I think I've clarified it now: let me know if I am missing anything. — Bob Ross

I think that's good progress. I don't actually read Aristotle or Aquinas as having anything near the focus on "parts" that you have, so I wouldn't attribute such an emphasis on "parts" to them. Apart from that, I think you're beginning to understand Aristotle's matter/form hylomorphism better. :up:

But then matter is something — Bob Ross

Reword it like this: matter is some thing.

If it is 'a thing' then it has form. If it has no form, then it's not a thing.

I wouldn't attribute such an emphasis on "parts" to them. — Leontiskos

General question: I have the idea that Aristotle's biology is what we would call 'holistic'. He identifies that there is an animating principle which determines how all of the parts are organised for the benefit of the whole. Is that fair?

The idea that matter is eternal seems false in the sense that prime matter could ever exist (yet alone eternally): if Aristotle thinks, as Leontiskos pointed out, that matter is eternal in the sense of never being created then he is using the idea of matter as if it is a separate substance and this eternal matter would be prime matter. — Bob Ross

Whether or not prime matter is said to exist, it could still function as a theoretical entity representing the conservation of matter (or in our terms, energy). Any such conservation principle requires something which is conserved, even despite the fact that everything observable changes. That "something" could be said to be prime matter for Aristotle. The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible.

In this sense, Aquinas' idea of a pure form that is not purely actual is patently false; for parts have the potential to receive form and all beings other than the actus purus have parts. So Angel's have matter: just not material matter. — Bob Ross

It might be fun to consider a similar objection that Aquinas gives:

Objection 3. Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (I:3:4). Hence God alone is pure act. — Aquinas, ST I.50.2.ad3 - Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

General question: I have the idea that Aristotle's biology is what we would call 'holistic'. He identifies that there is an animating principle which determines how all of the parts are organised for the benefit of the whole. Is that fair? — Wayfarer

Yes! See what I say <here> about David Oderberg's, "Reverse Mereological Essentialism." But your phrasing is quite good.

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. — Bob Ross

Such an infinite regress is incoherent and therefore logically impossible.

Yes, but this does seem to posit that there is a real kind of being or substance, distinct ontologically from the parts of a thing, which has the capacity to receive form. — Bob Ross

We are talking about hylomorphism aren't we? The form of a thing is distinct ontologically from the matter of the thing. And, if we divide a thing into parts each part will have form and matter. Infinite regress in such division is incoherent because it implies that there is no substratum, therefore no substance, allowing for infinite possibility, but this is contrary to empirical evidence.

But this could be the stuff which is the parts of a thing—no? It fits the definition of “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists”. The parts persist when the whole perishes and the parts are out of which the whole is birthed. — Bob Ross

You do not seem to understand what "parts of a thing" means. To be "the parts of a thing", the existence of the thing is necessary. Therefore the parts of a thing cannot preexist the thing. If certain things are used in the creation of a thing, and therefore become parts of that thing, they are something other than parts of that thing prior to becoming parts of that thing. And after the thing perishes they are no longer parts of that thing, but something else.

This distinction is very important in understanding the nature of "form". The things, which may through some creative act, become the parts of something, have a distinct form, which is completely distinct from the form of that possible whole. When they become the parts of that whole their forms are different than they were, now being parts of that whole.

This is why considering the priority of matter always leads to an infinite regress. Each time we say that a thing has been made by putting parts together, those parts cannot be pure matter, they must themselves, have forms, as prime matter is unintelligible. So as much as matter is prior to the thing which is composed of it, it cannot be prior in an absolute sense. The incoherent infinite regress is avoided by understanding the priority of form in the creative act, and positing form rather than matter, as substance. Then "matter" as a concept just stands in as a substitute, a place holder, for forms which the human intellect cannot grasp. Those are the independent, separate forms, which are prior to material existence itself.

I don’t see how this is necessarily the case. A thing could be made of some substance which is capable of receiving form, exist as the whole between the form and its imposition on that substance, have the potential to be affected by other things, and yet no other thing affects it; thereby remaining unchanged. It is metaphysically possible for a thing that is perishable to be in an environment where it will not perish. — Bob Ross

I think that your argument is refuted by what is known as the principle of plenitude. If given enough time, every possibility will necessarily be actualized. This is exactly the problem with your attitude of allowing for infinite regress. If we allow infinite time then we must allow the reality of all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem. That's one reason why infinite regress must be rejected as fundamentally repugnant to reason, therefore incoherent.

The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible. — Leontiskos

Conservation principles, like the conservation of mass, and the conservation of energy, are ideals which are put to use in practice. However, in reality, the real physical world does not obey them. There is always energy lost as time passes, and the discrepancy is written off as energy which is lost to the system, or sometimes as entropy. So this is not an argument that there is no such thing as conservation principles, there clearly is, and they are very useful. However, the real world doesn't actually obey them, and to understand the secrets of the real world is to understand why it doesn't live up to these ideals.

