Would you care to quote specific entries or summaries of entries so one can determine what exactly you're interpreting (or perhaps, if such a thing is possible, misinterpreting) and how it may or may not be relevant to the higher idea or body itself?

Yeah, let's tackle this. Please provide some passages.

There's not necessarily a contradiction. His critique of religious ethics boils down to 'you can't establish an 'ought (conclusion) from an 'is' (premise)'. And the right hand of his scepticism similarly boils down to 'you can't get a will-be from a has-been.'

Accordingly, neither predicted utility nor ethics are rationally founded, but the former relies on habit, which may be taken as a form of sentiment.

Critics of Hume have pointed this out. Likewise, the attempt to secure ethics through sentiment seems open to all sorts of attacks. For the egoist, it seems obvious that one should only pay any attention to sentiment and social norms when it appears to benefit oneself. Hume also famously argues to the ought of being good to children from an is about human nature about eight pages after claiming this sort of inference is never warranted.

When approaching Hume's Guillotine—the "is-ought gap"—I think we should ask: did Hume discover something seemingly obvious and fundamental that millennia of past thinkers simply missed? Or does Hume start from different assumptions?

I think Hume's Guillotine essentially just begs the question re a certain sort of moral anti-realism, and then obfuscates this move. It's also far from clear that Hume successfully demonstrates that desire is always irrational, or that his extremely deflated view of the intellect/reason as largely mere calculation is preferable to prior conceptions of the intellect. Past thinkers had the desire to know truth as a "desire of the intellect," and it seems to me that a strong case can be made for this position. At the very least, Hume's assumptions are far from obviously true.

Consider the oppositions' case (and it's worth noting that the opposition is quite diverse, running from New Atheists like Sam Harris to contemporary Thomists). It seems obvious that there are empirical facts about what is good for us. For instance:

• It is bad for children to have lead dumped into their school lunches.
• It is bad for people to be kidnapped, tortured, and enslaved.
• It is bad for a fox to have its leg mangled in a trap.
• It is bad for citizens of a country to experience a large-scale economic depression.

There are also empirical facts about values involving social conventions. E.g. "Gary Kasparov is better at chess than the average preschooler."

It seems fairly obvious that the truth of such statements is something that we can discover through the empirical sciences, the senses, etc. To insist otherwise is to insist that medicine, veterinary science, biology, welfare economics, etc. never provide us with information about what is truly good or bad for humans or other living things.

Now, the Humean will often try to counter here in two ways. First, they will try to move to universal maxims, with the Enlightenment assumption that ethics must be formulated in terms of universal maxims. So, they might claim: "ok, maybe you can reason from empirical observations to the fact that being lit on fire is bad for you, but you can hardly move from this to 'no one should light another on fire.'" But such a move simply defaults on the is-ought gap, since it allows that we can still reason from:

P1. The effects of burning are bad for me (i.e. burning is not choice-worthy).
P2. If I throw myself into the fire, I shall burn.
C. I ought not choose to throw myself into the fire.

The Humean might object that we need some sort of additional "ought premise" here, something along the lines of:

We should choose what is truly better over what is truly worse. That is, we should choose what is truly choice-worthy.

This seems completely unnecessary to me, since to be (truly) better, i.e., to be (truly) more choice-worthy, simply is to be what ought to be chosen. Further, it certainly seems that empirical sciences such as medicine, vetinary science, etc. can at least sometimes tell us about what is truly choice-worthy. Someone committed to the Guillotine can, of course, object to this. They can claim that there simply are no "facts of the matter" about what is truly choice-worthy, or that such facts must be always be epistemically inaccessible. Fair enough. I think that is a hard position to defend, but at least now the particular brand of anti-realism/skepticism that underlies the Guillotine is explicit.

It's worth noting here that some groups, e.g. most Thomists, agree that we need an additional premise. They claim that "we should always choose what is truly better over what is truly worse," is the axiom of practical reason (and it seems hard to disagree with this axiom without simply denying that anything can be "truly better"). However, they also point out that such an axiom is required for theoretical reason as well, something along the lines of "we should prefer truth to falsity."

