No, no thumbs up. Its not a good thing. Disagree with me! Show me were I'm wrong!

No, no thumbs up. Its not a good thing. Disagree with me! Show me were I'm wrong! — Banno

I was going to make a smart alec report in that same general vein, but I thought I would give us both a victory instead.

Good to see you here.

Those different things – hope, resolve, and so on – are they but species of belief?

The standard analysis has three parts: attitude, the believer and the statement believed. A simple account might have the cognition found in the statement, the emotion found in the attitude, and as you suggest the responsibility in the individual. Bringing in responsibility is a neat twist.

I'm plotting a post linking belief to action, something only addressed obliquely in the article.

Hope you have time to read an consider the article.

Hope you have time to read an consider the article. — Banno

Flip, flip, flip

My point was although these terms are referring to the same physical item it is referring to it in different states.

All of this does remind me of a discussion I tried to start over a decade ago about 'belief' and its various uses and connotations. It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context.

In the article the argue a point that is applicable to every facet of human experience. Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. What is attended to falls into the realm of 'belief' what is out-of-sight is assumed as too rigid to require our attention.

An example would be the Earth under our feet. We can attend to the idea of the planet Earth, but for the vast majority of the time we certainly do not. The 'belief' in Earth is only apparent once we attend to it.

What I read in the paper is someone's take on some degree of belief rather than seeing this as ubiquitous in all cognitive activities. Meaning, if they think belief is neither purely cognitive nor connotative, then where is the distinction between anything else going on in the brain? Nothing happening in our brains is one or the other.

The differences being talked about can only be abstractions.

4 CONCLUSION

It has been recognized that certain states are hard to categorize, that even though they are belief-like, they do not behave as the standard philosophical view of belief says they should. I have proposed instead that we view these examples as exposing that this view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude these states as real beliefs. I have here argued that a way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Even if one has not been convinced, I hope the discussion has revealed that reflection on these problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.

If anyone is not convinced all they need to do is study the cognitive neurosciences. No need to conceive of beliefs as emotions, just understand that all brain states can be expressed as emotional.

these terms are referring to the same physical item — I like sushi

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things?

It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context. — I like sushi

Yeah, I concur. But we have agreement that the topic is wider than that, including at least substituted statements that are held to be true.

...all brain states can be expressed as emotional. — I like sushi

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience.

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things? — Banno

No. I imagine there is something to looking at physical evidence. I am sure someone with a materialistic stance would hold that view though.

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience. — Banno

My mistake. Conscious and attentive states. Obviously there are automated states, but as we are talking about affective states (belief and general cognition) then it is true enough.

This is why I was curious as to your interest here as being about what consciousness is.

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content.

Brain States are attended to by Conscious States > affective states. On their own a Brain State is pretty meaningless. This is the general consensus.

In a rough attempt to explain this more clearly, it aligns with what I was saying earlier regarding our appreciation of being on Earth. We do not walk around with the concept of The Earth disentangled from our being, yet when attended to we cannot do so without emotional context, because everything we attend to requires emotional context. We can possess a Brain State that 'pushes' the concept of Earth into the background to the point that 'belief' no longer has meaning. It is just part of the mapping we've done left unattended. I know my name (Conscious State) but I do not always attend to it (Brain State).

Of course, there are alternative ideas like global network theory, but that is seemingly irrelevant to this line of discussion as it frames such as physical only - that is not to say such data cannot verify certain ideas expressed here. Mental-to-mental causation is probably where GWT has some legs.

@Banno @Hanover

I take it McCormick wants to find a way out of the categorization of belief as only rational, without part of it being cast out as irrational, which is the classic derogation of it as opposed to everything that is certain, logical, or true/false (knowledge). However, I find they are fighting too close in, and so their solution is tangled up by the confused framework. Instead of seeing past (Hegel style) the cognitive/non-cognitive misconception, they are attempting to resolve it with a different “mental state”, a feeling of belief. The funny part is that it does “feel” close to true. But I would argue that is because it captures the sense that part of what belief is are things like conviction or resolve or hope—which I wouldn’t characterize as species of belief @Banno, but that they show that belief is about what is important to us (what we might get emotional about). There is something like a feeling we must have in them, because it is a position (Wittgenstein’s “attitude”) we take towards them, what we are willing to do for them. Part of its workings as a practice is not the judgment of beliefs (or feelings), say, as right or wrong. We hold a person to their beliefs; we judge them. We can call them delusional, puppets, ignoring the facts, convinced by emotion, righteous, courageous, etc. “do we say instead that because [Bathasar] will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?” @Banno Well, we would say they do not have the courage of their convictions perhaps.

