If we should examine each of the tens of thousands of bullets suspended in air, now in midflight, and place each under the microscope to decipher what anger is embeded in each of them, I'd suspect that remarkably few have thoughts of God and ancient theologies within them — Hanover

Nicely put.

The hail of gunfire in Ukraine, for example, is a better example of mass destruction than 9/11. What intention do you suppose is impregnated in those bullets, the advancement of Christianity, Judaism, Islam? That doesn't seem right. Probably a drive for natural resources, the rebuilding of a fallen empire, or a a diversion from a failing economy? Secular interests that is. — Hanover

Not so sure about that .

The Russian Orthodox Church, particularly under Patriarch Kirill, provides critical religious justification for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The church has framed the conflict as a "holy war" aimed at defending "Holy Russia" and protecting it from Western influences. Christian nationalism is central to Putin and Trump, it would seem. I would not underestimate the role of the Orthodox church in Putin's Russkiy Mir empire building. Identifying as a Orthodox Christian has been central to his project.

It's true that religion can be exploited by corrupt individuals to sway voters and soldiers: figures like Putin and Trump have utilized religious narratives to bolster their political agendas. This manipulation doesn't render religion any less dangerous; on the contrary, it often provides the anger, motivation, and justification for atrocities, even if the underlying motives may be rooted in nihilistic greed.

That said, I wouldn't argue that religion is the sole source of abject cruelty on our planet. It's merely one of the major players.

That said, I wouldn't argue that religion is the sole source of abject cruelty on our planet. It's merely one of the major players. — Tom Storm

Indeed; int might not so often be the reason, but as you point out it is often used as an excuse, for doing things we know we ought not.

For many, it is uncomfortable to draw attention to that aspect of faith.

For many, it is uncomfortable to draw attention to that aspect of faith. — Banno

It's really not. It's like pointing out that governments can do evil things and thinking that only anarchists remain comfortable because they swore off government.

That religion has done some really bad things isn't debatable.

It's also not really debatable that government and religions are political entities. People and power create. Sometimes they create good. Sometimes not.

My response all along has been the special pleading of religion as evil, not denying it can be evil.

My response all along has been the special pleading of religion as evil, not denying it can be evil. — Hanover

For what it's worth, I think your take on this is fair.

It's really not. — Hanover

That's simply not what I read in the responses to my posts here.

That's simply not what I read in the responses to my posts here. — Banno

If you have located someone willing to argue the strawman, defeating them only proves you've found the weakest form of the argument to defeat. It doesn't suggest anything more philosophically as to what faith based beliefs entail.

The best I can decipher is you wish to generalize a psychological profile to those of faith, pointing out they're a particularly dangerous sort.

That's not philosophy. That's sociology. I'll defer to the studies whatever they might say. Regardless of what sociological studies say Christians, for example, typically are does not mean they logically must be.

And that's the philosophy question. That Christians or whoever might suck at higher rates than atheists isn't because of their religion. It's just because they suck.

You want to to turn all that's been said here into a bit of pop psychology. Fine. There's your straw man.

You want to to turn all that's been said here into a bit of pop psychology. Fine. There's your straw man. — Banno

Not pop psychology, but perhaps actual psychology. If it is the case that religious based reasoning does not dictate an evil propensity yet the empirical evidence shows the religious are more evil than their atheist counterparts, then some explanation as to why might be interesting.

For example, if I'm a Satanist, it might be that my evil ways are dictated by my ideology, and so you could rightly criticize Satanism. But if I'm a Christian and my evil ways are not dictated by my ideology, you can't rightly criticize my Christianity. If you can show, however, that Christians are disproportionately evil (even though there's nothing in their ideology that entails that evil (as there is with Satanism)), then I'd be interested in knowing what that is.

Buit that interest isn't a philosophical question. It's a psychological or sociological one. Maybe all Republicans are great dancers. If they are, I'd want to know why because it doesn't seem like dancing ability should arise from that belief system. It also doesn't seem like joining the Republican party will make me a great dancer.

