What is a 'mental object' in the first place? — Wayfarer

Concepts/images/qualia - units of thoughts.

Russell: "Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts."
This seems consistent with Armstrong's view of universals: they are sets of properties that exist where they are instantiated - and they can have multiple instantiations.

This doesn't preclude thinking ABOUT them conceptually. The concept is a mental object that corresponds (as in deflationary truth theory) to the universal. The triangle concept in my mind is distinct from the triangle concept in your mind, but both concepts correspond to the universal.

Feser:"A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once."
Yes, mental objects are private and subjective, but so is a concept - but as I said above, there is (or can be) a correspondence between each of our "triangle" concepts and the universal that exists in multiple instantiations in the world.

coherence of reason depends on universal judgements which are not themselves found in the objective world - they're transcendental in nature. But that, due to the overwhelmingly nominalist and empiricist cast of modern thought, their reality cannot be admitted, as to do so undermines the materialism that it erroneously upholds. — Wayfarer

Neither Armstrong nor I, is a nominalist. Universals exist, and we can form concepts that correspond to them. As long as we each have "true" concepts of the universals, we can can share additional knowledge with each other and make the same "universal" judgements. I therefore see no need to assume there's something transcendental.

This doesn't preclude thinking ABOUT them conceptually. The concept is a mental object that corresponds (as in deflationary truth theory) to the universal. The triangle concept in my mind is distinct from the triangle concept in your mind, but both concepts correspond to the universal. — Relativist

mental objects are private and subjective, but so is a concept - but as I said above, there is (or can be) a correspondence between each of our "triangle" concepts and the universal that exists in multiple instantiations in the world. — Relativist

Thanks for the response. But I’d like to press on the key issue: in what sense do universals exist?

You claim that universals exist only in particulars. But if our concept of a universal corresponds to something real, as you say, then that universal must be real in some way that is not identical with any of its particular instances, nor reducible to the act of thinking about it. Otherwise, what exactly is it that our distinct concepts are about? What are they referring to?

You say the universal “exists in multiple instantiations in the world.” But that only accounts for the instances of a universal—not the universal as such. If triangularity, for example, is just the set of all actual triangular things, then:

* How can we grasp it prior to seeing all of those instances?

* How can we know it applies to any triangle, even those we’ve never encountered?

That’s why I argue that universals—if they are truly universal—must exist in a way not reducible to particulars. And that implies a mode of being not located in space-time, but accessible only to reason. That’s what I mean by transcendental: not supernatural, but ontologically prior to particulars, and necessary for coherent rational thought.

If Armstrong’s “immanent realism” holds that universals are just shared properties instantiated in the physical world, then it seems to fall short of explaining the universality we actually grasp in thought—where we reason about the form itself, not its tokens.

I recall you’ve previously said that Armstrong doesn’t define universals or laws in purely physical terms. So in effect, what’s being presented here is a metaphysical theory dressed in the language of scientific realism—but it’s not empirical and it’s not testable. In that respect, it looks increasingly like a philosophical commitment to the principle of philosophical naturalism, but not science proper.

But I'll also add, this is because modern philosophy, generally, doesn't provide a conceptual space against which the 'transcendental' can be mapped. After all the keynote of the modern era is the secularisation and 'scientism' of philosophy. So they're averse to anything other than the natural domain, natural sciences, and so on, as it re-opens a question which they would rather believe has been closed.

but they instantiate principles which could never be predicted on the basis of physics alone — Wayfarer

But so what? This is an epistemic or explanatory point. Its just about complexity. No one you're arguing against finds this an interesting point, it doesn't conflict with anyone with a physicalist viewpoint. Why does it matter the level at whoch you choose to describe these things when at the end of the day they are all undergirded by the behavior of particles in physics. The fact that you need different explanations on different levels is due to human limitations, it doesn't change the fact that a brain which is basically a bunch of synchronous electro-chemical events can do math just in virtue of how its components.

When you study neuroscience, how much physics are you required to understand? — Wayfarer

Well a Hodgkin-Huxley neuron is basically just physics.


People make up new theories which often make predictions about things that haven't been observed yet. Many fail, some succeed. I don't understand what is special

but they instantiate principles which could never be predicted on the basis of physics alone
— Wayfarer

But so what? This is an epistemic or explanatory point. Its just about complexity. — Apustimelogist

It's not just about complexity, though. Organisms are fantastically complex, on the one hand - the processes of cellular mitosis, reproduction, evolution, and so on. But they're also simple, in that a single organism is a simple whole, which subordinates and synthesises all that complexity against the ends required to survive and procreate. Nothing in physcis either does that, or accounts for that.

I don't understand what is special — Apustimelogist

And what makes you think that's a philosophical argument? :brow: Your philosophical position is so baked-in that you can't comprehend how it can be questioned. I mean, no offence intended, but that's how you come across.

Well a Hodgkin-Huxley neuron is basically just physics. — Apustimelogist

Yes, a Hodgkin-Huxley neuron is described by physics. So are sound waves, but that doesn’t explain the experience of hearing music. Describing a system in physical terms doesn’t explain everything there is about that system—especially not its qualitative, representational, or rational aspects. Einstein said, 'A theory can be logically perfect and completely unassailable, yet still not represent reality. It would be like trying to understand a symphony by looking at the air pressure waves on a graph. All the information is there, but the music is missing.'

The point at issue isn’t whether neurons obey physical laws. Of course they do. The question is whether describing them physically is sufficient to explain how thought, reason, or consciousness arise. That’s not a scientific question—it’s a philosophical one. Which you continually assume has a physical answer, but for which you're presenting no argument whatever.

