More a matter of coherence. — Banno

Did you show that the theory of forms is incoherent? I missed that.

apparently you missed quite a bit. Cheers.

Go to: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy_of_the_divided_line

and click on tabular summary of the divided line.

The 4 levels of knowledge based upon their consistency with the pure form are:

Imagination (eikasia), Belief (pistis), Understanding (dianoia), and Pure Reason or Theoretical Reasoning (nous).

Imagination is the least reliably related to true form, and it's considered perhaps a creation of other parts of true forms (as in Pegasus would be horse, wing, etc, but not an actual thing).

This is my best understanding based on the rabbit hole I went down trying to figure this out.

How this correlates to your linguistic concerns is interesting, but difficult to integrate because Plato, at least here, isn't correlating words to meaning, but knowledge to things.

Thanks. A thoughtful reply.

I'm struck by how much this is an evaluation. And an evaluation that debases the physical world. A hierarchy, the commons at the bottom, the few at the top. A defence of elitism. So it would not be a surprise to see forms defended by erstwhile aristocrats. Just an observation.

Ordinary language concerns itself with practicalities. Its concerns are belief and appearance, enabling us to navigate daily life, make things, buy things, survive. Plato sees this as a problem, since truth is to be found in dianoia or noēsis. But that’s also what makes common language powerful—it works. It’s how we build, argue, care, joke, mourn. It may not be about eternal truths, but it's deeply human. And it is where meaning is found - since meaning is the use to which we put our common language.

So as one moves along the line, one moves away from use and practicality, presumably toward misuse and impracticality. There's the link to linguistic concerns.

Not a style of discourse I like much, being more at home in analytic responses. But increasingly folk seem to like this sort of fluff. Perhaps this will show you something of why I find forms somewhat objectionable.

Why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one identical' object present which it denotes? Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things ?
Why should not words be by nature 'general' ? (Quoting Austin) — Banno

Words can only be general because they denote universals. But universals are not things that exist. They are not objects as such. Designating them as 'things' is precisely the reification that you and Austin are complaining about. But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

Note again from Russell:

the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. ....it seems plain that the relation subsists

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects, but as the indispensable constituents of the rational structure of reality - the 'ligatures of reason' - grasped by the mind, and necessary for intelligibility, yet not themselves located in space and time.

I'll pick this up later.

struck by how much this is an evaluation. And an evaluation that debases the physical world. A hierarchy, the commons at the bottom, the few at the top. A defence of elitism. So it would not be a surprise to see forms defended by erstwhile aristocrats. Just an observation. — Banno

I know Plato was opposed to democracy, preferring philosopher kings, so that would be elitist. Traditional theism posits a perfect God, so that too appears Platonic, although the early OT God was very much on an earthly level. Christianity has an all high God, but it also holds meekness a virtue, so that does appear a counter to the suggestion elitism flows from Platonism, considering Plato"s influence on it.

Where Plato specifically addresses words and meaning: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-cratylus/

I found that discussion of little value other than historical. Debating whether words are arbitrary or somehow naturally linked to the form was an odd debate, but perhaps that work was a very early recognition of the tension between meaning and words.

as one moves along the line, one moves away from use and practicality, presumably toward misuse and impracticality. There's the link to linguistic concerns. — Banno

I see Plato as unapologetically metaphysical, a realm linguistic theory tries to avoid, so I see Kant's noumena in the forms more clearly than your implication. That is, the closer we get to reality, the less we know of it. Kantian phenomena are the shadows on the caves so to speak. See also,
Exodus 33:18-23 for interesting metaphor where God equals truth.

may not be about eternal truths, but it's deeply human. And it is where meaning is found - since meaning is the use to which we put our common language. — Banno

You live among the trees and that's where real life is experienced, but that doesn't mean recognizing the forest or even tending to it is a lesser good. I realize the analogy fails on an important level: trees are smaller parts of forests, where Plato's images are blurs of forms, but the point remains, life can occur in the foxhole, but wanting to know what the war is about matters too.

But to your specific point, that the emphasis on the most high and unknowable desecrates the truth of the daily experience gets at that vexing question of Truth.