This is similar to the ideal which the ancients held, and Aristotle discussed, eternal circular motion. The orbiting of the sun, moon, and planets, was thought to be eternal circles. However, the circles were later demonstrated to be other than perfect circles, therefore the logic which made these circles eternal (and the universe would be eternal if conservation laws ere true) was effectively refuted. And the true nature of the solar system was revealed by understanding how the orbits did not actually live up to those ideals.

So we can make the same argument against "prime matter". It's an ideal, which is not consistent with reality. We can employ it in theories etc., where it is useful, but we need to recognize that it is not an accurate representation of truth. And the path of metaphysics will lead us into these areas where such concepts fail, thereby guiding us toward understanding the secrets of the real world.

Whether or not prime matter is said to exist, it could still function as a theoretical entity representing the conservation of matter (or in our terms, energy). Any such conservation principle requires something which is conserved, even despite the fact that everything observable changes. That "something" could be said to be prime matter for Aristotle. The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible.

My understanding of this would be to say that prime matter would just be being itself (permeated through forms); because matter is only ‘conserved’ in the sense that destroying the whole does not destroy the parts: it just makes those parts no longer parts.

It might be fun to consider a similar objection that Aquinas gives:

Yeah, I read his entire section on that and it just seems like he’s thinking of physical matter: not anything that could receive a form. Only things which have parts have potency; otherwise, there is nothing that can be affected. So Angel’s must have parts if they have potency.

Likewise, to say something is purely form doesn’t make sense to me: all form is purely form. When we have an object that is a substance comprised of form and matter, the form infused with the matter is itself purely form. To be fair, I am assuming he means ‘pure form’ as ~’something which has being with no matter and only form’; but, then, a form is the actualizing principle which has behind it a universal: it’s not identical to pure actuality. A universal is not a form without act; and act is not a form without being permeated in matter. Both are equally incoherent. Pure actuality, then, is just pure being self-subsisting; and pure act is the permeation of form in matter by way of the creation of matter with being out of nothing.

If it is 'a thing' then it has form. If it has no form, then it's not a thing.

Yes, but then there isn’t some other substance which can receive potentiality. ‘Matter’ is not a substrate which receives form. The ‘material’ out of which something is created is the already existed stuff (objects) which can be made into a whole (by way of it receiving the form of the whole); so each object is both comprised of form and matter only insofar as its parts are the matter and its form is the actualizing principle of the structure that makes those parts its parts. There is no substrate of ‘matter’.

Such an infinite regress is incoherent and therefore logically impossible

Blanketly asserting this doesn’t help further the discussion. I gave an elaborate account of why it is possible and necessary. Here’s what I gathered you mean by it being incoherent:

Infinite regress in such division is incoherent because it implies that there is no substratum, therefore no substance, allowing for infinite possibility, but this is contrary to empirical evidence.

A substance, in hylomorphism, is the form (act) and matter (parts) conjoined. There is no other substratum besides that; and matter as a substrate would imply it is it’s own substance, which is impossible because it would entail that (A) there is a substance of pure potentiality whereof potentiality is non-being and (B) that there are two absolutely simple beings (one being purely actual and the other purely potential).

You are partly correct, though: if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself. This is why it is necessary to posit a purely actual, self-subsisting being, to account for the being of objects; however, as I noted before, it is equally necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. This is not to say that an object does not have a finite series of causes. There can exist, and necessarily exists, an infinite chain of causality of parts; but that infinite chain is infused with being through God—pure actuality. Pure being permeates through the infinity of parts.

You do not seem to understand what "parts of a thing" means. To be "the parts of a thing", the existence of the thing is necessary

I understand that: you are right that the part of a whole is no longer a part (of that whole) if the whole is not there. I was just loosely referring to the objects which would or did comprise the whole in question: the matter that receives the form in question.

The incoherent infinite regress is avoided by understanding the priority of form in the creative act, and positing form rather than matter, as substance

Hyle (matter) + morphe (form) = substance. Neither are a substance themselves. They both exist intertwined together. A purely actual being, God, is neither pure form or matter: He is self-subsisting being itself. Being is what gives the form and matter together being as a substance; which is identical to pure acts of creation by way of thought/will of a form into matter.

I think that your argument is refuted by what is known as the principle of plenitude. If given enough time, every possibility will necessarily be actualized

That doesn’t refute what I said: in principle, hypothetically, a being could exist which is never affected by anything and yet is not incapable of change.

