics or over/mis-use of dialectics or reason.

Philosophy at this point for me is mostly about doing away with bad ideas, which is most of philosophy.

And I feel pretty good about it actually, maybe wish I had come to this conclusion sooner. I certainly wouldn't want to waste any more time on bad philosophy.

I think other people have to go through the process they have to go through, and maybe that involves trying out bad ideas, but mostly I think they are just misguided.

It’s the ideas that matter. — T Clark

What I'm asking is if there's a reason you're attracted to this or that idea/author — Moliere

For some reason I keep reflecting back on this.

Partially it's because the concept of something "mattering" is nice and broad, and invites real reflection. It allows for the OP's questions about aesthetics to be introduced. It's also a reminder that what matters to me is probably not much constrained by "what ought to matter" -- if there is such a thing.

But I'm also thinking about an idea mattering. I take T Clark to mean, more or less, that they'll pursue a philosopher depending on whether the ideas are in some way intriguing or important. I certainly do the same. And yet . . . the ideas in almost any work of philosophy interest me, when viewed from the correct angle. If it's good philosophy, it's going to intrigue me, and most of my candidates for reading are good philosophers. So why this one rather than that one? Rorty used to say that he just didn't have an itch where some philosophers wanted to scratch. And vice versa, I suppose.

How this fits into an aesthetic appreciation, I'm not sure, but "an idea that matters to me" seems to be square in the middle of why I'll read the next book I'll read. Oh and I guess I should add: The more I'm familiar with some particular conversation around an issue, the more I'm likely to feel that the next contribution to that conversation will contain "ideas that matter."

It's also a reminder that what matters to me is probably not much constrained by "what ought to matter" -- if there is such a thing. — J

Beyond that, what matters to me isn’t necessarily the same thing that matters to you. I see this as a really personal question, at least for me.

But I'm also thinking about an idea mattering. I take T Clark to mean, more or less, that they'll pursue a philosopher depending on whether the ideas are in some way intriguing or important. I certainly do the same. And yet . . . the ideas in almost any work of philosophy interest me, when viewed from the correct angle. If it's good philosophy, it's going to intrigue me, and most of my candidates for reading are good philosophers. So why this one rather than that one? Rorty used to say that he just didn't have an itch where some philosophers wanted to scratch. And vice versa, I suppose. — J

Yes, intriguing or important to me, not necessarily anyone else. The way I feel seems a lot like what Rorty is describing.

How this fits into an aesthetic appreciation, I'm not sure, but "an idea that matters to me" seems to be square in the middle of why I'll read the next book I'll read. — J

Thinking more about this, I guess everything I’ve said boils down to me being interested in what I find satisfying, not necessarily what I find beautiful. Is that an aesthetic judgment?

Thinking more about this, I guess everything I’ve said boils down to me being interested in what I find satisfying, not necessarily what I find beautiful. Is that an aesthetic judgment? — T Clark

Good question. Pretty sure the OP wants to encourage an expanded use of "aesthetics," so I'd say yes. And it's interesting again because to really reflect on your question about "satisfying," we have to step away from received or common meanings, and ask what it means for me to be satisfied by an idea or its presentation. Is it like "feeling good"? Not exactly . . .

As always, trying to shy away from universalization. — Moliere

Good policy!

Is it possible to offer an aesthetic justification, rather than a causal-historical-preference justification, for what we read and say in philosophy? — Moliere

What if the aesthetic justifications we offer are such as they are on account of our culturally/ historically conditioned intuitions and preferences? I suppose genetics may also be in play. Anything else?

@Moliere

Here's another element of taste ― doesn't apply to everyone.

Some people have a decided preference for the new. Sometimes this is argued for, as Dewey does: the old ideas are dead, no longer suited to our time, and we need new ideas that suit our needs. Sometimes this is argued for as "the philosophy of the future", leading the way, changing the world rather than meeting the present need.

As some people want to be in the vanguard or the avant garde, some people want to stand athwart history saying, stop. Or, if they're not interested in a fight, they want to ignore whatever foolishness people nowadays are getting up to, and stick by the tried-and-true ideas of their forefathers. Some people are naturally suspicious of the new.

As I say, not a motivator for everyone, but I think for some people very important.

:100:

It doesn't seem to me there are that many philosophical questions. Or maybe it would be better to say that what appear to be many questions are all variations and/ or elaborations on a few basic questions ... The categories of philosophy seem to show the basic questions. — Janus

:up: :up:

... some dislike science because they think it disenchants the world. Others like science because to them, on the contrary, understanding how things work makes the world more interesting and hence more not less enchanting.