Just because we can model a neuron using physics doesn’t mean we've accounted for how neurons give rise to meaning, intentionality, or rational inference. Otherwise, you'd have to say a voltmeter has opinions.

And what makes you think that's a philosophical argument? :brow: Your philosophical position is so baked-in that you can't comprehend how it can be questioned. I mean, no offence intended, but that's how you come across. — Wayfarer

I mean, I offered a description of what happens. You haven't offered an argument for why that explanation isn't adequate.

But they're also simple, in that a single organism is a simple whole, which subordinates and synthesises all that complexity against the ends required to survive and procreate. — Wayfarer

So, what? None of this is threatening to someone who has a kind of physicalist world view or the notion that a brain can learn to do math just in virtue of its components behave.

The question is whether describing them physically is sufficient to explain how thought, reason, or consciousness arise. That’s not a scientific question—it’s a philosophical one. Which you continually assume has a physical answer, but for which you're presenting no argument whatever. — Wayfarer

Well we give computational descriptions of what neurons do that are nonetheless instantiated physically, its just that the physical functional structure happens to correspond to or be amenable to a computational description. There is no profound mystery.

But if our concept of a universal corresponds to something real, as you say, then that universal must be real in some way that is not identical with any of its particular instances, nor reducible to the act of thinking about it. — Wayfarer

Consider electrons: each of them has a -1 electric charge. This intrinsic property is identical in every instantiated electron. The charge is real, but it doesn't exist independently of the electrons. The -1 charge is a universal. So is electron: every existing electron has identical intrinsic properties. They are distinguished by extrinsic properties - location, which objects they are bound to, etc.

You say the universal “exists in multiple instantiations in the world.” But that only accounts for the instances of a universal—not the universal as such. If triangularity, for example, is just the set of all actual triangular things, then: — Wayfarer

-1 electric charge (a universal) only exists as a property that some objects have. There is no "universal as such" existing in the world.

Strictly speaking, triangles are concepts that don't exist in the world, because they are (conceptually) 2-dimensional. Objects in the world can have triangularity; by that, we're referring to a set of properties (the relations between the sides). There can obviously be 2 or more triangular objects with the same length sides arranged at the same angles.

If Armstrong’s “immanent realism” holds that universals are just shared properties instantiated in the physical world, then it seems to fall short of explaining the universality we actually grasp in thought—where we reason about the form itself, not its tokens. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you say this. We grasp the properties that objects have, and apply the way of abstraction to consider just the property. Our minds aren't manipulating the actual property that electrons have, it is entertaining ramifications that we learn about- like the fact that electrons will have a repellent force. There is universality if we each hold true concepts of electrons- concepts that we have to learn, and that we may make an error about - if we don't learn all the actual facts correctly.

I recall you’ve previously said that Armstrong doesn’t define universals or laws in purely physical terms. — Wayfarer

Yes, he does. Properties and relations (laws are relations) are physical, but they exist immanently. Properties and relations are generally measurable, so there's no issue with empiricism.

BTW. I looked thru Armstrong's book on universals, and he raises a problem with transcendental universals: how do you account for instantiations of the universal? Is there an ontological relation between the universal and its instantiation? What's the tie? What about the -1 charge of a specific electron: is there something that connects the charge to that electron?

Consider electrons: each of them has a -1 electric charge. This intrinsic property is identical in every instantiated electron. The charge is real, but it doesn't exist independently of the electrons. The -1 charge is a universal. So is electron: every existing electron has identical intrinsic properties. They are distinguished by extrinsic properties - location, which objects they are bound to, etc. — Relativist

I’d suggest that the nature of the electron is itself still an open question, particularly in light of quantum mechanics. The whole point of wave-particle duality, superposition, and entanglement is that even at the level of fundamental physics, we're dealing with mathematical structures that aren't neatly reducible to classical particulars (hence the ongoing disputes over interpretations). We describe electrons using the language of field theory and probability amplitudes, not by pointing to discrete “things” with self-contained identities.

Astrophysicist Adam Frank said

When I was a young physics student I once asked a professor: ‘What’s an electron?’ His answer stunned me. ‘An electron,’ he said, ‘is that to which we attribute the properties of the electron.’

So when we say "all electrons have a charge of -1," we are already operating in a space of idealized structure and abstraction, not simply observing physical things. I'm saying, that what are described as universals are indispensable components of those rational operations. But we're not directly aware of them as they're not, as it were, inherent in the objects of analysis. (That's what is meant by 'the hand can't grasp itself'.)

So when we say that all electrons have a charge of -1, what is it that we're referring to? It’s not just a feature observable in any one case—it’s a lawlike regularity, expressed in abstract terms, that applies to any possible electron, because that's how an electron is defined. But in order to grasp that, we’re not just detecting physical properties—we’re accessing something through reason: namely, an intelligible structure that governs particulars. And whether, or in what sense, that can be designated physical is the point at issue.

We grasp the properties that objects have, and apply the way of abstraction to consider just the property. — Relativist

Right - which is the unique ability of h.sapiens, so far as we can tell, and the ability which underwrites language, maths and science. We can learn the concepts which enable atomic physics and many other things, but those rational abilities are not something explained by science, and certainly not by physics alone.

how do you account for instantiations of the universal? Is there an ontological relation between the universal and its instantiation? — Relativist

The -1 charge of a given electron is not “tied” to the universal of negative charge by some cord or hook. Rather, the electron is an instance of a kind, and its negative charge is an instantiation of a universal property. We can only think about this because we already operate with concepts that abstract from particular cases. But the concepts don’t cause or bind the particulars—they are inherent in the intelligible structure. The universal isn’t an entity over here, and the particular over there, waiting to be connected. Rather, the universal is the intelligible content of the particular, grasped by reason. We abstract it in thought, but that doesn’t mean it’s merely mental. It’s real in the particular, just not as a separable object - it is how the object appears to the rational intellect.