As I'm following, the highest form of knowledge is of the form, not the reflections on the cave or in your imagination. The use of "knowledge" here requires Truth (as in JTB). So when Plato wants higher knowledge, he requires closer Truth (the form).

His is a conservation about knowledge (and so necessarily of truth) and yours of words. But maybe your placement of words at the level of forms is a suggestion that the word"s meaning is the highest truth?

Words can only be general because they denote universals — Wayfarer

So 'Wayfarer" is a universal? No.

But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist. — Wayfarer

That doesn't follow, and he doesn't, anyway.

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects — Wayfarer

Back to playing with 'exists'. If a 'ligatures of reason' is logical stuff like quantification and equivalence, then say so and we can have some agreement. Ohterwise, what the fuck is a 'ligatures of reason'?

...a realm linguistic theory tries to avoid.. — Hanover

Well, no, it doesn't. It deals with it by clarifying what's going on in metaphysical chat. That Kant made much the same error as Plato is not all that helpful... and that so much theology is built on Plato furhter complicates stuff.

Form other stuff you have said, you might agree that there only is a "forest" in so far as we interact with it - perhaps in recognising the river and the grassland as not forrest, or in planting seeds in order maintain the forest, and so on. The meaning (use) of "forest" rests on what we do, not on some abstracted forest form in a perfect world.

The picture Plato paints is arse-about.

I know Plato was opposed to democracy, preferring philosopher kings, so that would be elitist

The idea is also situated in a discussion of an ideal city as a model for the human soul. That's why the city is introduced in the first place, as an analogy for self-governance.

I find it ironic that Plato is often called an elitist today because this is very much the model of modern liberalism, at least in theory. There is, ideally, a highly trained, meritocratic elite who governs with the consent of the governed according to what is best for the whole. That's Plato, but that's liberalism from Hamilton writing in the Federalist Papers to modern progressivism, to the ideals of the Neocons.

*

Words can only be general because they denote universals. But universals are not things that exist. They are not objects as such. Designating them as 'things' is precisely the reification that you and Austin are complaining about. But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

Note again from Russell:

the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. ....it seems plain that the relation subsists

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects, but as the indispensable constituents of the rational structure of reality - the 'ligatures of reason' - grasped by the mind, and necessary for intelligibility, yet not themselves located in space and time. — Wayfarer

So, there are things that exist and things that do not exist. If those things do not exist, it might subsists. If it subsists, it is real. If it does not subsists, it is not real.

The question I have, if it does not exist and does not subsists, and thus not real, what is it? Can you provide an example of something not existing or subsisting?

It reminds me of what Quine said in "On what there is", "Wyman's overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst of it. Wyman's slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in the doorway; and, again the possible bald man in that door way. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men. How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another?"

there are things that exist and things that do not exist. If those things do not exist, it might subsists [sic]. If it subsists, it is real. If it does not subsists [sic], it is not real. — Richard B

I’m differentiating the sense in which particulars exist from the sense in which universals are real. Particulars exist in a phenomenal sense, but universals are real in a different sense. I think Russell uses ‘subsist’ to try and articulate this distinction, and while I don’t think that term provides a very elegant way of expressing it, at least it recognises there is a distinction to be made.

An archetypal example of a universal can be found in the argument from equals in the Phaedo. You will recall that in it, Socrates discusses the nature of 'equals' with Simmias, saying that unless we grasped the idea of 'equals' then we wouldn't recognise that two things of different kinds were of equal lengths. (Of course in the context Socrates argues that this must be because of knowledge the soul has before birth, but that is not relevant for my purposes.) So one might feasibly imagine an addendum to that dialogue:

Socrates: “This 'Equal' that you agree is essential to our judgments — can you show it to me? Can you point to it as you would point to a piece of wood or a stone?”

Simmias: “No, Socrates. 'The Equal' is not something we perceive with our senses. It is something that only reason (nous) can grasp.”

Thus, Socrates draws Simmias to recognize that the Equal — and by analogy, all such intelligible Forms — does not exist as a physical thing, but subsists as an intelligible reality, knowable only to a rational soul (psuché).