After all, theoretical inquiry is value laden. What constitutes "good reasoning," "good science," "good argument," "good faith," "good evidence," etc., and the very choice-worthyness of truth over falsity is itself an issue of value. If the Humean is committed to all issues of value ultimately stemming from wholly irrational passions, then this applies just as much to all questions of truth. Hence, the foundations of reason, logic, etc. would themselves be irrational (some are indeed willing to accept this).

The second counter is to claim that all notions of goodness ultimately stem from some sort of kernal of irrational preference. It's easiest to see how this works in reductionist descendants of Hume. These argue that experiences have a sort of atomic, irreducible element of pleasure or pain (positive/negative valance). This element, they claim, is irrational. In order to argue that "being melted with acid is bad for us" one must appeal to this irrational pleasure/pain element. And so, really, there is no "fact of the matter" as to whether being melted with acid or run over by a steamroller is bad! The fact must always be tied back to ultimately irrational atoms of pleasure and pain (again, the assumption is ultimately anti-realist).

The obvious problem here is that this sort of account tends to be straightforwardly question begging. Reason cannot determine facts about what is choice-worthy because what is considered choice-worthy is presupposed to be irrational and not based on facts alone. The conclusion is assumed, rather than argued for. And of course, a great many decisions people make involve selecting unpleasurable experiences over pleasurable ones, precisely because they think these choices are truly better. It's hard to see how martyrs, particularly atheist ones, are always motivated by the drive towards experiences with positive valance without simply assuming such a thing and trying to argue back to that starting point in a post-hoc fashion.

If the Humean is committed to all issues of value ultimately stemming from wholly irrational passions, then this applies just as much to all questions of truth. Hence, the foundations of reason, logic, etc. would themselves be irrational (some are indeed willing to accept this).

The second counter is to claim that all notions of goodness ultimately stem from some sort of kernal of irrational preference. [...]. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find that words and their connotations often get in the way: in Hume’s arguments against moral rationalism he wasn’t arguing or concluding that morality is grounded upon irrationality:

To paraphrase Hume: Hume, from my readings of a considerable time ago, in his “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals” basically argues that morals are founded on wants (which are experienced sentiments or passions) rather than on a priori deductive truths (which constitutes the rationalism which, if I remember correctly, he was critiquing in his writings). And wants do not ubiquitously equate to pleasures: e.g. the want to go to the dentist when one finds doing so unpleasurable.

On a personal note, I’m by no means one to support the view that wants are by their very nature irrational or even arational: regardless of how irrational or arational we might deem our emotions, of which wants are an intrinsic aspect of, they all have their teleological reasons for being/manifesting—i.e., they all want to accomplish some not yet actualized end—and I thereby take them to thus be rational (aka, reason-bound) in the strict sense just mentioned. But the reasoning they pertain to is certainly not that of the a priori deductive truths which rationalism traditionally upholds. To be clearer, I just briefly checked and moral rationalism is indeed commonly defined as purporting that metaethical values can be known a priori, and, thus, devoid of any experience—something I find utterly nonsensical so far.

I get that Hume did not anywhere explicitly claim that wants/emotions/passions are themselves reason-bound, this as I myself just did. Nevertheless, regardless of critiques regarding his arguments and views, the fact remains that Hume’s perspectives culminate in a form of virtue ethics, one replete with altruistic concern—and not in simple utilitarianism or the naïve sentimentalism in which the “boo” and “yay” fully relative and idiosyncratic to individual person(s) grounds that which is morally wrong and right If it were otherwise, he could not uphold what he in fact upheld, e.g.:

As a result, certain character traits commonly deemed virtues by the major religions of the time are deemed vices on Hume's theory. Hume calls these so-called "virtues", such as self-denial and humility, monkish virtues. Rather vehemently, he writes:

Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices... (EPM, §9, ¶3) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Enquiry_Concerning_the_Principles_of_Morals#Virtue_ethics

These so called "monkish virtues" are after all both pleasurable and of utility to many of the implied monks concerned.

