So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand or subscribe to rational norms? — goremand

Oh no, not at all. That strikes me as saying, "Someone does not subscribe to breathing, therefore they do not breathe."

To be honest, I was just trying to be generous. Your understanding of that point in the thread does not seem overly strong. The point is that there is an equivocation on what "moral" means. The reason people act morally when they are not intending to act morally is because they have a strange understanding of "moral," which is what the thread was trying to address. But that point you singled out is admittedly tricky, and I would even say it was a relatively weak spot in the OP, which could not be ironed out without adding excessive length.

Another observation is that “being at cross purposes” seems to play a fairly significant role in dismissal. Some kind of communal short-circuit occurs. For example, if someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, they are not at cross-purposes in the deeper sense, because they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution. Similarly, when two football teams face off, they are not at cross-purposes given that they are both engaged in the same genus of activity, even though they are opposed within that genus.

“Writing off” or dismissal seems to occur when the actual genus of activity differs between two people. For example, if someone comes to TPF to advertise their newest invention, they will literally be dismissed by the moderators because they are not engaged in the requisite kind of activity. Or if a musician aims only to make money rather than art, then her fellow musicians will dismiss and ostracize her in a way that they wouldn’t dismiss or ostracize a technically inferior musician who possessed the proper aim. Or if one person is engaged in a practical activity such as anti-racism, and another is engaged in a speculative activity such as studying racial characteristics, they will tend to dismiss and oppose one another. Other examples include the philosopher and the sophist, or the pious and the charlatan. It would seem that in order for moral indignation to fully flower the genus of activity must differ subtly, and in such a way that the second genus could be reasonably mistaken for the first. — Leontiskos

I am thinking of situations where, as you say, two gensuses ( genera) differ subtly enough that the second can be reasonably mistaken for the first. Your characterization of such situations seems to assume that nothing stands in the way of our recognizing and properly interpreting the meaning of the second genus, save for circumstances where the other intends to mislead. But what I have in mind are genera informed by conceptual systems that are not readily recognized and understood. Do you not believe that there are ideas floating around us which we are not prepared to assimilate because they are too alien relative to our background concepts? In the situation where someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, can we really say that they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution before we understand WHY they are doing what they are doing f from their own perspective? Opponents in a football game can easily switch sides because the game is understood in the same way by all. But the rescuer and exterminator of jews are not on opposing sides of the same game. They are playing different games, and neither side’s position appears justifiable to the other.

It's just called On the Philosophy of History. Like a lot of his stuff, it's free online. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks. :up:

the internal contradiction between the idea of democracy and self-rule versus the tendency of capitalism to concentrate wealth such that elites become able to manipulate the system and lock out economic and political competition (which is essentially the system destroying itself, corrupting its own principles). — Count Timothy von Icarus

We're a little bit off topic, but this is obviously related to the Adorno thread. I am wondering what the contradiction here is said to be, in a precise way? Is it that democracies can turn into oligarchies, and once they do then they are no longer democracies? I think that's true, but it looks like a change rather than a contradiction.

Or perhaps we have here the idea that democracy is incompatible with liberalism, because liberalism is tied to capitalism and therefore tied to oligarchy? If so, then I would want to ask, "What is it about liberalism that is tied to capitalism"? I'm not disputing the thesis, but I want to see the reasoning.

That's how Solovyov resolved Hegel's oppressive focus on the universal and Providential. He sees a telos to history, an end, but not necessarily its attainment; just as an organisms has ends but might grow ill instead. History becomes the meeting ground of truth and falsity, the dramatic encounter in which the wheat is winnowed from the chaff, the blazing fire that reveals what man has built his work from (I Corinthians 3:15). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. :up:

The problem that comes up in logo-skepticism is that nominalism and the elevation of the individual/particular has made it so that the logos must be embodied in Rome as it is, because culture and institutions are considered to be prior to any determinant logoi, the ground of their being. And so you get bad takes like: Virgil must be simply "writing propaganda," but then "sticking it to Octavian with his subtle skepticism" rather than the idea that Virgil (being exposed to Stoicism, Platonism, and the Peripatetics) simply recognizes that unities struggle to fully attain their form, and often fail, but that this struggle is needed for them to be anything (and anything good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, very good. :up:

Saint Isaac the Syrian is a good example: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great quote!

