If materialism is, as you assert, a popular and intuitively attractive view, then I don't find your characterizations of it plausible. — SophistiCat

So apparently you find his characterization unattractive. Do you have some reason why you think it is unattractive?

"Ionian materialists"? I thought you were addressing present-day materialism? For my part, I wouldn't venture to speculate about the psychological motivations of the few ancient materialists, of whom we know so little.

Russell's hyperbolic rhetoric doesn't help much. "How science says the world is" is a little better, but still leaves much to be desired.

I am not asking for a concise definition, but at least some sense of what you are talking about. Otherwise, the whole project seems unserious, more of a vague rant than analysis.

I think Materialism is a metaphysical ideology that came about due to mainstream society overlooking synthesis and intepreting science and the scientific method, which only concern analysis, as being epistemically complete. Consequently, the impossibility of inverting physics back to first-person reality, was assumed to be due to metaphysical impossibility rather than being down to semantic choices and epistemic impossibility, leading society towards a misplaced sense of nihilism by which first-person phenomena are considered to be theoretically reducible to an impersonal physical description, but not vice-versa. — sime

Excellent. :up:

I think when @Count Timothy von Icarus talks about "smallism," he is basically talking about the idea that reducing wholes to parts is a legitimate move, but synthesizing parts into wholes is not. Or else that only the former is explanatorily or epistemically useful.

So, it's just about physics being different? I don't think it makes sense to identify philosophical materialism with physics at a particular place and time - otherwise, it would just be physics, and we already know what it is and have a word for it.

So apparently you find his characterization unattractive. Do you have some reason why you think it is unattractive? — Leontiskos

Does anyone? Would any materialists nowadays own up to such a characterization?

"Physicalism" is a very common contemporary view that is usually recognized to be a form of materialism. It seems to me that all sorts of people believe this stuff. See for example Baden's thread, "The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism."

Both ancient and early-modern. Contemporary physicalism/materialism is sometimes very much an inheritor of this type of thinking though.

"Corpuscular/atomistic mechanism" might be more specific, but maybe too specific. You could consider Hobbes, Descartes (on the extended substance side of being), Gassendi, Boyle, Newton, Locke, etc.

"Physicalism" is a very common contemporary view that is usually recognized to be a form of materialism. — Leontiskos

Right, and even that term is fraught and uncertain, as the article that you referenced shows. I have a hunch, though I cannot back it up with a literature review, that among philosophers, discussions of such general topics as "materialism" or "physicalism" are less common today than they were, say, in Russell's time (other than an occasional windy essay with a title like "Why I am not a Materialist.") Part of this is, no doubt, an increased specialization and fragmentation of philosophical discourse. But perhaps another explanation is precisely in the difficulty of identifying, not an ideological camp, but a genuine "type of thinking." There may well be a type here, but it may be more a type of temperament and a way of seeing than a position that can be clearly articulated.

All right, thank you for the clarification.

I am making the grossly imprecise observation that if materialism was correct, if someone followed this intuition, “my brother” could not refer to anything other than atoms, and similarly, any references to “history” and “personality” would be references to my own mental abuses of words, unspeakable and incommunicable, until translated back into atoms perhaps. — Fire Ologist

So, do you think that this implication has never occurred to any materialists, or that there have never been any materialists to begin with? Because I refuse to believe that anyone could actually hold such a view.

So, it's just about physics being different? I don't think it makes sense to identify philosophical materialism with physics at a particular place and time - otherwise, it would just be physics, and we already know what it is and have a word for it. — SophistiCat

We were talking about intuitive appeal. The physics changed from becoming something a child could essentially grasp to something nobody, 100 years after QM, can understand or even agree on.

Are you saying that materialists deny this? Can you point to anyone, at any time in history, who held this position? — SophistiCat

Actually, I'm not sure that it is even possible to a materialist to abandon the idea of intelligibility. Certainly, it has been downplayed. So, I am probably wrong here.