@noAxioms, @Relativist, @Apustimelogist, @Wayfarer

I actually believe that, often, physicalists equivocate the meaning of 'physical', in order to explain consciousness, abstract objects and so on. If by 'physicalism', we mean that the physical is fundamental and everything else is derived from it, we would like to find a reasonable definition of 'what is physical'.

If we mean 'physical reality' as whatever exists in space-time and space-time itself (a definition that IMO is not without criticism), we have to explain how the apparent eternity and necessity of mathematical and logical truth can be explained by such a system, without falling into equivocity.

One way is to try to explain mathematical and logical truths as 'abstractions' that we derive from particulars. The problem, however, is that mathematics and logic seems to be transcendental, i.e. truths that we have to accept to even construct explanations, models and so on. An explanation, for instance, should be logically consistent. If fundamental reality is, indeed, 'physical' how can we explain the laws of logic in purely physical terms?
The same actually goes for mathematics. Mathematical truths seem to be independent from any particular circumstance. They don't seem to be contigent. We can't 'prove' that "2+2=4" by testing it with experiments, no metter how many time, as induction doesn't give us any 'proof', at least in the way mathematicians use the term.
If they were contingent, we could not even imagine to write physical theories in a consistent way. We would always have the expectation that all the mathematical structures of our theories might someday become unreliable.
A very strong 'empiricist' approach to explain mathematics and logic IMHO fails because, after all, we formulate explanations by assuming that mathematics and logic are correct. The very assumption that physical reality might be at least in part intelligible seems to be based on the idea that, indeed, logical and mathematical truths are not contingent and eternal.

If, however, we do accept that mathematical and logical truths are eternal and not contingent, the next step is to ask about their ontological status. Do they possess some kind of 'reality'? The fact that we assume that we can know them strongly suggests to me that they do have some kind of reality. This would mean that they are either fundamental in themselves (as say Penrose IMO suggests) or depend on something else that is also not contingent and eternal.

Of course, a physicalist might argue that the physical world is not contingent and eternal but the problem here is that this would go against what many physicalists seek in physicalism, i.e. a 'view of reality' where there is no 'Absolute'.

Of course, one might reject the premise that the 'physical world' is at least in part intelligible. But that's hardly a 'physicalism' IMO. It is more likely some kind of radical forms of skepticism (there are more than one) where we have the illusion that 'reality' is intelligible by our reasoning. That it seems like so. But this appearance is a self-deception so to speak and, in fact, the 'ultimate reality' is in fact completely 'beyond knowledge'.

Personally, I find the problem of 'abstract objects' a very difficult for any physicalist worldview, at least if we mean that 'physicalism' means that 'ultimate reality is physical' in a comprehensible meaning of the term. Also, the very assumption that reality is (at least partially) intelligible by our conceptual knowledge is, as I said before, something that suggests that logical and mathematical truths are not contingent etc as they would be the preconditions for any kind of explanations. In other words, physicalism(s) seem to be unable to explain why physical reality is intelligible and at the same time the ultimate level of reality without also introducing the assumption of the non-contigency of logical and mathematical truths. But once that is given, then, how can we call such a philosophical position 'physicalism'?

So IMO physicalists seem to be in a difficult position between some radical forms of skepticism about our conceptual knowledge and, instead, give some ontological status to abstract objects (at least logical and mathematical truths) something that IMO would hinder the physicalist project itself.

Is "only I exist" a logical contradition?

It doesn't seem a 'contradiction', but I am actually not sure.
I am not sure about your point, though. Propositions (or even models, theories, philosophical systems etc) can be formally valid (i.e. coherent) but still wrong.

In your previous post you alluded to the existence of mathematical truths, e.g. if "2 + 2 = 4" is true then the truth that 2 + 2 = 4 exists. Presumably, then, you also believe in the existence of propositional truths, e.g. if "bachelors are unmarried men" is true then the truth that bachelors are unmarried men exists?

If so then if "only I exist" is true then this propositional truth exists, and if this propositional truth exists then "only I exist" is false, giving us a contradiction.

So either "only I exist" is a logical contradiction or this notion that truths exist (whether mathematical or other) is mistaken – or at least the term "exists" is being used in two different ways, in which case mathematical truths are not prima facie problematic for physicalism.

I’d suggest that the nature of the electron is itself still an open question — Wayfarer

Regardless, I was just using the traditional understanding of an electron to illustrate the nature of universals: a type of thing, which can exist in multiple instantiations. The "type" is based on the intrinsic properties: multiple, distinct objects can have the same exact property. So irrespective of the true nature of electrons, it's uncontroversial that there exist multiple objects with a specific electric charge.

Right - which is the unique ability of h.sapiens, so far as we can tell, and the ability which underwrites language, maths and science. We can learn the concepts which enable atomic physics and many other things, but those rational abilities are not something explained by science, and certainly not by physics alone. — Wayfarer

I remind you that I'm just explaining what universals are, and defending the reasonableness of the definition. Even if the mind is (wholly or partly) immaterial, I believe Armstrong's model of universals makes sense - and possibly more sense than alternatives.