:fire:

I'm asking after philosophical justifications for this aesthetic choice.

Do you think that aesthetics in philosophy is a thing? Should it be? — Moliere

For some it's (almost) a reflex or bias. In so far as "aesthetics" is inherently philosophical, whether or not one makes aesthetic choices "in philosophy" seems to presuppose (an unconscious) metaphilosophy ...

Do you have a sense of your own taste?

Yes. I'm drawn to concise, clearly written, jargon-free texts on (suffering-based / agent-based) ethics and (naturalistic) ontology.

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?

They tend to focus on aporia which align with my own speculations or reflectively throw me into question.

Is there such a thing as bad taste in philosophy? If so, what should one do if we encounter bad taste?

I find 'essentializing' any form of bigotry, misogyny, homophobia, pedophilia, superstitions, academic quarrels, etc to be in "bad taste" and I tend to name and shame the culprit.

Likewise, is there such a thing as good taste in philosophy such that it differs from "the opposite of bad"?

As a rule, I don't 'essentialize' (i.e. reify the non-instantiated or un- contextualized) and avoid vague words or slogans as much as I can.

How do you feel about your own personal aesthetic choices?

Well, they seem to work for me ...

Do you think about how to choose which philosopher to read?

Not consciously.

How do you think about others choosing different philosophers from you? Is that the sort of thing one you might be "more right about"?

To each his own. No.

I often say that belief in God (for instance) is more likely a preference for a particular type of meaning and value which attracts us, rather than the outcome of sustained reasoning. If reasoning is involved, it tends to be post hoc.

[ ... ] there is often a clear aesthetic preference for a world with foundational guarantees of beauty and certainty.

[ ... ] notions of intrinsic meaninglessness is ugly, stunted and base. And therefore, wrong. — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

The process of philosophy is more interesting to me than the results of philosophy ... Good questions and observations that force us to look at the world differently -- that's the best philosophy to me. — Moliere

:cool: :up:

Philosophy at this point for me is mostly about doing away with bad ideas, which is most of philosophy. — ChatteringMonkey

:smirk: :up:

What if the aesthetic justifications we offer are such as they are on account of our culturally/ historically conditioned intuitions and preferences? — Janus

Yes. They're hardly ever otherwise. The OP question prompts us to ask, So what about that? Is this a mark against using our (conditioned) aesthetic criteria? Not universal enough? The discussion around that question might look very different from one that's similarly phrased, but concerns rational justifications that are called into doubt as culturally or historically relative. Here we're used to seeing an often acrimonious debate about whether "historical rational standards" is even coherent.

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?
They tend to focus on aporia which align with my own speculations or reflectively throw me into question. — 180 Proof

Yes, the theme of being drawn to inquiry or puzzlement as an aesthetic choice in phil. I resonate with that, especially if "aesthetic" is broad enough to include a desire to shape my own life through inquiry.

... a desire to shape my own life through inquiry. — J

Yes :up:

it is not as if austere empiricism or post-modernism don't rely on such appeals. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely.

To bring up something I said earlier about the "limits of reason" in many contemporary philosophical camps—I would point out that the claim that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms or world-views is, of course, a gnostic claim. One presumably knows this if one claims it to be so. Yet, as Hegel says, to have recognized a boundary is to already have stepped over it.

Now, if we claim that reason is in a sense isolated within "world-views and paradigms," we face the odd situation where some world-views and paradigms resolutely deny our claim. They instead claim that knowing involves ecstasis, it is transcendent, and always related to the whole, and so without limit—already with the whole and beyond any limit. And such views have quite a long history.

Our difficulty is that, if reason just is "reason within a paradigm," then it seems that this view of reason cannot be so limited, for it denies this limit and it is an authority on itself. Our criticism that this other paradigm errs would seem to be limited to our own paradigm.

The positive gnostic claim, to have groked past the limits of intelligibility and seen the end of reason (or immanence or presence) from the other side faces an additional challenge here if we hold to the assumption that any such universal claim must be "from nowhere," and itself issued from "outside any paradigm, " since it is also generally being claimed that precisely this sort of "stepping outside" is impossible. But perhaps this is simply a misguided assumption. Afterall, one need not "step out of one's humanity" to know that "all men are mortal." One can know this about all men while still always being a particular man.

