One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.
— Banno

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief. — I like sushi

I'm not an ordinary-language-first guy, but this is a case where I think we have to start by considering what we do say.

If you ask me, "Do you believe the Earth is round?" my answer is yes. I don't think anyone who speaks English would misunderstand this to mean that, at the very moment I was asked the question, something occurred in my brain/mind that constituted "belIeving Earth is round," whereas before it wasn't there and I didn't believe it. We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says.

Now you may feel this isn't a good way to talk. You may feel the ontological commitments are suspect, and we can do better with our terminology when it comes to a big concept like "belief," which has to contain so many different usages and interpretations. And you may be right. But I don't think you can begin by denying that we do talk this way about some beliefs, and are virtually never misunderstood.

. . . studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years — I like sushi

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? I'm still dubious about the claim that there is a necessary connection between all beliefs and emotion. Have there really been studies of that?

I would go further and say there is nothing whatsoever included in the notion of belief that it be consciously considered at the moment:

"Are you currently considering that the earth is round?" No.
"Do you believe the earth is round"? Yes.

You might ask the same person these two questions in a row, and they are likely to give these answers. This is not bad language at all, rather it is bad philosophy to confuse the one for the other, or to insist that the second mean the first.

You might ask the same person these two questions in a row, and they are likely to give these answers. — hypericin

I think so. I could imagine something like a "moment of belief" and/or a "moment of consideration" that might actually present to consciousness in that way, but it would be unusual, and not how we ordinarily speak about such matters.

This is not bad language at all . . . — hypericin

Maybe it's fine. But it's always appropriate for a philosopher to suggest that some example of language use could be ameliorated. If that's what @i like sushi has in mind, I'd welcome hearing why.

But it's always appropriate for a philosopher to suggest that some example of language use could be ameliorated. — J

I guess when it comes to language I'm in the "describe, don't prescribe" camp. Which is not to say that ordinary language use doesn't conceal a raft of errors.

@Banno @Hanover @J

All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world…. None of the above can be absent of emotional content. — I like sushi

I think you’ve gotten at the crux of the matter. I suggest that a better term for this “feeling-about-something” is our “interest”. And this has the ever-presence (of a kind) that you claim for “emotional content”. I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest).

What Wittgenstein did is recognize that we share interests, and they form into practices (“concepts”). More importantly, we share the standards, or criteria, that judge one thing from another, their workings, or: what is essential to us about it (PI #371). Our criteria codify what matter to us (or interests us) in a thing (thus why his method of looking at how we talk about a thing, shows us our shared interest in that thing).

we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence — I like sushi

And this is the classic philosophical framework, denigrating anything that doesn’t involve criteria that removes any human involvement. Our interest in evidence is that it can be certain without us (thus the power of science, whose conclusions would be the same no matter who conducts the experiment). But evidence is just one kind of interest among all others, which are not simply opposed to evidence, either as irrational or individual. Belief is not a lesser form of knowledge, they simply work differently.

The point here is that the individual (their “emotion”, or anything else thought to be internal to them) is not the arbiter of our acts—I apologize for the same reasons everyone else does, so no need for “me” to be involved at all, and, when I am, it is only to explain myself as the exception to the rule.

I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest). — Antony Nickles

Yes, this is more like it. I wasn't comfortable with privileging "emotions" quite so centrally.

Shank

At least start with "describe," especially if some analysis and discrimination of terms is likely to be needed. Having done that as best we can, I'm fine with suggestions for improving how we talk about difficult subjects. What I particularly don't like, in contrast, are endless wrangles about what is the "right term" or the "correct definition" for something that's been used in countless different philosophical traditions . . .

@Banno

we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it. — J

Sure; only to say that what is important about understanding, how it matters to us, is not any process of the brain, as if an internal ability that reaches a conclusion, but the demonstration of it.

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand. — J

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no less, but no more, reliable or possible to myself than others.

