... the fact that we don't really know what the body experiences prior to cognition ... — Janus

What is meant by this? Kind of like a rock 10 km deep experiencing heat and pressure, all sans any cognition to mentally experience those things? That was my guess.

I was referring to other universes, not remote parts of this universe. Other universes, if they existed, would not share our spacetime, hence no possible relation. — Janus

Of the 9 types of multiverses listed by Greene: Brane, Cyclic, Holographic, Inflationary, Landscape, Quantum, Quilted, Simulated, Ultimate, only Quilted, Quantum, and arguably Brane share the same spacetime as us (the same big bang, same constants). Of the 9, only Ultimate can claim 'no possible relation'. The rest are all related, but by definition of an alternate universe/world, they might have no direct causal effect on us. Exceptions: Holographic and Simulation.

I have very limited knowledge of string theory, so some details (inclusions and exclusions from lists) may be off.

In any case no matter how "stupid improbable" it might be, it has happened in our case, and thus we are here wondering about it.

Right. Solutions: Either an awful lot of dice being rolled, or one heavily loaded die. Wayfarer quoted Davies above that apparently favors the latter view.

OK, how about ‘no time outside the measurement of time’. I refer back to the earlier quote: "Clocks don’t measure time; we do. "
OK, that's pretty obviously the 3rd kind of time, thus I agree with your statement.
— Wayfarer

The objections to this seem to be that time is ‘obviously’ objective.

Not that kind of time, so not so obvious. Perhaps the problem is conflating one definition of time with one of the others.

Imagine some species on another planet, far larger than Earth, with a daily rotation of one of our weeks, and an annual rotation of tens of our decades. Presumably the units they would use for measuring time would be very different to terrestrial units. — Wayfarer

You are thinking of the Planck units, and yes, a species on another world can independently discover those units.
Under those units, four universal constants (speed of light, gravitational constant, reduced Planck constant, and Boltzmann constant) are all 1. Of course the aliens would give them different names.

There are also some quantum constants like the charge of an electron, and obvious unit charge.

Is there an objective time which is independent of these two apparently incommensurable systems of measurement? — Wayfarer

Time is always relative to something, the length of a worldline, an abstract coordinate system, or relative to the experience of a particular being. Even under an absolutist theory, there is not an objective age of the universe at a given event. It would depend on the depth of the gravitational potential where the age was measured, and there isn't any objective depth to that, or if there was, it is arguably infinitely deep, meaning it takes infinite objective time for one second to tick by on Earth. I didn't list absolute time in my list of 3, but mostly because it's totally undefined.

Well, I believe that physicalism posits that the 'physical' is fundamental. — boundless

Again, was not aware of that, but there is probably more than one view lumped under the term.

Just a quick terminological point. I believe that 'physicalism' and 'naturalism' are treated as synonyms. — boundless

Yes, and not materialism. One that latter point we apparently differ.
I take it as: Physical is responsible/sufficient for that we empirically experience/measure, which is pretty identical to how naturalism is expressed.

But, I would say that 'materialism' also can mean the same thing, unless we call 'matter' only a subset of what is 'physical'.

I would have said that a materialist would assert material to be fundamental, not supervening on something more fundamental, and the physicalism/naturalism do not assert that. That doesn't mean that the physical necessarily supervenes on something also physical.

Your definition makes it sound the same as materialism, an assertion that there isn't anything more fundamental than material, an odd assertion since the closer they look, the less they can find any material.

Another is that perhaps not all things that physics is concerned with are strictly "material". A physicalist may believe in quantum fields, but are quantum fields "material" or "matter"? — flannel jesus

Sure, stretch the definition and call 'fields' physical. You can do that all the way down, which blurs the distinction between the two terms.

But the risk here is equivocation. For instance, if I say that there are really 'physical laws', it seems that we end up with something like 'hylomorphism', i.e. the position that the 'physical' is also something that has a structure that is intrinsically intelligible (at least, in part). Is that 'structure' also 'physical'. I guess one can say so. — boundless

Yes, one can slap on the label or not at one's preference. How it works is unaffected by this. I would look at other worlds like the GoL discussed above. There are objects (spaceships for instance) in that world. Are they considered 'physical'? Answer: Your choice to say yes or no. The definition of 'physical' definitely gets shaky when one steps outside of our own particular universe.

But if one accepts that 'structures' are as fundamental as 'physical things', it certainly implies that wholes are not really reducible to parts (as parts cannot be 'abstracted' from their context).

I perhaps am one open to accepting structure as more fundamental than physical.

I can agree with that. And yes, you need to posit the 'truth' of the whole context. — boundless

Which may just bring it back to an objective truth, yes.

and a context requirement seems like an awful big asterisk to the claim of the objectiveness of its truth. — noAxioms

But this is just because you are giving completely differernt things the same representation. — Apustimelogist

How so? In the domain of integers, 2+2=4. but in a different (modulo 3 say) domain, 2+2=1. In Euclidean geometery, square circles are a contradiction. In non-Euclidean geometry, they're not.
What is being given the same representation here?

on the 'eternality' part. Actually, I do think that maybe logic and math are 'mental constructs'/'concepts' (I do have my sympathies with 'idealism'*), but not in the sense that they are conventional. — boundless

I also hold sympathies to idealism, to the point where ontology may well just be an ideal even if I'm not an idealist (mind being in any way fundamental). All sorts of traps on that road, but I think it is valid. Is there such a thing as ontic idealism?

Epistemic idealism seems to make sense to me. What do you mean by "I can't make any logically compelling argument from that position"?

I gotcha. But does 2nd hand count? If 60 GLY influences a galaxy that's right between us, and 30 GLY influences us...? — Patterner

Yes, it counts. Galaxies form early, so no 'new galaxy' like we did with the star. I picked 60 GLY because GN-Z11 (a record breaker until JWST found plenty further ones) is about 31 GLY away (proper distance along line of constant cosmological time). So let's say all galaxies form at 100 MY. We have galaxy X at 60 GLY comoving distance. The people on GN-z11 at age 13.8 GY can see both us and galaxy X. But they see both when they were super young, and they only see it recently since the effect took that long to get there. So they can't send a picture of say X to us since that light would leave now and would never get here. GN-z11 crossed our event horizon about 10 GY ago, so nothing there since then can ever effect us. Thus galaxy X still has zero causal effect on us.

What is being given the same representation here? — noAxioms

Its all different things blanketly labelled as 2+2 when really that doesn't actually describe the specifics of each thing and why they are like that.

Its like taking the words minute (time) and minute (size) and trying to call them the same thing because they are spelt the same, and then doing an analysis showing that that isn't really the case and are subjective.

What is meant by this? Kind of like a rock 10 km deep experiencing heat and pressure, all sans any cognition to mentally experience those things? That was my guess. — noAxioms

Yes what the body experiences pre-cognitively is unknown to us in vivo. Of course we can study it after the fact so to speak. But the critics will say the knowledge we get via such study is cognition based, which of course it is, and as such cannot tell us anything about what "really" goes on pre-cognitively.