A fuller elaboration of this point is provided by Eric D. Perl in "Thinking Being: An Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition":

Forms...are radically distinct, and in that sense ‘apart,’ in that they are not themselves sensible things. With our eyes we can see large things, but not largeness itself; healthy things, but not health itself. The latter, in each case, is an idea, an intelligible content, something to be apprehended by thought rather than sense, a ‘look’ not for the eyes but for the mind. This is precisely the point Plato is making when he characterizes forms as the reality of all things. “Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?—In no way … Or by any other sense, through the body, have you grasped them? I am speaking about all things such as largeness, health, strength, and, in one word, the reality [οὐσίας, ouisia] of all other things, what each thing is” (Phd. 65d4–e1). Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason. If, taking any of these examples—say, justice, health, or strength—we ask, “How big is it? What color is it? How much does it weigh?” we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense. They are thus‘separate’in that they are not additional members of the world of sensible things, but are known by a different mode of awareness. But this does not mean that they are ‘located elsewhere'... — Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28

Thus, when we distinguish between particulars that exist phenomenally and universals that are real intelligibly, we are making precisely the kind of distinction Plato articulates, and which later philosophy (including thinkers like Russell, despite his awkward terminology) recognizes as crucial to any coherent account of universals (not that he elsewhere defends scholastic realism).

As for Quine, that is a vulgar caricature.

Looks like there was something to see here after all...

Looks like there was something to see here after all... — DifferentiatingEgg

Yeah, look at all the scribbled forms on this web page form.

In considering Plato, we might ask: "In virtue of what are all just acts called 'just' or all round things called 'round?'" If there are facts about which acts are just, or which things are round, etc., in what do these facts consist?

If our response is that there are social rules for making vocal utterances, assertability criteria for declaring something 'just' or 'round,' I am not sure this gets us very far, since the most obvious response to: "when is it appropriate to assert that something is round?" is "when it is round, as opposed to say, square." It will be hard to trace back a rule for "round" that has nothing to do with round things (indeed, the rule would have to create roundness instead of vice versa). In order for something to "count as" "round" or "a fly" it seems there must be something identifiable by which all round things are round, all flies flies, etc. If there wasn't, no rule identifying these instances from any others would be possible. Plus, there is the further difficulty that when round things cease being round, roundness itself does not change.

Plato is certainly concerned with language, but the more primary concern is how anything is anything at all and how particulars instantiate universals. Language is downstream of this concern for Plato. In his letters, where he is more explicit, he specifically suggests that language only deals with relative truths, not the truths of metaphysics. Plato is living in a period where languages do not extend very far and are unstandardized, and where dialects vary from valley to valley. He is well aware of barbarians who use different tokens to represent things, have different customs, and "different concepts."

Nonetheless, if things can truly be just, round, cats, red, etc. then some explanation is needed. It will not do to simply point out that things are called "just," "round," "cats," "red," etc. by men, since presumably men do not call things such for no reason at all, or for no reason outside the rules regarding their own utterances. This would imply:

A. That the utterances and their rules generate themselves, as opposed to being caused by the presence of round things, cats, trees, etc. The utterances would be constitutive of anything being anything determinant. A ball would be round because it is called "round," as opposed to being called round because it is round.

B. Presumably, facts about what is taller than what, what is round and what is not, what is just or good, are not solely about the vocalizations some community tends to make in response to given sense stimuli. If it was just this (the behaviorist approach), the behaviorist theory itself would be contentless. Understanding would play no role in knowledge, and all facts would be mutable.

Given the extreme dominance of nominalism in our era, I think it's very easy to accidentally beg the question against Plato. One might point out that things like "water" "have changed." Now water is known as "H2O." Whales are no longer considered "fish," etc. However, these sorts of changes are only a challenge for universals if one has already decided that the universal just is the word in question, which is the very thing the realist denies.

A realist might object that the "water" we see today is very much the same water our ancestors dealt with when it rained, or when they came to ponds, rivers, etc. It's the same concept, it has the same quiddity. Our intentions towards it have just become more refined. Nothing about realism entails that one fully grasps a universal and all of its relations. According to Plato, we don't. If, as St. Thomas says, the collective efforts of man have yet to fathom the full essence of a fly, it should hardly be surprising that new intentions are developed of flies. The question is more: "is the fly prior to human language?" Or "does man have a name for flies because there are flies, or are there flies because man has a name for them?" If the latter, the realist challenge is "why does man create a name for flies?"