During compline, when we ask for God to strengthen and correct us that we might awaken to "hymn [His] incomparable glory all night long" the goal is not to be free of affect (it is rather to be filled with it) but of inappropriate affect (and presumably for monks and nuns, to not accidently sleep through the midnight service :rofl: ). There is less separation between emotion and thought in general though. The "heart" as the "eye of the nous" has both, there being a sort of intellectual emotion too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great - I think we agree on this. :up:

I am thinking of situations where, as you say, two gensuses ( genera) differ subtly enough that the second can be reasonably mistaken for the first. — Joshs

Right, and that is what I was talking about in the quote. I think you actually mean "innocuously" rather than "reasonably."

Your characterization of such situations seems to assume that nothing stands in the way of our recognizing and properly interpreting the meaning of the second genus, save for circumstances where the other intends to mislead. — Joshs

That post I quoted is literally identifying "being at cross-purposes" as one central cause of dismissal, and then going on to claim that dismissals of that kind can be either correct or incorrect. An example of an incorrect case would be the false attribution of blame, which is what you are thinking of.

In the situation where someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, can we really say that they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution before we understand WHY they are doing what they are doing f from their own perspective? — Joshs

Maybe try reading the OP of that thread, especially where I talk about "material positions." That is what you are talking about here, and it is taken for granted given the OP.

Opponents in a football game can easily switch sides because the game is understood in the same way by all. But the rescuer and exterminator of jews are not on opposing sides of the same game. They are playing different games, and neither side’s position appears justifiable to the other. — Joshs

I would argue that in both cases each side knows what the other is attempting to do, and that each is trying to thwart the other. That's why they are not at cross-purposes in the relevant sense. If we think of "being at cross-purposes" differently, then even the footballers are at cross-purposes simply in virtue of the fact that they are on different sides.

The idea is that in order for cross-purposes to result in (moral) dismissal, there must be blame. And in order for there to be blame the other must be falsely representing his purpose.

These points are incredibly subtle, so you will have to try to understand the context. No one took me up on that point in the thread, probably because it is too much of a quagmire for most. For example, you might say, "Ah, but the rescuer of Jews morally dismisses the exterminator." The answer would be, "Not in the sense we are speaking about, given the fact that they continue to engage with them (militarily)." The exterminators are not being dismissed or written off militarily. They are both engaged in an activity which presupposes that the lives of Jews are important. Again, these are subtle puzzles. One can dismiss the exterminator's aim as hopelessly depraved without dismissing the exterminator's military efficacy. The exterminator is being depraved but he is not being deceitful with respect to his genus of activity (or, if he is, it is not a beyond-the-pale form of deceit given the expectations of war, spying, etc.).

Not being either would qualify one as agnostic - which I think is a cop-out. — Harry Hindu

If you think that's a cop-out then we are on the same page. I am saying that there are some cases where it is impossible to say, "I am neither black nor white. I am perfectly neutral." If you think the theist/atheist case is one of those cases, then that is the sort of thing I am talking about.

"I am neither a framework-relativist nor a realist. I am perfectly neutral between the two."

If you think that's a cop-out then we are on the same page. I am saying that there are some cases where it is impossible to say, "I am neither black nor white. I am perfectly neutral." If you think the Theist/atheist case is one of those cases, then that is the sort of thing I am talking about. — Leontiskos

Isn't the common thread of those cases where it is impossible is where the distinctions have been clearly defined and are in opposition (law of the excluded middle)? Atheism is the antithesis of theism. There is no middle ground, but there could be an absence of both (agnosticism). The cases where it is possible are cases where there isn't a clear distinction and\or the ideas are not contradictory - meaning that opposite sides can actually be integrated into a consistent middle ground.

Atheism could be thought of as an absence of any religious frameworks. The issue is when the theist tries to integrate their supernatural framework with the natural one, or even a moral one (why did God create the circumstances that allow childhood cancer to exist?).

Morality is subjective. Sure evil is the opposite of good, but what each individual interprets as good and evil can vary depending on the context (like them being in that situation instead of the person they are observing). Are there better ways to integrate socially (doing good things) that improve the fitness of our species - sure. Is the continued existence of human beings a good thing or a bad thing? What type of framework would an advanced alien species possess and have to say about that? To say that some behavior is moral or immoral is based on one's own subjective framework. There is no universal framework of morality if you're asking if there is some universal moral framework to judge a person's behavior by.

It sounds like you’re talking about the kinds of general social know-how that allows us to navigate in interpersonal situations without having to have in-depth knowledge of other persons’ motives and beliefs. Ordering in a restaurant, driving in busy traffic, dancing the tango or strategizing against enemy soldiers are all examples of this skillful coping. Blame would seem to mark the limit of the anticipatory usefulness of such coping, the point where a more in-depth understanding of the other’s perspective becomes necessary. Deceit would not appear to trigger blame unless it could not be accounted for as an element of the social practice. Misdirection is an expected strategy in football and war, but not in cooperative ventures. The enemy general who pulls off a successful subterfuge ( D-day) is to be admired, whereas the friend who betrays one’s trust triggers rage and blame.