You've changed the topic. I haven't seen any argument that religious folk disproportionately evil, or more so than atheists.

For example, if I'm a Satanist, it might be that my evil ways are dictated by my ideology, and so you could rightly criticize Satanism. But if I'm a Christian and my evil ways are not dictated by my ideology, you can't rightly criticize my Christianity. If you can show, however, that Christians are disproportionately evil (even though there's nothing in their ideology that entails that evil (as there is with Satanism)), then I'd be interested in knowing what that is. — Hanover

Anti-religious bigotry has now taken on a life of its own, but the underlying tradition here is Enlightenment Rationalism. It was the Enlightenment's "Sapere Aude" which attempted to sideline faith—religious or otherwise. That tradition targeted faith itself, not Christianity per se. The anti-religious in this thread are mostly just involved in begging the question. Although some Enlightenment thinkers managed more than simply begging the question, there were nevertheless 18th century figures who already saw the folly, such as J. G. Hamann. Namely, they saw that "rationalism" possessed no foundation—historical or otherwise—upon which to stand. It is little more than borrowed capital pretending to assert itself as sovereign.

Enlightenment Rationalism was an interesting idea, but nowadays Hamann's critique has become common knowledge, namely that the project was a failure and a conceited naivete. Even many of the Enlightenment thinkers themselves quickly recognized how unstable and flighty their so-called "rationalism" was.* Logical Positivism was the last real gasp of air from that tradition, and so it's not surprising that the descendants of Russell are still sporting Enlightenment bumper stickers.

But the whole "faith is bad" propaganda campaign is an unkempt grandchild of that tradition.

(Curiously, Anglophone moral anti-realism flows out of Enlightenment thinking, and this is the place where Banno is perhaps most schizophrenic: affirming moral realism without having any substantial foundation or rationale for that stance. That's a clear symptom of Enlightenment-style thinking. Interlocutors of such moral realists are inevitably tempted to call that form of moral realism "faith-based" (in the anti-religious, pejorative sense).)


* Enlightenment Rationalism crashed and burned so hard that we are now left with the opposite extreme: strong reactions against the idea that reason has any efficacy whatsoever as a political force.

Faith, unlike ordinary belief or trust, is best understood through its persistence under conditions of strain, doubt, or suffering. It is not a rigid refusal to change, nor merely trust in authority, but a form of commitment that reveals itself when it is hardest to maintain. Definitions that ignore this pragmatic and temporal dimension fail to capture the lived meaning of faith.

Seems odd that religious folk seek to deny this. — Banno

Deny this aspect? You said yourself faith is “a form of commitment that reveals itself when it is hardest to maintain.”

That tells us where to look to see faith revealed, but doesn’t tell us what faith is. It doesn’t tell us what precisely is revealed, only “when” or where we might look to point to what faith is.

So I think people are denying this aspect speaks to the question of what faith is qua faith.

The grace under pressure aspect you find essential to the “lived meaning of faith” could be deceptive.

Galileo persisted in his beliefs about the solar system/galaxy in the face of duress, but for the sake of empirical science, which I’m sure you don’t equate with faith.

So pointing out beliefs maintained under duress may show you where to look to seek the “definition” (as you reference it) of faith, but maybe not. There must be something else entirely that defines faith, or you might have to say that Galileo under arrest was possibly trying to start a new religion.

Not following you here at all. I've been at some pains not to present a definition.

Rather famously, Galileo recanted. Sensible fellow.

Not following you here at all. — Banno

That seems to be your rule of engagement, perplexity at other minds saying things you wouldn’t say.

I've been at some pains not to present a definition — Banno

Right, you never do, but you keep talking anyway.

If you aren’t trying to define things, why did you say:
“Faith is…”
“Faith is not…”
“Definitions that ignore this…”

???

Why are you bothering with “definitions” then? You said it.

Why say what something like “faith is” and think you can avoid definition?

Seems odd... — Banno

Exactly.