So, that's my initial thoughts on the idea that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms (which suggests an aesthetic answer perhaps). It seems this must remain true only for some paradigms, and one might suppose that being limited in this way is itself a deficiency (one that is both rational and aesthetic). After all, what is left once one gives up totally on reason as an adjudicator? It would seem to me that all that remains is power struggles (and indeed , some thinkers go explicitly in this direction). Further, the ability to selectively decide that reason ceases to apply in some cases seems obviously prone to abuse (real world examples abound)—in a word, it's misology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If it were possible to establish some way of making appeals appealing then this might be a way towards a paradigm which isn't local -- not a view from nowhere, but a view from anywhere as @Banno puts it. At least if my suspicions are correct.

That is -- whether reason can or cannot adjudicate between traditions, or paradigms, is sort of an open question still. I wouldn't go so far as to claim I know that it cannot be so. Only that it's not so right now.

Especially with a few topics whereby otherwise reasonable people with all the resources one could ask for -- professors, philosophers, academics, in a word "experts" -- that don't reach termination.

I say "God, freedom, and immortality" as the obvious topics because Kant. And I disagree with Hegel where he speaks about having to be across a barrier to point to its limit. Like you note -- I know I'm mortal because I'm human. I don't have to know what it's like to be superhuman to know my limit.

Rather, we can point to a wall through the example of the interminable antinomies of philosophy -- realism/anti-realism in all topics.

****


What's interesting to ask here is -- why does this philosophy argue the universe is finite, and that one argue that the universe is infinite if there's no fact to the matter that could settle the dispute?

It looks to me that there's an aesthetic element here: somehow the finite or the infinite are perceived as more "beautiful", and so the arguments which a philosopher will deploy comes from this beginning attraction.

If so then being able to explicate these aesthetic choices would be a way to build bridges between traditions -- i.e. journey towards the view from anywhere, but together; even if our traditions cannot both be universally true.

So, no, I'm not trying to abandon reason or something along those lines. "the appeal to reason" is what structures philosophy.

It's just a little more complicated than we thought.

Eliminitive materialism or austere behaviorism might seem absurd, yet they are unassailable given their own presuppositions. Yet I'd maintain that it is ugly and small regardless of this consistency and closure. Nietzsche's thought has a certain beauty, Milton's Satan is inspiring, yet these also suffer from a certain smallness and ugliness. Absurdity is in the end, not glory. So too the idea of a maze of fly bottle like games that thought is forever trapped to buzz about in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nice. These are the sorts of judgments I'm thinking about here. What is it about eliminative materialism or austere behaviorism that makes them ugly?

Must glory be the result of philosophy, or could it just be an inspiration?

And if we hop out of one fly bottle and into another, no matter what, then wouldn't that be nice to know that there is no "outside the fly bottle"?

I agree. Although I hope it doesn’t prejudice the way we view each other.

Just because someone is drawn to Nietzsche, but repulsed by Aristotle, might mean nothing more than they don’t really understand one (or both) of them. It might not mean they are anti-essentialist. — Fire Ologist

Sure. Though I'd more want to ask after what's attractive in each rather than the position of essentialism.

Rather than asking after the strict inference I'm noting that there's more to philosophical argument than deduction, argument, and inference. And it's not insignificant.

But it's hard to articulate, hence the questions.

Yes, but I would say, if the ideas are the focus, the ideas can reshape the aesthetics as much as the aesthetics might have pushed one towards a certain idea. — Fire Ologist

Sure. If I'm correct then there's not really a separating one from the other -- we're attracted to an idea for a reason, itself an idea.

Reason, itself, is attractive. That's why philosophers pursue it.

So, I guess I like people who can write in this way, not so much inspiringly, although that helps, but interestingly. Charles Taylor is a good example. He doesn't strike any high oratorical notes, but despite having great density of ideas he nonetheless writes more like a great historian, the opposite of dry or abstruse. William Durant's philosophy stuff is like this too, and he is also pretty pithy.

This can make a big difference. I don't know if I'd ever recommend reading Gibbon to learn about Rome, but he's worth reading for the prose and Enlightenment era philosophy splashed liberally within his commentary. Whereas I sometimes struggle with works when reading them feels tedious.

That said, I don't really like polemical works, even when I agree with them. They certainly aren't the same thing, style (even oratorical) and polemic. Nagel, Lewis, and Frankfurt are good in this way, as recent examples. Augustine is a master. Chesterton is too good at it for his own good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nice. That's the sort of reflection I'm thinking after.

Also, it'd be interesting -- upon identifying an aesthetic reason for such and such a philosopher -- to attempt to go from that aesthetic grounding to the ideas themselves.

Yes I think as a atheïst I'm looking for a sort of non-religious theodicee, like the first philosophers, that is an 'arche' or way to envision the world as one continuous whole.