So Haidt compared video games to marbles and says that the video game is inferior to marbles because Piaget would play marbles with children and intentionally break the rules to see what the children did, which was to somehow negotiate the rules of the game in order to keep playing. — Moliere

Right, good.

There is a video game called MineCraft which doesn't exactly have rules to play by. There are rules in the sense that it is a physics engine where different simulations of objects interact within some set of rules which are apparently deterministic. But there's no reason to do one thing over the other. I've watched children play video games in the exact manner that Haidt praises the negotiation of rules for marbles -- the children are in fact still children even with different technology, and they negotiate all kinds of rules all the time. — Moliere

Are you truly unable to see Haidt's point? Have you ever watched children at recess, playing a game and disputing the rules? Minecraft is not a counterexample. It's just a game with loose rules. The only time Haidt's point comes up in video games is when there is a bug, and then some people exploit the bug, and then there is an argument over whether the bug ought to be exploited. But it is almost always fair game to exploit a bug in a video game, and that's no coincidence.

When I worked at a school there was one game in particular that the children played, which I believe they called "wall ball." But the rules were extremely complicated, and despite this the children understood them remarkably well (although I don't think they would have been able to articulate them clearly). I had a co-worker who I would sometimes lunch with, and she was never able to discern the rules of the game in the years she worked there.* That sort of phenomenon would never occur with video games. The rules of a video game are defined by the code, and they cannot be bent or broken.

Indeed, when adults play children's games with children, they are often convicted of transgressing the rules, and there will be a large number of infractions before they begin to understand how to play. That's normal, and also funny. Contrariwise, when an adult plays a video game with children, they get their ass beat, but they are never accused of breaking rules. They are just laughed at because they are so bad.


* One of the rules of this game was that, if you tried and failed to catch the ball after it bounced off the brick wall, then you were inactivated. You were unable to play again until the ball hit the wall. Even if every player missed the ball, there was no exception (and this fascinated me). At that point the whole game went into stasis, and could not be continued until an outside party joined the game, picked up the ball, and threw it against the wall. If no one came to renew the game, it would end and the children would veer off into other games, like basketball or kickball. That combination of competition, cooperation, fault/blame, and consequences—both individual and communal—has everything that a good game needs, for it mimics the complexities of reality and life.

Are you truly unable to see Haidt's point? Have you ever watched children at recess, playing a game and disputing the rules? — Leontiskos

Well, at the park at least.

That's very much what children do when they play anything at all.

Contrariwise, when an adult plays a video game with children, they get their ass beat, but they are never accused of breaking rules. They are just laughed at because they are so bad. — Leontiskos

Now note I'm talking about children playing with children. They do all the stuff you're describing no matter the medium -- at the park, playing wall ball, playing pretend, playing "a game", or playing MineCraft.

I think that the video game is singled out with respect to marbles because there's a kind of nostalgia for an age that didn't exist, as if children were somehow better off then than now, and our modern technology is ruining their development.

At one point it was comic books that would ruin children's minds, then television, and now video games. It's the same concern played out over and again.

Isn't the common thread of those cases where it is impossible is where the distinctions have been clearly defined and are in opposition (law of the excluded middle)? Atheism is the antithesis of theism. There is no middle ground, but there could be an absence of both (agnosticism). The cases where it is possible are cases where there isn't a clear distinction and\or the ideas are not contradictory - meaning that opposite sides can actually be integrated into a consistent middle ground. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think that's a good way of putting it. You wanted real-world application, so let's come back to the thread now, using your tool of the LEM. This is the central counter-claim of the thread:

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note the form: <Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]>. "Which do you believe it is?"

@Banno, @J, and @Srap Tasmaner have no ability to answer that question, and they failed to answer it for 20 pages, making all sorts of weird excuses.

@J and @Srap Tasmaner in particular tried to say, "Let's take a step back into a neutral frame, so that we can examine this more carefully. Now everyone lives in their own framework..." Their "step back" was always a form of question-begging, given that it presupposed the non-overarching, framework-view. That's what happens when someone falsely claims to be taking a neutral stance on some matter on which they are not neutral* (and, in this case, on a matter in which neutrality is not possible). In general and especially in this case, the better thing to do is simply to give arguments for one's position instead of trying to claim the high ground of "objectivity" or "neutrality."

