Good stuff. Right now I choose the way of dialectics: to ditch the metaphysics but also maintain the dichotomy. The dichotomy is not just a mistake—or if it is, it’s an important one.

I may return to these fascinating issues later.

That word - objective - again causes more confusion than clarity.

If ↪Jamal had only said that disagreement can only take place against, and so presupposes, a background of agreement, instead of saying it presupposes objectivity. — Banno

I can probably work with this. Language is such a bastard!

It is wrong to murder.

Ice cream tastes good.

Two propositions, both with truth values. Do you ask "to whom?" when answering the first, the second, both, or neither when determining that truth value?

If you answer the first without regard to whom, you are seeking the objective.

No!

The objective/subjective dichotomy is a mistake. Much clearer to use charity and truth, after Davidson — Banno

Yes!

https://chatgpt.com/c/68464d0f-584c-8007-9245-f61243387086

And yet, there is more to the history of a concept than etymology.

Unable to load conversation 68464d0f-584c-8007-9245-f61243387086

Don't want to clutter with cut and paste, but let me know if this won't open.

It is wrong to murder.

Ice cream tastes good — Hanover

I don’t know if murder is wrong in any objective sense, beyond the fact that it's a proscribed activity under the law. And even, more generally, “killing” in itself isn’t necessarily wrong; I can easily imagine situations where it might be justified. But cultures that permit casual killing among the population tend to be unsafe and verge on anarchy.

But what about something more extreme, how about killing babies for sport? That seems like a clearer case. I’d have to say we would find broad, almost universal agreement that this is abhorrent. (Not that it stops countries at war from energetically mowing down children as part of the process.) So while I might hesitate to call it “objectively” wrong in a metaphysical sense, there is a strong intersubjective consensus. I’d say the prohibitions and values of my culture have been passed down to me, so I share in teh consensus that finds killing babies abhorrent.

But a consensus like this doesn’t rest on some timeless truth. It rests on who we’ve become as a species, it rests on shared stories, emotions, and histories that shape our moral imagination. It’s not that we know such an act is wrong in some final sense; it’s that we’ve learned not to be the kind of people who could consider it. (Again, unless you're in one of the many war-torn countries where such horrors are treated as routine.)

...disagreement can only take place against, and so presupposes, a background of agreement, instead of saying it presupposes objectivity. — Banno

Is what I wrote above an example of such a background of agreement or have I strayed too far?

Again, unless you're in one of the many war-torn countries where such horrors are treated as routine.) — Tom Storm

Then upon what basis do you condemn their acts you find abhorrent? You have your preferences and they theirs.

Where are your jurisdictional boundaries that define your moral community? Am I bound by the consensus of the West, the US, the Southern US, my ethnicity, my religious heritage, my compound of similar thinkers? Can't it be that the entirety of my community could be wrong, yet I am right? If not, must I sacrifice babies to the gods if my community says it is good even if I disagree?

Ah, better. A good comeback. But you've moved over to ethics, and we probably should remain in the area of aesthetics, for the sake of the theme of this thread

So ChatGPT's argument would be something like, replacing moral with aesthetic,

This is the trap:
Either you accept that aesthetics is objective, and so your theory is committed to standards that transcend culture, history, and agreement.
Or you give up on objectivity and admit that any community’s coherent aesthetics framework is as valid as any other — including Star Wars societies or McDonald's. — ChatGPT

But it's a false dilemma. Aesthetic claims - that the roast lamb in the oven as we speak, slow cooked with six veg, to be served with greens - is better than a Big Mac, is not just an expressions of feeling nor statements of fact—but an interpretation within a context of belief, intention, tradition, form, and reception. It arises as a triangulation of speaker, interpreter and dinner. It's not objective, but it's not relative, either. It is cultivated and critiqued, without requiring foundational aesthetic truths, because it is an integral part of a holistic web of taste that extends beyond the speaker and even beyond the interpreter into the world at large. Further, no such aesthetic scheme is incommensurable with other such schemes.

We do not need some absolute aesthetic algorithm in order to make aesthetic judgements, but instead make them in a community as we discuss the gravy, decide if the potatoes really did need to be scraped in order to brown, and choose between the chard and the Brussels' sprouts.

No simple algorithm or rule will suffice for every aesthetic judgement. It's an activity in which we engage and improve.

And the lamb smells wonderful. Bah.