Well, probably Democritus who held that the most fundamental things were atoms and the void. Everything else was reducible to those (either via emergence or supervenience). I'm not sure, however, how he explained the interactions of the atoms. Did the atoms follow some 'laws'? If they did, how these laws can be explained in terms of the model he proposed?
Hume denied causation. Yes, he was probably more of a skeptic rather than a materialist but his influence is certainly immense.
More recently, some physicists accept the idea of 'superdeterminism' which, more or less says that while quantum mechanics makes wrong predictions, the universe behaves 'as if' QM makes correct predictions.

Anyway, my point was that materialism doesn't have IMO convincing ways to explain intelligibility, at least if it is based on a reductionist paradigm. After all, intelligibility implies that our intellect grasps some actual property of the material world. Since, however, what is grasped by the intellect are 'forms'/'concepts', this would imply that 'forms' are, indeed, an essential aspect of the material reality. I am not sure how this is consistent with a purely materialistic outlook.

So, perhaps I was wrong in my claim you quoted but, nevertheless, I think that my point stands.

We were talking about intuitive appeal. The physics changed from becoming something a child could essentially grasp to something nobody, 100 years after QM, can understand or even agree on. — RogueAI

Yes, I get your point. Although the intuitiveness of Newtonian physics shouldn't be overestimated either. It only seems commonsense because the basics have been drilled into us from an early age. But it is well known among educators and psychologists that our naive intuitions about motion (aka "folk physics") are not in line with Galileo and Newton. No wonder it took so long for these modern concepts to become widely accepted.

Actually, I'm not sure that it is even possible to a materialist to abandon the idea of intelligibility. — boundless

Well, what would any of us be talking about absent intelligibility? If there is an object of discussion, it is perforce intelligible. As for what accounts for the intelligibility of the world, I am not convinced that there are substantive disagreements between, say, realists and nominalists - disagreements that are more than just different ways of speaking / ways of seeing.

Since, however, what is grasped by the intellect are 'forms'/'concepts', this would imply that 'forms' are, indeed, an essential aspect of the material reality. I am not sure how this is consistent with a purely materialistic outlook. — boundless

Materialist philosophy of mind would probably account for that in terms of the well-adapted brain's ability to anticipate and model the environment. Impressive indeed, he will say, but ultimately just neurochemistry. D M Armstrong, who was Professor of the department where I studied philosophy, was a firm advocate for universals, which he identified with scientific laws. But his major book was Materialist Philosophy of Mind, which is firmly based on the identity of mental contents and neural structures. There are universals—but they are nothing over and apart from the physical form they take. They are repeatable properties instantiated in space and time. You and I wouldn’t accept that, but it’s a hard argument to refute.

Well, what would any of us be talking about absent intelligibility? — SophistiCat

I believe that some would say that even if the world isn't intelligible it would still make sense to 'talk about' it and builing models about it if they were useful.

But, again, I think that such a denial of intelligibility is incompatible with 'materialism' in any acceptable sense of the term. It's mostly found in skpetical philosophies like Pyrrhonism or even Kantianism (at least in reference to the 'things-in-themselves') and so on.

As for what accounts for the intelligibility of the world, I am not convinced that there are substantive disagreements between, say, realists and nominalists - disagreements that are more than just different ways of speaking / ways of seeing. — SophistiCat

I believe, instead, that the difference is much more than that. Realists assert that 'forms' are not just constructs of our minds which have at best practical utility but are in some ways independent from us. If it is so, then, it means that even the 'material' world has a structure that is analogous to the structure of our intellect, which is able to 'grasp' these forms. Nominalists deny this and assert that the forms are just convenient constructs that are useful to us. The problem is IMO that nominalism isn't able to explain why they are useful. In fact, if nominalism were true, any conceptual model simply can't grasp the structure of the material world, which remains forever inaccessible. But nominalism, in fact, seems to ironically lead us to a denial even of materialism, due to the fact that it denies intelligibility.
If, however, some kind of realism is affirmed, then, as I said before it seems that the material world has a structure analogous to the one of the intellect. Is this acceptable under a materialist ontology? I am not sure. At least, if the materialist ontology is reductionistic.

the material world has a structure analogous to the one of the intellect. Is this acceptable under a materialist ontology? I am not sure. — boundless

The materialist would say that an understanding of how brainsw work fills this gap.