Note that if one holds that all narratives or frames are equal, then they should just say that. They should be honest about it. The problem here is that it is evident to everyone that not all narratives are equal, and this is why such people refuse to answer the question in that way. We could sum up this part of the thread as, "There is an obvious truth that some people refused to admit, and their avoidance of dialogue was part and parcel of that refusal."


* And this is related to the deceptive genus I am discussing with @Joshs

I think that the video game is singled out with respect to marbles because there's a kind of nostalgia for an age that didn't exist, as if children were somehow better off then than now, and our modern technology is ruining their development. — Moliere

I've explained what you're unable to see. There was nothing in my explanation about "nostalgia for an age that didn't exist." There is a difference between video games and wall ball, believe it or not.

Take care, Moliere.

It sounds like you’re talking about the kinds of general social know-how that allows us to navigate in interpersonal situations without having to have in-depth knowledge of other persons’ motives and beliefs. Ordering in a restaurant, driving in busy traffic, dancing the tango or strategizing again enemy soldiers are all examples of this skillful coping. Blame would seem to mark the limit of the anticipatory usefulness of such coping, the point where a more in-depth understanding of the other’s perspective becomes necessary. — Joshs

Obviously we disagree on most all of this. If you want to give an argument for your positions, feel free.

Deceit would not appear to trigger blame unless it could not be accounted for as an element of the social practice. Misdirection is an expected strategy in football and war, but not in cooperative ventures. The enemy general who pulls off a successful subterfuge ( D-day) is to be admired, whereas the friend betrays one’s trust triggers rage and blame.

I agree with this part of your post. :up:

Regarding cross-purposes:

I wrote about topic-equivocation, for example <here> and especially <here>. — Leontiskos

The simple way this has churned out in this this thread is, "Oh, I thought we were forthrightly answering each other's questions. I see you're not doing that. So what game are you playing at instead?" Hence the deception.

which framework is being used by a toddler when they reach the cognitive milestone of object permanence? Can it even be described as a "framework"? — Harry Hindu

I have to say don't quite understand why you would ask me that.

So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand or subscribe to rational norms? — goremand

Oh no, not at all. — Leontiskos

Sorry, "no, I disagree" or "no, there is no need"? Do object to me characterizing norms as something you subscribe to?

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't.
— Count Timothy von Icarus

Note the form: <Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]>. "Which do you believe it is?" — Leontiskos

I didn't see the word, "some" in the original quote and that seems to make a difference. The original quote seems to be saying "either all narratives are true or all narratives are false", but that doesn't make any sense because there are narratives that contradict each other, so it cannot be that all narratives are true. But all narratives could be false in that we have yet to find the true narrative. This also doesn't seem to take into account that some narratives might be partially true/false.

If we were to narrow down the scope from "all" to "one" then if two people have opposing narratives - viewpoints that are the opposite of each other (god exists/god doesn't exist) - then yes one has to be correct and the other false, but if they do not AND they both have issues, then it could be possible that both are wrong. It seems to depend on where one narrative stands in relation with the other - if they are direct opposites (god exists/god doesn't exist) and how many conceptual holes each one has compared to the other. Many issues do not have black or white solutions. There can often be other narratives which might be a middle ground or might not - depending on how much of the two counter-narratives it overlaps or shares (only if it shares an equal amount of both of the other two narratives would it qualify as middle ground). If there are parts that the 3rd narrative does not share with either, one might say it is not a middle ground, but simply a 3rd possible narrative.

J and Srap Tasmaner in particular tried to say, "Let's take a step back into a neutral frame, so that we can examine this more carefully. Now everyone lives in their own framework..." Their "step back" was always a form of question-begging, given that it presupposed the non-overarching, framework-view. That's what happens when someone falsely claims to be taking a neutral stance on some matter on which they are not neutral* (and, in this case, on a matter in which neutrality is not possible). In general and especially in this case, the better thing to do is simply to give arguments for one's position instead of trying to claim the high ground of "objectivity" or "neutrality." — Leontiskos

When we hear about an issue for the first time and listen to the arguments that support one side or the other for the first time, and evaluate and compare the number and scope of conceptual holes in each for the first time, are we not taking a neutral position? Which position would we be adopting at this point if not one that says reason and logic are valuable methods for determining the truth of a claim? Is there another position one could take? Does it make sense to take the position that logic and reason are NOT methods for determining the truth of a claim? One might, but that would seem to undermine many of the other things that they have said. Is there a person alive that takes the position that logic and reason are NEVER useful methods for determining the truth of a claim? Could such a person survive in the world?