Is what I wrote above an example of such a background of agreement or have I strayed too far? — Tom Storm

Pretty much.

But a consensus like this doesn’t rest on some timeless truth. — Tom Storm

This is to the point - wants a "basis" so he can "condemn their art you find abhorrent"; and that basis is all around us and includes our community of learning and language.

Descriptors can come from any angle, from any mouth, and can vary in degree from similar to opposite according to whomever describes it. Therefor it is necessarily distorted by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations.

It is enough that the work itself is objective, and anyone can view it and come to their own conclusions. In that sense, that a work is objective is itself an objective quality, and probably the only one that matters.

Then upon what basis do you condemn their acts you find abhorrent? You have your preferences and they theirs. — Hanover

This is to the point - ↪Hanover wants a "basis" so he can "condemn their art you find abhorrent"; and that basis is all around us and includes our community of learning and language. — Banno

Am I bound by the consensus of the West, the US, the Southern US, my ethnicity, my religious heritage, my compound of similar thinkers? Can't it be that the entirety of my community could be wrong, yet I am right? — Hanover

Yes, to all of the above. That’s the condition we’ve always lived in. It seems to me morality emerges from a shifting balance of perspectives, shaped by history, culture, conversation, and imagination. There is no final foundation, only the ongoing work of negotiation, persuasion, and a hope for common ground. And yes, some cultures do lose this fragile balance though war or vested interests and anarchy results.

But I can already hear some asking but what does common ground matter if there's no objectivity? We are motivated by the desire to live with others without constant fear or conflict, to reduce suffering (our own and others), to be understood, to feel belonging, to imagine a world less cruel or arbitrary. Even without objectivity, these needs and aspirations don’t disappear. We don’t act because we’ve found final truths, but because we live among others, and must find ways to manage that fact.

Just because values are subjective doesn't mean they're infinitely relative. There's a very good reason people want a society that upholds a prohibition against murder; that is, so they don't get murdered. Also, so they are not required to commit murder - something people have a general disinclination to do.
Why?
Reciprocation!
We evolved as social animals; and have a moral sense attuned to reciprocal social justice.
Jane Goodall noted that in troops of chimpanzees, they would share food, share childcare responsibilities, groom each other, fight to defend the troop etc.
They also remembered which individuals engaged in these activities, and withheld services in future from those who did not.
An inclination toward sharing behaviours was rewarded, serving the interests of the individual within the troop, and such behaviours served the interests of the troop overall in the struggle for survival, ingraining a moral sense grounded in social reciprocity in the psychology of subsequent generations.
This is the basis of the evolved moral sense; a sense that might require one to commit murder in response to a murder being committed. i.e. An eye for an eye!
A society that makes it illegal to commit murder, even in response to a murder being committed, breaks the cycle of violence. It relieves the individual of the moral obligation to take revenge. i.e. Turn the other cheek!

The closest thing I have come up with for a mode or standard is emotions, but there are works that I consider cheap that still inspire emotions. — Red Sky

In my opinion, the value of a novel lies in its ability to captivate me from the first page to the last—so compelling that I can’t put it down and regret how quickly the remaining pages dwindle.

In my opinion, the value of a novel lies in its ability to captivate me from the first page to the last—so compelling that I can’t put it down and regret how quickly the remaining pages dwindle. — Jacques

My favourite novels often weren’t enjoyable at first. They grew on me, and the initial struggle with the author transformed me as I persisted. I didn’t come away simply entertained, I came away enlarged. I remember fighting with George Eliot in Middlemarch and with Faulkner in As I Lay Dying. In the end, I got through, and the effort itself felt like an achievement. For me, reading great novels isn’t always about immediate pleasure; it’s more like climbing a mountain, demanding, sometimes punishing, but meaningful precisely because of the journey into unfamiliar territory and even the sacrifices required.

My favourite novels often weren’t enjoyable at first. They grew on me, and the initial struggle with the author transformed me as I persisted. I didn’t come away simply entertained, I came away enlarged. I remember fighting with George Eliot in Middlemarch and with Faulkner in As I Lay Dying. In the end, I got through, and the effort itself felt like an achievement. For me, reading great novels isn’t always about immediate pleasure; it’s more like climbing a mountain, demanding, sometimes punishing, but meaningful precisely because of the journey into unfamiliar territory and even the sacrifices required. — Tom Storm

Interesting. I tend to think if a book feels like self-mortification, I might be in the wrong genre. Then again, maybe that’s the Calvinist in you talking.