You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say. — J

This is the classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it). The importance of “saying” something is that we are making a claim, which involves (then) judging whether something is the case, which is based on our shared criteria for it being the case. Our saying we understand (even to ourselves), is to make such a claim. Even the feeling of realization is itself merely the possibility of our understanding. It is not a matter of knowing or not knowing; there is nothing (internal or otherwise) that “is the case” until it is demonstrated (or determined not to be the case), which is also the case with other dispositions, like knowing or, as I am claiming, believing (though belief is not the same type of claim).

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no more, but no less, reliable or possible to myself than others. — Antony Nickles

Good, I was making the same point -- neither more nor less reliable.

This is classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it). — Antony Nickles

I don't think so. The distinction I'm making isn't about degrees of certainty. It's much more experiential. I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X," perhaps followed by some performance of this. (As we discussed above, not all types of understanding will fit this, but many do). Certainty aside, I claim them as distinct, based on my own self-reflection, as best I'm able to practice it. It makes me curious: Do you not have these two kinds of experience too? I'm often surprised by how differently thoughtful people experience their "insides."

Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object” — Antony Nickles

Spot on.

I think you've put your finger on a problem with the article, in that one believes things – holds them to be true – while not holding them in mind; you presumably believe that there are bacteria in the bottom of your left shoe, or any other equal triviality, but until now hadn't given it much thought. Odd, then , to call such a belief an emption.

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria?

Not sure where that leaves the discussion.

I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X,"perhaps followed by some performance of this. — J

I’m not exactly clear what this is meant to distinguish; certainly there are distinct cases. I can front (lie, bluster… purport) that I understand without knowing if I do; I can believe that I understand but it turns out I don’t; I can “say” I understand and it turns out to be the case, or I can say I don’t understand but then it turns out I did. All seem to be claims “followed by some performance” (whether honest or not or deluded or humble, or denials). What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this?

The “certainty” I mentioned is in comparison to this kind of claim; our desire that knowledge tell us something sure, beforehand, and without us having any part in it. If dispositions were internal states, then they would exist or not, before being tried, judged, demonstrated. We could look in our brain and find our “understanding”; we would “have” beliefs (like emotions).

We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says. — J

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both. There is leeway. The problem begins when we are equating a consciously held and articulated belief as equivalent to a so-called 'background belief'. The use of the term 'belief' is referring to something quite different in each case.

The brain maps the world. The 'we' we call 'we' does not in any way appear to be the whole of the brains content at all! If we take this into consideration I think we can begin to understand that 'belief' is certainly something only felt consciously and that obviously there is some brain stuff going on in the background.

This is more or less an epistemic argument.

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? — J

They are anchored in our understanding of the world. We have emotional attachment to existing. Neither are of any use without value attached to them.

Abstractions like algebra also operate under quite different 'beliefs' (if we are using this word) because they are Rules not Truths. It does not matter if you believe in the Rules of any game, it matter how they are of use to you.

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria? — Banno

I don’t like the word either. But maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to); for belief (generally), that I can and will answer for it. Though I wouldn’t put this as “confirming” “statements”, as that sounds like having justification to claim a fact (“evidence” as has been suggested), which is the purview of knowledge (acknowledging the long held opinion that knowledge is justified belief, which I would argue against).

Of course we may claim it is raining outside (“I believe it is raining”), even based on x,y,z, but this isn’t a claim to a fact, nor that x,y,z constitute knowledge. Belief (in this case) is a hypothesis; one which is not justified, but tested. I am not putting a “statement” up for confirmation, but putting my word on the line. When we look outside, we know it is raining (or not), but this doesn’t confirm my belief—though the fact is confirmed by our seeing it rain—because I never claimed I “knew”. If it is not raining, you think less of me: in being fooled, or making a ridiculous claim, or lying. I could try to mitigate your low opinion by saying I believed it was raining because the weather report said it would, but in doing so I am not making a claim to knowledge that fell short (was found to be unsubstantiated). I am making an excuse by shifting responsibility (I could be right with ridiculous reasoning too). If I walked into the house through the rain, I might claim I know it is raining. If it had stopped when we went to look, I would be wrong. If it was actually the sprinkler, I would be embarrassed. I didn’t “not know” it was raining, I (personally) was mistaken, but I believed it was.