The -1 charge of a given electron is not “tied” to the universal of negative charge by some cord or hook. Rather, the electron is an instance of a kind, and its negative charge is an instantiation of a universal property. We can only think about this because we already operate with concepts that abstract from particular cases. But the concepts don’t cause or bind the particulars—they are inherent in the intelligible structure. The universal isn’t an entity over here, and the particular over there, waiting to be connected... — Wayfarer

I'm struggling to see a difference between Armstrong's view of a universal and yours. Do you agree that all particulars have properties? And that a property may exist in multiple particulars? It sounds like it.

Rather, the universal is the intelligible content of the particular, grasped by reason. We abstract it in thought, but that doesn’t mean it’s merely mental. It’s real in the particular, just not as a separable object - it is how the object appears to the rational intellect

In another discussion, I believe you said that you agree that there exists a mind independent reality. This implies that, whatever it might be, it is not dependent on intelligibility or reason. Is it that our limitations and failures leads you to believe it is futile to consider the nature of mind-independent reality? That's all Armstrong is doing. In your prior questions, you seemed to be questioning whether or not Armstrong's theory gave an adequate account of universals, and questioned their relation to the related mental objects (our concepts of the universal). Do you now acknowledge that I've addressed those questions?

Presumably, then, you also believe in the existence of propositional truths, e.g. if "bachelors are unmarried men" is true then the truth that bachelors are unmarried men exists? — Michael

Well, the problem here is that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man' if I am not mistaken, so here we seem to have a tautology. '2+2=4', however, IMO isn't a tautology.

If so then if "only I exist" is true then this propositional truth exists, and if this propositional truth exists then "only I exist" is false, giving us a contradiction. — Michael

Unless, however, I say that 'only I exist' is wrong. For instance, that statement, if true, would contradict everything I think is true about 'reality'. I do believe that my being is dependent and, therefore, "only I exist" probably is a contradiction because, after all, I can't exist without something else.

The point I am making is that if truths exist then the proposition "only I exist" is a logical contradiction.

Therefore if "only I exist" is not a logical contradiction then truths do not exist.

I think we need to disambiguate the term "exists" and draw a distinction between saying that there are mathematical truths and saying that mathematical truths exist.

That 2 + 2 = 4 is not a problem for physicalism (or solipsism, for that matter).

Ah, I think I understood your point now. But note that neither solipsism nor physicalism can explain why mathematical truths aren't contingent.

Furthermore, physicalism(s), if true, can't derive mathamatical truths. And yet, these ontological systems seem to presuppose them. So, if we do not say that 'mathematical truths exist' we still have to explain IMO why they are needed and how we have to understand them in a physicalist ontology.

After all, mathematical and logical laws, truths etc seem to be 'laws of thought'. If thought is derived from physical entities, it would seem that even that that mathematics and logic should somehow derive from physical entities (Edit: in other words, if physical entities form the ultimate reality from which everything is derived, all the properties of thought - reasoning included - must be explained in terms of physical entities. I am not sure how physicalists can explain, say, why mathematical truths are true if physicalism is assumed to be true...).

I actually believe that, often, physicalists equivocate the meaning of 'physical', in order to explain consciousness, abstract objects and so on. If by 'physicalism', we mean that the physical is fundamental and everything else is derived from it, we would like to find a reasonable definition of 'what is physical'. — boundless

Yes, physicalism is arguably vacuous as a metaphysical category precisely because all of these fundamental metaphysical categories are somewheat vacuous. All knowledge is functional and structural. Physics, chemistry, biology all effrctively are about describing behavior. Intrinsicness doesn't come into it.

Why is physicalism so intuitive to some? I have thought about this and I think when people are saying physicalist they are effectively upholding the scientific status quo in opposition to scientifically unsubstantiated ideas likethe supernatural, parapsychology, substance dualism, woo-ism and platonic realms. Maybe in some ways it is more of a reactive stance than a proactive stance.

we have to explain how the apparent eternity and necessity of mathematical and logical truth can be explained by such a system, without falling into equivocity. — boundless

From my perspective there is no prpblem because all knowledge is just applying labels and makimg predictions about what happens next. All labels are abstract, all knowledge is abstract; there are no concrete objects of knowledge, only abstract ones. A stone is an abstract object, a particle is an abstract object, a dinosaur is an abstract object, "two" is an abstract object, "truth" is an abstract object. They all share abstractness on some level and we all infer them in the same way from sensory inputs; however, labels can be so abstract they transcend typical "concrete" objects (e.g. "this rock"), but that doesn't mean that they aren't abstracted from the same sensory data. For instance, we might have the concept of identity or sameness coming from indistinguishable perceptual responses or experiences - we just have a label for that called "sameness". You can have multiple iterations of the "same" "thing (another abstract label about our ability to make distinctions)" which is pretty self-evident in the natural world with recurrent structure and where we have perceptual abilities that can pick out and distinguish those structures ... you have quantity... the rest is just tautology; math is talking about how different descriptions are equivalent extrapolating from the idea of identity and quantity. Logic seems actually very much the same but not talking about quantity - we are talking about in what sense different descriptions are equivalent to each other - the premises to the conclusions.

I have no problem with people being skeptical with this description because its obviously not rigorous and comes a lot from my intuition. But I don't feel the need for anything added to explain things about how math or logic works. Once we pre-stipulate conditions for things to be the same or different, we are just extrapolating those properties in tautologous ways. These things can be gotten straight out of reality, or describe reality very well in suspicious ways, purely because reality has structure in which different parts of the reality act in the same way! And so there is nothing special about maths relation to reality if these are just tautologies.