Then again, maybe that’s the Calvinist in you talking. — Jacques

:rofl:

if a book feels like self-mortification, — Jacques

More like self-overcoming. I tend to hold good art should challenge and offer new ways of seeing. But maybe I'm doing it wrong. I do most things wrong so that's ok.

Ah, better. A good comeback. But you've moved over to ethics, and we probably should remain in the area of aesthetics, for the sake of the theme of this thread — Banno

I took though Davidson's critique to be that objectivity is universally muddled thinking. If the point he makes is simply that aesthetic judgments in particular don't lend themselves to objective reasoning, then his is just a platitude that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." That's obvioulsy not what he's limiting himself to when he challenges objectivity.

There are different sorts of judgments: moral, aesthetic, and empirical/ontological for example. I think we must maintain objectivity to morality. I would agree that the aesthetic is largely if not entirely subjective. The empirical/ontological is the most confusing because it asks what the thing is devoid of subjectively imposed attributes, leading us down the Lockean path of trying to distinguish what properties are inherent in the object and what are imposed by the person. It's the whole phenomenal/noumenal debate that leads us to direct and indirect realism conversations.

Yes, to all of the above. That’s the condition we’ve always lived in. It seems to me morality emerges from a shifting balance of perspectives, shaped by history, culture, conversation, and imagination. There is no final foundation, only the ongoing work of negotiation, persuasion, and a hope for common ground. And yes, some cultures do lose this fragile balance though war or vested interests and anarchy results.

But I can already hear some asking but what does common ground matter if there's no objectivity? We are motivated by the desire to live with others without constant fear or conflict, to reduce suffering (our own and others), to be understood, to feel belonging, to imagine a world less cruel or arbitrary. Even without objectivity, these needs and aspirations don’t disappear. We don’t act because we’ve found final truths, but because we live among others, and must find ways to manage that fact. — Tom Storm

You list out objective criteria for determining morality: (1) negotiation, (2) persuasion, (3) search for common ground, (4) avoidance of anarchy, (5) avoidance of war (6) reducing suffering, (7) increasing our feeling of being understood, (8) increasing feeling of beloingingness, (9) reduction of cruelty, and (10) reduction of arbitratry rule. You also impose an unspoken meta rule, which is that rationality is the arbiter of morality.

Does any theocracy adhere to any of these rules? Do they even apply your meta rule? The point here is that you can't assert there are no hard and fast rules, but then identify the hard and fast rules, and then suggest that your rules are not simply a recitation of Western values generally but are just obvious truths everyone takes to be self-evident. These rules are not universal and it is not a universal truth that morality is to be found through reason. That's not even the rule within traditional theistic systems within the West (i.e. divine command theory).

And this is the bigger question of moral realism. The question of moral realism is not whether we know for certain what every moral justification is, but it's whether there are absolute moral rules that we are seeking to discover. If the answer is that there is not, that it's just a matter of preference, then we are left asking why we can impose our idiosyncratic rules on others. If, though, you say there is an objective good, we can impose our assessement of what they are on others, recognizing we could be wrong in our assessment. However, to do this will require us to say that we assess morality based upon X because that basis is right, and if you don't use X, you are wrong. Once you've taken that step, you stepped outside of subjectivity and you've declared an absolute truth.

And how do you know your moral basis is right (whether it be the Bible, your 10 point system, Utliltarianism, Kantianism, or whatever), you just do. This is where faith rears its ugly (or clarifying) head once again.

Something that hasn't been mentioned yet is Kant's aesthetic theories which puts art into a category in-between the objective and the subjective. We judge works of art as if they have a truth value, and speak about works of art such that we believe others should feel the same, and yet there is no fact to the matter. Rather than a fact aesthetics consists in how the various powers of judgment in the mind relate to one another -- so the mathematically sublime is when the mind tries to reach up to comprehend infinity, and that aesthetic is one's finitude before the infinite that one feels as they attempt to grasp the infinite. Or the dynamically sublime is when we see horrible things, but from afar such that we can feel the fear without at the same time truly believing we are going to die: thus the attraction of tragedy.


It's neither objective in the sense that there are objects with properties like "beautiful" of which we can say they are true and false, and it's not subjective because it's not just my opinion but the shared structure of the mind which allows us to judge and understand one another's judgments.