Right, if I recall, part of the analysis relies on a (IMO, false) dichotomy. Either our wants are grounded in the passions and appetites, or they are grounded in the intellect, but not both. I would just counter that in some cases our wants do seem to be grounded in the intellect, e.g. "All men by nature desire to know." That, "sometimes we want to eat because of our appetite," does not, to my mind, rebut "sometimes we want to know something because of an innate desire for understanding and truth."

Re "monkish virtues" I always thought Hume, Nietzsche, and some of the other "masters of suspicion" had a very poor understanding of asceticism. They deal with pallid straw ghosts of Plato, or the authors of the Philokalia (literally "Love of Beauty) rather than grappling with why they thinkers though asceticism was useful.

To quote something I wrote earlier:

Here, it may be helpful to look back to Aristotle’s teacher, Plato. In the Republic, Plato examines the way in which an individual can become more or less a self-determining whole. We all want what is truly good for us, not what merely appears to be good, or what is said to be good by others.28 It never makes sense for us to intentionally choose what is truly worse over what is truly better. Those who claim to “prefer evil,” prefer it because they see it as “better for them.” Even Milton’s Satan must say “evil, be thou my good.”29 It would not make sense to say “evil, be thou evil for me” and then to pursue evil.xvii

For Plato, it is the “rational part of the soul” that both seeks, and is able to determine, “what is truly good.”xviii Hence, it is also the rational part of a person that is capable of ranking and ordering the passions and appetites, and only it is suited to determining the means through which they might be satisfied. A person’s thirst tells her nothing about how to pursue her anger. Her sorrow cannot tell her whether or not she should give in to her desire for sleep. Only reason has the calculating power to judge between desires and to determine which is most worthy of satisfaction.

Thus, the rational part of a person must reach downwards and shape the lower parts. For Plato, as for Aristotle and St. Thomas, we always desire things that are in some way good. We do not consciously wish evil on ourselves. The appetites and passions, however, seek only relative goods. If we are led by them, we shall stumble into evil through seeking a fractured part of the Good, its appearances, rather than the whole/absolute.30

Pace Nietzsche, this is not meant to be “the tyranny of the reason,” and the abrogation of the passions. The “just man” is not merely a special case of the “tyrannical man,” one with the proper part of the soul acting as tyrant. The just ruler focuses on what is good for the whole; the tyrant on what is good for himself (a mere part). As Plato makes clear in the Phaedrus, it is the rule of reason that will allow the passions and appetites to be most fulfilled, allowing them to get to what is truly best for them.

Whereas, if the parts of the soul are in conflict, the person will bounce randomly between different objects of desire, like a chariot whose rider is not in control of its horses, never getting to what any part of the soul would truly benefit from most. We might consider here the sex addict, who—through the tyranny of their appetites—does not enjoy even the object of their addiction as much as they would if they were properly oriented towards it. Thus, Plato can affirm the need for the rule of reason, while still speaking of the philosophers’ eros (appetitive desire) and love (passion) for goodness and truth

Hence, there is no conflict between the “well-being of having what reason knows as truly best” and the “well-being of fulfilling the passions and appetites most fully.” Such a multiplicity of goods is a contradiction in terms for Plato (and for Aristotle and St. Thomas as well). Indeed, Plato, and others following in his footsteps, such as St. Augustine, often describe the Good they pursue in highly sensuous terms. Consider St. Augustine’s prayer to God in Book X of the Confessions31:

“You called and cried out loud and shattered my deafness.
You were radiant and resplendent, you put to flight my blindness.
You were fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now pant after you.
I tasted you, and I feel but hunger and thirst for you.
You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace which is yours.”