I find that I side mostly on the side of the tragic/sensual/empircal and dislike most spirituality, metaphysics or over/mis-use of dialectics or reason.

Philosophy at this point for me is mostly about doing away with bad ideas, which is most of philosophy. — ChatteringMonkey

How do you do away with bad ideas, and how do you identify them as bad? Is it just that they don't provide a non-religious theodicy?

I'm guessing not because you go on to say "tragic/sensual/empirical" as something good whereas "spirituality, metaphysics, over/mis-use of dialects or reason" is bad -- in the aesthetic sense.

If no further answer then cool. We've reached the aesthetic terminus.

And I feel pretty good about it actually, maybe wish I had come to this conclusion sooner. I certainly wouldn't want to waste any more time on bad philosophy.

I think other people have to go through the process they have to go through, and maybe that involves trying out bad ideas, but mostly I think they are just misguided. — ChatteringMonkey

I think that's a common experience for people who read philosophy. Eventually you start to focus in on the couple of things that really interest you because there's just too much out there to be able to read it all.

But I like to wander around, still. I'm uncertain that much philosophy is truly bad, but only appealing to some other aesthetic. Not quite -- there are times where I don't think this -- but it's the idea that I'm thinking towards.

So why this one rather than that one? Rorty used to say that he just didn't have an itch where some philosophers wanted to scratch. And vice versa, I suppose. — J

Right! That's a great question.

I agree that I can usually find something attractive in a philosopher if I give it enough time.

The more general question might be interesting here too: "Why this philosopher and not that one, when both are good?" followed by "What is it about this group of philosophers/ies that includes them as the "good" ones? Just that I can find something interesting?"

How this fits into an aesthetic appreciation, I'm not sure, but "an idea that matters to me" seems to be square in the middle of why I'll read the next book I'll read. Oh and I guess I should add: The more I'm familiar with some particular conversation around an issue, the more I'm likely to feel that the next contribution to that conversation will contain "ideas that matter."

Yes, that makes sense. And good point in bringing up "mattering" -- in a way that's the question. What is this "mattering"?

I think familiarity helps for generating interest. In part that's because philosophers are constantly referencing one another, so if you find one thing interesting you'll likely be easily able to find another reference on the same topic with a different perspective.

What if the aesthetic justifications we offer are such as they are on account of our culturally/ historically conditioned intuitions and preferences? I suppose genetics may also be in play. Anything else? — Janus

True, they're not necessarily disconnected. A person who likes French literature because their heritage is from France comes to mind here. Though then I'd put it that this isn't exactly an aesethetic justification -- it's why I like something like ice cream, but since not everyone has French heritage I wouldn't expect others to feel the same as me.

The aesthetic judgment is this universalizing of the subjective, in a way. I know that it's an affectivity and interpretation, but if only you'd watch this movie I'm sure you'd feel the same!

Some people have a decided preference for the new. Sometimes this is argued for, as Dewey does: the old ideas are dead, no longer suited to our time, and we need new ideas that suit our needs. Sometimes this is argued for as "the philosophy of the future", leading the way, changing the world rather than meeting the present need.

As some people want to be in the vanguard or the avant garde, some people want to stand athwart history saying, stop. Or, if they're not interested in a fight, they want to ignore whatever foolishness people nowadays are getting up to, and stick by the tried-and-true ideas of their forefathers. Some people are naturally suspicious of the new.

As I say, not a motivator for everyone, but I think for some people very important. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's a good one. Nietzsche as the philosopher of the future and Burke as the lover of the tried-and-true.

That's an especially interesting category because I can see how it ties into the ideas of thinkers, too.

For some it's (almost) a reflex or bias. In so far as "aesthetics" is inherently philosophical, whether or not one makes aesthetic choices "in philosophy" seems to presuppose (an unconscious) metaphilosophy — 180 Proof

Yeah. Though I'm rather explicit about the importance of aesthetics in philosophy :)

Yes. I'm drawn to concise, clearly written, jargon-free texts on (suffering-based / agent-based) ethics and (naturalistic) ontology.

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?
They tend to focus on aporia which align with my own speculations or reflectively throw me into question.

Is there such a thing as bad taste in philosophy? If so, what should one do if we encounter bad taste?
I find 'essentializing' any form of bigotry, misogyny, homophobia, pedophilia, superstitions, academic quarrels, etc to be in "bad taste" and I tend to name and shame the culprit.