Broadly speaking these are attitudinal theories of aesthetics to where it's the attitude of the person witnessing the work of art which explains our judgments about beauty.

This is to the point - ↪Hanover wants a "basis" so he can "condemn their art you find abhorrent"; and that basis is all around us and includes our community of learning and language. — Banno

So I'll respond to the greater Wittgenstenian allusion here, which if Davidson is following (and you know better than me), we end up with a profound shallowness, particularly in the area of aesthetics which, properly understood (I'd submit), is to identify the underlying internal meaning of the thing to that person experiencing it. I understand that it's not that Witt denies the internal meaning is there, but it's that he ushers it out as superfluous, a sort of epiphenomenon that might exist alongside our speech. That is to say, ChatGPT can discuss at wonderful length the beauty of any piece of art, convincingly and entirely, playing the language game like the pro it is in manipulating syntax and identifying patterns. But it lacks the experience. And that is the point of aesthetics. It has no necessary utility. The Mona Lisa doesn't keep the wall in place. It has internal experiential meaning, so applying the analytic tradition to beauty seems an oddity unto itself.

I'm not sure I understand your point. My argument is that if artist A and B have conflicting opinions about what makes art good (say, maximalist vs minimalism), then that implies there isn't an objective correct answer.

I think this sort of disagreement only helps to support to the position that there is nothing objective to agree about if one has already presupposed that there is nothing objective to agree about (i.e. it is confirmation bias).

Consider that two scientists might disagree as to whether or not vaccines are a major factor in increasing autism rates. Does their disagreement demonstrate that there is no fact of the matter here? Or suppose a man is found murdered and detective A thinks the butler did it and detective B thinks it was the estranged heir. Does this imply that there is no fact about who killed the man?

Note that this applies equally with arguments from cultural relativity. For most of history, where you grew up and which culture you belonged to, determined what you thought about the shape of the Earth, the etiology of infectious diseases, etc. Beliefs re these issues have tended to be strongly dependent on time and place. Does this mean that the Earth has no shape, or that its shape varies by culture and historical epoch?

Most theories of objective beauty hardly deny that different things please different people. Aquinas' famous answer is that: "beauty is what pleases when seen," but in context this means more "beauty is what pleases when known." But knowing cannot be relativized, on pain of a thorough-going relativism about all sorts of things. A denial of aesthetic quality might very well lead to a denial of all qualities on the same grounds.

Hence, in these theories there is a healthy taste, a healthy response to and respect for things of beauty, and intelligible beauty is in some sense higher and fuller than sensible beauty. That some men are color blind does not imply that nothing is red or green, and that some men are blind does not imply that nothing "looks like anything." In the same way, some men are said to have healthy, educated tastes, versus unhealthy or defective tastes. Health is the standard, not illness, else blindness would be equally the measure of sight and deafness equally the measure of hearing. But note that the idea of sickness versus health, while common sense enough, requires some notion of human telos, a measure of human excellence/perfection, which much modern thought is likely to deny due to extreme nominalism.

Nonetheless, beauty is not a quantitative (dimensive quantity) univocal measure, and so we shouldn't expect everyone to agree. There are a number of reasons why people might disagree on aesthetic judgements even if there is a truth underlying such judgements (see below):

A. People might have negative associations with a particular object of aesthetic judgement that are accidental (e.g. finding out that a family member has died as one hears a song might lead one to dislike that song).

B. Too much familiarity - we tend to ignore things we see frequently, to “tune them out.” For instance, someone who grows up in the desert might have trouble recognizing its particular beauty.

C. Too little familiarity - this problem occurs when we have no context to place an aesthetic experience within. If we have heard very little music, we might find jazz or a symphony overwhelming on a first exposure.

D We might be comparing similar, but different species. The most obvious example of this is the great apes. Their features look so human-like that it is hard to appreciate their beauty. For, rather than seeing a “beautiful orangutan,” we end up judging the creature by the standard of “man,” and all orangutans, no matter how fine a specimen, look like ugly men.

E Similarly, we might judge one member of a species less beautiful simply because we are accustomed to more beautiful members. I sometimes have this experience with March Madness because, while college basketball can often be more exciting than pro-ball, it is also a good deal less polished.

F Because beauty deals with wholes, it will tend to include context. A strange context can make an otherwise beautiful object look less beautiful. For instance, a masterpiece painting might nonetheless lose something if it were surrounded by blinking lights and gaudy decorations.