Yes, but then there isn’t some other substance which can receive potentiality. ‘Matter’ is not a substrate which receives form. The ‘material’ out of which something is created is the already existed stuff (objects) which can be made into a whole (by way of it receiving the form of the whole); so each object is both comprised of form and matter only insofar as its parts are the matter and its form is the actualizing principle of the structure that makes those parts its parts. There is no substrate of ‘matter’. — Bob Ross

The substrate is what is translated as 'prime matter'. In this, I will defer to the others here with greater knowledge of Aristotle, but based on encyclopedia entries: Aristotle's Prime Matter (prōtē hulē) is conceived as pure potentiality. Imagine the most basic "stuff" of the universe, utterly undifferentiated and without any inherent qualities, forms, or properties of its own. It's not actually anything specific, but has the potential to become anything (to 'take form', so to speak).

This idea of prime matter is crucial for Aristotle's explanation of change, especially what he called substantial change – when one thing completely transforms into another (like a plant decaying into earth). For change to occur, there must be something underlying that persists throughout the transformation. Prime matter serves as this ultimate, enduring substratum. Without it, Aristotle argued, things would have to come into being from absolute nothingness, which he rejected as impossible ('nothing comes from nothing').

But because prime matter possesses no form or qualities, it cannot be directly observed or even understood in isolation (like I said, 'not a thing'). It is only possible to encounter things that are already a combination of matter and form – actual objects with specific characteristics. Hence Prime Matter is often described by what it isn't, rather than what it is.

For Aristotle, prime matter was generally considered ungenerated and indestructible. It was an eternal principle underpinning all creation and destruction in the observable world.

Speculatively, there are parallels to this concept (if it is a concept) and the mysterious 'fields' of today's cosmological physics. Nowadays particles are said to be 'excitations of fields' rather than self-existent point-particles. It is at least analogically suggestive. (There are modern interpretations of hylomorphism in quantum physics but that would take us too far afield.)

Only things which have parts have potency; otherwise, there is nothing that can be affected. So Angel’s must have parts if they have potency. — Bob Ross

In his reply Aquinas says that material things have a twofold composition, and immaterial things (namely creatures) have a "onefold" {my word} composition. So he is explicit that an angel possesses a kind of composition.

A substance, in hylomorphism, is the form (act) and matter (parts) conjoined. — Bob Ross

Despite the fact that substance is the individual, which is a composite of matter and form, when you read his Metaphysics, you'll find that Aristotle determines that "substance" is properly assigned to form. This is because n the case of self-subsisting things, the substance of the thing cannot be separated from the thing's form. Therefore the thing's form and the thing's substance are one and the same.

however, as I noted before, it is equally necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. — Bob Ross

Why do you say this? It is definitely not Aristotelian, as he clearly demonstrates why it s incoherent to assume infinite divisibility of anything substantial. This is the reason you yourself stated " if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself".

So I'll ask you again, why do you insist that it is necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. I think this is incoherent, because such an object cannot exist, therefore it is contradictory to say that such a thing (anything which might be infinitely divisible) is an object.

Hyle (matter) + morphe (form) = substance. Neither are a substance themselves. — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. In the case of self-subsisting things, the form is the substance. For reference, this is discussed in Metaphysics Bk 7.

They both exist intertwined together. — Bob Ross

They are not intertwined together, that is a misunderstanding. This is discussed in his description of generation in Bk 7.

That doesn’t refute what I said: in principle, hypothetically, a being could exist which is never affected by anything and yet is not incapable of change. — Bob Ross

It does refute your hypothesis. With an infinite amount of time, which is what you allow, that being would necessarily affect and be affected, or else it would be false to say that it is capable of affecting or being affected.

If I am right, then it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality). Each thing, then, would be caused by a prior actuality which would provide it with compresence of properties, identity through time, and potency by the mere causality of forms upon forms until we trace it back to the being which has a form that entails existence (i.e., God).
Am I misunderstanding the view? — Bob Ross

Not at all! From my amateur perspective, you have hit the entailing nail (Pure Potential) on the head. My own personal worldview is based on a notion similar to Hylomorphism, but expressed in 21st century terms : Information & Causation. Information is the meaning (definition) of a knowable thing, and Causation is the trans-form-action of that physical Thing (hyle) into a new Form (morph).

The science of Cosmology has traced this transformation of Energy into Matter back to the Big Bang beginning. At that point, the trail goes cold in an abyss of infinity, so pragmatic scientists close-up shop and go home. But philosophers, undeterred by absence of hard evidence, leap the information gap into the unknown by means of rational inference (every action has a prior cause) and poetic metaphor (chicken & egg ; tree & seed).