Likewise, is there such a thing as good taste in philosophy such that it differs from "the opposite of bad"?
As a rule, I don't 'essentialize' (i.e. reify the non-instantiated or un- contextualized) and avoid vague words or slogans as much as I can. — 180 Proof

Excellent. Those are very clearly stated philosophical aesthetics.

Good philosophy is clear and explicit. The topic is chosen due to the reader's position towards the topic such that it will result in aporia.

Bad philosophy utilizes the notion of essence to justify bigotry, misogyny, homophobia, pedophilia, superstitions, or academic quarrels and other such things. The appropriate way to react to this bad taste is to shame the person.

And, as a rule, reifying the non-instantiated or un-contextualized and using vague words or slogans is to be avoided as much as you're able.


Also, yours is a more "subjectivist" bent on an aesthetics --i.e. these are rules and attractions that work for you, but to each their own.


That's clearer than I can answer these questions for myself. :D Thanks @180 Proof

Especially with a few topics whereby otherwise reasonable people with all the resources one could ask for -- professors, philosophers, academics, in a word "experts" -- that don't reach termination.

Might this be a poor criteria though? Praxis is almost absent from the academy, it's been wholly privatized by the dominance of philosophies of secularism. But on the view that praxis is a necessary prerequisite for theoria, being a professional, reasonable, etc. isn't enough.

I certainly think the perennialists often distort the traditions they appeal to in trying to make them uniform. Nonetheless, their point is not entirely without merit, and the convergence seems to me to be a sign of robustness, whereas a process that leads to endless fractal divergence bespeaks a sort of arbitrariness (particularly when the divergence occurs due to competing bare, brute fact claims or "givens").

At least, from within the traditions of praxis themselves, this is exactly what is predicted, so in their own terms, this is not a great difficulty.

I say "God, freedom, and immortality" as the obvious topics because Kant. And I disagree with Hegel where he speaks about having to be across a barrier to point to its limit. Like you note -- I know I'm mortal because I'm human. I don't have to know what it's like to be superhuman to know my limit.

I am not sure if this is a good example for what Hegel is talking about though. Presumably, you know that which is not human, and that's "the other side." Hegel is also certainly not saying one must step on the other side of an issue to express uncertainty about it. He is in some ways a fallibilist after all. Hegel is speaking to gnostic pronouncements about the limits of knowledge. This is isn't to proclaim something undecided, but rather to claim that one has decisively decided it.

To borrow the quote I shared in the other thread from D.C. Schindler's the Catholicity of Reason that focuses on the major presumptions made by those who, out of "epistemic modesty" set hard limits on reason.

First, he responds to the idea that we never grasp the truth, the absolutization of Socratic irony as the claim that "all we know is that we don't know anything (absolutely)."

[Here], the scope is universal: one expresses a general reluctance to claim truth, “absolute knowledge,” in any particular instance. But note: this stance implies that the question of whether or not one’s ideas, in one case or another, are true in fact is, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant. The phrase “all intents and purposes” is particularly appropriate here because the stance willy-nilly absolutizes pragmatism.

But there is an outrageous presumption in this: if pursuing the question of truth requires one to venture, as it were, beyond one’s thinking to reality, dismissing this question means resolving not to venture beyond one’s own thinking as one’s own, which is to say that one keeps oneself away from the world and in one’s own head [or perhaps language game] — which is to say, further, that one absolutizes one’s own ego over and against God, reality, others, whatever it may be, all of which is equally irrelevant to that ego.

What reason does one have for dismissing the question of truth and suspending one’s judgment? While it could turn out in a particular case or another that suspending judgment is prudent, there can in fact be no reason at all for a universal suspension of judgment, insofar as accepting a reason as true requires suspending this suspension. It follows that this suspension is strictly groundless; it is a wholly arbitrary a priori, which claims preemptively that no statement will ever have a claim on one’s judgment without obliging oneself to listen to and consider any given statement. It may be that one opinion or another that one happens to hold is in fact true, but the suspension of judgment neutralizes its significance for me qua truth, again for no reason. I thus absolve myself of all responsibility: if I make no claim on truth, then truth never has a claim on me.

pg.24

The second idea he addresses is a sort of "bracketing" out of "epistemic humility."

The second alternative above, namely, that I claim knowledge about things in a delimited area, but make no judgment one way or the other regarding anything outside the limits, is at least apparently less presumptuous than the first, ironically because it does indeed admit that some of its knowledge is true.

The difficulty is in fact twofold. On the one hand, as we observed at the outset of this chapter, one can set limits in the proper place only if one is already beyond those limits, which means that to the extent that self-limitation is strictly a priori, and not the fruit of an encounter with what lies outside of oneself [or language], the limitation is an act of presumption: one is acting as if one knows what one does not in fact know. On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous.