Materialist philosophy of mind would probably account for that in terms of the well-adapted brain's ability to anticipate and model the environment. Impressive indeed, he will say, but ultimately just neurochemistry. D M Armstrong, who was Professor of the department where I studied philosophy, was a firm advocate for universals, which he identified with scientific laws. But his major book was Materialist Philosophy of Mind, which is firmly based on the identity of mental contents and neural structures. There are universals—but they are nothing over and apart from the physical form they take. They are repeatable properties instantiated in space and time. You and I wouldn’t accept that, but it’s a hard argument to refute. — Wayfarer

Interesting. But note that in his model, the material world has a structure analogous to the intellect. Is this ok for a materialist? I guess that at a certain point it also depends on how much one goes with the search for explanations, so to speak. It is rather odd for me that, say, a purely 'material' world would 'follow' laws. Where do these 'laws' come from? Are they 'material'? It doesn't seem so. In fact, laws do not seem to satisfy the criteria to be considered 'material'. They are not causal. They are not detectable. And so on.

And, also, if 'forms' and 'laws' are fundamental aspects of the material world then reductionism is false. After all, forms and laws seem properties of wholes rather than the 'smallest' objects.

The materialist would say that an understanding of how brainsw work fills this gap. — Apustimelogist

The brain is also a material object. So saying that the brain works in a certain way doesn't explain why the material world has such a structure. In fact, even the very attempt to understand 'how the brain works' assumes intelligibility of the material world or the brain in this specific case.

So, I don't think that understanding how the brain works gives an explanation here. It might however give us a confirmation that 'everything fits' once the intelligibility is however assumed.

But even in a panpsychist universe, the brain would have exactly the same role and would completely explain intelligibility in either a materialist or a panpsychist universe. It seems that once you start talking about our understanding of brains, the fundamental metaphysics is irrelevant to intelligibility. The intellect and the material world have analogous structures because a brain is a model of structure that exists in the material world.

But even in a panpsychist universe, the brain would have exactly the same role and would completely explain intelligibility in either a materialist or a panpsychist universe. It seems that once you start talking about our understanding of brains, the fundamental metaphysics is irrelevant to intelligibility. The intellect and the material world have analogous structures because a brain is a model of structure that exists in the material world. — Apustimelogist

Ok, but the panpsychist postis that the 'mental' is a fundamental aspect of reality. So it's no surprise to me that the 'material' and the 'mental' share some properties if panpsychism (in some form) were true.

Rather, the materialist asserts that the 'material' is fundamental and everything else is derived from the material. But if one accepts intelligibility is something essential to the 'material' then I believe that it is reasonable to ask how is that possible. As I said in my posts I have my reservations in asserting that what makes the world intelligible ('forms', 'laws'...) is 'material' in any acceptable sense of the word 'material'.

Of course, one can adopt 'nominalism'. The price is, however, that nominalism makes the world inaccessible to conceptual knowledge. And I am not sure that materialism actually is compatible with nominalism. After all, materialist generally acknowledge that there are intelligible structures, laws etc in reality.

Ok, but the panpsychist postis that the 'mental' is a fundamental aspect of reality. So it's no surprise to me that the 'material' and the 'mental' share some properties if panpsychism (in some form) were true. — boundless

So are you suggesting that what science understands about brains could never be true under idealism? How would you explain what we observe about brains and human cognition / behavior in that case?

It is rather odd for me that, say, a purely 'material' world would 'follow' laws. Where do these 'laws' come from? Are they 'material'? It doesn't seem so. In fact, laws do not seem to satisfy the criteria to be considered 'material' — boundless

I agree with you, of course, but I've had some discussions with an advocate of Armstrong's materialist theory of mind, and he's pretty formidable. I don't think his style of materialism is much favoured any more, but it's instructive how far it can be taken.

No. We know more now than we did then. — T Clark

So you don't think science ever progresses or regresses on the criteria you laid out? You don't think there can be progression or regression in the matter of, "quality control and assurance," for instance?