Philosophy doesn't reveal practical Facts, but theoretical Truths. For example, in imagination, Aristotle followed the trail of Causation to the end of observation, and then deduced a First Cause prior to the known-world Effect. Being practical-minded though, he didn't call it a conventional God, but gave it an operational definition : such as Unmoved Mover. Likewise, Plato made a functional distinction, similar to Hylomorphism, in terms of Potentiality & Actuality. Like a Creator God though, prior Potential “entails” the existence of Actual things --- or what Whitehead called “actual occasions”.

You asked : “why would we need to posit a real potency”? In my thesis of Enformationism, the Form (whatness) of a new thing is necessarily prior*1 to the material existence (isness) of the observable object. In my former profession as an Architect, a new building is posterior*1 to the design (form ; concept) of its structure. That complex idea must be conveyed to builders as an abstract design (blueprint), and then implemented in concrete bricks & mortar. Without the design (morph), a brick is just dried mud.

In this analogy, the “real potency” is merely an imaginary Idea, or Ideal (definition of a thing). And the idealizing Mind that dreams-up the idea (design) has traditionally been described as some kind of anthro-morphic creator : a God or Cosmic Architect. But, due to my emphasis on the compresence*2 of physical & metaphysical Information*3 --- like Einstein's equation of Energy & Matter --- I like to call that "prior actuality" a Programmer.

To modern secular minds, such unreal immaterial “Potency” does not make sense. And yet, Potential can be defined as not-yet-real. And we have many examples of such potency (e.g. voltage) in the real world. So, the notion of a pre-bang First Cause does make functional sense, if not factual sensation. :smile:


*1.In Bayesian statistics, prior probability is your initial belief about an event or parameter before observing any data, while posterior probability is the updated belief after incorporating new information or evidence.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=prior+vs+posterior+probability

*2. The "compresence of opposites" refers to the philosophical idea that contrary or contradictory properties can exist simultaneously in the same thing or within a single entity. This concept is often explored in the context of understanding the nature of reality, particularly in relation to Plato's theory of Forms and the nature of sensible particulars.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=compresence+of+opposites

*3. What is Information?
The Power to Enform
https://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page16.html

Aristotle's Prime Matter (prōtē hulē) is conceived as pure potentiality. Imagine the most basic "stuff" of the universe, utterly undifferentiated and without any inherent qualities, forms, or properties of its own. It's not actually anything specific, but has the potential to become anything (to 'take form', so to speak).

Yes, but then matter, albeit not pure matter in the sense of prime matter, is something separable, in principle, as its own entity. For something which in-itself is pure potential to receive form is toto genere different than that which is actual (viz., has form).

I’ve already noted the non-beingness of prime matter objection; but I will also briefly note that another issue is that prime matter would be absolutely simple and Aristotle equally holds that pure actuality is absolutely simple; but two absolutely simple beings cannot exist because they are ontologically indistinguishable—not merely conceptually or epistemically indistinguishable.

Of course, someone could object that prime matter cannot exist on its own; but, then, there doesn’t seem to be any matter in the sense of being an entity capable of receiving any form—that would be a substance of its own even if it always must be conjoined with something that does not have or has limited potential (like actuality).

For change to occur, there must be something underlying that persists throughout the transformation.

But the annihilation of a substance (as a whole) is done by the actualization of potentials of its parts which are potentials that necessarily annihilate the form it had (thusly disbanding the whole-parts relationship). It seems like Aristotle would reject this and say that the parts of a thing do not have the potential to be actualized in a way that would annihilate its own form (e.g., modifying the parts of a tree by burning it to lose its form of a tree).

Without it, Aristotle argued, things would have to come into being from absolute nothingness, which he rejected as impossible ('nothing comes from nothing').

I agree; but pure actuality actualizing something out of nothing is something I would imagine Aristotle would accept; and this is how the entirety of the infinity of parts and wholes originate—out of nothing from God.

But because prime matter possesses no form or qualities

But if it is pure potentiality; then it has no actuality. Right? So it is non-being. Unless, are you saying actuality is not identical to being?

Fair enough. However, isn't he, then, implying that matter is something which something with parts, in principle, does not necessarily have? If so, then how is this coheren with defining 'matter' as 'that which has the potential to receive form'?

Does Aquinas not think that an Angel's composition is that of recieved form? Namely, a form that is infused with its parts; afterall, the parts of an angel are parts of an angel and not parts of something else (or not parts at all) exactly because they are infused with a form that unifies them into a whole. Right?

Aquinas is claiming that an angel does not have matter, and therefore has no material parts, but that it does have a composition of essence + existence, which differentiates it from Pure Act:

Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (I:3:4). Hence God alone is pure act. — Aquinas, ST I.50.2.ad3 - Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

"Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act." I.e.:

• Essence/nature : Potentiality :: Existence : act

So Aquinas posits a potency-act distinction in angels (and every created being), by positing the essence-existence distinction. For Aquinas although the standard sort of potency-act distinction is indeed matter-form, there is nevertheless a second potency-act distinction within substances, namely essence-existence, and this applies not only to material substances but also to immaterial substances.