It does not in the least do to insist, “But I am limiting my claims only to this particular aspect!” because this begs the very question being raised here...

For example, one might isolate economics from politics as a closed system in itself, which is evidently misleading insofar as the “agents” of economic transactions are living members of communities whose choices inevitably reflect in a significant way the nature and structure of those communities. Perhaps less obviously, but with analogous implications, one might also separate politics from philosophical anthropology, anthropology from metaphysics, or metaphysics from theology. The problem will be there whenever one isolates a part from the whole in a way that excludes the relevance of the meaning of the whole to the meaning of the part, which is to say that one fails to approach the part as a part, i.e., as related to what is greater than it, and so one (presumptuously) makes it an absolute in itself.

To avoid this presumption, one might first seek to attenuate one’s insistence on knowledge within the delimited sphere in light of one’s ignorance of the larger whole, which would seem to acknowledge at least in principle the significance of that whole. But in fact this is a retreat into what we showed above to be the greatest possible presumption, namely, the universal suspension of judgment. The only way to avoid the dilemma is in fact to achieve actual knowledge about the whole...

pg. 24-26

...ironically, the more one insists on modesty in science, the more “impenetrable” one makes it, i.e., the more one makes it an absolute in itself and so unable to be integrated into a larger whole. To set any absolute limit not only keeps reason from exceeding a boundary, it necessarily also keeps anything else from getting in.

pg. 28

Or as Plato has the Stranger say in the Sophist: "the ultimate destruction of reason is the separation of one from all" (259e).

And if we hop out of one fly bottle and into another, no matter what, then wouldn't that be nice to know that there is no "outside the fly bottle"?

Well, ironically, on the relativistic view, one is only ever in a fly bottle if one has already placed themselves inside it.

Nice. These are the sorts of judgments I'm thinking about here. What is it about eliminative materialism or austere behaviorism that makes them ugly

I could opine at length about that one, but I'll suggest that one way to distinguish between paradigms is the extent to which they must reduce and demote aspects of human experience and being, as well as beauty, to illusion and error. "Two worlds Platonism" is rather famous for this. Yet radical empiricism might dismiss even more of experience. Post-modern theorists paint with their own monochrome brushes to dismiss quite a bit, to demote to "abstraction"—abstraction, which comes to have the ring, not of "intellectual apprehension," the "possession of form/actuality," but rather of "illusion and error." Solipsism and solipsistic paranoia are of course, the extreme examples. Shankara and the Advaita Vedanta goes so far as to break out into the other side. Whereas, when reading some of the traditions that come out of phenomenology, I often think that it is a very different thing to recognize that "Atman is Brahman," as opposed to "Brahman is really just Atman."

That's an especially interesting category [preference for the new] because I can see how it ties into the ideas of thinkers, too. — Moliere

And virtually the entire history of 20th century arts in the West! As I'm sure you know, the question of novelty or originality as an aesthetic value has been championed and then derided, back and forth. The debate in turn centers on whether self-expression is a key element of art; if so, then one ought to strive at least for a degree of originality. One wants to "sound like myself," and not some predecessor, however influential.

How far does this parallel philosophy? Great question. (My hesitant answer: Not very far. But that's my taste again.)

Might this be a poor criteria though? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes.

Praxis is almost absent from the academy, it's been wholly privatized by the dominance of philosophies of secularism. But on the view that praxis is a necessary prerequisite for theoria, being a professional, reasonable, etc. isn't enough. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But not for this reason.

Really you can substitute anyone in there -- any old expert will do as long as they have all the resources one could ask for in answering the question.


So for something non-secular -- compare the Buddhist monk to the Christian monk. Sometimes entirely praxis based, which is something I tend to favor, but still engaging in an interminable affair.

Not that this is bad, mind.

Only an indication -- at least if antinomies are a way to point to a wall -- that we're dealing with the limits of reason here.

I certainly think the perennialists often distort the traditions they appeal to in trying to make them uniform. Nonetheless, their point is not entirely without merit, and the convergence seems to me to be a sign of robustness, whereas a process that leads to endless fractal divergence bespeaks a sort of arbitrariness (particularly when the divergence occurs due to competing bare, brute fact claims or "givens").

At least, from within the traditions of praxis themselves, this is exactly what is predicted, so in their own terms, this is not a great difficulty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair.