Of course, that belief works this way also means people may abuse the practice and only judge the belief, thus moralizing the person away before considering them, their interests, their reasons, their context. “I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief.” @Hanover

Part of the issue is with a lot of moral theory before Nietszche: it is thought of as before an act or statement. As casual or considered (or felt)—which they can be—but we actually consider most of this only afterwards. We judge a statement as true based on our criteria for knowledge. We judge the other for their act and ask for their reasons. Deontology overlooks the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses (here I nod to Austin’s work on action @Banno). Still, despite all your evidence to the contrary, I may be willing to die for my belief. We may not come to agreement, but to call that irrational or an emotion, misunderstands how belief works, cutting off the possibility of common ground before we begin.

Let me just say, I sympathize with your mixed feelings about bringing in the Tao for a subject like this. On the one hand, it's an important reminder that what we're doing here may not have any ultimate metaphysical validity -- that there is such a thing as a world beyond words and categories. But then, if we stayed with that insight, we'd probably not be on TPF at all.

No, the boundaries are not arbitrary at all. Setting up distinctions and boundaries is something humans do. — T Clark

OK. Better say "contingent" or "contextual," perhaps. Just trying to get across the idea that the Tao's-eye point of view, if there could be such a thing, wouldn't include such discriminations.

If the position I attributed to Damasio in previous posts is correct, they can't be discriminated at all, at least not when they function as mental processes. — T Clark

Still not clear on this, though. How does it mean the same thing as:

His hypothesis is that the three are completely interconnected and that it is impossible to discuss the functions of one without realizing that the other two play a role.

Maybe I should be clearer about what I mean by "discriminate." I think of it as a rock-bottom term, one that would apply even when objects or processes are "completely interconnected" and "impossible to discuss" without awareness of the role each plays. "Discriminate," for me, means whatever it is that you and I are both doing when we make sensible sentences using the terms "rational processes" and "emotions." I don't have any big stake in that usage, though -- if you have a preferred way to divvy up the vocabulary, I'm open to it.

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content. — I like sushi

I feel a little dense, but what does that mean exactly? We're talking phenomenology here, right, not science? (I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") Are you saying that any conscious experience I have will, upon examination, reveal something emotional? Or that it presents as emotional? Not sure I'm getting the picture.

@Banno @Hanover

I tried to read a paper recently that discussed the difference Wittgenstein makes between sensations (toothache) and “dispositions” (PI #149-154) which would be knowing, thinking, understanding, etc. It is a little confusing because disposition also sounds like some internal state. However, he says “ 149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.)” (Bold emphasis added)

The “difference” is that dispositions are not determined by attending to brain processes (or mental states), because they are classifications judged by external criteria. #154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?”

I would classify belief as this type of “disposition”, externally judged on its “manifestations”, or, in this case, what we are willing to stand up for. Judging belief as an emotion is an attempt to capture this “non-cognitive” nature of belief, but still being trapped in the picture that it is an internal state. As I said, however, there are obviously emotions involved in or accompanying belief, even “wrong” ones such as arrogance, misplaced righteousness, etc. But, again, to lower belief to that level (although possible) is to dismiss the person, not solve the “irrationality” belief is characterized as.

#154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?” — Antony Nickles

I've pondered this one before. Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt.

@Banno @Hanover

Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt. — J

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more.

Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. — I like sushi

We may not know our reasons before we act, but only because we only make ourselves intelligible to others afterwards, not because they were in us already but unknown/unattended. Now, we can reflect on what we are going to do, and we can justify our act to ourselves ahead of time (with a belief), but those are not, nor do they determine, the criteria we share to judge an act.

I am talking about both. The main thrust of my point being that the evidence provided by science is sometimes too easily left on the sidelines.

(I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") — J

There is plenty of research into how emotions present themselves in brains. A specific description is part and parcel of how phenomenology has impacted cognitive science - in fact it is the very reason I started reading philosophy more frequently!