Now based on this, I suppose you could give ontological status to math and logic but not on any kind of mysterious way, *even though they aren't spatially and temporally constrained in our models of the world*, beyond how a sentence like "things exist" is a truth that uses abstract words but a physicalist wouldn't find problematic. I think though, ultimately in this kind of view one has to explicitly acknowledge the use of labels our cognitive apparatus in constructing knowledge - so it is thinner than a more naively realistic conception. At the same time, one could arguably still uphold a kind of realism in regard to the mapping of these constructs to reality in such a way that they can still affirm that "this is the case" in a way that describes what we see in reality in a consistent way. Importantly, none of our knowledge is something that *developed* independently of *our* sensory *history*. *Our sensory inputs* describe a reality that when you zoom in more and more you see is entirely built on microscopic particles (at least the stuff in everyday life we see) and when you unentangle its complicated knots, is ultimately scaffolded on and follows entirely by very general fundamental physical descriptions. *Logic and math imo are still outgrowths of, and play out, our models of the external world beyond our sensory inputs. Our models can just be highly abstract.*

Edited: **

'2+2=4', however, IMO isn't a tautology — boundless

Count two fingers, then another two fingers.

Now count four fingers.

we would like to find a reasonable definition of 'what is physical? — boundless

Here's how I address it:
The natural= That which exists (has existed, or will exist) including ourselves, everything that is causally connected to ourselves through laws of nature, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that may be inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of our universe.

It is postulated that everything that is natural, is physical; justified by parsimony.

Although my definition of "the natural" precludes things existing that we can't infer, I don't preclude the possibility of things existing that we can't possibly infer. But if so, they are unknowable and therefore we're unjustified in believing any specifics beyond the basic ackowledgement that are are possibilities.

One way is to try to explain mathematical and logical truths as 'abstractions' that we derive from particulars. The problem, however, is that mathematics and logic seems to be transcendental, i.e. truths that we have to accept to even construct explanations, models and so on. An explanation, for instance, should be logically consistent. If fundamental reality is, indeed, 'physical' how can we explain the laws of logic in purely physical terms? — boundless

The "laws of logic" are nothing more than a formalized, consistent semantics - for example, the meanings of "if...then...else", "or", "and", "not" - all sharply defined by truth tables.

What does it actually mean to be transcendental? Do transcendental things exist - are they part of the furniture of the world? If so, what's the relation between these existents and the things they are about? What's the relation to the our thoughts? Suppose there were no intelligent minds to grasp them - in what sense do these transcendental objects actually exist?

The very assumption that physical reality might be at least in part intelligible seems to be based on the idea that, indeed, logical and mathematical truths are not contingent and eternal. — boundless

From a physicalist's point of view, if some physical phenomenon is describable with mathematics, it is entirely due to the presence of physical relations among the objects involved in the phenomenon. Example: Newton's formula for the force of gravity is F=G*m1*m2/r^2. This describes a physical relation between an object with mass m1 and an object with mass m2, based on the distance between them. The phenomenon is not contingent on a formula; rather, the formula is descriptive - providing a means of prediction and comparisons to other phenomena. Physical reality (outside of human minds) itself doesn't make predictions and comparisons - it just behaves per laws of nature.

Of course, it turns out that Newton's formula is only valid within specific bounds, and General Relativity is a more accurate description. But is the description eternal? Physicists assume so. Why wouldn't they? There's no empirical evidence that they are NOT, so it's unjustified to assume they're temporary. From time to time, physicists hypothesize that some aspect of a theory may actually not be eternal, and may change over time (consideration of the cosmological constant is an example). Cases like this are based on empirical evidence and/or conflicts between the predictions of theories.

Of course, one might reject the premise that the 'physical world' is at least in part intelligible. But that's hardly a 'physicalism' IMO. It is more likely some kind of radical forms of skepticism (there are more than one) where we have the illusion that 'reality' is intelligible by our reasoning. That it seems like so. But this appearance is a self-deception so to speak and, in fact, the 'ultimate reality' is in fact completely 'beyond knowledge'. — boundless

I suggest that it is justifiable to believe the physical world is at least partly intelligible - justified by the success of science at making predictions. I don't see how anyone could justify being skeptical of this. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind our limitations. The known laws of physics (which I contrast with the ontological laws of nature) may be special cases that apply in the known universe but are contingent upon some symmetry breaking that occurred prior to, or during, the big bang. If so, it's irrelevant to making predictions within our universe.

Personally, I find the problem of 'abstract objects' a very difficult for any physicalist worldview, at least if we mean that 'physicalism' means that 'ultimate reality is physical' in a comprehensible meaning of the term. — boundless

I don't see a problem with abstractions. The "way of abstraction" (see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#WayAbst) is a mental exercise associated with pattern recognition. This describes the process by which we isolate our consideration to properties, ignoring all other aspects of the things that have them. The properties don't ACTUALLY exist independently of the things that have them, IMO. And I don't see how one could claim that our abstracting them entails that they exist independently.

I believe you said that you agree that there exists a mind independent reality. This implies that, whatever it might be, it is not dependent on intelligibility or reason. Is it that our limitations and failures leads you to believe it is futile to consider the nature of mind-independent reality? — Relativist

Mind-independence has two levels of meaning. At the empirical level, of course the world doesn’t depend on my mind or yours for its existence. But at a deeper level, what we take the world to be—what we can know or even meaningfully say about it—is always mediated by the mind’s structuring activity. In Kant’s terms, we never experience “things in themselves” (Ding an sich), but appearances shaped by our forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding.¹

This doesn’t mean the world is a figment —it means that what see as a mind-independent world is still the world as it appears to a conscious subject. Even to model a subjectless universe requires that the model is still constructed within the space-time framework our minds impose. Without a subject, there is no point of reference for spatial extension or temporal duration, since those are not properties of things-in-themselves but forms through which we intuit them. Without that framework, we'd be unconscious or in a state of complete dissociation.