Of the 9 types of multiverses listed by Greene: Brane, Cyclic, Holographic, Inflationary, Landscape, Quantum, Quilted, Simulated, Ultimate, only Quilted, Quantum, and arguably Brane share the same spacetime as us (the same big bang, same constants). Of the 9, only Ultimate can claim 'no possible relation'. The rest are all related, but by definition of an alternate universe/world, they might have no direct causal effect on us. Exceptions: Holographic and Simulation.

I have very limited knowledge of string theory, so some details (inclusions and exclusions from lists) may be off. — noAxioms

Okay I had thought that anything posited as another Universe would be by definition another spacetime, but you seem to have explored this more than I have, so I will take your word for it.

From this standpoint, I don't really see the problem you raise. I don't need to assume rational knowledge for my brain to do stuff... it just does stuff in virtue of how it evolved and developed. And none of what the brain does os strictly arbitrary because it depends on its interactions with the outside world. — Apustimelogist

My point is that the 'story' you're telling presupposes intelligibility in order to be 'right'. If you admit that the physical world - at least in some features - is intelligible (apparently enought intelligible to be certain of these things), then, at least the most basic concepts that ground describe the order of the physical world, which seem to imply that they are actually also part of the order of physical reality itself.

Also about predictions: unless one adopts a quite skeptical approach (for instance the one about 'perspective' I mentioned earlier), these extremely accurate predictions seem to imply that, indeed, mathematics does describe the 'structure' of reality. But if that is true, mathematics isn't invented (at least, the part that describes the structure of the world).

Anyway, I am not sure I understand your point here. The world is intelligible to us because we have a brain that is designed to model the world. — Apustimelogist

No, the world is intelligible because it is intelligible (if it is indeed intelligible). On the other hand, I can't exclude the possibility that it isn't really intelligible, in which case we evolved in a quite 'lucky' way that enables us to make useful predictions by using models that are in fact wrong.
The very fact that we speak of evolution - which is indeed intelligible as a concept - to explain why we can have knowledge presupposes that the world is intelligible in some sense (unless, as I said, one wants to embrace skepticism).

Two times two is two twos. Thats just two plus two. Its the same. If you are using the notion "equals", you are giving a numerical equivalence, a numerical tautology. — Apustimelogist

If 'equals' is only about the value, ok. But, in fact, the semantic content of the two expression is different. And this IMO shows that mathematics is more than 'tautologies'. It does enable to get access to non-trivial truths.

I don't agree. Set physicalism aside and just consider the evolutionary advantage of associating effect with "cause" (something preceding) with "effect" - even in nonverbal animals. This mirrors "if....then", the most basic form of inference. — Relativist

As I said in my previous post, if one speaks about 'evolution' and 'evolutionary advantage' as an explanation and, indeed, if one thinks that explanation is true, I don't see how one can escape the conclusion that the 'process' considered is intelligible. If it is intelligible, this means that our concepts do mirror the regularities of that which is 'happening'. Of course, if one embraces a quite radical skepticism where this evolutionary explanation is not considered true but 'useful', then, yes, one can avoid to attribute intelligibility to the 'evolutionary story'.

Such a 'skeptic' attitude, however, IMO goes against every 'physicalism' I can think of. Ironically, it's closer to epistemic idealism and some forms of phenomenology.

If the world does have structure/order, then it would be amenable to rational description. — Relativist

If it doesn't, then, I doubt that one can have a coherent form of physicalism. After all, a minimal degree of intelligibility is IMO assumed to talk about coherently of a 'physical reality'.

My only point here is that the capability of recognizing patterns is consistent with physicalism, so it doesn't require magic. — Relativist

My point stands, however. If the world does have structure/order which is intelligible and amenable to rational description, how we have to understand that 'order'? Is it something 'physical' (in a sense of the word that is not equivocal)? If there is not, how can we speak of 'physical reality'?

I mean even saying "there are objects that interact" assumes basic concepts like 'sameness', 'diversity', 'oneness', 'plurality' and so on. So, I guess that any account of 'physical reality' must be intelligible. Which to me raises the question of how to understand that intelligibility, that order in purely physical terms.

Or, consider the spectatular success of mathematics in predicting physical phenomena. How is that even possible without the assumption that mathematics does indeed enable us to 'capture' the structure of a physcial world (again, let us set skepticism aside)?

Order is not a property, per se. It is a high-level intellectual judgement. Properties are not parts. "-1 electric charge" is not a part of an electron, it's a property that electrons have. I don't see a problem with identifying an aspect (a property or pseudo-property) that 2 or more distinct objects have and then focusing attention on that aspect. Explain the problem you see. — Relativist

IMO you are oscillating between a position that requires some degree of intelligibility (the assumption that there is a physcial reality) and a skeptical position which would require to abandon all attempts to rational understanding of reality.
I would say that the 'order', if we take it seriously, would not be just a 'judgement' but also a property of physcial reality itself.

Yes, properties are not parts.

My point was that, if intelligibility of physical reality is assumed, then, you can't 'conceive' the more elementary parts of physical world independent of anything else. Mine was a criticism of reductionism rather than physicalism in that case, I should have clarified better.

Again, was not aware of that, but there is probably more than one view lumped under the term. — noAxioms

I did some googling and it does seem that you are right, in fact. It does seem that physicalism is used to denote some positions that are not about ontology.
Since this thread is about ontology, however, it would be probably more appropriate to refer to 'materialism', then, without using that term to indicate a specific form of 'materialism' that, say, is equated to ancient atomism or a literal interpretation of newtonian mechanics but it is compatible with modern physical theories.

Still, I am not sure why people would call 'physicalism' a non-ontological view, but that's me.

The definition of 'physical' definitely gets shaky when one steps outside of our own particular universe. — noAxioms

Yes, that's the problem that I have with using that term. Anyway, personally, I would not call principles, laws and so on as something physical.

In fact, they are more like the transcendental conditions for the existence of something physical. Personally, I would not say that they are 'physical'. To me that leads to an equivocation of the term 'physical' that renders it meaningless, in fact.

A purely 'unstructured' (i.e. intelligible) 'physical reality' is not a 'physical reality' at all. And the structure is more like a 'principle' than an 'object'. To me this means that the mere assumption that 'physical reality' is intelligible (which seems to be in fact necessary to speak about a 'physical reality'), contradicts materialism (and hence 'physicalism' as a metaphysical/ontological position).

I perhaps am one open to accepting structure as more fundamental than physical. — noAxioms

:up: Nice! I am also of the same opinion. An unstructured world is IMO a contradiction in terms. But the structure is more like a 'transcendental' for the world (i.e. a precondition of it).

Which may just bring it back to an objective truth, yes. — noAxioms

Right!

Is there such a thing as ontic idealism? — noAxioms

Well, it is often referred to the position that reality is exclusively mental and, therefore, there are only minds and mental content as we know them (a position that is most often attributed to Berkeley, but I think that he was more sofisticated than how it is often presented). In a sense, however, I would sat that even positions as diverse form that like, say, classical theism, neoplatonism, and other metaphysical positions which accept the existence of a 'material' world (which is not assumed to be fundamental, of course, but intelligible), are 'ontological idealist' because they assume that some kind of 'Mind' is the most fundamental reality (and mathematical/logical truths are concepts in that 'Mind'). But generally, these positions are not included under the label 'idealism'.