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution, but such a process easily see the difference between someone thinking about being chased by a scary dog, and someone thinking about a gift they received from a loved one. They are able to get a gist of what the person is thinking about and how they feel about it too.

So, description? Not exactly. They have a low resolution picture. I believe with multiple readings form the same person across a variety of contents it provides a better resolution picture of what they are thinking and feeling - if my memory serves me?

Although it might sound like sci-fi, it is not that mind-blowing when you consider they can see certain parts of the brain stimulated for motor functions and such.

We may not know our reasons before we act — Antony Nickles

Then we had no reason. If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything?

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act.

This is the more sketchy area of autonomous decisions and what that means. It is not really an area I like to delve into too deeply as I do not think we are in a position to place a line between 'action' and 'reaction,' only a vague no-man's land of "I don't know?".

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all.

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more. — Antony Nickles

Good stuff. But some questions:

- Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.)

- My distinction of conscious and unconscious wasn't necessarily pointing to some subconscious mental process going on when we believe or understand something -- the "turning inward more". Rather, I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time. This might include a disposition to act on that belief, again without requiring some conscious mental event called a "disposition." This seems different from a "thought", which we do want to say is a particular mental event at a particular time (Fregean "thoughts" aside). If I have a thought at T1 and am no longer having it at T2, we say "You're no longer thinking thought X." This is clearly different from how we talk about beliefs and dispositions.

So I'm agreeing with you (and perhaps Witt) that we need a separate account of what beliefs and dispositions amount to.

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution, — I like sushi

I agree with the thrust of this, though even "general idea" seems too high a resolution. Let's just say that Chalmers' "easy problem" -- mapping mental events to areas and activities of the brain -- is a doable project, one of these days.

But this still leaves the issue of what we now know about emotions. I'll repeat my question:

Are you saying that any conscious experience I have will, upon examination, reveal something emotional? Or that it presents as emotional? — J

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing?

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing? — J

I very many cases, yes. There are more subtler forms that could be called 'emotional content' that cannot easily, or cannot be pinpointed. All evidence points towards this being the case, hence it is the general consensus among cognitive neuroscientists.

The paper seems to be trying to push philosophers away from classical models of cognition. My point is that most neuroscientists dropped that idea literally decades ago. I do not know of any that hold to such a dated model of cognition today? Undoubtedly there are probably one or two?

Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.) — J

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs. So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”. Thus why Wittgenstein acknowledges that something “has occurred” to us (#154); but it is the “manifestations” that matter (#149).

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs. — Antony Nickles

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything.

So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”. — Antony Nickles

But this still seems murky to me. Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be?

A well-rounded account. Of course deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses", and a deontology that can at least account for these might be an improvement.

The warning against treating beliefs as mental or brain states is well made, and part of what is being addressed somewhat obliquely in 's account. The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be.

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered. One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.

Lurp

@Banno @Hanover

I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time. — J

There is no need for a background. I could say a fundamental part of who I am is my belief in Jesus, but that doesn’t mean there is something that “continues” in me, other than how I act and what I focus on and how I respond to others (say, in “putting God first”). Any of these if questioned could be answered with, “Because I believe in Jesus”, and that is the extent of its function: as the expression of our willingness to stand for something.

I am arguing that belief (believing) is a disposition, as understanding, knowing, or thinking. These are judged positions (and only thus “states”) that are demonstrated by the circumstances. We are disposed to do something because the possibility is there, not because of some thing in us, or behind us, or, say, unattended to. Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object”; again, differentiating the common parlance of “thoughts” as the talking that you do with yourself, from “thinking”, which is judged as problem solving, or attending to something in depth, or considering various future consequences, etc. Not to be cryptic, but not every thought is an instance of thinking.

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief.

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

Your judgement is better almost every cognitive neuroscientist alive today? This view was not widely held in the 80's and 90's. Since then the evidence coming in has forced the vast majority to reject the classical model of cognition.

There has been a swathe of studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years. I task you with finding a single one that did not find a connection between emotion and belief. I will be bold enough to put forward that you will not find a single one showing zero emotional content.

deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses", — Banno

All I meant was its nature is the desire to determine what is right ahead of time, so it has no use for how we mop up afterwards when the rules are not enough (or steer us wrong).