Despite the fact that substance is the individual, which is a composite of matter and form, when you read his Metaphysics, you'll find that Aristotle determines that "substance" is properly assigned to form. This is because n the case of self-subsisting things, the substance of the thing cannot be separated from the thing's form. Therefore the thing's form and the thing's substance are one and the same.

Yes, that is perfectly fine; and does not really deny that substance is comprised of matter and form. It’s an analogical account of God. We say God has a ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ that is identical to His ‘existence’ analogically and not univocally. God doesn’t really have an essence because, as you noted, He is self-subsisting, absolutely unified, Being itself. An essence is tied to the form of a thing, and a form is an actualizing principle which gives the structure to a being; but structure, and this infusion, implies parts. God has no parts, so we speak of His ‘nature’ only as an analogy of comparison to describe Him.

Why do you say this? It is definitely not Aristotelian, as he clearly demonstrates why it s incoherent to assume infinite divisibility of anything substantial.

I am not claiming it is Aristotelian, and I demonstrated it to you here in a former post:

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

In short, if we have a causal series with God as the beginning for composition like [G, [P1], [P2], [P3], …, O] (where God is ‘G’, the ‘P’s refer to parts, and ‘O’ refers to the object/whole in question), then the immediate subsequent member of the causal chain from God must also be absolutely simple (which in this case is the set of parts containing one element/part, P1); for that part would be composed of either (1) God (which is an absolutely simple being so He would provide no parts to this part, P1) or (2) it’s own self-subsisting being (since nothing comes prior to it that has parts and is not from God). Either way, e.g., the set [P1] contains parts which have no parts. This is impossible because there would, then, be at least two beings that are absolutely simple; and two absolutely simple beings are indistinguishable ontologically. I am pretty sure you would disagree with the idea that ontological simplicity entails one such kind of being (as a possibility); but you get the point.

his is the reason you yourself stated " if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself".

I did say that, and it does not refer to what you are thinking of. The causality of everything bottoms out at God—e.g., if the set {E} contains everything that is caused, then the set of causality (including what causes, not just what is caused) would be [G, {E}]—but the causality of composition in terms of parts/whole is an infinite set; and this infinite set is identical to {E}. God’s very being is permeated through the infinite collection, which is what accounts for the being of these parts/wholes. As I noted in the quote you have of me, this we can know because an infinite collection of parts and wholes is insufficient to explain how they exist; for each member gets being derivatively from the other and yet no member has the intrinsic ability to be. This means there must be a cause outside of that chain of composition which being is derived from. This is true irregardless if one accepts the infinite divisibility of composition or not.

It does refute your hypothesis. With an infinite amount of time, which is what you allow, that being would necessarily affect and be affected, or else it would be false to say that it is capable of affecting or being affected.

Imagine a block in a room standing still. Imagine the air is removed from the room and you know with 100% certainty nothing will ever infiltrate into the room nor will anything in the room be changed by something in the room. This block, given infinite time, would remain that block in the exact manner it was and will also be.

Got it. So, if I am understanding correctly, Aquinas does believe that matter is NOT merely that which is capable of receiving form but also is something physical. If so, then that's fine: I am just using the term matter to refer to that which can receive form simpliciter.

- Sure, but is existence a form received by an essence? If existence is a form and an angel receives the form of existence, then the angel must have matter, but I wouldn't really want to describe it that way. This also obscures the position which objects to Aquinas and says that angels do have proper (spiritual) matter.

A key difference here would be belief in the eternal existence of matter (Aristotle), or the pre-existence of matter (some heterodox theologians), whereas Aquinas holds to the orthodox positions of creation ex nihilo. But he thinks this is something that comes to us from revelation, and that Aristotle merely fails to prove the eternity of the world.

However, I think it's a bit stronger than that when you take Aquinas' corpus as a whole, because the preexistence of anything but God makes no sense. Essence, what something is, exists in God in the way a sculpture exists in the mind of the sculptor, as creative potential (generally ascribed to the Logos, Christ, in the Patristics). But everything exists in God, "in whom we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28). And so there is a clear distinction between essence, what, and existence, that, both of which must be posterior to God.

When God creates the intelligences (which being intelligences, are immaterial) he is bringing them into being with a certain whatness, through the granting of existence to form (not through generation, the informing of matter, but rather through creation from nothing) but these are not pure being (essence ≠ existence), and so they are subject to change. Indeed, since God can change all finite creatures, this clearly must be so, since only infinite, subsistent being is changeless, since all else is subject to the divine will. The contrary would imply that God needs matter to create.

