How would you answer your own question? — Leontiskos

That they would be "good ants" if I judge them according to my framework, and that this does not require that they have any understanding of said framework. Similarly, people can be rational without understanding the normative framework used to judge them as such.

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them. — Leontiskos

I would agree, in principle. A norm, insofar as it is a euphemism for some explicit rational condition, understanding is that by which that condition is given its object. That I understand perfectly well the explicit condition, e.g., respect as a certain, albeit merely cultural, norm, it does not follow I must always without exception, hold the door for a lady.

It went down hill from soon after the opening post, a result of the contributions of those who could not abide what that post said.

That they would be "good ants" if I judge them according to my framework, and that this does not require that they have any understanding of said framework. Similarly, people can be rational without understanding the normative framework used to judge them as such. — goremand

Well we agree that ants protect their queen, do we not? And we agree that ants are not rational, and therefore do not engage in rational norm-following, do we not?

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Well we agree that ants protect their queen, do we not? And we agree that ants are not rational, and therefore do not engage in rational norm-following, do we not? — Leontiskos

My point is that it's easy to "reverse-engineer" a normative framework just by observing how some entity tends to act (humans, ants, clouds, whatever), and claiming that this is how they "should" act. But this does nothing to justify the the framework, i.e. justify the claim that "this is how things should be".

And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Isn't the "rational appetite" just another type of "natural appetite"? Certainly most people are inclined to be rational.

My point is that it's easy to "reverse-engineer" a normative framework just by observing how some entity tends to act (humans, ants, clouds, whatever) — goremand

And my point is that it is absurd to claim that ants are engaged in rational norm-following, so this is a massive strawman you are wielding.

Isn't the "rational appetite" just another type of "natural appetite"? Certainly most people are inclined to be rational. — goremand

In the context of that quote, acting for an end via the will is much different than acting for an end via mere instinct. This is why, for example, animals do not have any developed language.

And my point is that it is absurd to claim that ants are engaged in rational norm-following, so this is a massive strawman you are wielding. — Leontiskos

It makes no sense to make this about "rational norm-following" (which I assume means following a set of norms because it is rational to do so) when discussing rational norms themselves. Reason can't compel you to be reasonable, that's circular.

In the context of that quote, acting for an end via the will is much different than acting for an end via mere instinct. This is why, for example, animals do not have any developed language. — Leontiskos

I don't really see why it is much different. I believe human beings are rational by "mere instinct".

What has any of this to do with the topic of this thread - an account of the distinction between having a philosophy and doing philosophy?

Can someone relate it back to the theme?

It makes no sense to make this about "rational norm-following" — goremand

I simply do not think that non-rational norm following is coherent. So to talk about norm-following is to talk about rational norm-following. Because they are not rational, the ants are not following a norm. End of story.

I don't really see why it is much different. I believe human beings are rational by "mere instinct". — goremand

Even if humans are naturally rational, it remains true that a rational decision is different from an instinctual reaction.

What has any of this to do with the topic of this thread - an account of the distinction between having a philosophy and doing philosophy?

Can someone relate it back to the theme? — Banno

To my understanding, Leontiskos objected that you can't "do philosophy" without already "having a philosophy", and so to him this distinction doesn't really make sense. Then he made the more specific claim that rational norms are a condition for "doing philosophy", and I took issue with that. I'm sorry if our discussion is a weed in this beautiful garden of a thread.

I simply do not think that non-rational norm following is coherent. — Leontiskos

I take this to mean you stipulatively define norm-following as necessarily rational. Leaving aside how I think it's pretty common to apply norms to animals, machines etc. that clearly aren't rational, given that rationality is a set of norms, haven't you now made being rational a necessary condition for becoming rational?

To me, if you transition from from defying rational norms into following them, you've transitioned from irrationality to rationality. But that transition obviously can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves, so under your definition it appears simply impossible, because you don't allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.

I take this to mean you stipulatively define norm-following as necessarily rational. — goremand

I think norm-following requires rationality. No stipulation required.