I didn't see the word, "some" in the original quote and that seems to make a difference. The original quote seems to be saying "either all narratives are true or all narratives are false" — Harry Hindu

I've worked through this before in the thread, but we can do it again:

"Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." (original quote)
∴ "Either all narratives are [X], or they are not."

1. "Either all narratives are [X], or they are not all [X]."
   
   • ∴ "Either all narratives are [X], or some are not [X]."
   • ∴ "p v ~p"
2. "Either all narratives are [X], or they are all not [X]."

I don't think (2) is a plausible interpretation. It looks like something which is clearly false, and something which does not fit the context, and also something which is an inherent stretch (namely to distribute the "all" in that way). It is also contrary to the other ways @Count Timothy von Icarus has phrased the point.

Beyond this, (2) looks like a strawman, and this is why. Accepting for the sake of argument that both interpretations are possible, nevertheless (1) results in a valid argument and (2) results in an invalid argument. So why interpret (2) rather than (1)? @J has accused Count of transgressing the principle of charity, but his interpretation is by definition uncharitable. "He might be saying something that is perfectly valid, but I am going to interpret him in a different way, such that his argument is invalid."

I mean, suppose a marine biologist says, "Either all the fish are diseased, or they aren't." Would you really interpret that as, "Either all the fish are diseased, or else all the fish are not diseased"? I.e. "Either every fish is diseased, or else every fish is not diseased"? I simply do not see that as a plausible interpretation.

Which position would we be adopting at this point if not one that says reason and logic are valuable methods for determining the truth of a claim? Is there another position one could take? Does it make sense to take the position that logic and reason are NOT methods for determining the truth of a claim? One might, but that would seem to undermine many of the other things that they have said. Is there a person alive that takes the position that logic and reason are NEVER useful methods for determining the truth of a claim? Could such a person survive in the world? — Harry Hindu

I think once we understand that (1) is being said rather than (2), then a lot of the things you point out here follow. The earlier iteration : "Well, in ruling out, 'anything goes,' you are denying some positions." I.e., "If we say that not anything goes, then we are saying that some things do not go."

Sorry, "no, I disagree" or "no, there is no need"? Do object to me characterizing norms as something you subscribe to? — goremand

You were asking two different questions:

So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand or subscribe to rational norms? — goremand

1. So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand rational norms?
2. So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to subscribe to rational norms?

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them.

Else, you are using the word 'need'. I would ask, "Need for the sake of what?" Your phrasing is implicitly instrumental.

We're a little bit off topic, but this is obviously related to the Adorno thread. I am wondering what the contradiction here is said to be, in a precise way? Is it that democracies can turn into oligarchies, and once they do then they are no longer democracies? I think that's true, but it looks like a change rather than a contradiction.

Or perhaps we have here the idea that democracy is incompatible with liberalism, because liberalism is tied to capitalism and therefore tied to oligarchy? If so, then I would want to ask, "What is it about liberalism that is tied to capitalism"? I'm not disputing the thesis, but I want to see the reasoning

Well, this is "contradiction" in the context of Hegelian dialectical, which starts off pretty clear in the Logic with being/nothing -> becoming, but becomes less clear cut in historical analysis. The basic idea is that a historical moment (e.g. early liberal republicanism) comes to negate itself, making itself what it is not precisely because of what it is.

For Hegel, who has a strong classic bent in this respect, the telos of history is the emergence of a truly self-determining human freedom (man becoming more wholly himself and more truly one). But freedom itself is subject to the dialectic. If we begin with freedom as "the absolute lack of constraint and determinateness," the "ability to choose anything," we run into the contradiction that making any choice at all implies some sort of determinacy, and is thus a limit on freedom. Yet the fact that, to sustain our perfect freedom, we need to never make any choices, while freedom is also "the capacity to choose," is a sort of contradiction. He identifies this sort of flight from all determinacy with the excesses of the French Revolution early in the Philosophy of Right, but you still see this in leftist and libertarian radicals all the time; they flee from any concrete, pragmatic policy because determination is a limit on liberty.

So there ends up being many revisions of freedom, which has to be worked out across human history (the idea of a "commonwealth" coexisting with slavery and conquest is one example going back to Saint Augustine's City of God; the fact that the "lord" is not free to lift his boot off the neck of the "bondsman" without risking revolt is another). With liberal democracies, I would like to say that the problem was that they were self-undermining. They allowed for, and indeed positively promoted their own collapse into non-democracy, which is a negation of the original term that promotes and expresses freedom. Socialism and nationalism, in their respective ways, helped to avoid this self-negation by addressing the concentration of power that could be used to subvert liberal democracy. But now, globalization, mass migration, and then secularism and capitalism's tendency to erode culture, have destroyed the basis for nationalism, and yet "national identity" was holding up support for the redistribution of socialism.