I have a good quote on this pointing out the radical dependence of creation. This existential shift is very consequential, so even though Aquinas keeps a lot of Aristotle, this has very large ramification. But Aristotle had also been interpreted as a Platonist/Neo-Platonist for centuries (and not without reason), so the difference isn't as large as it might seem, at least on some readings of Aristotle. Still, I think it's fairly different. Matter plays a different role given this separation of form and actuality/existence.

Creare [creation] can never be used to indicate the generation of things from or by what is itself a contingent [temporal] finite being.Creation is the “act” whereby a thing has being; generation is what determines it, at any instant(including the instant of first creation), as this-or-that. As the Nicene Creed makes clear, all things are created by God: whatever is, insofar as it is, “participates” in self-subsistent being, or it would not be. As Aquinas puts it, “a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is this being. . . God is the cause, not of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being.” On the other hand, the changing and ephemeral identities of things are governed by the processes of nature, and in this sense, almost everything is subject to generation and corruption.


Christian Moevs - The Metaphysics of Dante's Comedy - pg. 119-120

Or from the introduction:

these principles are that (1) the world of space and time does not itself exist in space and time: it exists in Intellect (the Empyrean, pure conscious being); (2) matter, in medieval hylomorphism, is not something “material”: it is a principle of unintelligibility, of alienation from conscious being; (3) all finite form, that is, all creation, is a self-qualification of Intellect or Being, and only exists insofar as it participates in it; (4) Creator and creation are not two, since the latter has no existence independent of the former; but of course creator and creation are not the same; and (5) God, as the ultimate subject of all experience, cannot be an object of experience: to know God is to know oneself as God, or (if the expression seems troubling) as one “with” God or “in” God.

Let me spell out these principles at greater length. In medieval hylomorphism (the matter-form analysis of reality), pure Intellect (consciousness or awareness) is pure actuality, or form, or Being, or God: it is the self-subsistent principle that spawns or “contains” all finite being and experience. Intellect Being is what is, unqualified, self-subsistent, attributeless, dimensionless. It has no extension in space or time; rather, it projects space-time “within” itself, as, analogously, a dreaming intelligence projects a dream-world, or a mind gives being to a thought. The analogy holds in at least three respects: (1) like dreams or thoughts, created things are radically contingent, and dependent at every instant of their existence on what gives them being; (2)as there is nothing thoughts are “made of,” so there is nothing the world is “made of”: being is not a “something” to make things out of; and (3) dreams and thoughts have no existence apart from the intelligence in which they arise, but one cannot point to that intelligence because it is not a thing. In the same way, one cannot point to the Empyrean, the tenth heaven that the Comedy presents as the infinite intelligence/reality “within” which all things exist; remove it and the universe would instantly vanish. Note that the analogy in no way implies that the world is “unreal” or a “dream” (except in contrast to its ontological ground); rather, it expresses the radical non-self-subsistence of finite reality. This understanding of the radical contingency of “created” things is the wellspring of medieval Christian thought, without which the rest of medieval thought makes little sense.

I am not claiming it is Aristotelian, and I demonstrated it to you here in a former post:

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

In short, if we have a causal series with God as the beginning for composition like [G, [P1], [P2], [P3], …, O] (where God is ‘G’, the ‘P’s refer to parts, and ‘O’ refers to the object/whole in question), then the immediate subsequent member of the causal chain from God must also be absolutely simple (which in this case is the set of parts containing one element/part, P1); for that part would be composed of either (1) God (which is an absolutely simple being so He would provide no parts to this part, P1) or (2) it’s own self-subsisting being (since nothing comes prior to it that has parts and is not from God). Either way, e.g., the set [P1] contains parts which have no parts. This is impossible because there would, then, be at least two beings that are absolutely simple; and two absolutely simple beings are indistinguishable ontologically. I am pretty sure you would disagree with the idea that ontological simplicity entails one such kind of being (as a possibility); but you get the point. — Bob Ross

What I deny is your premise, that God is absolutely simple. This mistake I attribute to Neo-Platonists who wanted to make God "the One". Christian theologists rejected this for the Trinity. And Aristotle refuted that conception of divinity as "the One" in his discussion on the meaning of "unity" and "one". To make God absolutely simple is to make God "One" in the sense of a mathematical Ideal, and mathematical ideals are potencies rather than actualities. So the Neo-Platonist's divinity turns out to be an absolute potency. But this infinite potential, by Aristotelian principles (cosmological argument) is actually in a sense, impotent, not having any actuality to be able to actualize anything, even itself. That is why Neo-Platonism has difficulty explaining emanation, it must be explained by principles other than causation. Then this is a sort of incoherent concept, which has things emanating from "the One", but not through causation.

Sure, but is existence a form received by an essence?

