Why must any of them buy a cake?

Particular Pete ONLY likes Eccles Cake 1 - therefore, if offered the choice of the three, he MUST choose Eccles cake 1. Is that right? — bert1

uh no not necessarily. someone can of course have reasons for choosing something that isn't their preference.

The conclusion here is that there are gradations of free will, of choice, from particular to absolute, depending on our preferences/values. — bert1

I wouldn't even say that this example illustrates that. Just because someone likes one option more than another doesn't mean they aren't exercising as much free will as another person. I keep on hearing the idea from various people that free will only comes into play when the options presented are equal or near-equal. I don't think that's the case.

If that were the case, then that would mean someone WASN'T exercising free will every time they did something they really wanted to do, or avoided doing something they didn't want to do, and thus they deserve no blame or praise for those actions. So if a rapist really wants to rape, and prefers that strongly above all other options, that means they have no free will in that choice? And thus can't be blamed? Mmmmm I think that misses the mark by quite a lot.

I've set it up that way I guess! This universe consists of a cake shop, three cakes, and four people. What else is there to do? If Pete chooses not to buy a cake, he's not Particular Pete any more, he's Absolute Pete.

They are all chained by desire, and their freedom is nothing but a conflict of desires. is that right?

Desire is a projection of memory.

Thus the determinism of the mind is an introjection of the determinism of the world , which is a projection in turn of the need for stability and predictability. The storyteller is constrained by their need for neatness.

Wilful Willy hurls a brick through the cake shop window showering the remaining cakes with glass fragments - the other poor lost souls all die of internal injuries, caused by greed, except Abdul who dies of a brick to the head. "Just what I wanted", says Wil.

I've set it up that way I guess! — bert1

In your story, you are god and always correct.

If Pete chooses not to buy a cake, he's not Particular Pete any more, he's Absolute Pete. — bert1

So Pete does not determine his choice, but is determined by it?

uh no not necessarily. someone can of course have reasons for choosing something that isn't their preference. — flannel jesus

Sure, I'm trying to keep the universe simple to make it easier to think about. But these other reasons, are they anything other than competing preferences? In which case must Pete choose the option that his strongest preference inclines him to?

They are all chained by desire, and their freedom is nothing but a conflict of desires. is that right? — unenlightened

Yes and no, it's relative. Geraldine, for example, is chained by her desire for a cake, but is not chained by her indifference to which Eccles cake she prefers.

Thus the determinism of the mind is an introjection of the determinism of the world , which is a projection in turn of the need for stability and predictability. The storyteller is constrained by their need for neatness. — unenlightened

The storyteller is a philosopher who wants to start with a simple OP that is easy to comprehend but serves as a basis for exploring some ideas. :)

Wilful Willy is a significant complication to the universe.

If that were the case, then that would mean someone WASN'T exercising free will every time they did something they really wanted to do, or avoided doing something they didn't want to do, and thus they deserve no blame or praise for those actions. So if a rapist really wants to rape, and prefers that strongly above all other options, that means they have no free will in that choice? And thus can't be blamed? — flannel jesus

That is indeed the intuition, yes. For the avoidance of doubt, I do think that rapists should be prevented from raping, but perhaps not that they should be punished because they are to blame.

Desire is a projection of memory. — unenlightened

Is this a psychological fact? As I believe it cannot.

In your story, you are god and always correct. — unenlightened

Sure, but my artificial universe is intended to be a simplified version of this one, and therefore meaningfully critiquable. I'm happy for people to complicate it to make it more realistic.

Desire is a projection of memory.

Thus the determinism of the mind is an introjection of the determinism of the world , which is a projection in turn of the need for stability and predictability. — unenlightened

I don't immediately understand this. Could you elaborate a little?

gradations of free will — bert1

I think "will" consists of just two parameters:

Direction and magnitude.

"Will" is a vector. "Freedom" is not a parameter of a vector.