What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this? — Antony Nickles

I'm able to distinguish, in my own mental experience, a type of (purported) understanding that is best pictured as "the light bulb going on." It doesn't involve words at all. I was contrasting this with the subsequent possible performances that would attempt to demonstrate this understanding -- and in the course of which I might discover that the understanding was indeed only purported.

It's crucial that we see this "mental experience" type of understanding as not being criterial for understanding, since I may be wrong. The light bulb may be functioning faultily. Indeed, if you wanted to call the experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine. We could just call it "the light bulb experience." But I do insist that the experience occurs, under whatever description, and that it isn't the same thing as talking (to myself or others) about what I believe I've understood.

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both. — I like sushi

Yes, but Witt's point, if I'm understanding him, is that we're looking in the wrong place if we look for the location of beliefs in the unconscious. He wants us to break away from the whole idea that a belief refers to a mental content. In the case of background beliefs, I think this is right. That's part of why we're so puzzled about how to talk about all this, as Banno points out:

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria? — Banno

maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to) — Antony Nickles

I can't do any better than that either. Or maybe just say that "I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue. "I believe" = "I assert that" seems to work for this kind of belief, but not all.

@Banno

Indeed, if you wanted to call the [a-ha!] experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine. — J

I of course acknowledge that we have that experience, even would call it a feeling, but, yes, it is not understanding (see PI #323 et seq “Now I have it!”). It is optimism perhaps, a “glad start”, (countered by deflation when we realize we didn’t really understand), but that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us, as belief is not evidenced by emotion (or even interest, because we might not care enough to meet the criteria for believing: to put ourselves out there as answerable for our desires).

"I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue. — J

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.” Certainty isn’t part of belief (perhaps resolve) and it may not even be possible for knowledge, but it is a desire philosophy has always had for knowledge, thus minimizing anything else as “belief” or “instinct” or “emotion”.

that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us, — Antony Nickles

Right. One interesting feature of the aha! experience is how strongly it causes us to believe we have understood. I'm guessing this is because, taken all in all, it is usually a good predictor of actually having understood. In my own case, I'd estimate that the times it has led me astray are perhaps 1 out of 10. (Naturally, my aptitude varies enormously depending on the subject!)

"The occurrence of 'understanding' somewhere in us . . ." That can't be right, of course, but the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do.

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.” — Antony Nickles

Must it be? I'd call that a higher "certainty quotient" than just "There are bacteria on my left shoe." Do you think an assertion must claim knowledge? The difference I'm pointing to would be shown by two different answers: Are there bacteria on your left shoe? "Yes." Do you know there are bacteria on your left shoe? "Not strictly speaking, not certainly. I think so, I believe so, it seems very likely to me. That's why I said they were on my left shoe."

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context.

Cheers, all. Some excellent input.

I take it that we are much agreed that a belief is not, shall we say, present in the mind in the way being angry or being ecstatic are, and that this to some degree counts against their being considered as emotions.

I played with ChatGPT a bit, asking for examples of common ways "belief" is used, and asking for an analysis after the style of Austin. LLP AI would seem to be appropriate for such tasks. HEre's aprt of the result:

1. Common Uses of “Belief” in Ordinary Language
Here are some typical examples:
• “I believe it’s going to rain today.”
• “She holds a strong belief in democracy.”
• “That’s just your belief.”
• “He acted on the belief that she was in danger.”
• “It’s hard to change someone’s beliefs.”
• “Do you believe in ghosts?”
• “I don’t believe you.”
• “He lost his belief in God.”

These examples show that “belief” functions in a range of settings:
• Everyday judgment or opinion: “I believe it’s going to rain.”
• Doctrinal or ideological commitment: “Her belief in democracy.”
• Disagreement or challenge: “That’s just your belief.”
• Motivating reasons: “He acted on the belief...”
• Existential or religious questions: “Do you believe in ghosts/God?”