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

The problem here is that it’s apples vs the concept of justice. There is the “knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does.” (PI #149). It’s perfectly fine to learn how the brain works; it facilitates the possibility of our lives. But it doesn’t come into consideration as a criteria for how belief works, or our interests in claiming them.

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered. — Banno

I only said “lower” because emotion is traditionally, pejoratively deemed irrational, subject only to persuasion, etc. What I was trying to hang onto is that a belief maintains its rationality not because of its structure or nature, but because I claim responsibility for it. It is my reason, even if it comes from my being afraid, or delusional, or parroting someone else. That it is mine, that I own up to it, is what makes it intelligible. Yes, my anger may fade, but what really “endures” is that I am answerable for what I have said I believe, or what that leads to.

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

Get @Sam26 in here why don’t you. Not to stray off topic, but, of course, we can agree we don’t (can’t) “know” the earth is round (except scientifically). I would argue we would be hard-pressed to believe the earth is round, but only because: who would we make that claim to? Now, I could believe the earth is flat, because there is some responsibility in holding that position.

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything. — J

Granted; but the nomenclature is misleading (behind what?). The circumstances for a belief are in the world, at a time, and may define who I am. Also, all this may in fact “cause” me to do something (what I believe is my duty), and may be the culmination of my life, or maybe just a moment.

Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be? — J

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something, nor is it demonstrative that we do understand (“I’ve got it! Wait, darn it.”) It can accompany understanding, but it is not the criteria for understanding. In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about. But, maybe more interestingly, someone may not understand a joke, and no amount of explanation might get them to.

justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world. — Tom Storm

I think this is the correct framework. What to do with the words is another issue.
Explicit acceptance of X seems to be a fine way to characterize belief. I don't find much here to suggest otherwise. That said, it does seem weird not to mention the pre-and-post cognitive states as directly related to the belief, so definitely more to be said. Very interesting thread.

@Banno

If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything? — I like sushi

Well I would hope we can agree that, out of everything we do, not all of it we know why. And, even if we do consider something beforehand, as you say, it may not matter, or mean anything, to others; maybe never need justification. But also, something I did may be asked to be explained afterwards to others, and those possible questions could never all be considered beforehand. But we can fill in the blanks for others (even ourselves) without reasoning out every possibility ahead of time.

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act. — I like sushi

That seems to be both brushing off basic individual responsibility (“we” do it all, outside of mitigating circumstances) and granting me too much control over what is considered an act (only those I am conscious of). Perhaps we believe an act doesn’t reflect who we truly are, or that we shouldn't be judged by everything we do (both understandable desires).

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all. — I like sushi

I think for our purposes it’s just a matter of reimagining intention as not accompanying everything we do, and seeing that an action is based on classification not individuality. They are labels that are judged externally after something is out of the ordinary or brought up. Every movement is not an action, and every action is not intended. “Were you [completing the act of] hailing a cab, or just raising your arm?” “Did you intend to run that red light?”

All good points. I think if we are looking at what we mean by 'belief' then we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence. Then there is the justification for beliefs we provide, or even the kinds of beliefs we do not even consider offering justification for.

If a belief is questioned I cannot see how anyone can react completely devoid of emotion. All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world.

Beliefs can be something taken-to-be-true (we are on Earth or The Earth is Flat), that can be questioned but is not normally questioned by those holding the belief, or something regarded as unknown (Life After Death) which is more or less a clinging to sceptical ideas with a strong inclination towards some conclusion - absent of objective evidence.

None of the above can be absent of emotional content. If you believe it can I would really like to hear why and how this is at all possible given that the classical cognitive model has been pretty much dead and buried for a couple of decades now.

Maybe this is a useful link for the discussion: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/index.html#RatiEmot

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something, — Antony Nickles

This suggests to me that we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it.

In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about. — Antony Nickles

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand. Are you saying that translating it into behaviors and having others see them makes them more reliable? That others would be less likely to be fooled, or mistaken? Hmm, maybe, but it sounds a little thin. The possibility of error is always there, and I don't see that "going on" in some way, as opposed to just thinking about it, increases or reduces the possibility.

We have to remember that the question isn't -- or shouldn't be -- "When do we say that someone has understood?" It's "When has someone understood?" You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say.