It is this desire of reason to have what is “truly best” that allows us to transcend what we already are. Reason is transcendent in this way. When we strive to discover something that we do not already know, or when we try to figure out if “what appears good to us” is “truly good,” we are moving beyond our current limitations, transcending current beliefs and desires. Hence, the “rule of reason” is also what allows us to become self-determining. When the rational part of the soul fails to unify a person in this way they become less a true whole, more a heap of warring appetites and passions. There is a “civil war in the soul.”32

This is why Socrates’s parting request to the Athenians after they have sentenced him to die in the Apology is that they should properly chastise and punish his sons if they do wrong. Socrates wants the Athenians to encourage his sons to live justly, so that they will not “think they are something when they are nothing.”33 To slip into vice—to be ruled over by mere parts of oneself—is to cease to function as a true whole, to become more a mere bundle of external causes, and so to slide towards non-being.


Relevant footnote: Indeed, Plato’s discussion of the “tyrannical man” in Book IX of the Republic sheds more light on why it is only reason that can unify and properly lead the soul. At 571b-c, Socrates distinguishes between necessary and unnecessary pleasures and desires. It is reason that is capable of making this distinction. When the lower parts of the soul “rule,” a person might prioritize the unnecessary over the necessary. Yet this can often lead to misery, since we will end up not having our more basic needs met because we have prioritized some ancillary concern. Consider here the wrathful individual who pursues vengeance at the expense of all else, and ends up miserable as a result.

In particular, I think Humean or Nietzchean accounts often have a difficult time explaining something like Harry Frankfurt's second-order volitions. We can intentionally shape our own tastes and preferences, or be educated in them. Indeed, one of the goals of asceticism and the spiritual life (and of education more generally in the past) is to achieve this, and sometimes people seem to be remarkably successful at this. Our wants are not unanalyzable primitives that the intellect must figure out how best to accommodate, but are in fact shaped by the intellect.

Part of the problem then is not just an impoverished conception of reason and the intellect, but also an impoverished psychology.

If I interpret you correctly, we then are in general agreement on the key issues. (My intention was not that of championing Humean philosophy: to me, he got some thing right and others not. As to asceticism, my personal view is that if it does no harm, then to each their own.)

Our wants are not unanalyzable primitives that the intellect must figure out how best to accommodate, but are in fact shaped by the intellect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To what extent, if any, would you then agree with the following:

At minimum, no spatiotemporally occurring intellect (stated to differentiate from the hypothetical of a non-spatiotemproal intellect, commonly termed "God" in the West) can ever be other than fully unified in non-manifold manners with it own intrinsic wants, desires, intentions, and therefore passions - via which reasoning becomes implemented.

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This to me is the other side of the same theme I previously mentioned: that all passions (emotions, desires, wants, etc.) are bound to and unfold via reasoning: namely, minimally, teleological reasons for being that which they are.

Maybe interestingly, wants are not all of the same nature in terms of whom, or what, they pertain to - even when all wants can be validly stated to pertain to the same self or being: To express a relatively straightforward example, there's a maybe subtle but extreme difference between being envious oneself and shunning as best one can pangs of envy which one senses withing one's own total being. I use envy because its telos is relatively simple and universal: roughly, that end or aim of becoming in sole possession of something which pertains to someone else. Envy is the emotion addressed, and it holds a clear want - itself bound by teleological reasons and hence reasoning. If one is envious, then one is actively intentioning the telos/aim/end of the envy. If, on the other hand, one is rejecting one's felt pangs of envy, than one as, I'll here say consciousness or intellect, is antithetical to becoming envious. The first envy pertains to the conscious intellect, is that which the conscious intellect momentarily is. The second however, does not pertain to the conscious intellect but to that intellect's total workings of mind at large. Yet it will be the (to me, always passion-possessing) intellect which via its capacities can choose and thereby determine whether it converges with the felt pang of envy to actively become envious or else denounces it so as to remain devoid of that given emotion. And, in this example, if the conscious intellect decides to not become envious, it will then hold a desire, else passion, antithetical to that of envy: in a sense, here, the intellect passionately endeavors to remain un-envious despite the felt pangs of intruding emotions (these emotions, wants, intentions, then, not pertaining to the conscious intellect itself).

Thought I'd mention one example to try to better clarify my previous statement.