In your model I see various wills and a variable range of options. Omni Otto steers the vector to a direction according to Otto's desire (by the way, avoiding the worst case in the long run can also a be desire). I think, freedom, in this context, is a metaphor for the range available, and this range doesn't lie in the vector per se; a vector is not a range but an "arrow", so to speak. Still, Otto's "decision device" is not really free; his desires are caused by something or occur at random. In either case -- causal or random -- it's not Otto's "will" that generates Otto's desire. "Will" is neither free nor unfree; "will" is just a force. Can a gravitational force be free? Can a magnetic force be free? No, it can only be forceful. It's something else that can influence a force. The force itself cannot influence itself.

So, are there gradations of free will? I would say there are gradations of will; to be precise: Gradations of the will's direction and the will's magnitude. If we talk about the gradation of options, then it's about options, not about will.

Cool, that's very interesting, thanks. I'll come back to it later.

One more thought regarding the cakes in particular:

A cake is a complex thing.

Ten X-cakes don't neccessarily represent a greater option bandwidth than one Y-cake.

You can visualize ten X-cakes by drawing this bandwidth:

XXXXXXXXXX

Now you could add a will-vector that can point anywhere within this bandwidth.

Similarly, you can visualize that one Y-cake by drawing a bandwidth of its Y-elements (cherry particles, sugar particles, chocolate particles etc.):

CSHFGXCBNVMUIOQPLYP

Add a will-vector that can point anywhere within this bandwidth.

Now which bandwidth is greater? The one of the ten X-cakes or that of the Y-cake?

It cannot be answered. It's all relative. The degree of freedom (of options) requires a reference.

When something is free, it's free of what? Free of certain limits. On the other hand, these limits are relative, not absolute. Even God's enormous freedom, if he exists, is not unlimited: He doesn't have the freedom to be a non-God, because if he were a non-God, he wouldn't have that enormous freedom.

But these other reasons, are they anything other than competing preferences — bert1

No you've got it, they would be competing preferences I think.

Desire is a projection of memory.

Thus the determinism of the mind is an introjection of the determinism of the world , which is a projection in turn of the need for stability and predictability.
— unenlightened

I don't immediately understand this. Could you elaborate a little? — bert1

I desire ecclesiastical cakes because I have enjoyed ecclesiastical cakes in the past AND I expect ecclesiastical cakes to be the same in all relevant ways. So my desire is predicated on the assumption that ecclesiastical cakes and my tastes are predictable and consistent. {I decided to leave that autocorrection just for fun} In other words, desire presumes determinism. The next eccles cake might make me ill, or taste foul because it was made with palm oil instead of butter, or I might have developed an allergy to currents, but my desire already presumes consistency.

So mind projects consistency onto the world even to the extent of mechanising the production of eccles cakes and regulating by law the ingredients, in order to back-project as it were, that consistent predetermined nature onto itself as desiring ego. It is the mind and only the mind that predetermines what it will 'inevitably' decide.

The particulars here, seem to be in decisions made from past experiences. In your example the choice was made by a past decision. But perhaps something occurs that makes you change that decision. Like some Icecream is 400 calories per serving, some are 100 calories per serving. You may decide that from now on you want to try something with less calories. So you update a decision preference. To decide means to kill off other options.

One does lose in choice if they go with the predecided factors but the choice was already made at some point. But limiting yourself to safe choices because you know you like that 1 option is how limited some people are. Sometimes we make choices not at the precipice of the moment. Where as true spontaneous choice in the matter requires us to be free from preformed decisions.

This is reminiscent of Nan-In's Cup of Tea story...
How can one be taught anything when their head is already convoluted by preformed decisions about that something.

I've set it up that way I guess! This universe consists of a cake shop, three cakes, and four people. What else is there to do? If Pete chooses not to buy a cake, he's not Particular Pete any more, he's Absolute Pete. — bert1

Your set-up is confusing, though. If Pete were to decide to buy an Eccles 2 cake, would he be General Pete or Universal Pete. Would he know?