A "co-constitutional" approach that splits the difference runs into the problem of the naturalist observation that flies appear to be far more ancient than human language.

As I see it, the only way to perceive The Forms, is through mathematics. Thus, if one were to try and describe in mathematics, what Plato alluded to The Forms, then, would it be tantamount to the very mathematical identities which one encounters in the study of mathematics?

Would the irrational number, π, also constitute some understanding of The Forms? — Shawn

How does one perceive mathematics? When did homo sapiens sapiens perceive mathematics? What is a mathematical entity? When dividing 10 by 3, what is the form of the infinite number of 3s that is part of the quotient?


I think of Plato's forms as informational templates - mental categories that take the visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, etc. forms our senses provide. While all things are unique, they may share many properties with other things or not share many things. Think of a document template like a resume. All resumes are unique but follow a template. There are certain properties that make a document a resume and some properties that play no role in whether or not it is defined as a resume (like the language or the font used) but play a role as the variety in resumes.

Since everything is unique, I would say that forms are secondary to particulars. Minds conceive of forms only after observing multiple particulars.

Those things that are more similar than dissimilar are grouped together for the purpose of communicating them to others. Which forms we communicate is dependent upon our current goal. When telling you about an animal I had seen, I will refer to the template and not the particular when the distinctions between the particulars are irrelevant to the current goal - what it is I'm trying to communicate.

In your own view, what are The Forms — Shawn

Essences, or universals, or ideas - intelligible/mental stuff.

Or in art, you have the medium (paint, bronze) and the particular form the artist gives them (Starry Night, The Thinker).

Plato’s theory has a lot of issues, as he recognizes in the Parmenides. That only gives him more credibility. And he was having the same conversation we are right now, but about 2500 years ago. So he must have been prettty smart. Not just “a mistaken theory” at issue.

Plato's "Symposium" is a very good source as a tutorial for understanding "Forms" through the theory of participation.

In considering Plato, we might ask: "In virtue of what are all just acts called 'just' or all round things called 'round?'" If there are facts about which acts are just, or which things are round, etc., in what do these facts consist? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Acts are called just when they seem to the one doing the calling to be fair. There is no necessity that everyone will agree with the assessment of justice. As to roundness, it is a perceptible quality and most people will agree, so no mystery there.

I wonder how would an elemental form could be. For it being elementary, it should be everywhere right? In flavours, in sounds, in sight. I think there should be some starting from, from where our mind builds representations, otherwise our mind must be as complex as universe

In your own view, what are The Forms, which Plato alluded to?
As I see it, the only way to perceive The Forms, is through mathematics. Thus, if one were to try and describe in mathematics, what Plato alluded to The Forms, then, would it be tantamount to the very mathematical identities which one encounters in the study of mathematics? — Shawn

I agree. Some on this forum are uncomfortable with the concept of Ideal Forms, because it's a non-empirical metaphysical notion. But then Mathematics is also abstract and intangible. For example, there are no numbers in the real world, only multiple things that can be counted by a rational Mind. And logical relationships are mental, not physical phenomena. Besides, the Greek word Mathema simply refers to knowledge in a mind, not to physical things in the world. Moreover, the Greek word Thema means the Idea of something, not the actual thing itself.

And yet, physical science has found metaphysical Mathematics to be useful, perhaps indispensable, for learning how the world works. And modern Math includes the concept of Zero --- symbolic of Nothingness or Absence --- which the ancient Greeks, including Aristotle, considered to be impractical, and even dangerously metaphysical --- in the sense of spookily unreal. Even so, we can see, with the mind's eye, a resemblance between real physical beauty and ideal metaphysical perfection, to which we may attach a number for relative perfection. {image below}

Moreover, the modern philosophical resistance to the very notion of Metaphysical Forms may stem from their implication of supernatural objects that can only be known subjectively via imagination. In fact, a common explanation for the theory of Forms is that they are Ideas, Concepts or Designs in the Mind of God. And that notion is, for some, unacceptably transcendent of material reality.