From this, we might diagnose the problem and some historical currents, but we could hardly use it to predict the future. That's Solovyov's main insight. History might be providential, but man is free, and he "loves the darkness" (John 3). I
History doesn't have a utopian end point assured to it, as Eusebius and Hegel might assume, but is closer to Dante's vision (where he is most unique as a philosopher) of a goal whose assurance isn't realized. It is, however, perhaps actual only to the extent that it rationally embodies this telos (Hegel's famous point with "the rational is the actual and the actual is the rational.") Which is just to say, we can speak meaningfully of "progress," of actualization, but we mustn't fall into the trap of many left Hegelians, of thinking this makes history a sort of manichean battleground. The good is sewn with the bad and only time tests then.

I didn't see the word, "some" in the original quote and that seems to make a difference. The original quote seems to be saying "either all narratives are true or all narratives are false", but that doesn't make any sense because there are narratives that contradict each other, so it cannot be that all narratives are true. But all narratives could be false in that we have yet to find the true narrative. This also doesn't seem to take into account that some narratives might be partially true/false.

Natural language is fuzzy, so I suppose it could be read like that, although that seems to be a stretch to me. Saying "all x are y or they aren't" is a simple disjunct between affirmation and negation of "all x are y." That's how I intended it at least. So, the objection of the possibility of narratives without truth values was brought up, but I don't think this affects the disjunct. If some narratives are neither true nor false, then obviously they are not "all true." The excluded middle here would instead be "all narratives are neither true nor not-true." Note though that the context is epistemology and presumably epistemology, since it deals in knowledge, deals in narratives that have truth values, if not exclusively, at least primarily.

I don't even like the term "narratives," to be honest. It's connotations seem perhaps inappropriate for epistemology. I would rather say perhaps "all knowledge claims."

Well, this is "contradiction" in the context of Hegelian dialectical, which starts off pretty clear in the Logic with being/nothing -> becoming, but becomes less clear cut in historical analysis. The basic idea is that a historical moment (e.g. early liberal republicanism) comes to negate itself, making itself what it is not precisely because of what it is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So every substantial change is a contradiction, on that reading?

For Hegel, who has a strong classic bent in this respect, the telos of history is the emergence of a truly self-determining human freedom (man becoming more wholly himself and more truly one). But freedom itself is subject to the dialectic. If we begin with freedom as "the absolute lack of constraint and determinateness," the "ability to choose anything," we run into the contradiction that making any choice at all implies some sort of determinacy, and is thus a limit on freedom. Yet the fact that, to sustain our perfect freedom, we need to never make any choices, while freedom is also "the capacity to choose," is a sort of contradiction. He identifies this sort of flight from all determinacy with the excesses of the French Revolution early in the Philosophy of Right, but you still see this in leftist and libertarian radicals all the time; they flee from any concrete, pragmatic policy because determination is a limit on liberty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. :up:

With liberal democracies, I would like to say that the problem was that they were self-undermining. They allowed for, and indeed positively promoted their own collapse into non-democracy, which is a negation of the original term that promotes and expresses freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but I'm asking "why?" Why is liberalism thought to be incompatible with democracy? Or why is a "liberal democracy" thought to be self-undermining? What is the reasoning? Again, I don't necessarily doubt the conclusion, but I want to see some particular reasoning for it.

(I like Durant's "every civilization begins like as a Stoic, and dies an Epicurean," too, even if it isn't always true). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd push here and say "Is it ever true?" -- but I'd want Durant to clarify his use of "Epicurean" which I imagine is the more popular image.

Epicurus gets the shaft far more often than deserved so I always want to stand up for him -- especially because I'm guessing Durant means it as in "decadent pathos at the cost of prudence"

I'll just add that the classical formulation of the difference is that science deals with the universal and the necessary. History is always particular though. Indeed, it's the particular in which all universals are instantiated. This doesn't preclude a philosophy of history, but it does preclude a science of history. Jaques Maratain has a very short lecture/book on philosophy of history that makes this case quite compactly, and he's drawing on the "traditional" distinction (in the West) that was assumed for many centuries. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I tried to draw an analogy between science/history as I'm trying to defend it, but then upon examination I thought "Naw -- there really is a conceptual difference here" -- In a way this is a testament to philosophy, though. What we mean by "science" in our world today is a product of philosophical exploration -- it just took some odd 400 years to even be able to point to the distinction in a reasonable manner.