Leaving aside how I think it's pretty common to apply norms to animals, machines etc. that clearly aren't rational, — goremand

How so? How is it at all common? We could say, "The blender is abiding by the norm of blending up fruit. He hasn't deviated from that norm yet." But that is metaphorical language. We don't actually think the blender is abiding by norms.

given that rationality is a set of norms, haven't you now made being rational a necessary condition for becoming rational? — goremand

You would have to spell that argument out in more detail.

To me, if you transition from from defying rational norms into following them, you've transitioned from irrationality to rationality. But that transition obviously can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves, so under your definition it appears simply impossible, because you don't allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons. — goremand

First, do plants, animals, and machines "defy (rational) norms"? I don't see that they do, or can.

Let me try to sketch your argument. I'm still not quite sure what you are saying.

1. If someone transitions from defying rational norms to following them, then they have transitioned from irrationality to rationality.
2. Some people do transition from defying rational norms to following them.
3. Therefore, some people do transition from irrationality to rationality.
4. But that transition can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves.
5. Leontiskos does not allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.
6. Therefore, under Leontiskos' definition the transition would be impossible.

(4) and (5) are especially opaque to me.

I'm sorry if our discussion is a weed in this beautiful garden of a thread. — goremand

:wink:

We could say, "The blender is abiding by the norm of blending up fruit. He hasn't deviated from that norm yet." But that is metaphorical language. We don't actually think the blender is abiding by norms. — Leontiskos

More likely we would express it like "a blender should be able to purée fruit", in particular we might be quite disappointed if a blender failed to do so. I don't think this is a metaphor at all, I think we have expectations about how machines should behave.

First, do plants, animals, and machines "defy (rational) norms"? I don't see that they do, or can. — Leontiskos

It think that depends on our willingness to ascribe beliefs to non-humans, I am open to reasonably intelligent animals and maybe computers behaving irrationally. Plants not so much, I guess you could even say that plants are always rational, but only in the same sense in which they never lose at football.

You would have to spell that argument out in more detail. — Leontiskos

My idea of "norm-following" is conforming to a set of norms. Your idea seems to be the same, but with the added requirement that you have to be rational.

Let us say we want to figure out whether or not an entity is rational. Since being rational means following rational norms, we have to first establish whether the entity is capable of norm-following. According to you, that depends on whether or not the entity is rational, which is what we're trying to figure out in the first place. So we could never know whether the entity is rational or not.

(4) and (5) are especially opaque to me. — Leontiskos

Maybe I overinterpreted what you wrote, it took "rational norm-following" to mean "rationally justified norm-following". So I took you to be saying that adopting a set of norms requires rational justification, which doesn't makes sense if rational justification itself depends upon a set of norms.

More likely we would express it like "a blender should be able to purée fruit", in particular we might be quite disappointed if a blender failed to do so. I don't think this is a metaphor at all, I think we have expectations about how machines should behave. — goremand

So you think we should put it on the blender that it has failed to follow a "norm"?

It think that depends on our willingness to ascribe beliefs to non-humans, I am open to reasonably intelligent animals and maybe computers behaving irrationally. Plants not so much, I guess you could even say that plants are always rational, but only in the same sense in which they never lose at football. — goremand

Whereas I would not say any of that.

My idea of "norm-following" is conforming to a set of norms. Your idea seems to be the same, but with the added requirement that you have to be rational. — goremand

Well, you have to be able to "attend" to the norm in a non-metaphorical way, and for that you need rationality. We can say that the blender "attends" to the purée-norm, but this is just whimsical or metaphorical speech. The blender is not attending to anything. It is just being forced to move in certain ways.

Since being rational means following rational norms — goremand

That's your strange definition, not mine. So the circularity seems to be coming from your own definitions.

Maybe I overinterpreted what you wrote — goremand

Then please re-write the argument I provided, correcting any mistakes I made. I want to see your actual argument.

So you think we should put it on the blender that it has failed to follow a "norm"? — Leontiskos

Yes, and the consequences for the blender will probably be quite harsh.