Yet, where in the material world can we find instances of Numbers & Mathematical Principles, except in a human mind? Likewise, abstract, in-corporeal, non-empirical Forms can only exist in an imaginative mind of some kind. And the God-Mind, or Form-Realm, could be viewed as simply a hypothetical locus of Forms such as Beauty, Perfection, Infinity, Zero, Unity & Multiplicity, that we can access only via rational inference, or idealization from empirical evidence, not by means of physical senses. :smile:


Plato's Theory of Forms, which posits a separate realm of perfect, eternal ideas or Forms, faces several criticisms. Some philosophers argue that it is too abstract, lacks empirical evidence, and raises logical problems in explaining the relationship between Forms and the imperfect world of appearances. Additionally, questions arise about the nature of Forms, their accessibility, and the implications for ethics and knowledge.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=the+problem+with+platos%27s+forms

IS IT REAL, OR IS IT A.I., OR IS IT IDEAL?

I hadn't noticed .

Here's a potted history of some of the main arguments from the last century of analytic thought.

“In virtue of what are all just acts just, or all round things round?”—is itself misleading. It presumes there must be some essence or metaphysical commonality underlying all uses of a term. But why should this be so? Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? Why should we not, for example, use the same word to name different things? And if one looks at the uses to which we put our words, it seems that this is indeed what we do. The red sports car and the red sunset are not the same colour, despite our using the same word for both. The round hill and the round ring are quite different.

There simply need be nothing common to all red or round things. And perhaps the same is true for the Just. Rather there may be many, diverse and overlapping similarities. The classic example here is of a game: we use the word "game" quite successfully despite not having at hand a rule that sets out for us what counts as a game. And indeed, it seems that were any such rule proposed, it would be a simple matter to find or invent a counter instance, a game that does not fit the rule. Yet we manage to use many, many words without access to such rules.

One approach leads us to suppose that there is a thing called “roundness” that exists apart from round things, a thing called "redness" apart from cars and sunsets. There's then the problem, central to this thread, of what sort of thing redness or roundness might be, if it exists over and above round or red things.This is hypostatisation, the act of treating an abstract idea or concept as a real, tangible thing or entity. It's what leads to asking what the forms are. But perhaps they aren't.

We might see this more clearly by asking how we learn what is red, what is round, or what is just. We don't learn to use these words by becoming familiar with a form for each. We learn to use these words by engaging in the world and with those around us. By using language. And here we will not be just learning to use a rule, since the application of any rule requires a background of practice and training against which to stand. We learn how to use "red" not only by talking about red things, but also by being told that the sunset is not red but pink, the car not red but orange, and so becoming able to use these words to act with others in a community. Learning is not an abstract process, but an engagement with the world.

We would do well not to sit back and consider such issues in the abstract, but instead to take some time to observe what happens around us. “Don’t think, but look!”. "We are not looking merely at words... we are looking at what we do with words." We should examine what words do in the wild, as well as in philosophical captivity. In what situations do we say something is "round", or something is "just"? And what do the misuses of such terms look like, and what do they tell us?

Most of all, we should have the humility to admit that these words work very well, thank you very much, without, and sometimes even despite, the interventions of philosophers.

Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? — Banno

Again that is the very reification that you previously criticized. ‘Reification’ is derived from the root ‘res’ which means ‘thing’ (it is also the root of 'reality'.) And forms (or universals) are not things. Nor are they thoughts, although when they appear, they appear as thoughts (per Bertrand Russell, previously quoted.) But if they are principles that operate in reality and are grasped by reason, then they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects. That is the nub of the issue.

And furthermore, being round or being red are not very good examples of forms (principles or ideas). That they can easily be regarded as attributes or properties of particulars is not an argument against the idea of forms. Better examples are those debated in the original texts - such as the form ‘equals’ in the Phaedo. What attribute or shape does 'equals' correspond to? None that I can think of. Yet you and I can both grasp what it means, because we’re possessed of rational skills and the ability to apprehend abstractions. Is 'equals' a thing? Perhaps in the modern vernacular, (‘when did that become a thing?) but not in any other sense. But without the concept equals, verbal communication and certainly basic arithmetic would be impossible.