I would say the existence (being), essence/form, and matter of a thing are all different but related aspects of it. The being is just what makes it real; the form/essence is the universal idea of a thing that makes it the kind of thing it is (viz., provides its whatness); and the matter of a thing is the beings which receive the form through act.

Where it gets weird is that the beings which receive the form have the same setup; namely, they are form received by other beings (which comprise them) through act; and so matter is really just the preexisting being which receives the form ad infinitum.

Of course, if all there is causally is just this infinite regress of composition (of form and matter) then there would be no being; for each member lacks the innate ability to self-subsist (but rather gets it derivatively from another). Therefore, there must be a first cause which is purely actual (viz., self-subsisting being) which provides the being to the infinite regress of composition.

It must be an infinite regress of composition, as opposed to a finite regress, because (1) a finite regress would entail at least two absolutely simple beings (which is impossible) and (2) there would be no matter (since it is just preexisting being which has the potency to receive form).

This also means that God must create the infinite regression of (at least) His immediate creation simultaneously; and this preexistence of matter is merely atemporal.

If existence is a form and an angel receives the form of existence, then the angel must have matter, but I wouldn't really want to describe it that way.

If the form of a thing is its existence, then it can’t have parts; right? There would be nothing to receive the form (i.e., nothing previously which has being to receive it), so a pure form would be a being that is pure idea that self-subsistently exists: isn’t that God? Maybe even God isn’t this kind of being, because God really doesn’t have a form; for He is absolutely simple—we merely talk of Him having a form analogically.

 This also obscures the position which objects to Aquinas and says that angels do have proper (spiritual) matter.

This honestly makes his view even more confusing to me; because I thought he was arguing that Angels are each their own species because they have no matter whatsoever.

Also, how can there be a difference between mental (spiritual) and physical (material) matter? Both are ‘stuff’ that a thing is made up of which can be immaterial insofar as they are not in space or time.

What I deny is your premise, that God is absolutely simple.

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they are just 'atoms') and this is impossible. To hold your view, you have to accept that two absolutely simple beings are not ontologically indistinguishable from each other.

When God creates the intelligences (which being intelligences, are immaterial) he is bringing them into being with a certain whatness, through the granting of existence to form (not through generation, the informing of matter, but rather through creation from nothing) but these are not pure being (essence ≠ existence), and so they are subject to change

Again, this treats ‘matter’ as if it is a something that can be created by God to receive a form; and that, whereas, God can also create something which has form without creating this ‘something’ that receives the form.

I am merely asking:

1. What is this ‘something’?
2. How could form be imbued with being without requiring the creation of parts?

For number 1, my answer I have unraveled so far (by merely thinking about it) is that ‘matter’, this ‘something’, is merely that which is capable of receiving form; and only parts are capable of receiving form. So, it follows that the beings which preexist (at least atemporally) the form which is imbued into it are the only beings which can be said to be matter (relative to form). This, of course, leads to the necessary conclusion that composition is infinite and that there is a first cause outside of that infinity for the being of each part (which is God).

For number 2, I find this so far to be metaphysically impossible: Aquinas seems to be blundering by using a notion of some ‘matter’ that is ‘physical’ and trying to omit that for the sake of spiritual substances. However, even these spirits are made up of parts; for otherwise they would be purely actual; and this entails that they have matter in the sense that I defined it in #1.

I am not following why Aquinas is treating ‘matter’ as if it is more than just the potency preexisting beings have to receive form.

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they are just 'atoms') and this is impossible. To hold your view, you have to accept that two absolutely simple beings are not ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

That's a faulty conclusion. All we need to do is accept that form is categorically different from matter, therefore formal causes are categorically different from material causes. No being is simple, as each is a composition of matter and form. And, the priority of form (such as God, and the soul, who are not properly "beings" but Forms) allows that matter is created (not from nothing, but from form) according to the specific purpose intended.

Matter, in this sense, is still a constituent in a thing with parts; so either a composed being is composed infinitely or there is a part which is has (somewhere along the line) that has no parts itself.

That would be the form. But form is complex (not in the sense of having material parts though), and not simple. If you do not accept the categorical difference between matter and form you'll be forever stuck in the same rut.

You are missing the point.

Even if you accept that there can be a being of pure form, they would have immaterial parts. Parts comprise wholes; and my argument addresses wholes and parts simpliciter.

We can run this argument for something like and Angel that is pure form as well:

1. Either the Angel is comprised of an infinite or finite regression of immaterial parts.

2. A finite regress of immaterial parts entails at least two ultimate parts which are not made up of parts. (For there must be at least one part where the regression ends which by definition has no further parts and there must be two because if there's only one such part then it is identical to the whole which it comprises making it not a part but rather that whole)

3. Two or more beings without parts cannot exist.

4. Therefore, an Angel must be comprised of an infinite regression of parts.

edit: positing a distinction between types or kinds of parts, such as immaterial vs. material parts, does not rejoin my argument here.