My intuition is that restricitions are what makes any particular will descernible as will. So if Absolute Abdul has no preference at all, in what way could we say there's will? He's certainly free to chose between four equal opportunities - but the choice doesn't matter. There's no will here, only randomness.

Your set-up feels like one of those logical puzzles: the optimal outcome is:

Pete: EC1
Geraldine: EC2
Ursula: IF
Abdul: None

But viewed like that, both freedom and will appear to be a social-distribution category. But your categories don't say anything about the social dimension. It's just sort of implied in the three-cakes/four-people set up.

For example, Absolute Abdul could choose Eccles Cake 1, as the social dimension is not part of the "Absolute" modifier, and thus undefinied. Your set-up doesn't tell me what happens if Particular Pete, General Geraldine and Absolute Abdul all choose Eccles Cake 1. I suppose the Universe terminates in an error?

In addition to what I wrote above: I would distinguish between will und the ability to reach the will's goal.

Arnold's goal is to become an astronaut. That's his will.
Arnold is imprisoned in Alcatraz. This doesn't inhibit his will to become an astronaut.

Will is a mental function. The police can imprison the body but not the mind.

Geraldine wants to eat a cake. That's her will.
There are no cakes, so her will's goal cannot be reached. But her will is still there.

If Pete chooses not to buy a cake, he's not Particular Pete any more, he's Absolute Pete.
— bert1

So Pete does not determine his choice, but is determined by it? — unenlightened

Maybe yes. Pete's choice might change his nature perhaps.

I think "will" consists of just two parameters:

Direction and magnitude.

"Will" is a vector. "Freedom" is not a parameter of a vector.

In your model I see various wills and a variable range of options. Omni Otto steers the vector to a direction according to Otto's desire (by the way, avoiding the worst case in the long run can also a be desire). I think, freedom, in this context, is a metaphor for the range available, and this range doesn't lie in the vector per se; a vector is not a range but an "arrow", so to speak. — Quk

I think I'm pretty much happy with that. Makes sense to me.

Still, Otto's "decision device" is not really free; his desires are caused by something or occur at random. In either case -- causal or random -- it's not Otto's "will" that generates Otto's desire. — Quk

It seems to me that particular desires just are will-vectors, no?

And it occurs to me that desire in general is perhaps a restlessness of the will. Will is such that it tends to pick an object, at random if there is no pre-existing particular desires that already condition it in a relevant way.

Perhaps the freedom of the will is the portion of will that is not committed to an end, not desiring something.

An individual has free will perhaps is a couple of senses: (1) they have uncommitted will 'spare' perhaps (2) there are things that s/he is free from. I passed a copy of 50 Shades of Grey today in a bookshop, and I was free not to buy it, as it has no hold on me, I don't have a will-vector committed to obtaining it. In the scenario, Geraldine is free from having to buy an Iced Finger and one of the Eccles cakes. Not caring, and indifference (which have negative connotations) might describe a kind of psychological freedom in relation to the objects one is indifferent to.

"Will" is neither free nor unfree; "will" is just a force. Can a gravitational force be free? Can a magnetic force be free? No, it can only be forceful. It's something else that can influence a force. The force itself cannot influence itself. — Quk

That's interesting. I'm not sure. What about an unmagnetised bit of iron? There's no overall force - the forces of the crystals average to zero over the whole thing (or something like that - please correct me). That might be analogous to the person who desires/wills many things simultaneously to an equal degree, and therefore is unable to choose any of them (except at random) - the vectors cancel.

I would say there are gradations of will; to be precise: Gradations of the will's direction and the will's magnitude. If we talk about the gradation of options, then it's about options, not about will. — Quk

Yes that sounds reasonable and more precise than my original wording.

As everyone knows, cake stores serve customers on a first come first served basis. Since Pete‘s first, he takes an Eccles cake. Geraldine is second, so she also takes an Eccles cake. Ursula takes the iced finger. Nothing for Abdul.