Scientific realism typically assumes that the world exists just as science describes it, entirely independently of any subject or perspective. But this overlooks the extent to which the scientific image of the world is grounded in the conditions of our cognition. Kant’s transcendental idealism accepts the empirical reality of the world but denies that we can know it apart from the way we constitute it in experience.

The idealist criticism of scientific realism is that it forgets or overlooks the role of the subject - as another of the German idealists said, 'materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself'.

¹ Critique of Pure Reason, A369–370.

I suggest that it is justifiable to believe the physical world is at least partly intelligible - justified by the success of science at making predictions. — Relativist

I agree—but intelligibility is grounded in relations among representations. To the extent that things appear to us as structured phenomena, it’s those mental structures that make intelligibility possible. This insight is echoed not only in Kantian terms but in cognitive science and the constructivist tradition more broadly.

This challenges physicalism, not by denying the success of science, but by questioning the metaphysical leap that treats “the physical” as something with inherent, mind-independent reality. Scientific models work because of their predictive and explanatory power—but that success doesn't license the conclusion that the world exists exactly as described in itself, independent of the subject’s contribution to its appearance.

The objection I have to materialist theories of mind is that they attempt to ground intelligibility in the physical domain itself—specifically in neurological processes—without acknowledging that the meaning and coherence we attribute to neural data are not in the data; they are read into it by the observing scientist ('this means that', 'from this, we can infer that....'). In other words, it is the mind that interprets the brain, not the brain that explains the mind.

This reveals a circularity at the heart of the physicalist account: it presumes that mind is reducible to brain, while relying on the mind’s interpretive capacities to make sense of the brain in the first place.

Maybe we don't experience the world "as it is", out of perspective, but I would say that all that characterizes a perspective is the incompleteness or partiality of the information that is being seen. So I would say we can keep Kant's phenomenal perspectives but that they don't have any interesting ontological meaning because from my perspective, what I see is just structural information in my sensory inputs that map to causes in the external world, a mapping that in principle can be probed in the functional structure of networks of neuronal activity. So to me the fact that we seee the world frok a perspective can be valid without implying anything fundamentslly mysterious.

Without a subject, there is no point of reference for spatial extension or temporal duration — Wayfarer

But what about relativity!? You can do experiments which show the effects of things like time dilation related to clocks without requiring observers or perspectives or anything like that.

without acknowledging that the meaning and coherence we attribute to neural data are not in the data; they are read into it by the observing scientist ('this means that', 'from this, we can infer that....'). In other words, it is the mind that interprets the brain, not the brain that explains the mind. — Wayfarer

Sure, but this is the natural foibles of science and difficulties studying a complex system. But nonetheless we might produce a coherent story and use models to reproduce the empirical behavior we see to gain some kind of understanding of what brains do. And ofcourse, its difficult to have anywhere near the desired amount of information from the brain to do thid, and people often have different, contrary ideas about how or why certain things happen or what they do.

This reveals a circularity at the heart of the physicalist account: it presumes that mind is reducible to brain, while relying on the mind’s interpretive capacities to make sense of the brain in the first place. — Wayfarer

But its not just interpretive because there is empirical data, whether neurobiological or behavioral you can compare models to. And the hard problem of consciousness doesn't factor into most neuroscience. You don't need to assume the mind is descriptively reducible to a brain - but what people have found is that there is an unmistakable causal relationship between experiences and behaviors, and brains - whether you infer that through brain injury, stimulation, neuroimaging, all sorts of things.

So to me the fact that we seee the world frok a perspective can be valid without implying anything fundamentslly mysterious. — Apustimelogist

I feel your frequent statements of not seeing anything profound or mysterious or needing to be understood indicate a kind of absence of curiosity or insight into specifically philosophical questions. Rather a kind of sanguine acceptance of the scientific worldview. Would that be fair?

You can do experiments which show the effects of things like time dilation related to clocks without requiring observers or perspectives or anything like that. — Apustimelogist

Yes. You can or I can or someone else can. But those experiments don't do themselves. In all cases the experimenter is providing the perspective within which the observations are meaningful.

To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. — Bergson-Einstein Debate

the hard problem of consciousness doesn't factor into most neuroscience. — Apustimelogist

That's because neuroscience is not philosophy. 'Facing up to the problem of consciousness' was about the fact that the neuroscientific accounts cannot, as a matter of principle, provide an account of the first-person nature of experience. That's where the explanatory gap is found.

Scientific realism typically assumes that the world exists just as science describes it, entirely independently of any subject or perspective. — Wayfarer

In one sense, it does exist just as science describes it -when the science is correct. Granted, the descriptions are in human terms and from a human perspective but what other terms could they be? Do you deny that some scientific propositions are true?

If you simply want everyone to be reminded that our analysis and our language means that science is merely giving a human perspective - that's fine. But a human perspective is the only ones that can be meaningful to humans.

The idealist criticism of scientific realism is that it forgets or overlooks the role of the subject — Wayfarer

I'm not convinced that's entirely true, other than in terms of perspective and the need to express science in terms humans understand. But assuming it is true that the role of the subject is completely ignored, how do you propose correcting this?

intelligibility is grounded in relations among representations. To the extent that things appear to us as structured phenomena, it’s those mental structures that make intelligibility possible. — Wayfarer

Sure, but how is that a problem?