2. Observations from Usage
• Belief can be tentative or firm: “I believe it’s raining” is open to correction, whereas “Her belief in democracy” implies stability.
• Belief is not always knowledge: Saying “I believe” often marks uncertainty or lack of certainty—unlike “I know”.
• Belief often contrasts with evidence: “That’s just your belief” can suggest a lack of rational grounding.
• Beliefs can be held unconsciously or unreflectively: “She never questioned her beliefs.”
• Belief is frequently used in both personal and impersonal contexts: from the mundane (“I believe the shop is open”) to the doctrinal (“belief in the resurrection”). — ChatGPT

In a simialr vein i asked for words proximal to believe, and then for words proximal to those words, and had those diagramed. Not all that neat, but here is the result:



Perhaps if nothing else this exercise shows how ill chosen an approach to the analysis of "belief" that presumes it refers to the one thing might be.

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these.

@Banno

the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do. — J

I’ve been trying to argue that this “what we do” is our individual responsibility, and not anything like “what’s actually going on” that we could “explain”. The “difficulty” is our inability to relinquish control over belief, and yet also our reticence to have it depend on us. The characterization of this as a problem with something “actual” happening is created by this desire for control and inevitability.

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context. — J

Absolutely the phrasing is loose and the circumstances and responses determine a lot; only to add that those two cases (once differentiated) would be categorically different, with different workings and different criteria, claimed for different types of reasons with different ways of moving forward and resolution (with what mattered about the context being different).

Grk

@J

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these. — Banno

I’ve learned in this thread that belief does have more involved than I thought. Even though emotion seems to be an accompaniment (and not essential), I had not realized that they reveal what matters to us; they are an expression of our interests. I do still argue the common feature or important mechanics is that it involves me, individually, tied to my responsibility in claiming (or wanting to claim) to believe, and so reflecting or creating me.

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul, as it’s not about an answer so much as an exploration. And I hate, even more, to agree with a machine, but “She holds a strong belief in democracy” demonstrates that belief involves commitment (here a recognition of it actually); the person has done something to demonstrate that they hold fast against some threat.

I hate even worse arguing with one, but “That’s just your belief” is simply sloppy (who even says that?); I only possibly imagine it as a very disrespectful insult, in the vein of “I don’t care about what is important to you”, though that shows that who we are is tied to our interests. p.s. - We of course say “That’s just your opinion.” (which is also dismissive) but opinions and beliefs are not the same thing (as “I believe it’s going to rain” is neither a judgment nor an opinion, but a personal conjecture, a hypothesis, a gamble). Opinions are assessments, of people, or politics, or plumbing estimates (thus the personal nature of the jab about my opinion, and why we consult experts).

“Do you believe in ghosts/God?” is in one sense obtuse, asking for justification (evidence), ignoring this is about living in a way in relation to something other, say, than ourselves.

I do find the example interesting that “He acted on the belief that she was in danger” but isn’t it just qualifying a mistake? Seems it turned out she wasn’t in danger and he perhaps did something bad and is asking to be excused because he had the wrong impression. But is thinking that something is the case and being mistaken really what is at stake? Consider, “Why did you do that?” “She was in danger.” I take an action and when asked say “I did it because I believe x”, which is, again, to say something about me, who I claim myself to be. In this case, the defender of those in danger. And so is the request to be excused about being wrong? or asking that the bad be erased by the (perceived) good?

Like every word in any language it is context dependent. It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people.

Like I have said, the way I view it is through the lens of 'knowledge' - which I take to mean 'something put under some of consideration' - and that 'belief' is that which straddles our immediate appreciation of the world and our background mapping of the world (world as in "weltanschauung" or "axis mundi").

I grant that knowing what a book is - outside of really paying conscious attention to this understanding of 'book' - can be called a belief in what I book is ... personally I do not see the use in calling that a 'belief' though, any more than would find myself saying a rock believes gravity keeps it on the ground or data stored on the hard drive on my PC can ever constitute a 'belief' from the perspective of my hard drive.

@Banno @I like sushi @J

Looking at the diagram of associated concepts made me think more on the assertion of a claim of knowledge compared to a statement of belief. I want to say we don’t “believe” in facts as some tentative or lesser claim to knowledge. When we say “I believe steel has a high tensile strength”, we might be in a situation where we are trying to calm ourselves before driving a heavy truck over a steel bridge, and we are expressing (reiterating) our trust in a fact. When we say “I believe in global warming”, we are in a sense accepting the consequences of facts. Another general sense is that we are ready to stand behind the science, which simply means that we assess the scientific method was followed competently (which is not to doubt the facts so much as their validity at all).