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Edit: To complement what I've just expressed, on the one hand there are emotions for which we have no terms for in English; on the other, states of being such those of serenity, calmness, being focused, psychological objectivity or impartiality, and the like (which the intellect might strive to maintain in ideal conditions) are all emotive, of themselves sentiments or passions - and not products of deductive reasoning. The intellect might reason, deductively or otherwise, that these emotive states of being are beneficial and ought to be maintained or acquired, but these states of being which the intellect might potentially find itself in are yet emotive (loosely, facilitating certain, non-physical, motions of the intellect) - and so fall under the umbrella category of the passions or else sentiments.

I wouldn’t go so far as to say Hume’s is a contradiction, but moreso an incomplete philosophy. He just didn’t think deep enough into the abstractions prevalent in human intelligence, granting only “quantity and number”, thus relying pretty much exclusively on empirical cause/effect.

E.C.H.U., 12, 3, 132, 1748, says it all, methinks.

It seems obvious that there are empirical facts about what is good for us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There truly doesn't seem to be any facts of this kind. There appears to be habits.

did Hume discover something seemingly obvious and fundamental that millennia of past thinkers simply missed? Or does Hume start from different assumptions? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Aristotle didn't miss what Hume discovered - in fact it is not impossible that he derives his views in opposition to him (or his followers). That's a historical issue that I don't know enough to pronounce on.

From memory, Aristotle says (in from memory Nicomachaean Ethics VI). "Reason by itself moves nothing". He outlines the original concept of practical reason. It isn't a very clear concept, but outlines a quasi-syllogistic format that takes a value statement and a factual statement with an action as a conclusion. "1) Food is good. 2) This is food. 3) I should eat this food."

Hume's "Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" is a souped-up version of the same thought. He doesn't seem to acknowledge Aristotle's theoretical reason at all. Clearly, his analysis of cause and effect and in his description of "relations of ideas" are meant to replace it. I see his reduction of these to customs or habits as essentially his response to what he calls "Pyrrhonism" - radical scepticism. He accepts that he cannot refute it but that no-one will change their ways. The best cure for it is involvement in the affairs of ordinary people.

The is/ought distinction seems to me a souped-up version of what Aristotle says about practical reason, in that the major premiss is a value statement. In that context, a factual statement is needed to generate the action. Aristotle develops a hierarchy of values, based on the observation that chain of means and ends needs to end in something that is done "for it's own sake" and consequently thinks that there must be a Supreme Good, which everything seeks to attain. Hume's sentiments are less amibitious but have the same function.

One could see Hume as an impoverished version of Aristotle (or, presumably, Thomas Aquinas, & co), but others might feel that it is down to earth and realistic.

It seems to me that by citing different passages, one could show both that (1) Hume bases his ethics on sentiment, and (2) he bases his ethics on utility. the problem here of course may be confusion on my part. I would appreciate any attempt to clarify this issue. — Jedothek

I think this is a good question, but that it has an answer. Utility presents itself as something objective, but is just a posh way of talking about what people want. So it derives from sentiments.
However, there is a real issue about the is/ought distinction. The world does not present itself as neutral and value-free. Our sentiments are responses to the world, in the context of human desires and needs, and our understanding of the world is deeply influenced by them. Arguably, the "scientific" view of the world as value-neutral is a specialized stance, adopted in certain contexts, but abandoned completely when we return to ordinary life. I'm not at all clear how far that undermines the distinction.

Right, the will is not the intellect, that's what the passage gets at. However, Aristotle has motivating desire coming from appetite, spirit, and rational wish, from the rational soul/intellect. Hume has it coming only from the appetites and passions because the intellect/nous has been deflated to just ratio.

But perhaps more important is the idea that facts about what is good for beings, their telos, can be reasoned about from the nature of things, because the world isn't value free. "Food is good for man" or "water is good for plants" are accessible to theoretical reason as facts.

It leads to a radically different ethics. "Reason is and ought only be a slave of the passions" is an inversion of the rule of the rational soul, not a supped up version of it.