That seems to be your rule of engagement, perplexity at other minds saying things you wouldn’t say. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that seems to be the case, at least for your posts.

Sentences beginning with "faith is..." might be predications, not definitions. I've used a few of them in mapping the use of "faith", and I think at some length. But I do not think that this provides a complete account of each and every use of "faith", which is what some folk seem to think they have done with such stipulations as "faith is trust in authority" or some such. I've tried to look at how the word is used in the wild, rather than to just make some shite up.

I really like your approach of looking at how “faith” operates in real discourse instead of locking it into a rigid definition. Words like “faith” are notoriously slippery and context-dependent, and reducing them to a single formula (like “faith is trust in authority”) oversimplifies the richness of how people actually use them

Thank you. It's good to know there are folk who are reading along. If you are interested, there is more on this approach to philosophy to be found in Wittgenstein, and in philosophers such as J. L. Austin.

Again, you attack me, and not what I have argued. And you do so behind my back, by not making use of the @ function to link a mention.

It's not just simply rudeness; it's craven.

You've changed the topic. I haven't seen any argument that religious folk disproportionately evil, or more so than atheists. — Banno

If that's not your view, I stand corrected. I take as an example a prior quote of yours though,

"this goes beyond the merely epistemological point, to demand a response from the faithful as to their humanity.

Faith is not always a good. If your faith is strong enough for you to fly a Boeing into a building, or to fire rockets indiscriminately into a city, then something has gone astray."

Why the cautionary tale identifying the dangers of faith if evil is just an attribute of mankind? Is not implicit in this comment that those without faith are more benign than those with? If just an argument for moderation, why not mention the dangers of extreme atheism as well?

Anyway, to clarify, which makes for the better society, ceteris paribus, one all of theists or one all of atheists?

A juxtaposition. Doubtless, as the Orange Emperor said, there are good people on both sides.

I gather that we, you and I, are agreed that faith is not much of a virtue. There are perhaps those hereabouts who on the contrary take it as a central virtue. The discussion on my part has been to dissuade others from such a view. This goes beyond the merely epistemological point, to demand a response from the faithful as to their humanity, as to the circumstances in which they would recant. It's not implicit in this, that those without faith are more benign than those with; but that faith must be tempered.

Were I writing in opposition to myself here, I might be pointing out that faith is one amongst at least a trinity, and that when set in the context of hope and love it shines, and my arguments fall away.

But it would remain that faith by itself can be a source of evil.

Were I writing in opposition to myself here, I might be pointing out that faith is one amongst at least a trinity, and that when set in the context of hope and love it shines, and my arguments fall away. — Banno

So this is a complicated statement, crossing categories with strong Christian allusions (lthe trinity and primacy of love (John 4:8 "Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love)).

So, faith and hope I'd classify as epistemic categories. It describes the way we know our reality. Faith falls into the certainty class, and should we say we have fauth of something we indicate in our speech as it is. To hope (as to wish, to dream) we don't indicate it is, but we state it as a hypothetical or aspired for reality. The point being that I place hope and faith as ways of qualifying our knowledge of the Good., but not the Good itself

But love, as you use it, sounds like tthe Good iself, the thing we wish to achieve.

Your comment could therefore be interpreted as saying faith in something other than love is dangerous, which is consistent with saying that faith in something other than God is dangerous, if we equate God with love, as John did.

Perhaps. I'm not so keen on such theological meanderings. Thanks.

predications, not definitions. — Banno

“Predications” as distinct from definitions. There goes the goal post again. Or there you go pulling the ladder out from under yourself.

Just more words to struggle to avoid defining (while predicating and presumably relating mappable elements) and while we avoid defining “faith” instead.

How are you able to speak and think you are not giving me definitions? Not forcing definitions down my throat with each predication, not definition, you distinguish and speak of??

It’s literally preposterous to me, or a lie. If you know what a lie is (as opposed to knowing how to use “lie” in a sentence.)