The difficulty is, we’re some centuries removed from the cultural milieu in which forms were part of philosophy (then known as "realism" with quite a different meaning to what it has today). And they were then part of an alternative conception of knowledge, which provided the broader context within which they were meaningful:

Ockham (a principle instigator of nominalism) did not do away with objective reality, but in doing away with one part of objective reality—forms—he did away with a fundamental principle of explanation for objective reality. In doing away with forms, Ockham did away with formal causality. Formal causality secures teleology—the ends or purposes of things follow from what they are and what is in accord with or capable of fulfilling their natures. In the natural world, this realist framework secures an intrinsic connection between efficient causes and their effects—an efficient cause produces its effects by communicating some formality: fire warms by informing objects with its heat. ....

A genuine realist (concerning forms) should see “forms”...as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom — Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong with Ockham?

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@Count Timothy von Icarus

It's not clear to me what I am to conclude from your reply.

to be sure, there is a worthy area of study that seeks to understand the forms as they are found in various worthy historical works. Please, if that is the task here, go ahead.

But if the forms are to be taken as serious contenders for an account of how things are, then there might be a reckoning with the criticisms given above. If "they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects", then an account of this different existence might be offered, and a reason given as to the need for such a thing, especially in the light of what was said above.

And I don't see such a thing here.

If "they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects", then an account of this different existence might be offered, and a reason given as to the need for such a thing, especially in the light of what was said above. — Banno

You won't see it because you're representing a philosophical attitude (analytic philosophy) which has long since eschewed any idea of an hierarchical ontology, which is what is required to make sense of the idea that things and principles are real in different ways or exist on different levels; there can be no 'levels'. The default view is that existence is univocal, there is only one meaning to 'it exists' and something either exists or it doesn't. But that sense of univocity, and the corresponding loss of an hierarchical ontology, is itself a subject for metaphysics. And as metaphysics is a dead subject - why, then, there can be no account!

Analytic philosophy may be broader than you seem to suppose. I'll be happy to accept some "hierarchical ontology", if you can demonstrate the need. As things stand you appear to be indulging in some sort of special pleading rather than engaging with the very direct and explicit comments above.

I'm somewhat surprised to see you accept such an authoritarian stance.

As things stand, I think I have presented very good reasons not to make use of forms in any worthwhile ontology, but instead to look at how we make use of words. You haven't provided much by way of a reason to supose otherwise.

Analytic philosophy doesn't eschew metaphysics so much as insist that it be done well. Here, it suggests that we not introduce unnecessary entities such as forms. Can you show that they are needed?

Thanks, Banno. I appreciate you pressing for clarity. Let me try to make my position more explicit.

The real issue here is not whether we can use words like “game,” “red,” or “round” without reference to forms—we obviously can, as you say. The deeper question is what makes such uses possible in the first place. What makes it possible, for instance, for different people in different times and places to agree that 2+2=4, or that a circle is defined as form with all points equidistant from a center? These aren’t just verbal habits or social conventions; they are stable, objective insights that transcend their pragmatic use.

On your view, meaning arises from use. Fair enough. But that already presupposes that all meaning is socially constructed or linguistically mediated, which is already nominalist. The trouble with that is that it fails to ground the stability and universality of many basic concepts—not least those in mathematics, logic, and ethics.

For example, the concept 'equals' does not arise from observation. It isn’t the property of any object we can point to. Yet without it, as I said, both language and mathematics would not be possible. So what grounds the universality of this relation? Saying “it’s just how we talk” sounds more like an attempt to dodge a metaphysical question than to account for it.

As I said, I think the origin of forms and universals was as explanatory principles that account for why the world is intelligible in the first place. Forms are not things alongside other things. They are the reason why things are what they are and why we can know them as such. Eliminating them may appear to simplify your ontology, but it actually leaves you with no account of meaning other than habit or social practice, leaving only a consensus reality.

So the choice is not between “plain speech” and “unnecessary metaphysics.” It’s between two competing worldviews—one that treats intelligibility as real and one that reduces it to a social artifact. I’m inviting you to consider that the first may have more going for it than analytic fashion currently allows. And also that the historical reasons for the current ascendancy of plain language and analytic philosophy are plainly discernable.