Arguably, the "scientific" view of the world as value-neutral is a specialized stance, adopted in certain contexts, but abandoned completely when we return to ordinary lif

This is "scientific" only in the sense that proponents of this view tend to want to conflate it with "science" in order to give it legitimacy. And yet science cannot exist without distinctions of value, as between good evidence and bad evidence, good argument and bad argument, science and pseudoscience, good scientific habits and bad ones, etc. Notions that one ought not simply falsify one's data, or argue in bad faith for whatever is expedient is, or turn science into power politics, etc. are of course, value-laden.

Thanks very much for this. I may not agree with you, but at least I can see where I disagree. Which is definitely progress.

Right, the will is not the intellect, that's what the passage gets at. However, Aristotle has motivating desire coming from appetite, spirit, and rational wish, from the rational soul/intellect. Hume has it coming only from the appetites and passions because the intellect/nous has been deflated to just ratio. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Surely, the will is not intellect. But when you refer to "rational wish", you are referring to a problem, not a conclusion. If all wishes were rational, it would not be possible to act irrationally. That's what the classic puzzle about the practical syllogism is about. Is the conclusion words/thoughts? They are not action. Is the conclusion action? That has no place in a syllogism. Hume doesn't need to deflate anything. Plato recognized this problem in the form of what he called "akrasia" and we call "weakness of will", articulated as "how is it possible to know what is the better action and yet execute the worse one?"

Plato, on the other hand, does supply a bridge in his third element, thumos. Thumos differs from appetite in that it is capable of submitting to reason (or better, nous is capable of training thumos. When that doesn't work out, reason is incapable of controlling both "thumos" and appetite. That's why I prefer the translation "emotion" for "thumos", since emotions include a cognitive element and so can be seen to bridge the gap.

It's worth mentioning that Plato gives another account, (which, as it happens, I prefer) in the Phaedrus. There, Socrates explains to Phaedrus that it is eros that moves us to philosophy, and eros is something that arises between friends/lovers where one is already a philosopher and the other still a student. What's significant here is that he is positing that an appetite can be transformed (harnessed?) in the right environment.)

But perhaps more important is the idea that facts about what is good for beings, their telos, can be reasoned about from the nature of things, because the world isn't value free. "Food is good for man" or "water is good for plants" are accessible to theoretical reason as facts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. If you add a criterion for what is good or bad to theoretical reason, you can derive practical syllogisms. Only it only applies to some things. It's in the nature of rocks that there is no good or bad for them, only what happens. In addition, what is good for the plague bacillus is bad for human beings. Finally, I accept that there are some things that are good for human beings as such. But it doesn't follow that there are not other things that are good for some human beings, but not for others. That even applies to some foods. In addition, there are some foods that become poisons in excessive amounts. When you try to implement the generalization, you very quickly get into trouble.

More seriously, that argument does enable one to work out what is good for some beings, at least. As it hapens, I'm content with that relativistic notion of good, but it may be that you are looking for something higher or deeper, such as "what is good?". I don't have any idea how to answer that question and doubt whether it has an answer. What's worse is that people often think they have an answer to that question when they do not, and that is the source of much evil. (I don't blame reason as such for that. I do blame the difficulty in being sure that one has not made a mistake.)

This is "scientific" only in the sense that proponents of this view tend to want to conflate it with "science" in order to give it legitimacy. And yet science cannot exist without distinctions of value, as between good evidence and bad evidence, good argument and bad argument, science and pseudoscience, good scientific habits and bad ones, etc. Notions that one ought not simply falsify one's data, or argue in bad faith for whatever is expedient is, or turn science into power politics, etc. are of course, value-laden. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, I like to distinguish between science and scientism. It's a complicated issue. There has been much over-reaching since the original battles. But the original battle was, IMO, about the over-reaching of theologians in claiming that the Bible was the ultimate authority on physics.
It is true that once you bring the scientist into your account of science, everything changes. Hence the more modest view that science represent our present understanding of the world, but is always provisional. That is, the most important change is a certain modesty, even humility, in what one claims - what Hume describes as "judicious scepticism".