“Here, let me now explain how there are no such things as words. For some reason, it is best if I use words to do so, so just bear with me, we may never get there, but I will keep talking about wordlessness until there is no further need of explanation…”.

Or, “watch as we approach the goalpost of ‘faith’, as soon as I bring you near to it, I will move it and replace it with some other goal post, like ‘mapping use’.”

It’s why Wittgenstein had to explain the ladder he built was to be thrown away. He had to say that out loud to avoid our confusion at the structure and definition he built.

Here is where we should agree:

Defining things (what I like to do) is as absurd as talking about undefined things (what you do).

Maybe I shouldn’t start speaking until I clarify what an essence is, or what a definition does for speech.

But maybe you should not start speaking until you can show something can be said about anything without having thus defined that thing.

If you don’t see meanings of words, meanings in your mind to define as you speak about those words (ie faith), that’s fine, but I say to you, without essential definitions, without discernible, perceptible distinctions between things in mind, you can’t speak.

You aren’t communicating, or you are lying, if you say you don’t see the meaning of the definition of “faith” here:

“

Faith […] is persistence under conditions of strain, doubt, or suffering — Banno

It doesn’t matter how you mean those words, or where those words came from, or if they are complete; they are now the objects used, with others, to define “faith” in this discussion. They are useful words when speaking of the essence of “faith”.

It’s unnecessarily impractical to handicap a discussion by avoiding definitions for each and every term we say to each other. It is unhelpful to painstakingly avoid definition, while predicating.

Otherwise you are wasting your time making up your uses for words so that once anything concrete is established we will remind ourselves we have only been “mapping uses” and not found anything fixed by ‘this map.’

We are all stuck with ‘this’ and ‘not that’ - like “predications, not definitions.” Why deny it? Or more precisely, why deny it, while trying to speak about ‘this, not that’??

Words like “faith” are notoriously slippery and context-dependent, and reducing them to a single formula (like “faith is trust in authority”) oversimplifies the richness of how people actually use them — Areeb Salim

This, interestingly, is very similar to the point I made about "metaphysics," over on the "Hotel Manager" thread, where we began discussing whether "a wrangle over definitions" is usually useful or not. Trying to pin down a definition does, as you say, ignore what might be learned from a variety of usages. But anyway, the underlying assumption is dodgy at best: That one of these definitions is correct. We can stipulate a definition for the purposes of a discussion, or we can talk about how "faith" or "metaphysics" was defined and used in a particular tradition, or by a particular philosopher, but beyond that . . .?

interestingly, is very similar to the point I made about "metaphysics," over on the "Hotel Manager" thread, where we began discussing whether "a wrangle over definitions" is usually useful or not. — J

It’s the same conversation on so many threads. Same exact conversation. Which is a good conversation, but without definitions, a conversation about “faith” and a conversation about “metaphysics” become the same conversation about “conversation.”

When talking about “x”, such as “faith” or “metaphysics” or “cats, not mats”, we can either talk about “x” using definitions, or we can talk about the difficulties of “talking about x” and avoid talking about x and instead talk about talking.

I agree it is hard to define certain ideas, like faith. But admitting the difficulty in fixing one permanent all inclusive definition of things like “faith” is not the same thing as admitting “there are no definitions, or essences or meanings of words to define.”

If one marks any line between any two directions, if one says “this” to clarify “not those”, definitions emerge. Otherwise, without definitions of words to track against the things those words speak of, Speaking “this” while meaning “not those” would not be possible.

If we deny this, we might not have said “this” in the first place; but we already did say ‘this’, we already did say ‘faith’, we are already speaking and partially understanding each others’ partial definitions and blurry but nevertheless clarifying lines.

But speaking is always speaking of. We need what comes after the ‘of’ in ‘speaking of..’ in order to say we are speaking at all. We speak, and communicate our minds to other minds, so definitions must emerge between us.

You said “… we began discussing whether "a wrangle over definitions" is usually useful or not.”

Like “faith”, what is a “wrangle”?