I'm afraid I find antinomies persuasive, for whatever reason. It seems like you have to pick one side and defend it, but it won't matter how you defend it just that you defend it because the other side will do the same.

I am not sure if this is a good example for what Hegel is talking about though. Presumably, you know that which is not human, and that's "the other side." Hegel is also certainly not saying one must step on the other side of an issue to express uncertainty about it. He is in some ways a fallibilist after all. Hegel is speaking to gnostic pronouncements about the limits of knowledge. This is isn't to proclaim something undecided, but rather to claim that one has decisively decided it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair. I do think "God, Freedom and Immortality" are the examples Hegel had in mind, given his critique of Kant.

To borrow the quote I shared in the other thread from D.C. Schindler's the Catholicity of Reason that focuses on the major presumptions made by those who, out of "epistemic modesty" set hard limits on reason.

First, he responds to the idea that we never grasp the truth, the absolutization of Socratic irony as the claim that "all we know is that we don't know anything (absolutely)." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The second alternative above, namely, that I claim knowledge about things in a delimited area, but make no judgment one way or the other regarding anything outside the limits, is at least apparently less presumptuous than the first, ironically because it does indeed admit that some of its knowledge is true.

The difficulty is in fact twofold. On the one hand, as we observed at the outset of this chapter, one can set limits in the proper place only if one is already beyond those limits, which means that to the extent that self-limitation is strictly a priori, and not the fruit of an encounter with what lies outside of oneself [or language], the limitation is an act of presumption: one is acting as if one knows what one does not in fact know. On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous.

I don't think that setting a limit is strictly a priori. And I don't think setting limits requires a presumption -- it's not like I'm saying "Tim, I've seen the limits of reason and these are it. Heed my call, or suffer the consequences!"

I'm saying "Hey, look over at that God debate that's been happening for thousands of years. Notice how smart people, people we would not otherwise question, disagree? Maybe there's a limit here"

On the other hand, and perhaps more profoundly, to allow oneself judgment on one side of a boundary and at the same time to suspend judgment on the other side is to claim — again, in an a priori way, which is to say without any sufficient reason — that what lies on the other side does not in any significant sense bear on my understanding of the matter or matters lying on this side. But of course to make this claim without investigation and justification is presumptuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So it's not this. "allowing oneself judgment" isn't something we can do. We judge whether we like it or not.

But the process of philosophy sorts out the good from the bad judgments. Or attempts to.

Also, I ought note that just because God lies on "the other side" in terms of justificatory knowledge, that does not then mean I think or argue that God is insignifcant.

Indeed, lots of my thoughts deal with wondering why the false is significant, or something along those lines. And not for a priori reasons.

Well, ironically, on the relativistic view, one is only ever in a fly bottle if one has already placed themselves inside it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Only in the extreme version whereby whatever one person decides is right is what is right.

I think the notion of the fly-bottle is to say something like: the philosophy you espouse is clouding your judgment without you realizing it. You see the world and bounce against what you cannot see. But if you let go of your philosophical ideas, arguments, presuppositions, what-ifs, etc., and chase therapy you'll find that the world was always there all along, and it was the various ideas you had about it that stopped you from flying.

But then: Do we ever get out of the fly bottle? Was Wittgenstein outside it?

How far does this parallel philosophy? Great question. (My hesitant answer: Not very far. But that's my taste again.) — J

Naturally, my taste is to say the opposite:

The debate in turn centers on whether self-expression is a key element of art; — J

Self-expression is a necessary element of philosophy.

Art might, at times, cross over into something more sublime.

But the philosopher is always speaking about themself, whether they like it or not. (At least, this is what I believe)

Good philosophy eats itself, and can always be summed up as "The worm turns."A philosophical tradition is thus a daisy chain of linked worms. {Hands up who even knows how to make a daisy chain these days} Always one wants to start again from scratch, and always one cannot, because one has to thread one's way through the errors of historical philosophy one was brought up on.

But this time I'm going to manage not to bite my own tail. — Every Philosopher Ever

Don't talk with your mouth full. — unenlightened's mother

The debate in turn centers on whether self-expression is a key element of art;
— J

Self-expression is a necessary element of philosophy. — Moliere

Interesting. I guess you're using "self-expression" in a very general way. A technical discussion of some point in modal logic, for instance -- you could say that Prof X, who holds one view, is "expressing himself" by doing so. But then what are we comparing self-expression to? What is not self-expressive?

We know how this would go, in an artistic discussion, too. Artists like T.S. Eliot and Stravinsky claimed to be doing the very opposite of expressing themselves -- they wanted to escape from self, and focus on the work, appealing to the much older idea of art as involving making a good thing rather than expressing anything about the maker. But many have replied, "And yet something of yourself is surely being expressed, otherwise how is your work so immediately recognizable as yours?"