I think the value-neutral view of the world has an important place. For one thing, it is what enables judgements of value (because values may not be realized) and establishes the difference between desire and it's realization (and yet also provides the means towards realizing desire). It is also where the unknown resides, something that scientists do well to understand.

Surely, the will is not intellect. But when you refer to "rational wish", you are referring to a problem, not a conclusion. If all wishes were rational, it would not be possible to act irrationally

Rational wish relates to the rational soul, but there are also desires of the sensible and vegetative soul. Still, we can make choices involving the intellect that we might deem "irrational" and this occurs when a person is ignorant about what is truly good or has weakness of will. This seems like a sensible explanation to me. Plato, for his part, actually seems to deny the possibility of weakness of will in a number of places, the Parmenides being the place where he discusses this at most length. However, this makes more sense when one considers the extremely high standard Plato has for knowledge, and knowledge of what is truly best.

A key difference here is that not all desire comes from the sensible and vegetative souls (or spirited and appetitive parts of the soul for Plato). Of course some desires do come from these. Hume argues from a false dichotomy where it is either one or the other. This makes sense only if the intellect has been reduced to "the means by which one moves from premise to conclusion." In that case, Hume would be correct, reason can never motivate action.

That's what the classic puzzle about the practical syllogism is about. Is the conclusion words/thoughts? They are not action.

They are thoughts that imply action. "X is choice-worthy" implies "choose x." This makes perfect sense in the Aristotelian psychology where the will (natural or absolute will in some terminology) is always directed towards the good in a general sense and requires the intellect to inform it. The intellect informs the will (conditioned will) vis-á-vis which particular goods to seek. Crucially, the will is also itself an intellectual power, part of the rational soul (Aristotle says "the will is in reason" (De Anima, III, 9), see also Aquinas Summa Theologiae, I, Q82.

Plato, on the other hand, does supply a bridge in his third element, thumos. Thumos differs from appetite in that it is capable of submitting to reason (or better, nous is capable of training thumos. When that doesn't work out, reason is incapable of controlling both "thumos" and appetite. That's why I prefer the translation "emotion" for "thumos", since emotions include a cognitive element and so can be seen to bridge the gap.

I'm not sure what you mean by "bridge" here. For Plato, the rational part of the soul has its own desires, which can motivate us to action. Indeed, it is reason's desire to know truth, and to know what is truly good, as opposed to what merely appears to be good (appetites) or is said to be good by others (spirited part), that drives his entire psychology. This desire of reason is what allows us to transcend current belief and desire, to become more than what we already are, and so to be self-determining wholes instead of a mere bundle of external causes and warring desires. The spirited part of the soul is not needed as a "bridge" if this is to mean that the rational part of the soul cannot induce us to action.

However, Plato does indeed say that the spirited part of man is the "natural ally" of the rational part in a number of places (e.g. Republic). In the chariot image of the Phaedrus, the charioteer of reason trains/breaks both horses (the black horse of the appetites is treated much more violently). To know the good, the "whole person" must be turned towards it, including the appetites. The higher part of a person must shape the lower. This certainly carries over in Aristotle, who thinks we can be trained, habituated to, and educated in either virtue or vice.

That's what the entire model of reflexive freedom and self-determination hinges on, the idea that we can shape our own appetites, that reason can (and ought be) the master of the passions and appetites. The movement from vice, to incontinence, to continence, to virtue, involves shaping desire. The virtuous person enjoys virtue, as opposed to the merely continent person. This comes out strong in the Neoplatonic/Aristotelian thought of Dante, who centers the entire Commedia around discourses on choosing good as opposed to bad loves, a process that the intellect is deeply involved in.

This is obviously very different from modern views where "no desire is bad, only acts," and where the influence of Freud has generally led people to see "repressing" desire as a chief root cause of all our woes. And of course there is the view, in Hume and much stronger in Nietzche, that the ascetic disciplines and efforts to cultivate this older ideal are misguided, which I responded to above.