Let's go back to this for a second. You've identified more scientific, less scientific, and pseudoscientific. You don't seem to have left any room for badly performed science. Is that less scientific or only lower quality. Haute cuisine is good cooking while my macaroni and cheese made with Velveeta is bad cooking, but they're both cooking. — T Clark

They're both cooking: some better, some worse. Two things can both be science, some better, some worse. "Badly performed science," would presumably be less scientific. As @Srap Tasmaner noted, the method and the conclusions are interconnected.

Are you saying that scientificity is as easy to define and measure as speed? Isn’t that really the question on the table here? You and I disagree. I think scientificity is a very, very great deal less obvious. — T Clark

Does "scientific" mean something? If it does, then it looks like we have to admit that some things are more scientific and other things are less scientific. If a criterion such as, "quality control and assurance," is not uniform throughout every scientific discipline and age, then the strong science-pluralism that is being promoted within this thread looks to fail.

So are you suggesting that what science understands about brains could never be true under idealism? How would you explain what we observe about brains and human cognition / behavior in that case? — Apustimelogist

Well, in some ontological forms idealism, in a sense, no. If the whole reality is exclusively 'minds' + 'mental contents' then there is no 'brain' as a 'material object' outside minds. In another sense, however, yes: the models are still good for predictions and for practical usefulness.

But not even all ontological idealists deny the existence of something non-mental.

Regarding the epistemic idealists, I would say that the answer would be that the scientific models are correct at the level of phenomena, not at the level of the things-in-themselves.

I agree with you, of course, but I've had some discussions with an advocate of Armstrong's materialist theory of mind, and he's pretty formidable. I don't think his style of materialism is much favoured any more, but it's instructive how far it can be taken. — Wayfarer

Ok. Yes, I would prefer that kind of materialism rather than others. But IMO such a materialism is hard to differentiate to either a panpsychism of sorts or something equal or close to hylomorphism.

then there is no 'brain' as a 'material object' outside minds. In another sense, however, yes: the models are still good for predictions and for practical usefulness. — boundless

But the point is that the scientific study of brains doesn't care about fundamental metaphysics. We just study and describe patterns of what we observe in reality regardless of some fundamental metaphysical description.

The point is that if one is able to explain our intelligibility of the world in terms of brains, it is open to anyone regardless of their metaphysical preference. Providing one can make a good argument that brains are sufficient to explain intelligibility, then it seems less compelling imo to just assert that any specific metaphysical picture precludes intelligibility unless one can give some concrete argument other than incredulity.

are correct at the level of phenomena, not at the level of the things-in-themselves. — boundless

This is meaningless imo. To say something is incorrect means that we get things wrong about it and make predictions that do not come true. But to my understanding of these viewpoints, one could in principle exhaust the correct in-principle-observable facts and still not penetrate the noumena. But then if no one can access it, then in what sense do these things actually have any influence on events in the universe? In what sense is there anything at all to learn about them?

The other alternative is that you are simply saying we have (alot) more to learn about the brain and may have got some stuff wrong, which isn't a particularly radical or troubling claim.

IMO such a materialism is hard to differentiate to either a panpsychism of sorts or something equal or close to hylomorphism. — boundless

D M Armstrong is strictly materialist - thoughts are the output of brains, and brains are purely physical. Mental states are nothing but brain states. The only point I was trying to get across, is that when you encounter someone who is well-versed in this attitude, they're surprisingly difficult to debate with. It seems to me (and probably to you) that once you see through it, 'the scales fall from your eyes' so to speak. But for the committed materialist, the shortcomings that you and I might see are not at all obvious.

In any case, I think the very best arguments against Armstrong's form of materialism is the fact that propositional content can be encoded in an endless variety of languages, symbolic forms, and material media. The same proposition can be written out in different languages, encoded as binary or morse code, carved in stone or written on paper - and yet still retain the same meaning. So it's not feasible to say that the content of an idea must be identical to a particular state of physical matter, such as a brain state, as the meaning and the form it takes can so easily be separated.