Well, you have to be able to "attend" to the norm in a non-metaphorical way, and for that you need rationality. We can say that the blender "attends" to the purée-norm, but this is just whimsical or metaphorical speech. — Leontiskos

Then how is it that you agreed with what I wrote here:

The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework. — goremand

So the agent doesn't have to be aware of the framework, but they need to capacity to "attend" to it? What does that mean?

That's your strange definition, not mine. So the circularity seems to be coming from your own definitions. — Leontiskos

I'm really surprised to see you object to this ("being rational means following rational norms"), I thought this was at the core of what you wanted to say. Originally you made an analogy to with moral norms, do you also have problem with "being moral means following moral norms"? What is the actual relationship between rationality and the associated norms, if not this? Can you follow rational norms without being rational, or vice versa?

I've asked what your argument is, and I've even tried to represent it:

1. If someone transitions from defying rational norms to following them, then they have transitioned from irrationality to rationality.
2. Some people do transition from defying rational norms to following them.
3. Therefore, some people do transition from irrationality to rationality.
4. But that transition can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves.
5. Leontiskos does not allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.
6. Therefore, under Leontiskos' definition the transition would be impossible. — Leontiskos

Again:

Then please re-write the argument I provided, correcting any mistakes I made. I want to see your actual argument. — Leontiskos

If you are unwilling to state your position clearly and without ambiguity, then I see no reason to continue.

---

Edit:

I'm really surprised to see you object to this ("being rational means following rational norms"), I thought this was at the core of what you wanted to say. — goremand

I've said that one who follows norms is rational (i.e. If X is following a norm, then X is rational). I'm not sure how you managed to get a definition of rationality out of that. But again, you have to set out your argument clearly if I am to know what you are saying.

I've asked what your argument is, and I've even tried to represent it: — Leontiskos

I'm sorry for not making this clear: I'm withdrawing my argument, because I lost faith in my interpretation of your view. Any argument I make is necessarily against what I take to be your view, there is no point if I don't have some degree of confidence in my grasp of your position.

What I would like you to attend to are the questions I asked about the your view on the relationship between rationality and rational norms, because it's something I'm confused about right now.

If you are unwilling to state your position clearly and without ambiguity, then I see no reason to continue. — Leontiskos

Understandable, but I maintain that I am absolutely not unwilling. Anyway, you're not under any obligation to keep this up, if you're just bored or annoyed with this talk that's a perfectly legitimate reason to bow out.

I'm sorry for not making this clear: I'm withdrawing my argument, because I lost faith in my interpretation of your view. Any argument I make is necessarily against what I take to be your view, there is no point if I don't have some degree of confidence in my grasp of your position.

What I would like you to attend to are the questions I asked about the your view on the relationship between rationality and rational norms, because it's something I'm confused about right now. — goremand

Okay, well let me expand on my edit:

• Leontiskos: If you are acting in accordance with a norm then you must have an understanding of that norm at some level. If you have no understanding of a norm then you cannot act in accordance with it.
• Goremand: Ants act according to norms without understanding.
• Leontiskos: Ants do not act according to norms, given that they have no rationality (and therefore no understanding).
• Goremand: You must be committed to the claim that being rational means following rational norms.
• Leontiskos: Why?

We can go back in the conversation:

I have read the OP, but I can't promise I've absorbed it completely. What stood out to me is that you allow for acts to be judged as moral (or as you say now, rational) even if moral judgement doesn't feature in the decision of the act, which I think is true. The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework. — goremand

And:

Why can't I act in accordance with rational norms without understanding those norms? — goremand

This is apparently coming from the notion of susceptibility:

A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment.

...

Admittedly, there is a difference between an act that involves a moral judgment and an act that is susceptible to moral judgment, especially on non-Aristotelian theories. This difference should be largely irrelevant, although I will tease out some of the implications as we go.⁴ — Leontiskos

What this all turns on is volition and negligence:

More precisely, the concept of susceptibility helps highlight the central moral notions of volition and negligence. — Leontiskos

Negligence is the idea that someone can be accountable to a norm that they are not currently following. Note that humans can be negligent and ants cannot, and this is because ants do not act self-consciously according to norms.