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works. Of course, our desire to stand for something can be lessened by learning facts, but that is not the same thing. Accordingly, there is no “fact” about us as well. There is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”, which is the desire in the paper: to solve for belief, to find the version of it as a switch that could be flipped. We don’t account for belief through a fact about it, we hold the person to account.

Another feature this brings up though is that there is a scale of attachments; I wouldn’t characterize it as “tentative or firm” but what extent we are willing to go to. It could just be an expression, or “view”, to willing to risk life and limb. So, from the diagram, maybe scaling from suspicion to impression to inclination to assumption to confidence to disposition to attitude to idea to tenet to conviction to creed to dogma to faith. These seem to move between those I hold for myself to those I express or claim to others, thus giving the impression of “emotion” vs “rationale”.

It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people. — I like sushi

that's not he point here so much as that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to the very same people.

That is, we use the word to perform quite different actions.

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul... — Antony Nickles

What it is doing here looks to me to be more like a calculator doing a few additions. it's just saving me time in listing groups of words. That and by handing the task over to an automation I might be rid of accusations of bias.

But I see your point, and agree that doing the task is the largest and most important bit. It's putting such a diagram together oneself that instructs about how these words relate.

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works. — Antony Nickles

Surely this is too strong? At the least some beliefs are about facts - I believed it was warm outside, but it was still below zero...

So while "there is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”in every case, it's not that there are no cases of of something that is “believing”.

The diagram is certainly a confabulation. The double up of "Hunch", "Attitude", "Creedence" and "Feeling" shows a lack if diligence, perhaps - but "Feuth"? Did it misspell "faith" or did it intend "fullness"? But of course it has neither diligence nor intent...

Turnt

@J @I like sushi

At the least some beliefs are about facts — Banno

Yeah I worded that poorly, making it sound like belief has no relation to the world, which of course is putting too much mustard on it. And having the impression that it is fine out, when it really is cold, I accept is a belief. But is this a matter of actually being correct? Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational? I may even concede the temperature, but maintain my position (unrelated to my sensation even). Then you might think me courageous, or silly, or insane, but not wrong about a fact (unless I am guessing the temperature, which is belief as hypothesis).

It is convenient to have the terms gathered, but I think the important part about OLP is that a human can imagine cases (even fantasies), fill out the context to distinguish (even novel extrapolations), or change the circumstances—even as part of a collaboration with others because everyone has the ability to provide input—which is different than aggregating data and regurgitating analysis.

Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational? — Antony Nickles

Ordinarily, just talking, I think we would use the word "wrong": "No, you're wrong, it's freezing out!" I hear you asking what, exactly, is being called wrong in such a case. I am wrong on the facts, no doubt of that: "warm" can't mean "freezing." But am I also being told that my belief is wrong? That I am wrong to believe what is not true? Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?

I think all these are possibilities, and I don't have a strong intuition about whether there is one correct usage here. It seems to depend on what the interlocutor assumes I do or don't know: If he assumes I don't know it's freezing out, then he probably thinks I've just made a mistake. If he assumes I do know, but maintain my belief anyway, then "wrong" starts to be replaced with either "crazy" or "lying about what I believe, for some reason". Background assumption: I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true.

Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?… I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true. — J

That would be the sense that “You can’t be serious!” (Not, denying the fact, but questioning my experience). But I could say, “You should have seen the weather where I grew up” or concede partly “I must still be warm from inside.” Maybe it takes more, better example of when belief absolutely flies in the face of facts, because it is contingent on me, thus the desire to either discount it, or create something to fix it internally, like “emotion”.

,

Perhaps here we agree that the thermometer reads 0℃ and yet differ as to the appropriate response?

So the world is constant, yet the utterance changes against the beliefs of the speaker, and is to be triangulated with the beliefs of the interpreter.

Do we then have agreement as to the facts, but not as to what to do about them?