No philosophy needed.

You can change the order they go into the shop if you like. Could any of them have done otherwise than they did?

Part of the point of the OP is to look at the level of abstraction to see if it has any relevance to the free will/determinism debate. Is somebody who likes cakes in general any more free than someone who likes a particular cake only? The generalising person has more options, no?

Is the educated person, who perceives causal societal structures in the world and can more effectively strategise and make choices based on this invisible underlying structure, any more free than someone who doesn't see any of that and only perceives what is happening in their immediate concrete particularised environment? That may be a different kind of question than the one posed in the OP, I'm not sure.

The generalising person has more options, no? — bert1

My earlier post was whimsical and silly, and I sort of wish I hadn't made it, but there is a point hidden away in there and it concerns this:

We make distinctions and attach our desires to them. So it's not necessarily true that, from the perspective of the person in question, that they have more options. It depends on the categories that are meaningful to them. Maybe they just like "cake": their options would be equivalent, while the "texture" of their desire would be less rich, if that makes sense.

There was a second point, too, but it was even more implied:

What's the relationship between desire and will? Do they have the same target, or is will the result of a synthesis of bundles of conflicting desires? So when you reply to Patterner thus:

This universe consists of a cake shop, three cakes, and four people. What else is there to do? — bert1

I would say, taking the desires (known or unknown) of the other three people into account can be part of the will (as some sort of social desire: the desire to be looked upon well, the desire to see others happy, etc.). If you want to bracket the social element, that's fine, but you depending on what you think will is you might have gotten rid of the opportunity to see the whole picture. The question is: if we focus simply on the desire for cake, did we get rid of "will"? Does will emerge from the conflict of desires as some sort of synthesised compound?

It seems to me that particular desires just are will-vectors, no? — bert1

What's the relationship between desire and will? Do they have the same target, or is will the result of a synthesis of bundles of conflicting desires? — Dawnstorm

Good questions. Two thoughts:

1. Desire and will have the same meaning. From now on I just use the word "will", but that's a synonym for "desire" too.

2. Will is not static. There are dynamic bundles, trees, branches of multiple wills. A certain will may last for several years or just for a few milliseconds. Example: I want to eat cheese (will A) and I want to lose weight (will B). This is a dilemma. Here comes will C which wants to compare will A with will B: What's more important now and in the long run? The hedonist-meter indicates: Will A is greater than will B. Here comes will D which wants to rely on the hedonist-meter; will D makes the final decision: Eat that cheese now and lose weight later!

Now, are A, B, C, and D all free?

A --> Eat cheese. Reason: It tastes good. The eater hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason.

B --> Lose weight: Reason: The latest fashion dictates that slim bodies look better. The fashion follower hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason.

C --> Compare A with B. Reason: Joy maximization. The joy maximizer hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason.

D --> Make a final decision: Reason: Someone else is about to take this cheese. The final decider hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason.

None of those special wills have the freedom to unlink themselves from their special reasons. The reasons generate the wills, and whether they're going to be fulfilled depends on the options available. The occurance of a special will may also be a reason for another will and so on -- like a chain reaction. Random events may disturb the chain's causality. In any case, I find it hard to integrate the word "freedom" in this system.

Desire and will have the same meaning. — Quk

If I may desire whatever I want, but it is altogether impossible to will whatever I want, then the two concepts cannot have the same meaning for me.

Is this a good analysis? — bert1

I think not, insofar as that situation whereby a choice MUST be made contradicts the fundamental idea of choice itself.

MUST choose. The impossibility of NOT choosing. Therefore, MUST choose is the same as not NOT choosing. Which answers the thread title: apparently we are not entirely free to choose, because we are not free to make no choice.

But of course…we are.

