A very nice essay, it is a good read as a critique of libertarianism. For me it is a bit parochial of course, because the holes in liberarianism are so glaringly obvious. To that extent, the essay would benefit from a bit more focus on some of thee arguments. It sometimes tries to do too much in a short text. I also do not know if all the protagonists are well chosen. Jordan Peterson is an academic and to the best of my knowledge also inspired by Christian teaching. I have no idea if the other too really have a 'worldview'. They argue for certain things, but I would not take their arguments as a sign that a certain political ideology is incoherent. For instance that Trump argues for tariffs is not a sign that libertarianism is incoherent, it is a sign that Trump does not embrace it to the fullest extent.

It sees the social world not as the ground of freedom but as its main obstacle. Institutions are not tools of liberty but threats to it. What this view overlooks, and what the next sections explore, is the extent to which individuality is socially and historically formed and how real freedom depends on shared conditions, not their absence. — Moliere

This statement for instance lacks nuance. Also a libertarian loves the social world because where else can she or he practice trade? Also liberarianism contains within it the concept of recognition. The shape of that recognition takes the shape of the free individual contracting with the other free individual. Through the contract the other as an owner is recognized. I say specifically 'as an owner' because that is what the other is, an owner of possessions, of herself, her labour, etc. Within the contract both parties affirm their being owners in their bartering with each other. Institutions must exist but to the extent that they enable this recognition and not compromise it. It actually comes worryingly close to the classical conception of the individual in private law, the indivdual as a bundle of rights. That conception is I think flawed, you think so as well, but in the context of the essay it merits some more treatment.

At the same time it elevates figures who use public power for private gain and disguises domination as freedom.
The ideology enables policies that weaken safety nets, disenfranchise the vulnerable and concentrate power in unaccountable hands. It fosters political apathy and strengthens demagogues who promise freedom while dismantling its foundations. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just a contradiction. It is a script for democratic decline disguised as moral clarity. — Moliere

It enables it, but more by accident. Its ideal is the world as a market place where each of the participants realize their inner being, namely as contracting parties, rights wielders.

2.2 Liberty Through Coercion
Trump’s trade war illustrates liberty asserted through force. Tariffs and trade barriers, classic interventions, are reframed as tools of sovereignty and pride. That self-described libertarians embrace them shows how flexible freedom becomes. What matters is not principle but the actor. Coercion becomes liberty if used by the right person. Hierarchy is acceptable if it matches their ideals. — Moliere

If Nozick is consistent it does not. In fact, libertarianism might well argue for rather wholesale redistribution based on a large trajectory of coercive trades. The people you take issue with are bad libertarians, but making an example out of a weak opponent does feel a bit 'straw manish'.

2.4 Justice That Begins After the Crime
Nozick’s justice assumes holdings are legitimate if acquired justly, with a vague nod to rectifying past injustice. In practice, this clause is ignored. The theory becomes a cover for inequalities rooted in historical theft. Property is treated as legitimate unless clearly stolen. This conceals injustice rather than addressing it. — Moliere

Here too, Nozick could counter this. 'Real existing libertarianism' pans out this way but that does not necessarily harm the theory. My qualm would be with its unreflective acceptance of the notion of property and its defense of it. I believe the case for property rests on the fact that one 'mixes one's labour' with a good. However, if that is the case the good owns the person mixing just as much, because if it is a mix, who says only one party acquires the right to do with the good as she pleases? The problem with libertarianism is that it lacks awareness of ecology. You also treat this in your essay strongly, but sometimes a bit too cursory for me. I think two ideas within libertarianism merit further discussion, individual autonomy and its concept of 'the other'. As your correctly argue, both of these doctrines in liberarianism are deeply flawed I think, but why is a nice question.

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution. — RussellA

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. — RussellA

The view of Mr. Mill here is absurd. The first counterexample pertains to children. You do feel it is ok for a parent to restrain a child when he considers crossing the road do you? Yes you do. You might object, 'but they are not individuals yet!', sure but in all kinds of settings, old age, psychological ailment, physical impairment, we allow others to make decisions for individuals. And that's okay; it's good when you prevent a friend from jumping in front of a train, really!

The second counterexample pertains to criminal law. If we consequently follow Mill we cannot punish, say a war criminal, if there is no danger of recidivism. Many war criminals led perfectly normal lives afterwards; should they really not be deprived of their liberty?
I make this point not just to quibble with Mr. or Mrs RusselA here, but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. Just like in many other contexts in which the word 'sovereignty' is used, in the context Mill uses it too, it is but a fiction. We are not sovereigns. That is the whole point of the essay and the point so sadly missed by libertarians.