Anyway, I was not trying to 'make a case' for any of these 'idealist' positions. I was more like 'making a case' for the 'reality' of 'mathematical and logical truths' by simply assuming that there is an intelligible physical/material reality.

Roger Penrose, for instance, endorsed the existence of a 'platonic realm' which for him is independent from both the material/physical and the mental 'realms' (see this video, for instance: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujvS2K06dg4). I would distinguish Penrose's positions that the ones mentioned before. Plato himself seemed to me unclear about whether the 'forms' are 'concepts' (and are in some kind of 'eternal Mind') or if they are 'independently real' and, in fact, something ontologically different and independent from either minds/souls and 'matter'. I guess that those mathematicians that are deemed platonists are in both camps (for instance, Kurt Godel was both a platonist and a theist, so I would suspect that he considered mathematical 'forms' as concepts (in the Divine mind). The early Bertrand Russell was an atheist but a platonist, so I would imagine that he held a similar view to Penrose. Also G.H. Hardy mantained a similar view). In any case, if one assumes the 'reality' (and the 'indipendence' from the physical world and our minds) of math and logic, then one cannot be a 'materialist' and possibly even endorse some forms of ontological idealism, for that matter.

How can you be certain of that kind of existence when you have no access to an objective viewpoint? — noAxioms

I have an argument for the existence of my mind, which is based on the fact that experience exists and is coherent. You can find it here.

There are even some interpretations of our universe (as opposed to objective) that say that 'you' are in superposition of being and not being, but mostly the latter. — noAxioms

I think the interpretation of Bohmian quantum mechanics is correct since it is anomaly-free.

Same thing essentially. — noAxioms

Correct.

My point is that the 'story' you're telling presupposes intelligibility in order to be 'right'. If you admit that the physical world - at least in some features - is intelligible (apparently enought intelligible to be certain of these things), then, at least the most basic concepts that ground describe the order of the physical world, which seem to imply that they are actually also part of the order of physical reality itself. — boundless

I don't think so, because I don't explicitly need concepts for the world to be intelligible. I can see the trajectory of a thrown ball, predict where it will end up and catch it without overt need for any concepts. We apply concepts after the fact, mapping them to what we see. Much of the time they are wrong and make false predictions. The ones that happen to be empirically adequate may survive, generally.

On the otherhand, I have said all our concepts are anchored to some extent to sensory reality, just some are far more abstract than others. I think maybe then you could argue that math does capture something about the empirical structure of reality - quantity. It is self-evident quantities exist, and we can identify them; but this isn't really interesting like an independently existing platonic realm. Its almost trivial to observe the world around you and be able to identify that there can be more of something or less of something, bigger things and smaller things.

Also about predictions: unless one adopts a quite skeptical approach (for instance the one about 'perspective' I mentioned earlier), these extremely accurate predictions seem to imply that, indeed, mathematics does describe the 'structure' of reality. But if that is true, mathematics isn't invented (at least, the part that describes the structure of the world). — boundless

I am not presuming some exclusive dichotomy of invented or discovered. Something can be both. You can invent a system of rules and then discover implications of following those rules that you did not know before.

Again, you don't need any special explanation for the effectiveness of maths. It is just extremely flexible and broad. If math was an extremely small field that entirely described physics exclusively then I would say you have a point but math can describe thing that are physically impossible or physically don't make sense. It describes stuff that have nothing to do with the empirical, physical world. It just explores the logical limits of manipulating quantities, perhaps in some counterfactual sense.

No, the world is intelligible because it is intelligible (if it is indeed intelligible). — boundless

I don't think it contradict the idea that the world is intelligible to us because we have a brain that allows us to understand it - i.e. it captures the structure of the world in a way that we can predict what happens next.

On the other hand, I can't exclude the possibility that it isn't really intelligible, in which case we evolved in a quite 'lucky' way that enables us to make useful predictions by using models that are in fact wrong. — boundless

Even if your models are wrong beyond some limit, the fact that you can construct models that give correct predictions suggests that there is an intelligible structure to that part of reality which is being captured. If reality wasn't intelligible, you wouldn't be able to do that.

Intelligibility is about understanding and comprehension, it isn't about being right or wrong. I would say something is unintelligible when you cannot create any model that gives correct predictions; even then, I am skeptical that such a thing even exists except for say... complete randomness... even paradoxes and contradictions are intelligible and understandable... even the concept of randomness itself to some extent.

The very fact that we speak of evolution - which is indeed intelligible as a concept - to explain why we can have knowledge presupposes that the world is intelligible in some sense (unless, as I said, one wants to embrace skepticism). — boundless

I think the core issue here is that I just don't agree with how you think intelligibility has some kind of importance here. Like, intelligibility to me seems to just say that the world has structure and we have brains that can capture that. Neither do I need some platonic realm of maths to understand why math can be used to describe that structure. I guess at the most abstract level of description, anything we perceive through our senses can be related to quantities. But again, its just a trivial observation of the world that can be captured abstractly by a sophisticated brain. Why do I need aome special explanation for the fact that I can count things that I see in the world (under the assumption of identifying those counted things as the same)?

As I said in my previous post, if one speaks about 'evolution' and 'evolutionary advantage' as an explanation and, indeed, if one thinks that explanation is true, I don't see how one can escape the conclusion that the 'process' considered is intelligible. — boundless

Sure, but you said you agreed that's an innate belief, reasonable to maintain:

I agree with you here. If we also give credence to the basic belief of the intelligibility of the world would imply that we assume that the world has a 'structure' that can be 'mirrored' by our mental categories. — boundless

how we have to understand that 'order'? Is it something 'physical' — boundless

It seems to me that it makes more sense to believe it IS physical, because otherwise we must make some unparsimonious assumptions about what else exists, besides the physical. I just don't get why so many are embracing idealism- it seems to depend on skepticism about the perceived world, and then makes the unsupported assumption that reality is mind-dependent. I see no good justification for believing that. Sure, our perceptions and understandings are mind dependent, but I see no justification to believe that's all there is to reality. The innate, basic belief has not been defeated, and if we merely apply skepticism- we should also be skeptical of the hypothesis of idealism.

IMO you are oscillating between a position that requires some degree of intelligibility (the assumption that there is a physcial reality) and a skeptical position which would require to abandon all attempts to rational understanding of reality.
I would say that the 'order', if we take it seriously, would not be just a 'judgement' but also a property of physcial reality itself. — boundless

No, I'm being consistent with physicalism in terms of what a property is: properties are universals that exist immanently where they are instantiated.

if intelligibility of physical reality is assumed, then, you can't 'conceive' the more elementary parts of physical world independent of anything else. — boundless

In the case of properties (universals) - you can recognize that two or more things have it. It's true that we aren't visualizing redness as a thing- we're visualizing a red surface, but we are intellectually just identifying the sameness that red things have.

Since this thread is about ontology, however, it would be probably more appropriate to refer to 'materialism', then, without using that term to indicate a specific form of 'materialism' that, say, is equated to ancient atomism or a literal interpretation of newtonian mechanics but it is compatible with modern physical theories. — boundless

So this modern materialism then, what does it suggest, especially above and beyond what naturalism does?