If I may desire whatever I want, but it is altogether impossible to will whatever I want, then the two concepts cannot have the same meaning for me. — Mww

I can't desire what I want. For example, I'm heterosexual because my genes are programmed like this. I can't switch my desire for women over to men. That's impossible. My desire and my will is directed towards women. I don't have the freedom to change that.

Well, I can write some desires on a paper and send them to Santa Claus. I may wish to get a unicorn although I hate unicorns. These lines on that paper may all sound like desires. But I'm talking about real desires, not fake desires nor desires in the grammatical sense.

A --> Eat cheese. Reason: It tastes good. The eater hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason.

B --> Lose weight: Reason: The latest fashion dictates that slim bodies look better. The fashion follower hasn't the freedom to deactivate this reason. — Quk

I've read C, but I'm stopping here for a reason. I'm not convinced an analytic combination of desire/will creates a fine-enough tool to look at the situation. There are a couple of dimension here I'd like to address, unsystematically for now:

1. Trigger. A sudden craving for cheese vs. seeing a piece of cheese and wanting to eat it. The object triggers the situational instance of will/desire, vs. something else (some association? a random firing of neurons?) triggers the will/desire. The target is ideal if not present, and specific if present (but also ideal, because to recognise cheese as cheese is to have expectations for a category that overlays the instance). It's far easier not to eat cheese if there isn't any and you'd have to go to the fridge/shop etc to get it. [Aesop's Fox and Grapes is instructive here.]

2. Complexity of what you call "reason" here: "tastes good" seems less complex than fashion dictates. But where there's complexity, I'd need analytic categories to account for components. Would a conflation of desire and will make things clearer or cause confusion (note that this might differ from person to person, since people have different thought habits).

3. What you call reason seems to split up into two modes: legitimisation and motivation. Even "tastes good" can be some sort of legitimisation; if you're eating cheese out of habit and have no real other reason you might want to convince yourself of liking the taste more than you actually do. If you were to kick the habit and then go back to eating cheese later, you might find you no longer like it (I'm speaking from experience, though not with cheese). A question here is: was I ever motivated by taste, or was this an easy-to-understand and not-too-implausible rationalisation for an indecipherable bundle. In any case, the vector (a pretty good choice of word, thanks for that) of the desire does point towards cheese.

So given that, what's the advantages/disadvantages of having one category or two, here? My own position so far is that I'd intuitively like to keep them separate for now (call this a weak instance of "desire/will"), so I'm biased. But this particular question (dis/advantages) is an open one with no concrete answers or even models in my mind. Still thinking.

(Part of the background context is that I consider "free will" both an unimportant and vague concept, so I don't usually think about it, and I never bring it up of my own accord.)

I agree that the system is way more complex. I just wanted to show a simplified sample section of a dynamic "will" network that actually consists of a zillion wills. For the purpose of simplification I decreased the amount of wills to four.

The examples you added -- "go to the fridge" etc. -- are all fine. These are some of those zillion reasons and will-generators that I excluded in my simplified illustration. I'm not trying to say that reality consists of just four wills; I was just trying to illustrate the principle of this network.

I can't desire what I want. — Quk

Desire: in general, a subject's capacity to become, by means of his ideas, the cause of the actual existence of the objects of those ideas.

A related effect does not necessarily follow from having a causal capacity, but for that subject attaining the effect related to an idea, a causal desire for it is necessarily presupposed.

A guy passes up a parking spot, without knowing the availability of any other, has immediately the idea of a shorter, post-parking, walk, the desire for which can only be satisfied by causing himself to look for a closer spot.

A guy takes the first parking spot he comes to, the idea of cruising the lot in vain hope of finding a better one insufficient causality for a very contingent effect, expresses a more relaxed desire, but a desire nonetheless.

I can't switch my desire for women over to men. — Quk

Yet, there are instances of record of those that desire the switch, and of those there are some that will themselves to cause the attainment of the idea contained in that desire. From which follows that the concepts of desire and will having the same meaning is not necessarily the case, and if not necessarily the case, then possibly not true at all.