G Beauty is experienced first by the senses. However, the senses rely on proper conditions for interaction with the ambient environment and the object sensed. Nothing looks beautiful in a pitch black room. Nothing sounds beautiful with earplugs in. From these extremes, we can also recognize other cases where our experience of beauty may be affected in this way, e.g. “not enough light,” or “looking at a work of art from too far away/too close,” etc.

H Likewise, malfunctioning sense organs, or more general feelings of pain, anxiety, or illness can rob us of our aesthetic enjoyment of beautiful objects.

I A lack of aesthetic distance, as when we judge our own children’s art, can also cause us to overvalue or undervalue something’s beauty.

J Maturity is another important factor. One would not expect a three-year-old to appreciate Hamlet, though they might appreciate a colorful painting. Part of this gets back to the idea that context is involved in aesthetic appreciation, and this involves intellectual context as well. The intellectual context proper to some art might not be accessible to immature audiences. Likewise, sometimes we come to appreciate some works of art more once we understand their intellectual context, their allusions, their history, etc.

I would add that this “context sensitivity” can apply even to natural, sensuous beauty. In the High Peaks region of the Adirondacks, there are a number of small alpine lakes. These are quite lovely, and at first glance their crystal clear water, perfectly reflecting the surrounding mountains, is very beautiful. However, I later learned that these lakes were not always clear in this way, but have only become so due to acid rain, which upset the delicate ecosystem and essentially wiped out most of the life in these small lakes. This knowledge certainly doesn’t make the lakes ugly, yet it takes away from their beauty in the wider context of the landscape (i.e. they now seem like a “tear” or “blemish”).

K. Finally, there are individual tastes. These vary because we are each unique, but also because we have unique experiences and a unique mix of knowledge that colors the “intellectual context” of our experience of beauty. Sometimes, this sort of difficulty is raised first in a consideration of aesthetic objectivity. For example: “if experts disagree over Bach versus Beethoven, how can there be any objectivity?”

I think we can dismiss this sort of objection on the grounds that one does not make a rule from the most difficult edge cases. Some music might sound better to some ears. Likewise, depending on our particular history, we might find some literature more beautiful or more edifying. However, this hardly means that we cannot decide between Bach and the noise of road construction, between Beethoven and a child banging on a piano, or between Dante and poorly written pulp fiction.

Indeed, "objective" is often taken as a synonym for "noumenal" rather than "without relevant bias." This is often grounds for equivocation. Someone says that "morality is not objective," and so it cannot enter into politics or education. But, upon investigation, we learn that by "objective" they mean "noumenal" and they end up agreeing that the whole of engineering, physics, and chemistry is also "subjective." Yet usually, they do not think engineering should be barred from having any influence on education, constructing aircraft, or bridge building due to its "subjectivity," and so the entire point about morality or taste failing to be "objective" ends up being wholly irrelevant.

I don't think art and science are comparable in that way, tbh. Science concerns itself with proven and repeatable things in a way that art does not. My point is that if there was a science to art that resulted in proven, repeatable "good art," then any artist that doesn't do that would be a fool doomed to failure. However, we frequently see art that "breaks the rules" change how we think about art and what makes it "good." I think that volatility of opinion and inherent subjectivity means that there cannot be a wide, objective standard of art beyond insular taste groups. Though perhaps I am misunderstanding you. It seems like you may agree that art is on some level subjective, but I got a little lost as to what your point was tbh.

My point was merely that disagreement is poor evidence for a lack of objective aesthetic value/criteria. People disagree about virtually everything.

Now you've offered a supporting thesis, that science is objective, and aesthetic judgements not, because the former involves observations that are repeatable.

However, this poses another problem if it is the sole thesis. For the facts that historians, detectives and prosecutors, etc. deal in, and many practical judgements we make in life that we think involve facts (a "truly best choice"), are not repeatable in this way, even in theory.

One cannot, for example, run the American Revolution 100 times and discover that the Declaration of Independence is signed on 7/4/1776 in 99 of them.

But yes, I would agree that scientific facts are not the same as historical or aesthetic facts. Generally, the former are considered to involve something like necessity or universality, while history (and arguably beauty) is always particular.