Still, I am not sure why people would call 'physicalism' a non-ontological view, but that's me.

It's how I use the word, but mostly just to identify 'not dualism', and I prefer to use naturalism to describe that, so I admit that the term needs something else, perhaps said ontological stance.

Anyway, personally, I would not call principles, laws and so on as something physical.

No, but I don't suggest that I am composed partially of principles and laws either. Those things are the means by which physical stuff interacts.

In fact, they are more like the transcendental conditions for the existence of something physical.

:up:

A purely 'unstructured' (i.e. intelligible) 'physical reality' is not a 'physical reality' at all. And the structure is more like a 'principle' than an 'object'. To me this means that the mere assumption that 'physical reality' is intelligible (which seems to be in fact necessary to speak about a 'physical reality'), contradicts materialism (and hence 'physicalism' as a metaphysical/ontological position). — boundless

I am trying to understand all the terms being used here. Some examples would help, perhaps of something unstructured, and how exactly speaking about a physical reality contradicts materialism.
Something unstructured would seem to not stand out to anything, and in that sense it wouldn't be intelligible. Not sure if that's what you mean though.

An unstructured world is IMO a contradiction in terms. — boundless

Maybe. As I said, it doesn't stand out, which makes it perhaps not exist, but I don't see it being contradictory.

Well, [ontic idealism] is often referred to the position that reality is exclusively mental and, therefore, there are only minds and mental content as we know them (a position that is most often attributed to Berkeley, but I think that he was more sofisticated than how it is often presented). — boundless

OK, but I've always associated that with just 'idealism'. Perhaps I should ask what non-ontic idealism is then. I mean, epitemic idealism makes sense, but almost in a tautological way. You only know what you know.

Anyway, I was not trying to 'make a case' for any of these 'idealist' positions. I was more like 'making a case' for the 'reality' of 'mathematical and logical truths' by simply assuming that there is an intelligible physical/material reality.

Assuming a reality to make a case for a reality?

In any case, if one assumes the 'reality' (and the 'indipendence' from the physical world and our minds) of math and logic, then one cannot be a 'materialist' and possibly even endorse some forms of ontological idealism, for that matter.

Agree

Yes what the body experiences pre-cognitively is unknown to us in vivo.
The experience of anything that isn't you is not known to you. Still not sure what you mean by cognition here, but plenty of things (trees, slime molds) do plenty of experiencing and communicating without the benefit of a nervous system.

— Janus

Its all different things blanketly labelled as 2+2 when really that doesn't actually describe the specifics of each thing and why they are like that. — Apustimelogist

Except it is 2+2 being discussed, and not the label nor any of the symbols or concepts of them, nor how anything is spelled.

I have an argument for the existence of my mind, which is based on the fact that experience exists and is coherent. — MoK

OK. I don't agree with the premises, so whether any of the conclusions follow from them seems irrelevant. Your belief seems not to answer my question about your belief not including any conclusion of objective existence. It all seems to hinge on relations between subjects experiencing objects.

I think the interpretation of Bohmian quantum mechanics is correct since it is anomaly-free..

Well that interpretation is not included in my suggestion of you being in superposition.
Not sure what you consider an 'anomaly' to be, but retrocausality seems to be one of them, don't you think?

Except it is 2+2 being discussed, and not the label nor any of the symbols or concepts of them, nor how anything is spelled. — noAxioms

So its like discussing spelling: m-i-n-u-t-e.

Imagine some species on another planet, far larger than Earth, with a daily rotation of one of our weeks, and an annual rotation of tens of our decades. Presumably the units they would use for measuring time would be very different to terrestrial units.
— Wayfarer
You are thinking of the Planck units, and yes, a species on another world can independently discover those units.
Under those units, four universal constants (speed of light, gravitational constant, reduced Planck constant, and Boltzmann constant) are all 1. Of course the aliens would give them different names.

There are also some quantum constants like the charge of an electron, and obvious unit charge. — noAxioms

I'm was not familiar with this terminology, so I sought help from the Oracle, who provided some helpful clarifications along these lines, although having read it, I now understand it.

The claim that Planck units (Planck time, Planck length, Planck mass, etc.) are a set of "natural units" derived solely from fundamental physical constants: the speed of light (c), the gravitational constant (G), and the reduced Planck constant (ℏ) is correct. These constants are believed to be universal throughout the cosmos. In this sense, an advanced alien civilization, by studying the laws of physics, could indeed independently arrive at the concept of Planck units and their values. They represent the fundamental scales at which quantum gravity effects are expected to become significant, and they are independent of any specific planet's rotation or orbit. (Remember the Pioneer Plaque? This was attached to a satellite bound for interstellar space, on the basis of the belief that an alien culture capable of intercepting it would know what it meant.)

However the existence of Planck units, while providing a universal and objective scale for duration, does not fundamentally undermine the argument that measurement (or observation from a specific frame of reference) is an essential element of duration, nor does it negate the "subjective" components we discussed.

Even if an event's "true" duration is, say, X Planck units in its own rest frame, an observer moving at a high velocity relative to that event, or an observer in a strong gravitational field, will still measure a different duration for that event due to time dilation. The laws of physics (including those that lead to Planck units) are universal, but the measurement of duration is relative to the observer's frame of reference. So, while Planck time provides a "floor" for how short a meaningful duration can be, and a universal constant to define a second, it doesn't mean all observers will measure the same number of Planck times for a given event. The "objective unit" itself (e.g., one Planck time) still experiences relativistic effects. (Also while Planck units are fundamentally important in theoretical physics, they are incredibly tiny (5.39×10 ⁻⁴⁴seconds) and are not a practical unit of measurement.)

But the structure is more like a 'transcendental' for the world (i.e. a precondition of it). — boundless

My point that "measurement is an essential element of duration" stands. In a relativistic universe, duration isn't an absolute, pre-existing quantity that merely needs to be "counted" by an observer. In other words, it is not transcendental, but phenomenal. The duration of an event itself is dependent on the observer's frame. Therefore, the act of measurement, by defining the observer's frame of reference, is intrinsically linked to the definition of that particular duration for that observer. You're not just measuring a pre-defined duration; you are, in a sense, participating in the definition of its duration by being in a specific frame.

I just watched Brian Cox explain the incomprehensible minuteness of the Planck Length: if you expanded a single proton to the size of the solar system, the Planck Length would be the size of a virus. :yikes:

The claim that Planck units (Planck time, Planck length, Planck mass, etc.) are a set of "natural units" derived solely from fundamental physical constants: the speed of light (c), the gravitational constant (G), and the reduced Planck constant (ℏ) is correct. These constants are believed to be universal throughout the cosmos. — Wayfarer

Note that under such natural units, all four of those constants have the value of 1.

In this sense, an advanced alien civilization, by studying the laws of physics, could indeed independently arrive at the concept of Planck units and their values.

This is what you asked about. It suggests that such units are not made up, but rather are physical, a mind-independent set of units that is a property of our cosmos.

However the existence of Planck units, while providing a universal and objective scale for duration, does not fundamentally undermine the argument that measurement (or observation from a specific frame of reference) is an essential element of duration, nor does it negate the "subjective" components we discussed.