I appreciate your response and that all sounds interesting, but right now I am trying to understand hylomorphism simpliciter (viz., the OG theory). I still haven't been able to wrap my head around what 'matter' is if it does not refer to merely the 'stuff' which are the parts that are conjoined with the form to make up the whole. — Bob Ross

In skimming this thread, I must have missed "the OG theory". And "hylomorphism simpliciter" may be above my pay grade. But I think has clearly & simply presented the traditional philosophical answer to your basic question "what is matter"? And he has even introduced the non-classical Quantum notion of statistical Stuff (pure Form?). Which, absent the hyle, probably would not make sense to Aristotle, but might fit into Plato's world of abstract Forms.

So, I'd like to add that modern physics has a counter-intuitive mathematical definition of Matter, that doesn't make sense to non-mathematicians : the fundamental element of reality is not material (actual) "stuff"*1, but immaterial (statistical) Fields*2. Since those Fields are not something you can see or touch, they are more like Aristotle's Potentia (statistical probability) as distinguished from Actus (real thing).

The total Universal (unified) Field is mathematically defined in terms of an infinite array of dimensionless points, not in space, but of space. Which amounts to nothing, unless those valueless points consist of Potential Energy, that can be actualized, or realized, or excited by some outside force or internal perturbations (conflicts?)*3. Unlike that imaginary Field, some local fields (e.g. electromagnetic) are measurable, hence real & physical & dimensional. But the UF is an Ideal, and may be equivalent to Aristotle's Potentia*4, which may also be the "formless stuff" that combines with enforming (actualizing) Energy to produce tangible Matter : hylo + morph.

It's over my head, but A.N. Whitehead published a Quantum Field Theory*5 of his own, in which the excited "points" of Potential are defined as "Events" or "Occasions". I find it easier to imagine those particular events as actualizations of potential Energy (Causation). Which, depending on ambient conditions, may take on the form of mathematical Mass (graviton?), or tangible Matter (particles). Since I haven't fully digested this theory myself, I'll just mention it in passing, as one more way to imagine the HyloMorph notion.

The bottom line for me is Form (non-physical essence), which is monistic & simplistic in that it has no internal parts, but omnipotential, in that it can transform into both Energy & Matter, and eventually Mind. :nerd:

PS___ Sorry to get so technical & complicated, but I'm still working on a modern scientific equivalent to the ancient notion of HyloMorphism. In my thesis I call it EnFormAction.


*1. Yes, in physics, fields are considered fundamental concepts. They are not just mathematical constructs, but rather represent the underlying reality of how forces and particles interact. In quantum field theory, particles are understood as excitations of these underlying fields.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=physics+field+is+fundamental
Note --- The "excitations" are supposed to be inputs of energy. But where do those pinpricks come from, if the Field is all there is? Stick a pin in a Field, and a bit of Matter pops out.

*2. In the context of quantum field theory (QFT), the term"immaterial" can be misleading. Quantum fields are considered fundamental physical entities, not in the sense of tangible matter, but as the basis for all other physical phenomena. They are not made of anything else, but rather, particles are seen as excitations or disturbances within these fields.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=quantum+field+immaterial
Note --- In my own theory, the Fields are made of Potential, that can transform into Energy or Matter.

*3. In modern physics, particularly within quantum field theory (QFT), matter is fundamentally understood as excitations or manifestations of underlying fields, rather than being comprised of discrete, fundamental particles. These fields are not just mathematical constructs, but are considered the most fundamental aspect of reality, with particles being secondary emergent phenomena.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=physics+matter+is+fundamentally+a+field
Note --- Whence the "excitations"?

*4. In Aristotelian philosophy, "matter" and "potentia" (or potentiality) are closely related concepts. Matter, in this context, refers to the underlying substance that has the potential to take on different forms. Potentia, on the other hand, is the capacity or possibility for something to become actualized. Essentially, matter is the substratum that possesses potential, and potentia is the inherent ability of that matter to change and develop into a specific form. . . . .
Aristotle viewed matter as the fundamental, formless stuff that underlies all physical things.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=potentia+and+matter

*5. Whitehead's philosophy, particularly his concept of "actual occasions" or "events," offers a framework for interpreting quantum field theory. His process philosophy, emphasizing becoming and relationships, aligns with quantum mechanics' focus on processes and interactions, and his ideas about indeterminacy and creativity resonate with quantum phenomena.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=whitehead+quantum+field+theory

Even if you accept that there can be a being of pure form, they would have immaterial parts — Bob Ross

Parts are what a material object is composed of. I don't think it makes any sense to talk of the parts of an immaterial form. Neither does your argument make any sense.

3. Two or more beings without parts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Why not?