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“In virtue of what are all just acts just, or all round things round?”—is itself misleading. It presumes there must be some essence or metaphysical commonality underlying all uses of a term. But why should this be so? Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? Why should we not, for example, use the same word to name different things? And if one looks at the uses to which we put our words, it seems that this is indeed what we do. The red sports car and the red sunset are not the same colour, despite our using the same word for both. The round hill and the round ring are quite different.

Yes, those would be instances of equivocal predication or pros hen predication, etc. What's the claim here though, that all predication is equivocal? Then you don't have logic. That terms are never predicated univocally? Then you also don't have logic.

But a basketball and baseball are not spherical in different ways, nor is red paint splashed on a wall here a different red than the a hockey stick painted with the same red paint. "Some predication is equivocal" is not a good argument for "no predication is univocal."

Who in "analytic logic" says otherwise?

There simply need be nothing common to all red or round things. And perhaps the same is true for the Just. Rather there may be many, diverse and overlapping similarities. The classic example here is of a game: we use the word "game" quite successfully despite not having at hand a rule that sets out for us what counts as a game. And indeed, it seems that were any such rule proposed, it would be a simple matter to find or invent a counter instance, a game that does not fit the rule. Yet we manage to use many, many words without access to such rules.

Is all predication supposed to be vague in this way? That seems pretty problematic. That'd be supposing all terms are vague.

A basic syllogism such as:

Socrates is a man.
All men are mortal.
Therefore Socrates is a mortal.

Would be in jeopardy if "man" is some vague notion of this sort. Certainly, one couldn't do geometry this way. Imagine trigonometry with a triangle defined in this way.

We might see this more clearly by asking how we learn what is red, what is round, or what is just. We don't learn to use these words by becoming familiar with a form for each. We learn to use these words by engaging in the world and with those around us

This is simply question begging if taken as an argument against realism though. Perception, including perception of language, involves forms in realism. The form is what is transmitted to the intellect. As an argument (as opposed to say, just laying out an alternative theory, I'm not sure of your goal here) this would be akin to: "nominalism is correct because nominalist theories say so."

Anyhow, how does one figure out how to "apply a rule for the word round," if there are not first round things? The form is, first and foremost, called in to explain the existence of round things, second our perceptions of them, and then language. It is not primarily about language because language was never considered "first philosophy" before the advent of analytic philosophy (i.e., "being and thought are prior to speaking.") People must be able to identify roundness to use to words to refer to it.

As things stand, I think I have presented very good reasons not to make use of forms in any worthwhile ontology, but instead to look at how we make use of words. — Banno

If there is any truth to what a thing is, then there is a need for forms. The form of a thing is what it is. If a thing has no form then there is no such truth, as what the thing is. So we need to allow that a thing has a form, if we want to allow that there is truth or falsity about what a thing is.

I believe that an ontology which holds that there is truth to what a thing is, is a worthwhile ontology. Therefore I find that there is good reason to make use of forms in a worthwhile ontology.

Right, but it's worth pointing out that this is sometimes denied (i.e., there is no truth about "what a thing is") and people still try to do ontology with this assumption. Although, when they—as they often do—appeal to "regularities," "patterns," and "constraints," that are prior to the act of "naming things what they are," I do think there is a problem, since these terms themselves either have some form or are simply contentless hand-waving to avoid a slip into an absolute volanturism (where the will makes anything what it is by a bare act of choice).

IMO, this mostly comes down to the elevation of potency over actuality. When the order is inverted, then one always has limitless possibility first, and only after any (arbitrary) definiteness. Voluntarism plays a large role here. It becomes the will (of the individual, God, the collective language community, or a sort of "world will") that makes anything what it is through an initial act of naming/stipulation. But prior to that act, there is only potency without form and will.

Presumably though, you need knowledge of an object in order to have any volitions towards that object. This is why I think knowing (even if it is just sense knowledge) must be prior to willing, and so acquisition of forms prior to "rules of language," and of course, act before potency (since potency never moves to act by itself, unless it does so for no reason at all, randomly).

Edit: I suppose another fault line here that ties into your post (which I agree with) is: "truth as a property of being" versus "truth solely as a property of sentences." In the latter, nothing is true until a language has been created, and so nothing can truly be anything until a linguistic context exists. That might still require form to explain though, because again, it seems some knowledge must lie prior to naming.