The Planck unit of time is one of proper time (type 1), not the third type (awareness of) time which you seem to have been referencing. Don't confuse the two. There's little point in utilizing Plank units for measuring a specific species' awareness of time.
Also, you switched your argument here from awareness of time (type 3) to coordinate time (type 2) which is time relative to a frame of reference. That too does not have much utility for Planck units since for instance light does not travel at c except locally. So the 'constants' are no longer constant.
Yes, an alien culture would probably use a different frame of reference, if only a difference in gravitational potential.

Even if an event's "true" duration is, say, X — Wayfarer

I'm not sure if whatever you're referencing would have a true duration. I use the physics definition of 'event', which is a point in spacetime, something without duration. OK, so a different sort of event like the sinking of the Titanic, which took hours, but that sort of duration is coordinate time, not proper time. That duration varies relative to one's choice of reference frame, as is necessarily the case with anything with extension like that. There's no one 'true' duration of something that multiple people are aware of or relative to different frames since it is different for each of them.

Planck units in its own rest frame, an observer moving at a high velocity relative to that event, or an observer in a strong gravitational field, will still measure a different duration for that event due to time dilation.

That's coordinate time, and yes, it is frame dependent. Proper time is invariant, and Planck units are units of proper time.

My point that "measurement is an essential element of duration" stands.

That only works for type 3 durations, and I stand by that point. Coordinate time requires awareness to compute, but it otherwise doesn't require being computed to have a coordinate duration.

In a relativistic universe, duration isn't an absolute, pre-existing quantity that merely needs to be "counted" by an observer. — Wayfarer

This is wrong. Proper duration is invariant in both a relativistic and an absolute interpretation of the universe, and coordinate duration (including 'actual' duration in the absolute universe) is not invariant. Neither kind of time has a requirement to be noticed by any observer. Of course, that's different in any mind-dependent sort of ontology where being noticed is a requirement.

I just watched Brian Cox explain the incomprehensible minuteness of the Planck Length: — Wayfarer

So its like discussing spelling: m-i-n-u-t-e. — Apustimelogist

Apparently Apustimelogist finds your statement completely ambiguous.

Yea, natural units are at the quantum scale, not anything of particular day to day pragmatic use.

Apparently Apustimelogist finds your statement completely ambiguous. — noAxioms

Ironically, the original point I was making there is that you are the one finding such things ambiguous hence why you conflate 2+2 referring to completely different things.

Thanks for the reply, this conversation is requiring that I do some research on concepts of time in relativity and philosophy, which I'm learning from. So, to recap the debate thus far:

As for there being no time outside the awareness of it, that depends on your definition of time.
1) Proper time, which is very much physical and supposedly mind independent. This is what clocks measure.
2) Coordinate time, which is arguably abstract and thus mind dependent since coordinate systems are mental constructs. Coordinate time is that which dilates.
3) One's perception of the flow of time, which is very much only a product of awareness, pretty much by anything tasked with making predictions. — noAxioms

The Planck unit of time is one of proper time (type 1), not the third type (awareness of) time which you seem to have been referencing. Don't confuse the two. There's little point in utilizing Plank units for measuring a specific species' awareness of time. — noAxioms

Proper duration is invariant in both a relativistic and an absolute interpretation of the universe, and coordinate duration (including 'actual' duration in the absolute universe) is not invariant. Neither kind of time has a requirement to be noticed by any observer. Of course, that's different in any mind-dependent sort of ontology where being noticed is a requirement. — noAxioms

So, you are saying I am conflating different levels of analysis when I discussed Planck units in the context of a species' differing perceptions of time based on their planet's cycles. You are saying that Planck time is a fundamental unit of physical duration (proper time at a very small scale), while my thought experiment is about a species' subjective experience and culturally defined units of time (more akin to "awareness of time"). And I've learned from my research that these different "types" of time, with "type 1" (proper time) being the more fundamental (or "physical") concept, is recognised within the framework of relativity.

However, earlier in the discussion, I had introduced a quote from an essay on Bergson and Einstein's debate about the nature of time, which I present here again:

To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time. — Clock Time Contra Lived Time, Evan Thompson, Aeon Magazine

My bolds. And my claim is that this is true even of so-called 'Type 1', supposedly mind-independent time. Bergson's analysis challenges the idea of a time that exists completely independently of any form of "experiencing" or "measuring" (in the broader sense that includes conscious awareness). Even physical clocks, which we might think of as objective measures, rely on physical processes unfolding in space, which we interpret as temporal intervals.

This suggests that time, insofar as it is meaningful to us, is inherently linked to how we perceive and interpret change and succession. (And if it's not meaningful to us, then what is there to discuss?) Even in the case of physical measurements, we are the ones who interpret the spatial movements as representing the passage of time. Without an observer (human or otherwise) to relate the spatial changes to the concept of time, the clock's movements are just that – movements in space. The distinction between the discrete moments measured by a clock and the continuous flow of lived duration aligns with the distinction of "physical" time (like Planck time or proper time) and "awareness of time." However, a Bergson would likely argue that even the "physical" time we measure with clocks is still dependent on a framework of spatial measurement and our interpretation of it which only an observer can provide.

So if we take Bergson's challenge seriously, we might ask: what does Planck time mean in the absence of any system (even a theoretical one) to "observe" or be affected by events at that scale? Is it a fundamental property of spacetime that exists independently of any interaction or measurement, or is its significance tied to its role within our theoretical frameworks of how the universe operates?

Bergson's analysis provides a philosophical argument for the idea that time, as we understand and experience it, is deeply intertwined with the process of observation and interpretation. While Planck time might represent a fundamental unit of physical duration at the smallest scale, Bergson's perspective suggests that even this concept is embedded within our theoretical framework of measurement and understanding. It reinforces the idea that time is not simply a pre-existing entity that we passively record, but something that emerges through our interaction with the world, whether that interaction is through conscious experience or through the construction and interpretation of physical measurements. (This, incidentally, is in keeping with the 'enactivist' philosophy of Evan Thompson who wrote the article being discussed.)

I also hold sympathies to idealism, to the point where ontology may well just be an ideal even if I'm not an idealist (mind being in any way fundamental). All sorts of traps on that road, but I think it is valid. Is there such a thing as ontic idealism? — noAxioms

Ontic or ontological idealism holds that the world is ultimately mental (or spiritual) in nature. I'm arguing for epistemological idealism which argues that whatever we know of the world has an ineliminably subjective pole. Whilst objectivity is pragmatically possible and useful, the objective stance ought not to loose sight of this broader point: reality is not something we're outside of, or apart from.

Ref: Who Really Won when Bergson and Einstein Debated Time, Evan Thompson, Aeon.

