Desire: in general, a subject's capacity to become, by means of his ideas, the cause of the actual existence of the objects of those ideas. — Mww

Do I understand this definition correctly? I can only desire something that is feasible?

"I want to become Superman" is therefore not a desire, as it's not feasible?

By the way, on Leo.org these four words seem to be synonymous:

desire
request
wish
will

I can only desire something that is feasible? — Quk

No, I think the definition implies one can desire in accordance with whatever idea crosses his mind, but that desire doesn’t mean he has the capacity to cause, or to will, those ideas to manifest objectively.

On the other hand, one can attain only that which is feasible, or possible, which could be said to be the limitation of practical desire.

one can desire in accordance with whatever idea crosses his mind — Mww

Does this agree with Dawnstorm's idea regarding "trigger"?

1. Trigger. A sudden craving for cheese vs. seeing a piece of cheese and wanting to eat it. The object triggers the situational instance of will/desire, vs. something else (some association? a random firing of neurons?) triggers the will/desire. — Dawnstorm

I take these "mind-crossings" and other "triggers" into account in my illustrations, I just call them "reasons" (or "causes") instead of wills or desires. A trigger itself is not a will nor a desire. When the rising sun triggers my will to leave the bed, that trigger is 150 million kilometers away from my mental location. My will doesn't generate the sun. It's true that my will can generate another will, but -- vice versa -- my will cannot generate that same will's cause or reason. An egg cannot generate its mother.

Does this agree with Dawnstorm's idea regarding "trigger"? — Quk

Ehhhh….dunno. Maybe. Smacks of psychology to me, while I’m more inclined toward speculative metaphysics for its explanatory power.

someone can of course have reasons for choosing something that isn't their preference. — flannel jesus

The clearest example of a free choice is a choice made against and despite all biases, drivers, necessities and forces. Choosing the cake that no one wants, that you don't need, that you think will taste horrible, that you are told not to choose, that will kill you, and without any need to choose anything at all - choosing that cake, can only be an act of freedom. Giving ones life can be an act of freedom.

There are gradations of course. Choosing the cake that you hate but for someone else who loves that cake, knowing that other person doesn't expect or even know about the cake (so no cake is needed), this might be a cake chosen out of free will and no outside forces.

So what is freewill then - what is left to drive the choice if one is choosing outside of all biases, drivers, and forces?

I don't know, but describe it this way - we create the thing called "will" in the same instant we choose against forces that demand we choose something else. When we seek all three cakes, see our drivers and biases towards this cake or that one, and then choose something else, the choice is the physical manifestation of the now created "my will" that consents to that choice belonging to "me".

Choosing the cake that no one wants, that you don't need, that you think will taste horrible, that you are told not to choose, that will kill you, and without any need to choose anything at all - choosing that cake, can only be an act of freedom. — Fire Ologist

There's a reason to choose that horrible, toxic, useless cake. This reason leads the will. The will doesn't have the freedom to deactivate this reason. You may think there is no such reason, but I'd say there is one; you just need to take a closer look.

And if there's no such reason, then the cake selection is pure random. In that case too the will has no freedom; it's just controlled by a random trigger instead of a reason.

"The will is free."

The problem with this statement is that the expression "free" is incomplete.

Free of what? That's the missing part. The will can only be free of special reasons and causes.

So, I think the issue cannot be generalized; it needs to be specialized.

Example:

If I'm indifferent to cakes, there's no reason to eat one, nor is there any reason not to eat one. In this special case the will is free of cake related reasons.

But the will is not free in general. There's always a cause or a reason for a decision. It's impossible to inhibit all causes and reasons of the universe.

"My will is currently free of cake related reasons."

That is a complete statement because it gives the word "free" a reference. The word "free" makes sense now. Cakes are not influencing my will at this moment.

There's always a cause or a reason for a decision. It's impossible to inhibit all causes and reasons of the universe. — Quk

If it is impossible to inhibit all reasons, is there a single reason, or a manifold of reasons under a particular rubric, necessary in itself, to cause any decision? Is there one reason impossible to inhibit for decision-making?

To arrive at the possibility of a singular condition is the very epitome of specialized, insofar as the will’s freedom, and the will’s limitations thereby infused into it, are given.

Is there one reason impossible to inhibit for decision-making? — Mww

Is there any reason among all reasons which cannot influence a decision? -- I don't think so.

Can all reasons influence a decision? -- Yes, I think so.

Is there any reason among all reasons which cannot influence a decision? -- I don't think so. — Quk

But I’m asking about the possibility of there being one reason which always influences any decision.

Could there be a single universal non-dividable reason influencing any decision? I'd say no, not a single one; I see a threefold core:

1. Logic in general
2. Causality in general
3. Random in general

In the instance we are being invited to examine here, IMO none of the four subjects are applying their 'free will'. I would actually go further and claim that there are no such things as graduations of free will either ("Wow! You were almost free willing there!") ... In much the same way that IMO there's no such thing as a 'near death' experience.

I'll respond to this quickly and then get back to earlier replies (sorry to everyone for the delays).

Yes, I think I agree with you. I was speaking very loosely and I'll come up with a different formulation to express the gradation I was thinking of.

I'm interested in non-vague concepts, that is, concepts that do not admit of degrees, and do not admit of borderline cases. It seems you think that the line between free will and unfree will is sharp (or perhaps the line between will and non-will is sharp), and also the line between alive and dead is sharp, perhaps? Other possible concepts that are perhaps not-vague are consciousness, space, and less-than-7.

The vast majority of concepts are vague - they admit of borderline cases. Famous ones are heap/pile and baldness. Others could include human, chair, lawnmower, male, female, liquidity, planet, wall, food, kidney, brain, and pretty much any concept you care to think of.

Oh, and welcome to the Philosophy Forum :)

I understood your "gradation" as a reference to the amount of options, not to the will's intensitiy. I understood, the will which accepts 100 options has a greater freedom than that other will which accepts 3 options. Anyway, even this quantitative idea won't work, in my opinion, because the amount of options is a relative number: Considering 2 cakes doesn't necessarily imply a higher number than considering the cherry, chocolate, and nut of 1 cake. The large Sahara doesn't necessarily imply a greater variety than the small Stonehenge does.

Yes there is arbitrariness in the things we choose to count. Very interesting. I'll get back to your earlier posts as well asap.