Still, I say this without having read the lecture/book you refer to.

That's an interesting point. I'd generally agree. Historians can sometimes absolutize historicism and scientists of a certain persuasion can sometimes absolutize their inductive methodology into a presumption of nominalism and the idea that all knowing is merely induction. In the latter case, this is sometimes quite explicit, e.g. Bayesian Brains. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

In terms of a logos at work in history, I certainly think we can find one, just not a science. Hegel's theory seems to explain some aspects of 20th century history quite well. There is a sort of necessity in the way internal contradictions work themselves out, and you see this same point being made in information theoretic analyses of natural selection that look at genomes as semipermeable membranes that selectively let information about the environment in, but arrest its erasure. Contradiction leads to conflict that must be overcome. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given my persuasion I ought agree -- but it's one of those points that I constantly find myself coming back to to work out what it really means, after all. I recognize the irony here -- negating sublation would lead to the sublation of sublation -- but my doubt is a little old fashioned here in wondering just how do I go about making this inference myself?

There are a handful of examples that I can see the pattern in, including my own patterns of thinking.

But I also know it's very easy to read patterns into what we're considering. And at least as I understand it Hegel's philosophy of history is pretty out there to the point that, while I find it interesting, I know exactly how it'd sound to anyone who thinks time is linear.

I'm fairly skeptical of a logos in history, too, but I doubt that's surprising :D

But you cannot predict this sort of thing in any strict sense, because it is always particular. A great image for this is in Virgil. Virgil is very focused on the orientation of thymos (honor, spirit) in service of a greater logos (the good of the community, the historical telos of Rome, and ultimately, the Divine). However, although his gods (themselves a mix of personified man-like deity and more transcendent Logos) set the limit of logos in human history, and characters only ever recognize them when they leave. I've been rereading the Aeneid and this seems true in almost every case; only when they turn to go, when we are "past them" in the narrative, are they recognized as gods by man. It's very clever, and works well with elements in the narrative that are skeptical of the ultimate ability of man to consistently live up to logos. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I like your ability to draw analogies to pre-modern philosophy. And definitely appreciate the references to poetry.

I don't think we can predict these things in a strict sense, of course. History is too particular for that. But then, to wrap this back to the OP, to what extent does the world-builder philosophy help understand these historical moments? Not prediction, but what is the relationship? "Sense-making"?

Saying "all x are y or they aren't" is a simple disjunct between affirmation and negation of "all x are y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. I await the day when "natural language philosophers" finally begin to understand natural language. :smile:

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms — Leontiskos

Is this necessarily the case (i.e. do they need to)? It doesn't seem like it if you look at norms in general. I could unknowingly be acting in accordance with any number of arbitrary norms as I go about my business. Why can't I act in accordance with rational norms without understanding those norms?

I mean, suppose a marine biologist says, "Either all the fish are diseased, or they aren't." Would you really interpret that as, "Either all the fish are diseased, or else all the fish are not diseased"? I.e. "Either every fish is diseased, or else every fish is not diseased"? I simply do not see that as a plausible interpretation. — Leontiskos

I see your point which is why I pointed out that the word, "some" was not used. If it were then it would be obvious what you are saying. What if one were to say, "All fish are swimmers, or all fish are not swimmers"? How would that be different, if at all?

Just on it's face, "All narratives are true" simply does not fit observation when we are aware of narratives that contradict each other. All narratives can't be true by way of LEM.

Natural language is fuzzy, so I suppose it could be read like that, although that seems to be a stretch to me. Saying "all x are y or they aren't" is a simple disjunct between affirmation and negation of "all x are y." That's how I intended it at least. So, the objection of the possibility of narratives without truth values was brought up, but I don't think this affects the disjunct. If some narratives are neither true nor false, then obviously they are not "all true." The excluded middle here would instead be "all narratives are neither true nor not-true." Note though that the context is epistemology and presumably epistemology, since it deals in knowledge, deals in narratives that have truth values, if not exclusively, at least primarily.

I don't even like the term "narratives," to be honest. It's connotations seem perhaps inappropriate for epistemology. I would rather say perhaps "all knowledge claims." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Natural language is not fuzzy. It only appears that way in philosophy forums (language on holiday) when philosophers forget that language use is not just syntax but semantics in that language refers to states-of-affairs in the world. The scribbles are about states-of-affairs in the world. Just because you followed the syntactical rules of some language does not mean that you used language correctly. It has to point to some state-of-affairs as well - whether that state-of-affairs be in another country, on another planet, another person and their ideas and intentions, or all knowledge claims as opposed to some.