I see Armstrong's style of materialism as a direct descendant of scholastic philosophy, but with science assigned the role formerly attributed to God, and scientific laws equivalent to the Aristotelian universals.

But the point is that the scientific study of brains doesn't care about fundamental metaphysics. We just study and describe patterns of what we observe in reality regardless of some fundamental metaphysical description. — Apustimelogist

Ok. Methodological naturalism doens't imply a metaphysical commitment of any kind. But if one is agnostic about metaphysics, let's be agnostic.

The point is that if one is able to explain our intelligibility of the world in terms of brains, it is open to anyone regardless of their metaphysical preference. Providing one can make a good argument that brains are sufficient to explain intelligibility, then it seems less compelling imo to just assert that any specific metaphysical picture precludes intelligibility unless one can give some concrete argument other than incredulity. — Apustimelogist

We prabably are talking past each other about intelligibility because we have different criteria to judge something as 'intelligible'. For me, intelligibility means that our concepts can, in principle, mirror perfectly some properties of the external world as in classical metaphysics.
If one doesn't assume that there is a correspondence between the structure of our thoughts and the structure of material reality, then, we can't really understand material reality. We might be able to predict, to make good models but we can't have real understanding in my opinion.
If there is correspondence, however, this would mean, for me, that the material is not so opposed to the 'mental' as it is commonly assumed to be. Neither that the mental can be derived from something that is purely non-mental. Unless a credible explanation can be given about the emergence of intentionality, consciousness, laes of intellect/reason from what is devoid of these things is given, I see no reason to think that these things are not fundamental.

This is meaningless imo. To say something is incorrect means that we get things wrong about it and make predictions that do not come true. But to my understanding of these viewpoints, one could in principle exhaust the correct in-principle-observable facts and still not penetrate the noumena. But then if no one can access it, then in what sense do these things actually have any influence on events in the universe? In what sense is there anything at all to learn about them? — Apustimelogist

You seem to have a pragmatic approach to truth. I respect that. Just a curiosity, though: do you think that, say, the ancient geocentrists did have 'knowledge' of the world as they were able to make correct predictions?

Regarding the noumena... well, it is a quite complex issue. I see it more as an antinomy of reason, if you like. That is, we can't go 'out' of our perspective or, at least, be sure that our knowledge is independent from it.
These days, I am more drawn to something like hylomorphism or platonism however. That is, forms are real and are really in some way instantiated in the material world. This to me implies that the material world has, ironically, a mental aspect that allows us to be able to understand via conceptual knowledge. So, I do think that our conceptual reasoning gives us a real understanding of the material world... because in a sense the material world is not so different from the mental.

But for the committed materialist, the shortcomings that you and I might see are not at all obvious. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree.

In any case, I think the very best arguments against Armstrong's form of materialism is the fact that propositional content can be encoded in an endless variety of languages, symbolic forms, and material media. The same proposition can be written out in different languages, encoded as binary or morse code, carved in stone or written on paper - and yet still retain the same meaning. So it's not feasible to say that the content of an idea must be identical to a particular state of physical matter, such as a brain state, as the meaning and the form it takes can so easily be separated. — Wayfarer

Right! Also, that material data doesn't intrinsically have meaning. And that if one assumes that, in fact, forms are really a property of the material, then, the material has some intrinsic intelligible content, which would imply that it's not material in the sense that one might want it to be.

I see Armstrong's style of materialism as a direct descendant of scholastic philosophy, but with science assigned the role formerly attributed to God, and scientific laws equivalent to the Aristotelian universals. — Wayfarer

Yep! But note that scientific laws, in fact, can be considered universals, in fact. But if they are taken to be real, then, one must IMO abandon reductionism.

For instance, consider the conservation of the total momentum of a two-particle system in newtonian mechanics. If it is considered something real, it is clearly a property of the whole system. You can't derive it from the properties of the parts. The variation of the momentum of each particle is 'constrained' by this law that is about the whole system. I am not sure how a reductionist picture of the material world can accomodate this.
For a reductionist it is much more convenient to adopt a nominalist view of the law, that is a denial that is in some sense real but just an useful construct.