I did use the word 'Objective' in a confusing way in this post.
One thing I wanted to know was when it came to art what was the judge of quality.
Specifically if there was one thing you needed no matter what. (I am still open to opposing ideas)
Do a number of factors combined have to meet some standard? But if something was slightly less than that standard, would it also not qualify?
The reason for this post is that in art I don't understand anything about why people like it (besides something just being cool). For example, the Mona Lisa to me is just a painting of a woman, but when I think about how the world views it there is a big difference. Much less abstract art.
Books are different, because they are stories and people have different tastes and experiences, but even then I don't understand why people like books I find especially boring or bad. (I know people have different tastes)
However I still don't understand what makes 'the world go round' in the sense of artistic quality.

More like self-overcoming. I tend to hold good art should challenge and offer new ways of seeing. But maybe I'm doing it wrong. I do most things wrong so that's ok. — Tom Storm

There is nothing wrong in it. Everyone does it in their own way. I'm more the type who likes to savor things, whether it's music, art, or literature.

Objectivity implies (by def.) that it is independent of human conscience. Can a book, or art, be judged independent of the mind's involvement? Probably not.

If you were to ask for a universal standard, then you would be stuck with the majority's vote unfortunately.

If you were to ask for the best conceivable standard of quality that should be universal, you would be stuck with multiple want-to-be-universal qualities as quality is in the artistic sense (by def. of it being dependent on the human conscience) is subjective. Evidently, there are many art forms which judge art by different standards. So, you may be left with pretty robust standards of quality but none can overthrow the other as art is seen through the human mind.

makes 'the world go round' in the sense of artistic quality. — Red Sky

A pretty common description of this would inter-subjectivity.

You list out objective criteria for determining morality: — Hanover

No, they are not objective criteria nor do i lay them out as my version. I'm saying that this is what generally happens in the pluralistic West.

These rules are not universal and it is not a universal truth that morality is to be found through reason. That's not even the rule within traditional theistic systems within the West (i.e. divine command theory). — Hanover

They are not rules and I do not say they are universal, but I do think they are practiced widely in the West. Possibly elsewhere, I have not made a survey.

And how do you know your moral basis is right (whether it be the Bible, your 10 point system, Utliltarianism, Kantianism, or whatever), you just do. This is where faith rears its ugly (or clarifying) head once again. — Hanover

I don't think so. Firstly, we don’t know what is right. There's no neutral, context-free standpoint from which to declare one moral system universally right.

We can probably start with a goal, something like reducing suffering. No need for faith in the religious sense although we'd acknowledge the religious values that run through Western thinking. We might have a view that certain systems work better for people than others, but again, that's the ongoing conversation humans have with each other.

Which provides a safer culture: Islamic theocracy or Western-style democracy? Which parts of democracy aren’t working? It's the conversation we have, and are having, and we can agree on goals we want and situations we want to avoid. None of this involves objectivity, it's more like a recipe made out of our shared judgements and hopes.

The question of moral realism is not whether we know for certain what every moral justification is, but it's whether there are absolute moral rules that we are seeking to discover. If the answer is that there is not, that it's just a matter of preference, then we are left asking why we can impose our idiosyncratic rules on others. If, though, you say there is an objective good, we can impose our assessement of what they are on others, recognizing we could be wrong in our assessment. However, to do this will require us to say that we assess morality based upon X because that basis is right, and if you don't use X, you are wrong. Once you've taken that step, you stepped outside of subjectivity and you've declared an absolute truth. — Hanover

In reflecting on your response, I would say that calling someone morally 'wrong' doesn’t require escaping subjectivity or appealing to some higher moral realm; it means staying grounded in our shared world, giving reasons, listening carefully, and trying to find common ground. We don’t need absolute foundations to act; we need commitment, dialogue, and the willingness to stand by our views while accepting they’re always open to challenge.

~~

I took though Davidson's critique to be that objectivity is universally muddled thinking. If the point he makes is simply that aesthetic judgments in particular don't lend themselves to objective reasoning... — Hanover

The answer given for aesthetics is applicable to ethics and science. I gave aesthetic examples becasue that's the topic here.

Aesthetic and moral judgements tell us how we want things to be, other judgements tell us about how things are. That's a useable distinction.

It often seems that folk misapply this is/ought distinction, thinking it is the same as that between subjective and objective. Such folk are apt to say that morality and ethics are subjective while science is objective. That's a mistake.

We end up with folk thinking that "though shalt not kick puppies" is about the way things are, when it is about the way things ought be. They look for proof that one ought not kick puppies in the wrong place.