We can’t avoid the essence we speak of and speak of ‘this’ and not ‘that’. We can’t avoid definitions without having the same conversation about all things (as if there are no differences to speak of.)

When talking about “x”, such as “faith” or “metaphysics” or “cats, not mats”, we can either talk about “x” using definitions, or we can talk about the difficulties of “talking about x” and avoid talking about x and instead talk about talking. — Fire Ologist

I understand what you mean, but why not do both? As I was saying over on the other thread, there's a great deal to be learned about the methods of philosophy by "talking about talking." And there's no need to avoid the more specific topics, just because a hard-and-fast definition of some term may elude us. Two different conversations, no?

I agree it is hard to define certain ideas, like faith. But admitting the difficulty in fixing one permanent all inclusive definition of things like “faith” is not the same thing as admitting “there are no definitions, or essences or meanings of words to define.” — Fire Ologist

No indeed. I contrasted this with "tiger," saying:

"Another reason I'm in favor of being more self-conscious about terminological wrangles is that we can learn something, in the process, about what can be usefully defined. That poor tiger we talk so much about can in fact be given a definition which admits of being accurate or inaccurate. It may not be the "only way to define a tiger," but it allows us to sort them out with near-perfect success, and accords with a naming tradition (biology) that has won universal acceptance. Such is not the case, sadly, for putative definitions of love, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to name three. So . . . what is the difference? Plenty of food for philosophical thought here."

So it's not the question of definition as such, but rather of whether and how to try to define terms like "faith" or "metaphysics" that lack universal acceptance, definitionally. But even here, it's fine to stipulate for the purposes of discussion. What I'm calling the "wrangle" begins when someone tries to claim that the stipulation is correct.

Perhaps. I'm not so keen on such theological meanderings. Thanks. — Banno

You mention trinity and the primacy of love as a value in a thread about faith and think no one will notice the consistency with Christianity?

An argument could be made that you're just making the argument that Christianity would be fine if Christians would just adhere to their creed.

I think most Christians would give an Amen to that.

What I'm calling the "wrangle" begins when someone tries to claim that the stipulation is correct. — J

I agree with everything you said.

I would clarify that the wrangle as we are now wrangling here, begins when someone tries to claim there are stipulations at all.

I get the Wittgensteinian observations that ask the question:

what can be usefully defined. — J

I get it.

I don't get seeing "faith" is one of those things that cannot be usefully defined, and then continuing to talk about faith. Ridiculous. No one can ever say anything, nor says anything, nor said anything, without reference to differences and distinctions and definitions (or essences if you so choose to name them), by creating a reference point like "faith" and trying to distinguish what has been said from what has not been said. So are the anti-essentialist, non-definers saying anything at all about anything, or what? What recourse could we have to answer that question without defining things and revealing definitions?

There is no need or ability to once and for all clarify the distinct definitions that separate fairy elves from fairy godmothers. If you think "faith" is a word like "fairy elf", that points to nothing ultimately defineable, why try to speak about it all?

But if you think there is something, anything, specific to faith that would distinguish it from anything else you think about specifically, then you must be able to define that specific, line approaching "faith" and leaving "fairy elf" behind.

When talking about “x”, such as “faith” or “metaphysics” or “cats, not mats”, we can either talk about “x” using definitions, or we can talk about the difficulties of “talking about x” and avoid talking about x and instead talk about talking.
— Fire Ologist

I understand what you mean, but why not do both? — J

I think it is essential to do both in order to do the science of philosophy. Talking about talking is more like epistemology. It wonders about the ontology of the connections between my mind, the words my mind creates, and the objects about which my mind is directed and about which my words refer. We need to do this.

Talking about "faith" or "cat, not mat" is more like metaphysics, which is more like physics. It wonders about existing things, not how they are knowable or spoken of. It just says them. "Atoms make chemical combinations." To continue speaking, one needs to define atoms as distinguished from chemical combinations - one needs to do physics and metaphysics.