This challenges physicalism, not by denying the success of science, but by questioning the metaphysical leap that treats “the physical” as something with inherent, mind-independent reality. — Wayfarer

Any metaphysical system would do the same- that's the object of the game. Obviously, none can be verified or falsified. Should we abandon the game? My principle reason for defending physicalism is NOT because I'm committed to it. Rather, it's to counter arguments from ignorance that I see others make, based on supposed metaphysical "truths". I also jump in to explain components of it, when I see questions or misunderstandings - that' what prompted my first post in this thread. I don't care if anyons believes it, but if they're going to dismiss it- it should be based on a correct understanding.

Scientific models work because of their predictive and explanatory power—but that success doesn't license the conclusion that the world exists exactly as described in itself, independent of the subject’s contribution to its appearance.

How about Structural Realism?

My issue with your position is that you've only stated negatives- what's wrong with physicalism and/or scientific realism. Do you have something superior in mind? If so, I'm curious how it can be immune from the same problems.

The objection I have to materialist theories of mind is that they attempt to ground intelligibility in the physical domain itself—specifically in neurological processes—without acknowledging that the meaning and coherence we attribute to neural data are not in the data; they are read into it by the observing scientist ('this means that', 'from this, we can infer that....'). In other words, it is the mind that interprets the brain, not the brain that explains the mind. — Wayfarer

Explaining the mind is absolutely physicalism's weakness. Does that necessarily mean physicalism is false?

Yes, the mind is doing all the interpreting- whatever the mind is. Do you have a better account of the mind?

My issue with your position is that you've only stated negatives- what's wrong with physicalism and/or scientific realism. — Relativist

Thanks for this thoughtful and open response.

I agree that any metaphysical frameworks face limitations, and I appreciate your concession that explaining the mind is a weak point for physicalism. That’s where I keep pressing—not because I deny the empirical success of science, but because I question whether empirical models alone can explain intelligibility itself, or the first-person structure of consciousness. And also that this is inherent to the kind of 'scientific theory of mind' that characterises physicalist philosophies.

You're right to ask for a constructive alternative. I don’t propose a complete system—but I do think we need an account that puts the subject back into the frame, rather than treating experience as a by-product of unconscious machinery. That’s why I’m drawn toward post-Kantian approaches (phenomenology, enactivism, and some forms of idealism), where the focus is on how reality appears to us as structured, meaningful, and knowable.

As for structural realism: yes, it might be a way of moving toward a more modest realism, one that acknowledges that what we know is structure, but perhaps not the intrinsic nature of what instantiates that structure. That could open the door to something more meaningful than bare physicalism.

So no, I don’t think physicalism is “disproven” but I do think it has an inherent blind spot. And the moment we acknowledge that meaning, interpretation, and intelligibility are not themselves physical, we’ve already moved beyond physicalism in the strict sense.

Yes, the mind is doing all the interpreting- whatever the mind is. Do you have a better account of the mind? — Relativist

But in order to even approach a coherent account of mind, a framework is needed—something more than functional or mechanistic description. Classical Greek philosophy, as Pierre Hadot shows, was precisely an attempt to provide such a framework: not just a proto-scientific theory, but a vision of reality informed by reflection on what it means to live and to know. Similarly, Buddhist thought offers an extraordinarily detailed and multi-layered account of mind and its transformations—yet it does so without treating mind as reducible to brain.

These traditions aren't opposed to observation or analysis, but they don’t assume that science alone defines what is real (especially because science in today's sense wasn't even understood in their day). But they remind us that the subject—the knower—is part of the picture, and that understanding mind means engaging with it from within, not just from the outside.

These traditions aren't opposed to observation or analysis, but they don’t assume that science alone defines what is real (especially because science in today's sense wasn't even understood in their day). — Wayfarer

a vision of reality informed by reflection on what it means to live and to know. Similarly, Buddhist thought offers an extraordinarily detailed and multi-layered account of mind and its transformations—yet it does so without treating mind as reducible to brain. — Wayfarer

These approaches may be useful in a psychological way (some might say "spriritual")- a potentially helpful way to approach life or reality. But I don't see that it has a superior shot at objective truth. Do you disagree?

But I don't see that it has a superior shot at objective truth. Do you disagree? — Relativist

I've already gone through in detail the hidden assumptions behind the term 'objective truth', no point doing so again. Thanks for the chat.

indicate a kind of absence of curiosity or insight into specifically philosophical questions. Rather a kind of sanguine acceptance of the scientific worldview. Would that be fair? — Wayfarer

Not at all, its the conclusions I come ro exploring those questions.

In all cases the experimenter is providing the perspective within which the observations are meaningful. — Wayfarer

Sure, observations can be interpreted differently, but these are not intended as subjective interpretations, they are speculations about an actual event. You can perceive an observation event or measure it in different ways, but ultimately what you are latching on to is the fact that an event happened, that clocks can run differently due to time dilation. Even if you interpret the observation as having a different cause, you are postulating that you believe an objective event happened. Even if there are different ways of looking at an event, science wants those different ways to agree and be coherent; for instance, different methodlogies of measurement, different mathematical formulations that predict the same things. Obviously, things may not practically gel ideally or even very well, but imo, these kinds of things (e.g. arguments about the irreducibility of chemistry) don't point to some kind of conspiratorial aspect of reality that inherently prevents reducibility ontologically - its about the limits of us as human beings to observe and make sense of things.

Clocks don’t measure time; we do. — Bergson-Einstein Debate

Tell that to your gps.