I've learned from my research that these different "types" of time, with "type 1" (proper time) being the more fundamental (or "physical") concept, is recognised within the framework of relativity. — Wayfarer

It isn't more fundamental under all views. Under idealism, perceived time is more fundamental than the time from any theory.
About the Bergson Einstein debate, let me try to paraphrase it. Imagine Bergson standing on a highway with a little numbered marker each 0.1km. He's at marker 125.
"To examine the measurements involved in space, Bergson considers himself on a road. At each location, a clearly visible sign indicates the position in space, points on a line or a tape measure. The sign is quite legible, but smaller ones are perceived in the distance with increasing numbers and other observers in the presence of those. In the case of the road, the position at which he is located – is what we call ‘here’. Each successive ‘here’ of the road contains nothing of other locations because each location, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience space. Instead, we hold these separate locations together in our memory. We unify them. A physical ruler measures a succession of spatial locations, but only experiencing 'expanse' allows us to recognise these seemingly separate locations as a continuum. Rulers don’t measure space; we do. This is why Bergson believed that ruler-distance presupposes lived distance"

It's definitely idealistic leaning, but seems legit, no? Do you agree with it all?

And my claim is that this is true even of so-called 'Type 1', supposedly mind-independent time.

It is true. It does not become a mental construct of proper time until experienced. But type 1 is proper time, not the mental construct of proper time, and the argument seems not to be true at all of the latter.

Bergson's analysis challenges the idea of a time that exists completely independently of any form of "experiencing" or "measuring" (in the broader sense that includes conscious awareness).

Based on much of the content of this topic, I can even agree with that, since ontology is potentially a mental construct. What proper time is, is a different issue than what it means to say it exists. OK, by some definitions of 'exists', the word means to 'be' whatever it is, but by other definitions, to exist means to be labeled thus by something that worries about such things.

Bergson believed that time is a continuous flow, something that very much is a conclusion only from perception.

He criticized Einstein's view of time, arguing that it failed to capture the subjective and fluid nature of lived time. That it does, not being in any way a theory about experience. But neither does Einstein's view predict a different experience.

Even physical clocks, which we might think of as objective measures, rely on physical processes unfolding in space, which we interpret as temporal intervals.

You may choose to interpret these things any way you want. Proper time is still the same (invariant) in any interpretation, and is something meaningful to us.

Even in the case of physical measurements, we are the ones who interprest the spatial movements as representing the passage of time.

Not all interpretations represent time as something that passes. Movement may represent time, but not necessarily its passage.

Without an observer (human or otherwise) to relate the spatial changes to the concept of time, the clock's movements are just that – movements in space.

I agree with this.

The distinction between the discrete moments measured by a clock

Lacking a Planck clock, I don't think any clock measures discreet moments in a way that a human doesn't.
Proper time isn't discreet, but quantum time might be.

However, a Bergson would likely argue that even the "physical" time we measure with clocks is still dependent on a framework of spatial measurement and our interpretation of it which only an observer can provide.

Perhaps he would argue that, incorrectly. Our interpretation of clocks gives us a sort of epistemic time, but it doesn't create physical time, it only measures it, and physical time, just like physical distance, can (given a sort of mind-independent interpretation) be without any necessity of perception. So OK, Bergson is perhaps not such a realist, and that's not an invalid position. But a choice of premises is very different than an unbacked assertion that those premises are necessarily true. Same goes with Einstein if he makes such an assertion.

So if we take Bergson's challenge seriously, we might ask: what does Planck time mean in the absence of any system to "observe" or be affected by events at that scale?

That scale being more fundamental, all events at any scale are affected by them, even if what we call classical behavior is more emergent than coming directly from the Planck scale. But then there's the 'what does it mean' part. Absent some kind of awareness, there's nothing to find meaning. If ontology is meaning, then it doesn't even exist. But in a mind-independent view, proper time (at whatever scale) doesn't require itself to be meaningful to anything.

I would say even that proper time might be something emergent I've seen artist depictions of the chaos of what spacetime looks like at quantum scales, and it isn't all nice and flatness and describable in four lousy dimensions. Extension is just another classical emergent thing.

Is it a fundamental property of spacetime

More fundamental than spacetime, but probably not actually 'fundamental' itself.
Our theories are just models, not anything proscriptive.

Bergson's perspective suggests that even this concept is embedded within our theoretical framework of measurement and understanding.

Of course it is.

Ontic or ontological idealism holds that the world is ultimately mental (or spiritual) in nature. — Wayfarer

Not what I'm talking about then. How is that statement distinct from regular idealism?

I'm talking more about people/experience still supervening on the physical (mind-independent world), yet the designation of this existing and that not existing is purely a mental distinction. Perhaps there's a term for that other than 'ontic idealism'.

I'm arguing for epistemological idealism which argues that whatever we know of the world has an ineliminably subjective pole.

I can think of few views (if any) that would disagree with that.

Ref: Who Really Won when Bergson and Einstein Debated Time, Evan Thompson, Aeon.

Saw that in my searches. Don't trust such an assessment written by somebody clearly favoring one side over the other. Such debates express two points of view, neither debunked, and thus comes down to who can think faster on their feet. I'm thinking of say the way WL Craig clearly trounced Hitchens despite my opinion of which side is correct and despite my opinion that Craig doesn't even believe what he pitches. He's incredibly good at the pitching, and that's what counts in a debate. Not who's right, and not what one's actual belief's are.

Ironically, the original point I was making there is that you are the one finding such things ambiguous hence why you conflate 2+2 referring to completely different things. — Apustimelogist

You missed the point then. I was searching for any context where 2+2 might be equal to something other than 4, any reason to not accept 2+2=4 as an absolute truth.

I was searching for any context where 2+2 might be equal to something other than 4, any reason to not accept 2+2=4 as an absolute truth. — noAxioms

This is the same as what the bit you quoted was describing.

I was searching for any context where 2+2 might be equal to something other than 4, any reason to not accept 2+2=4 as an absolute truth. — noAxioms

If you have 2 apples in one hand and 2 apples in your other hand you are holding 4 apples. If you have 2 apples in one hand and 2 oranges in the other hand you are holding 4 pieces of fruit. Etc

But once you say 2+2=4 you are now in into the realm of mathematics where different rules apply and 2+2=4 is not an absolute truth. Rather, 2+2=4 is only true within specific mathematical systems - most commonly Peano Arithmetic - where you start of with certain axioms and rules and then you can derive 2+2=4.

I don't pretend to understand them, but there are other mathematical frameworks where 2+2 is not necessarily 4 - e.g Modular Arithmetic and Abstract Algebra..

It's definitely idealistic leaning, but seems legit, no? Do you agree with it all? — noAxioms

Yes, I completely agree with it. It highlights the role of the mind in stitching together - synthesising - a set of otherwise disconnected facts into the unitary perception of space-time. You said you haven't read up on Kant, but he says something like this: space and time are not derived from experience (a posteriori), nor are they concepts, but rather they are the necessary, a priori conditions of experience. In other words, we cannot perceive or imagine anything without situating it in space and time. And they are not things or properties in themselves but are the conditions under which appearances are possible. Kant calls them "pure" because they are independent of any particular empirical content, and "intuitions" because they represent a singular, immediate framework for perception, not a general concept or category. Yet, also important to note that Kant is an empirical realist, i.e. he accepts that the objects of analysis are real as phenomena.

Proper time is still the same (invariant) in any interpretation, and is something meaningful to us. — noAxioms

In any interpretation, yes. But again, what it is outside any interpretation can only be inferred.

You asked a rhetorical question in the thread title - 'Does anybody support a mind-independent reailty' - from what I'm seeing, the answer would be that you do. Would that be right?