This probably hinges on exactly what we want the concept of "expression" to cover. In English, I think we tend to associate expressivity with the personal, the psychological.

A central question might be "Why do I like the philosophy that I do?" — Moliere

Because you are a curious person.

Do you think that aesthetics in philosophy is a thing? Should it be? — Moliere

The philosophy of art is a branch of philosophy. The elegance in philosophy is in writing concisely.

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems? — Moliere

Almost everything. Questions in all fields of philosophy with the aim of finding an answer to them.

Sure. If I'm correct then there's not really a separating one from the other -- we're attracted to an idea for a reason, itself an idea. — Moliere

I may not follow you here.

Your OP places the aesthetic as the prior, and asks what is the aesthetic behind one’s attraction to this or that particular idea or philosopher.

But if we are now saying that aesthetic and rational judgments are not really separable, can’t we now equally say:
“I see X ideas, because they follow the Y aesthetic”
OR
“I see the Y aesthetic because it follows X ideas?”

What does that make of your OP placing the aesthetic as prior to the ideas one is attracted to?

This makes me think of the following question: when using aesthetics to shape ideas, aren’t you being an artist, but if using ideas to shape aesthetics, aren’t you being a philosopher/scientist?

So for the philosopher, doesn’t that boil down to “what are the ideas” and not “why do you like these ideas over those ideas?” Philosophers only like truth.

And in the end, the philosopher need only care about the ideas and should never give in to any aesthetic temptation or prejudice. The aesthetics will fall into place based on the ideas, for the philosopher.

Unless one wants to be an artist, in which case, let the ideas fall where they may. That’s fine, but where aesthetics underpin, philosophy has not begun.

So, to me, the question of the OP has become, why do I like doing philosophy over doing art (and not why do I like this philosopher/idea over that philosopher/idea. The answer to this second question becomes easy: I like any philosopher that presents a clear enough idea that might one day inform my aesthetic.)

(Long form of - for the philosopher, aesthetics are a by-product, but ideas are the product.)

I guess you're using "self-expression" in a very general way. A technical discussion of some point in modal logic, for instance -- you could say that Prof X, who holds one view, is "expressing himself" by doing so. But then what are we comparing self-expression to? What is not self-expressive? — J

With respect to philosophy, at least, it'd be non-philosophical self-expression. But then that'd be decided by some set of understood conversational rules or standards of evaluation or relations of significance.

But yes I don't mean it in terms of just saying whatever it is one wants because that's who one wants to express. Rather, within the confines of what is persuasive one expresses themself. They're working on the problem they're working on for a reason, yes? I don't mean it in terms of expressing their personality, but there's a reason that thinker or researcher is there.

So supposing Locke, for instance, in his treatises on government. He's going about describing a philosophical theory in that appropriate manner that philosophers did then, and he chose this topic because he genuinely opposes Kings.

In order to persuade people the expression will have to fit the norms of persuasion in said discipline and utilize evidence which is deemed worthy of consideration. But that whole "deeming worthy" part looks a lot like aesthetic judgment to me. It may turn out to be false and so discarded, but that choice to pursue some line of thought or deeming some evidence as relevant to the topic at hand -- that takes interpretation, which in turn takes standards -- i.e. aesthetics.

We know how this would go, in an artistic discussion, too. Artists like T.S. Eliot and Stravinsky claimed to be doing the very opposite of expressing themselves -- they wanted to escape from self, and focus on the work, appealing to the much older idea of art as involving making a good thing rather than expressing anything about the maker. But many have replied, "And yet something of yourself is surely being expressed, otherwise how is your work so immediately recognizable as yours?"

This probably hinges on exactly what we want the concept of "expression" to cover. In English, I think we tend to associate expressivity with the personal, the psychological. — J

Right, and that's not exactly what I'm meaning. Rather, there are subjective conditions of judgment which we then universalize -- expect others to hold a similar standard. Here meaning that there's someone that has to do the interpreting and thinking. It's a creative process, rather than something read off the evidence.

What T.S.l Elliot and Stravinsky claim I'd grant as within the area of aesthetics. Indeed, "reaching beyond" has often been something which inspires artists and attracts thought! What's important to reject is the notion that just because I say so so it makes it so, except fo the cases where this is not so :D

I think agreement does the work here. If people agree on a particular mode of judgment then people understand that there are some shared standards which guide the discussion.