That's because neuroscience is not philosophy. 'Facing up to the problem of consciousness' was about the fact that the neuroscientific accounts cannot, as a matter of principle, provide an account of the first-person nature of experience. That's where the explanatory gap is found. — Wayfarer

No, but I don't think an explanatory gap entails some kind of fundamental metaphysical dualism or revisionism. Imo, neuroscience and physics attests to that because there is no evidence for mental substance, afterlife, the supernatural, etc etc. And when people start offering a kind of non-physicalism without any scientific revisionism, its more-or-less like physicalism imo

Sure, observations can be interpreted differently, but these are not intended as subjective interpretations, they are speculations about an actual event. — Apustimelogist

Outside the awareness and measurement of duration, there is no time.

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

I don't think an explanatory gap entails some kind of fundamental metaphysical dualism — Apustimelogist

by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. — David Chalmers, Facing Up...

Maybe we don't experience the world "as it is", out of perspective, but I would say that all that characterizes a perspective is the incompleteness or partiality of the information that is being seen. So I would say we can keep Kant's phenomenal perspectives but that they don't have any interesting ontological meaning because from my perspective, what I see is just structural information in my sensory inputs that map to causes in the external world, a mapping that in principle can be probed in the functional structure of networks of neuronal activity. So to me the fact that we seee the world frok a perspective can be valid without implying anything fundamentslly mysterious. — Apustimelogist

Exactly, just because our interpretation of the world is an approximation that is processed from the data we have and how our brain processes it to minimise the use of energy, does not mean that there isn't an independent reality. We have science and equipment to fill in the gaps that we cannot see or hear or smell etc. bats wont see the sky as blue. apparently the ancient Greeks did not have a word for blue.

Why must something be "relation-independent" in order to count as real? — Janus

Those are just two possible definitions of what it means to be real. I actually counted 6 or more such definitions. Most of the assertions about what is real vs what isn't use a definition that implies, if not explicitly, mind dependence.

We have no physical relation to such worlds.

I disagree. We share the same big bang perhaps. For a star 60 GLY away, they can see the same galaxy the we do, even if we can't see each other. Those are relations, just not direct causal ones.

The fine-tuning argument has never done it for me. I don't believe we can accurately calculate odds when the sample is but one.

Not an exact calculation, no, but 'stupid improbable' can very much be shown. Just not exactly how stupid improbable.

Come on. When you study neuroscience, how much physics are you required to understand? — Wayfarer

Probably not relativity or cosmology, but definitely chemistry and quantum mechanics since quantum effects are critical to nerve operation as much as it is critical to transistor operation.

Sure, the brain and other biological structures don't operate in defiance of physics but they instantiate principles which could never be predicted on the basis of physics alone.

I disagree with this, but I lack the credentials to deny any claim that any biological primitive operates on non-deterministic physics (and by that, I mean that randomness is not amplified or otherwise leveraged anywhere).

OK, so the algae thing is relevant. I know for instance that photosynthesis is so comples that it requires something like quantum computing to implement, especially to have evolved in the first place. I know that trees talk to each other. They've measured it: A whole forest of veterans calming the younger ones about a scary event coming up in a few hours.

So algae operation has questionable physical explainability. That's a good start. They need to find out where the gaps are. That's pretty hard with chemistry since the intermediate reactions are hard to isolate.

Nothing in physcis either does that, or accounts for that. — Wayfarer

Nothing in physics is violated by that either. That physics operates at a more fundamental level than something complex like say 'mitosis' doesn't mean that mitosis necessarily not physical.
Yes, a physical description is much like a graph of air pressure over time. That's a full description. It doesn't explain 'music', (any more than does your take on it), but it very much shows music (as it exists in an auditorium) to be nothing more than physical. Similarly, you admit that biological functionality is physical despite a lack of satisfactory 'explanation', and yet you seem to assert that something non-physical is required to make it all work, despite that also not being explained.

People make up new theories which often make predictions about things that haven't been observed yet. — Apustimelogist

I toyed with bringing up such an example in my prior topic about predication. I am a software engineer. One puts out a functional spec, a document which specifies what the product does. That's a list of predicates of a nonexistent thing, a potential example of existence not being prior to predication..
This of course can be countered by arguing that the functional spec does not have any of the predicates listed, it just lists them.
Your example is about theories making yet-to-be-verified predictions (such as time dilation, which was eventually demonstrated). But before that demonstration, the predicate was already there. Predication does not depend on it being observed.

If, however, we do accept that mathematical and logical truths are eternal
...
This would mean that they are either fundamental in themselves (as say Penrose IMO suggests) or depend on something else that is also not contingent and eternal... — boundless

What do you mean by 'eternal' here? I have two definitions of that, and neither seems appropriate. I seem to favor the idea of mathematics being fundamental, but not all would agree.

There is a set of things that existed in the past, a set of things existing in the present, and a set of things that will exist in the future. — Relativist

Under presentism, yes. But you called all those 'existing', the tense of which implies 'currently existing'. That's what I was commenting on.
Many (most?) presentists don't consider future events to exist since it interferes with their typical assumption of free will. Far be it from me to put words in their mouths; I'm not a presentist.

Without a subject, there is no point of reference for spatial extension or temporal duration — Wayfarer

A point of reference IS a subject, just not one with subjectivity, although a point of reference does not alone define a coordinate system, so coordinate quantities like extension and duration are undefined.

But what about relativity!? You can do experiments which show the effects of things like time dilation related to clocks without requiring observers or perspectives or anything like that. — Apustimelogist

That's just geometry.

But those experiments don't do themselves — Wayfarer

They do actually. Physics is not something that happens only in labs or when people are watching. Epistemology of physics does, sure, but I don't think Apustimelogist was talking about epistemology.