I don't think so, because I don't explicitly need concepts for the world to be intelligible. I can see the trajectory of a thrown ball, predict where it will end up and catch it without overt need for any concepts. We apply concepts after the fact, mapping them to what we see. Much of the time they are wrong and make false predictions. The ones that happen to be empirically adequate may survive, generally. — Apustimelogist

And yet, on the other hand, probably even in order to 'see' the trajectory, you need to have already some kind of interpretative structure. So which comes before which?
And BTW, you are assuming that the 'world' to be structured but you are not explaining how it can be. If you did, you would use precisely those concepts you think are totally derived from experience.

Its almost trivial to observe the world around you and be able to identify that there can be more of something or less of something, bigger things and smaller things. — Apustimelogist

So, where 'more or less' comes from? Isn't that evidence, then, that concepts do map 'reality' in some way? How is that so?

I am not presuming some exclusive dichotomy of invented or discovered. Something can be both. You can invent a system of rules and then discover implications of following those rules that you did not know before. — Apustimelogist

Fine!

If math was an extremely small field that entirely described physics exclusively then I would say you have a point but math can describe thing that are physically impossible or physically don't make sense. — Apustimelogist

Actually, the history of physics clearly showed us how some 'obscure' mathematical concepts have been used in physical theories. Moreover, I do believe that this property of math as being 'more' than what is actually employed in physics gives more credence to platonism. If math wasn't so 'broad', its truths would be accidental. And, frankly, I am not even sure in a purely physicalist perspective how can we even conceive something that has no relation to '(experienced) reality'. What would even the point of that?

Even if your models are wrong beyond some limit, the fact that you can construct models that give correct predictions suggests that there is an intelligible structure to that part of reality which is being captured. If reality wasn't intelligible, you wouldn't be able to do that. — Apustimelogist

Agreed. More precisely, if reality wasn't intelligible and still we can make successful predictions this would imply that we can do that due to sheer, inexplicable luck. It is sort of possible, I guess. We can't exclude that. But it just doesn't seem 'right'.

Intelligibility is about understanding and comprehension, it isn't about being right or wrong. I would say something is unintelligible when you cannot create any model that gives correct predictions; even then, I am skeptical that such a thing even exists except for say... complete randomness... even paradoxes and contradictions are intelligible and understandable... even the concept of randomness itself to some extent. — Apustimelogist

Not sure how can you understand something without being 'right'. In a way, one might even say that 'reality isn't intelligible' is self-refuting: in order to be true, it must correctly 'describe' reality. But if it does describe reality, then...

Why do I need aome special explanation for the fact that I can count things that I see in the world (under the assumption of identifying those counted things as the same)? — Apustimelogist

Partly it's psychological...because, well, for me it isn't 'obvious'. It isn't something I would take for granted. BTW, personally I also marvel at 'existence' itself.

And, in fact, I guess these two things are related. Why reality is 'ordered' when it could be otherwise? Is it even conceivable to speak about 'order'/'structure' without assuming some mental categories? Does this have implications?

It seems to me that it makes more sense to believe it IS physical, because otherwise we must make some unparsimonious assumptions about what else exists, besides the physical. — Relativist

Viceversa, I just don't understand why many physicalists are so sure that using the term 'physical' is appropriate for the 'structure'/'order'. To me it's just equivocating the term.

I just don't get why so many are embracing idealism- it seems to depend on skepticism about the perceived world, and then makes the unsupported assumption that reality is mind-dependent. I see no good justification for believing that. Sure, our perceptions and understandings are mind dependent, but I see no justification to believe that's all there is to reality. The innate, basic belief has not been defeated, and if we merely apply skepticism- we should also be skeptical of the hypothesis of idealism. — Relativist

Note that unlike an idealist thinks that the 'physical world' is just mental content they also believe that there is something 'outside'. And, in fact, even someone like Berkeley would say that the order is 'mind-dependent' if 'mind' is taken to be the individual mind.
Of course, Berkeley would probably say that mental content and minds are all there is. But 'idealism' includes a much more diverse picture.

That is, only some idealists would claim that the physical world is reduced to perceptions and understandings. They would probably agree with you that, instead, the world is 'external' from the mind and it is intelligible. They would probably contend that its intelligibility is an indication that shares a common structure with the mind and, therefore, it is (for them) an indication that it is ontologically secondary to Mind (I use the capital letter because these types of ontological idealists often believe in a higher 'Mind' as the ground of the physical world).

Then, of course, we have epistemic idealists. These would say that, in fact, we can only know the world as it is represented by our own mental categories. For them, it isn't at all surprising that the world seems intelligible: our experience is structured by our own mental categories. This specific type of idealism, however, makes no claim about how the world is 'outside' of experience.

The metaphysical physicalist, on the other hand, assumes that the physical world is primary and intelligible and mind is derived from it. But how can a purely physical account explain its intelligibility without just assuming it as 'taken for granted'?

And, yes, skepticism works in both ways. But note that I was thinking about the consequences of accepting the assumption that the physical world is intelligible.

No, I'm being consistent with physicalism in terms of what a property is: properties are universals that exist immanently where they are instantiated. — Relativist

Aristotle for instance agreed with this and he wasn't a physicalist.
Anyway, assuming that a 'hylomorphic' physicalism holds (i.e. a Aristotelian picture of reality without the 'super-natural' aspects of his worldview), do you believe that formal causes exist? I mean if there is an 'order' in the physical world, it just seems that the world has a 'form' in a quite Arisotelian way.
Note that this is different from saying that math can be used to make predictions. It assumes that we can truly understand something 'essential' of the world.

In the case of properties (universals) - you can recognize that two or more things have it. It's true that we aren't visualizing redness as a thing- we're visualizing a red surface, but we are intellectually just identifying the sameness that red things have. — Relativist

Note that this wasn't my point. I said that reductionism cannot explain a structured world because 'structure' is a property (if it even can be considered a 'property') of the whole, not of the parts.
It was something separate from universals.

So this modern materialism then, what does it suggest, especially above and beyond what naturalism does? — noAxioms

If I am understanding your question correctly, that 'modern materialism' would be the thesis that fundamental reality is 'physical', 'natural' etc.

It's how I use the word, but mostly just to identify 'not dualism', and I prefer to use naturalism to describe that, so I admit that the term needs something else, perhaps said ontological stance. — noAxioms

My problem with this is that there are also philosophical models that do not make any 'stance' about whether 'the physical' or 'the mental' is fundamental. Some phenomenological approach conceptualize this by saying that the 'first-person perspective' (the 'mental') and the 'third-person perspective' (the 'physical') are not reducible to one another but you need to take both into account even if it is not possible to make a synthesis of them (think about 'complementarity' in QM). To none of them, however, an ontological status is actually granted. Both are ultimately 'point of views'.
How would you classify this? It is obviously not 'dualistic' in the sense that an ontologiy is not even presumed.

No, but I don't suggest that I am composed partially of principles and laws either. Those things are the means by which physical stuff interacts. — noAxioms

Sort of agree. They are not 'parts' that we are composed of. That would be a 'materialistic' interpretation of principles and laws. But even saying that they are 'means' is wrong IMO. I would say that they 'manifest' in the way physical stuff interact. If they weren't 'there', there would be no 'way' in which physical stuff would interact.