This is why the knowledge claim, "All knowledge claims are true" is simply false on it's face because we already know that some knowledge claims contradict each other and LEM. I don't even need to get to your other claim that "all knowledge claims are not true" to know that the first one is false. You start off with a faulty premise and it is faulty because it does not fit observation and follow the LEM. Adding the second claim as if it even relates to the first, or your use of "all" is an example of what language on holiday is.

This is why the knowledge claim, "All knowledge claims are true" is simply false on it's face because we already know that some knowledge claims contradict each other and LEM. I don't even need to get to your other claim that "all knowledge claims are not true" to know that the first one is false. You start off with a faulty premise and it is faulty because it does not fit observation and follow the LEM. Adding the second claim as if it even relates to the first, or your use of "all" is an example of what language on holiday is.

Yes, that was the point. P V ~P is not a premise and conclusion, but a premise itself, a basic disjunct. Also, might you be confusing the law of the excluded middle (LEM) with the law of non-contradiction (LNC)?

Maybe, but if you assume that a proposition must be either true or false (LEM), then it follows that a proposition cannot be both true and false (LNC). Conversely, if you assume that a proposition cannot be both true and false (LNC), and that there are only two truth values (true and false), then it follows that a proposition must be either true or false (LEM).

I see your point which is why I pointed out that the word, "some" was not used. If it were then it would be obvious what you are saying. — Harry Hindu

I think it is obvious. In philosophy it is called the Square of Opposition, and I have mentioned it often in this thread. To negate the claim "All X are Y" is to affirm the claim "Some X are not Y." To say, "Not all are that way," is to say, "Some are not that way." My "some" interpretation is the obvious interpretation.

Saying "All X are not Y" also contradicts "All X are Y," but it does so gratuitously. The charitable and minimal interpretation requires interpreting what is necessary, and to deny "All X are Y" it is necessary to affirm "Some X are not Y." It is not necessary to affirm "All X are not Y" in order to deny "All X are Y." This is a classic case of trying to push one's opponent into an extreme position in order to make them easier to refute (i.e. the informal fallacy of the strawman).

What if one were to say, "All fish are swimmers, or all fish are not swimmers"? How would that be different, if at all? — Harry Hindu

Do you interpret, "Either all fish are swimmers, or they aren't," as, "All fish are swimmers, or all fish are not swimmers"? It's the same issue.

Just on it's face, "All narratives are true" simply does not fit observation when we are aware of narratives that contradict each other. — Harry Hindu

If not all narratives are [X] then some narratives are not [X]. That's exactly what @Count Timothy von Icarus was pointing out. It is not a controversial claim, to say the least. The more interesting question asks why it has been evaded for 20 pages.

Is this necessarily the case (i.e. do they need to)? — goremand

Else, you are using the word 'need'. I would ask, "Need for the sake of what?" Your phrasing is implicitly instrumental. — Leontiskos

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Why can't I act in accordance with rational norms without understanding those norms? — goremand

Because if you are acting in accordance with a norm then you must have an understanding of that norm at some level. If you have no understanding of a norm then you cannot act in accordance with it.

Because if you are acting in accordance with a norm then you must have an understanding of that norm at some level. If you have no understanding of a norm then you cannot act in accordance with it. — Leontiskos

So If I invented a normative framework for say, ants, with rules like "ants should protect their queen", "ants should walk in a line", "ants should utilize a caste system" etc. and most ants acted in accordance with it, it must be the case that the ants have an understanding of my normative framework?

Been away half a year, saw this interesting thread start and went to the last page only to find people building drone view pyramids of arguments and counter argument and well, ”I missed this one” . Would be neat with an AI thing that could summarize what have been said in this 25 pages…

If I invented a normative framework for say, ants, with rules like "ants should protect their queen", "ants should walk in a line", "ants should utilize a caste system" etc. and most ants acted in accordance with it, it must be the case that the ants have an understanding of my normative framework? — goremand

I made a rule that the clouds should eject some water when they hit a low pressure zone. They've been doing a great job.

So If I invented a normative framework for say, ants, with rules like "ants should protect their queen", "ants should walk in a line", "ants should utilize a caste system" etc. and most ants acted in accordance with it, it must be the case that the ants have an understanding of my normative framework? — goremand

How would you answer your own question?