In other words, when I hear someone say "faith cannot be defined", because that person said 'faith' and not some other thing, all I heard them say is "I don't know the definition of 'faith'." If "faith" cannot be defined, than they haven't said anything at all yet, but jibberish, like "elf" when they said "faith." So if they want to continue asserting things like "that is not 'faith', or 'they don't understand how to use 'faith' in a sentence", then you must merely be saying, about "faith", that they don't know how to define it; they are not actually saying "faith cannot be defined" at all.

If you question whether the assertion "atoms" refers to anything that can approach a definition, you have to instead talk about how we can talk about "atoms" at all meaningfully, and we are back to the same, more epistemological conversation that could care less about the distinction between atoms and chemical combinations. Like here, talking about "predication, versus definition" which could care less about "faith" or any other particular object, like "metaphysics" was on the other thread.

I understand what you mean, but why not do both? — J

I actually think all of us philosophic thinkers, do both at the same time.

In order to speak, we are metaphysicians, taking ontological objects, in an epistemology.

To do metaphysics, we posit objects related through epistemology.
To do epistemology, we posit objects related through metaphysics.
To posit objects, we universalize (meta), our perceptions (existing particular things - ontological objects).

To focus on any one area, we must focus on all three at once. We don't peer into epistemology without a metaphysic and ontology supporting us. We don't peer into metaphysics witihout an epistemology supporting us.

The fourth thing we do, because we speak to others about our metaphysical, ontological, epistemological mental activities, is language itself. Language, to me is metaphysics, for the sake of epistemology. Words refer to, like knowledge is knowledge of.

Which is why it is dissappointing when people raise a topic, make some points about that topic, and then leave it all at "that cannot be defined". They have already denied the inability to define it by speaking "it" and not "that".

I don't get seeing "faith" as one of those things that cannot be usefully defined, and then continuing to talk about faith. Ridiculous. — Fire Ologist

There's an aspect of the ridiculous to it, quite often: People talking past each other, banging their metaphorical tables, never appearing to notice that they aren't talking about the same thing. No doubt many of these conversations would be better off with a stipulation everyone could accept for the time being.

That said, you're certainly putting a lot of faith (sorry!) in the idea of a definition. Has it actually been your experience that, without clear definitions that can be shown beforehand to be correct, progress can't be made in intellectual areas?

I think the insistence on lexical correctness is the problem. This is a matter of whether a word fits a concept, yes? You have a certain concept and you believe that the word "faith," let's say, fits that concept, just as biologists have examined our concept of "tiger" and clarified our word for it. In discussing this with someone else, you might find that they understand your concept quite well, and agree with much that you say about it; however, they don't think "faith" is the right word to apply.

So: shall the two of you wrangle about who is correct about the word "faith"? What would be the point? How would you ever settle it? What you're interested in is a particular concept (or fill in whatever your metaphysics may allow here, if you don't care for concepts). Rather than arguing about a word, why not keep looking at the concept, the idea, the thing under discussion, under whatever name or description?

And when all that is over, and in the happy event that the two of you see eye to eye, you might realize, "Ah, it seems that 'trust' might be more helpful here in capturing what we've been talking about. Let's share what we've learned with others and recommend they also adopt this use of 'trust.'" Now if you want to call that "discovering a definition," I can't stop you, but I think definitions are established by universal agreement within a particular community, not by the sort of ameliorative process I just described. What makes the use of a word like "trust" helpful or not helpful, in a sample case like this, will be whether it carves up the conceptual territory in a perspicuous way, a way that lets us understand what relates to what, in the cluster of concepts under examination. It's not because it was the "correct word" all along, nor does it become the "correct word" now. We can only recommend, on intelligent grounds.

How are you able to speak and think you are not giving me definitions? — Fire Ologist

A babe uses "mum", understanding who mum is, and yet cannot provide a definition. Definitions are secondary and derivative, not foundational. Use is at the centre of language. I think yo agree with this, but frankly it is very hard to work out what you think form what you write.

Take care.