I am trying to understand all the terms being used here. Some examples would help, perhaps of something unstructured, and how exactly speaking about a physical reality contradicts materialism.
Something unstructured would seem to not stand out to anything, and in that sense it wouldn't be intelligible. Not sure if that's what you mean though. — noAxioms

Mmm it's difficult to make an example of something unstructured... because making a description would actually assume an intelligible structure!

I am not even sure that it even makes sense to think about an 'unstructured reality'. So, probably, this implies that, after all, intelligibility is sometinh essential to anything real.

Regarding my point about 'physical reality' and materialism, think it this way. If one posits that, say, the fundamental reality is, say, the Platonic 'world of Forms' it's possible to explain why the physical world presents to us regularities. They are, so to speak, 'moving images' of the Forms or 'manifestations' of them. And physical things are instantiations of the forms.
But materialism would simply assume that there is an 'order' in the world without having a conceptual category that explains it. Is being intelligible intrinsic/essential to be material? Is the 'order' material? etc

OK, but I've always associated that with just 'idealism'. Perhaps I should ask what non-ontic idealism is then. I mean, epitemic idealism makes sense, but almost in a tautological way. You only know what you know. — noAxioms

I quote my previous post which tries to explain 'epistemic idealism':

Then, of course, we have epistemic idealists. These would say that, in fact, we can only know the world as it is represented by our own mental categories. For them, it isn't at all surprising that the world seems intelligible: our experience is structured by our own mental categories. This specific type of idealism, however, makes no claim about how the world is 'outside' of experience. — boundless

Assuming a reality to make a case for a reality? — noAxioms

Assuming some kind of reality of mathematical and logical principles to make a case for the intelligibility of physical reality.

My point that "measurement is an essential element of duration" stands. In a relativistic universe, duration isn't an absolute, pre-existing quantity that merely needs to be "counted" by an observer. In other words, it is not transcendental, but phenomenal. The duration of an event itself is dependent on the observer's frame. Therefore, the act of measurement, by defining the observer's frame of reference, is intrinsically linked to the definition of that particular duration for that observer. You're not just measuring a pre-defined duration; you are, in a sense, participating in the definition of its duration by being in a specific frame. — Wayfarer

Well, I guess that one can even say that in order to even think to make a measurement you have to assume that the 'world' is intelligible in terms of mental categories (and 'time' might be one of them). The epistemic idealist would then say that such an assumption of intelligibility is only valid when the world is analysed in the context of experience, i.e. we can't make any claim about how 'the world is' without any kind of reference to experience. So the 'perspectival' character of physical quantities might even be an indication of this.
If duration is quantized, it would still not 'falsify' epistemic idealism IMO. It would simply tell us how 'the world as is presented' is best understood.

we can't make any claim about how 'the world is' without any kind of reference to experience — boundless

That’s it. This is what I believe Kant means by the ‘in itself’, as distinct from ‘the phenomenal’. The issue is, empiricism tends to take what exists in the absence of any observer as the hallmark of what is real, but that entails an inherent contradiction.

Under idealism, perceived time is more fundamental than the time from any theory. — noAxioms

It's more the case that any theory ultimately depends on perception/measurement of time. And that shouldn't be taken as a 'falsifiable hypothesis', as it is not. The pre-theoretical experience of temporal succession and measurement is logically prior to any theoretical model of time. We could not arrive at any theory of time without already presupposing the ability to observe, record, and compare events in time.

So it's not a 'falsifiable hypothesis', because falsifiable hypotheses are propositions within a theoretical framework that make empirical predictions that could turn out to be incorrect. Rather, this is a meta-theoretical observation —a philosophical reflection on what must already be the case for any theory to arise or be tested. It is not as if one could simply 'swap out' this analysis for some alternative: it reflects the conditions of possibility for any empirical theorizing at all.

That dependency is what the 'blind spot of science' (Frank, Gleiser and Thompson) fails to recognise.

And yet, on the other hand, probably even in order to 'see' the trajectory, you need to have already some kind of interpretative structure — boundless

I am not sure what this means: the interpretative structure of following a ball and catching it?

And BTW, you are assuming that the 'world' to be structured but you are not explaining how it can be. — boundless

What kind of answer you want? I don't understand why you want me to explain how the world can be structured. It seems self-evident to most people.

So, where 'more or less' comes from? Isn't that evidence, then, that concepts do map 'reality' in some way? How is that so? — boundless

Actually, the history of physics clearly showed us how some 'obscure' mathematical concepts have been used in physical theories. Moreover, I do believe that this property of math as being 'more' than what is actually employed in physics gives more credence to platonism. If math wasn't so 'broad', its truths would be accidental. And, frankly, I am not even sure in a purely physicalist perspective how can we even conceive something that has no relation to '(experienced) reality'. What would even the point of that? — boundless

We have a brain that receives sensory input and abstracts structure that maps onto structure in the world. I can then manipulate that inferred structure. I can then construct a system that describes abstract stuff and discover new implications from it. But this isn't really more interesting than brains doing stuff. I don't need a platonic realm to do this, I just need a brain that can infer quantity in the sensory world and extrapolate.

Not sure how can you understand something without being 'right'. — boundless

You can have an intelligible model that is incorrect. Like people used to have models of the solar system that were intelligible, gave correct predictions and turned out to be completely wrong.

only some idealists would claim that the physical world is reduced to perceptions and understandings — boundless

How do they justify believing this?

Physicalism is epistemically grounded in our perceptions of the world - presumably our senses deliver us a reflection of reality (so there is a bit of distinction between perceived reality and actual reality) and the success of science. It's logically possible for these assumptions to be false, but the grounding beliefs are innate - basic beliefs. Possibility alone doesn't justify abandoning them.

This specific type of idealism, however, makes no claim about how the world is 'outside' of experience. — boundless

This seems to entail denying the reality we experience and interact with, denying the basic beliefs we're born with- and isn't it solely based on the possibility these innate beliefs are wrong?

. I said that reductionism cannot explain a structured world because 'structure' is a property (if it even can be considered a 'property') of the whole, not of the parts.
It was something separate from universals. — boundless

Your view is inconsistent with physicalism. Under the physicalist paradigm, reality has a structure, and physical structures have ontological properties, but the structure (i.e. having structure vs being unstructured) is itself not an ontological property.

Particulars have properties and relations to other particulars. Properties and relations exist immanently. Two (or more) particulars can have the same property and/or relation (or sets of these) - these are universals.

Laws of nature are relations between universals; they are universals. Laws of nature entail necessitation, and they account for causation.


This framework reflects, and accounts for, the structure that we see in the world. It's not a causal account, it's a structural account.

do you believe that formal causes exist? — boundless

No. It doesn't fit into a physicalist paradigm, ontologically.

I just don't understand why many physicalists are so sure that using the term 'physical' is appropriate for the 'structure'/'order'. To me it's just equivocating the term. — boundless

"Physical" is just the label attached to the things that exists that is causally connected to everything else. Causally disconnected things are logically possible, but because of an absence of causal connections, their existence is moot and there is no epistemological justification to believe such things exist.

If you still believe there's an equivocation, please describe it.