Plato, on the other hand, does supply a bridge in his third element, thumos. Thumos differs from appetite in that it is capable of submitting to reason (or better, nous is capable of training thumos. When that doesn't work out, reason is incapable of controlling both "thumos" and appetite. That's why I prefer the translation "emotion" for "thumos", since emotions include a cognitive element and so can be seen to bridge the gap.

:up: The spirted part of the soul is often later called the "passions," but then in modern discourse the appetites (and the desires of reason) sometimes get collapsed into this label, such that all desire is "a passion." It's also associated with the irascible as opposed to concupiscible appetites.

Finally, I accept that there are some things that are good for human beings as such. But it doesn't follow that there are not other things that are good for some human beings, but not for others. That even applies to some foods. In addition, there are some foods that become poisons in excessive amounts. When you try to implement the generalization, you very quickly get into trouble.

Sure, but the demand for "universal maxims" is not so much a centerpiece for pre-Enlightenment ethics. Running is healthy for man, but not for the man with a broken leg. However, to object that "having mercury in kids' drinking water is bad for them," because "what if some deranged tyrant blood tests every kid and enslaves and tortures everyone whose mercury levels are below a certain threshold," would be a facile objection. There, we are just replacing one known ill with a greater one. To know facts about what is truly good for some being does not require a reduction to universal maxims.

"Goodness" is an extremely general principle, on the Scholastic view among the most general. We should not expect that ethics can be reduced to general maxims or any great deal of precision (Aristotle for his part warns against this at the outset of the Ethics).

This doesn't save Hume though. For it still seems we can know facts about what is truly most choice-worthy in some situations. However, if Hume is not to be an implicit anti-realist (or at least a skeptic) he is in the position of having to argue that we can know, as a fact, through reason, that "x is truly most choice-worthy," but must then turn around and claim that "x is most choice-worthy" does not ever imply "choose x," which is absurd. It's like claiming that reason cannot pick out the greatest number in a set because, though reason can know the greatest number, it cannot move to pick it out. At best, this is simply confusion about how the will and intellect interact (or, IMO, an implausible psychology where knowing is completely divorced from action).

More seriously, that argument does enable one to work out what is good for some beings, at least. As it hapens, I'm content with that relativistic notion of good, but it may be that you are looking for something higher or deeper, such as "what is good?". I don't have any idea how to answer that question and doubt whether it has an answer. What's worse is that people often think they have an answer to that question when they do not, and that is the source of much evil. (I don't blame reason as such for that. I do blame the difficulty in being sure that one has not made a mistake.)

My rejoinder would be that paralysis over fear of error can often be every bit as damaging as fear of error itself. There is what Hegel termed in the preface to the Phenomenology, "the fear of error become fear of truth."

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

- William Butler Yeats - The Second Coming

Rational wish relates to the rational soul, but there are also desires of the sensible and vegetative soul. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ah! Well, that's a different kettle of fish. But then I'm not clear what we are talking about when we talk and "the will"! Why don't we just say that all three souls have the power to act.

Plato, for his part, actually seems to deny the possibility of weakness of will in a number of places, the Parmenides being the place where he discusses this at most length. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for this. I hesitated about this, because I was sure that he recognizes akrasia but couldn't come up with a reference. (I sometimes pursue these questions when writing replies, but they often lead down a rabbit-hole and distract me.)

the intellect has been reduced to "the means by which one moves from premise to conclusion." In that case, Hume would be correct, reason can never motivate action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It has always seemed odd to me that our conception of reason is so narrow. I've taken to using "reasonable" when talking about reason that doesn't fit the current definition.

Crucially, the will is also itself an intellectual power, part of the rational soul (Aristotle says "the will is in reason" (De Anima, III, 9), see also Aquinas Summa Theologiae, I, Q82. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the reference. I thought there must be one, but it is a long time since I read De Anima. But then, why do we talk about "the will" as different from "the intellect"?

For Plato, the rational part of the soul has its own desires, which can motivate us to action. Indeed, it is reason's desire to know truth, and to know what is truly good, as opposed to what merely appears to be good (appetites) or is said to be good by others (spirited part), that drives his entire psychology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's another problem. What on earth is supposed to be wrong with hunger and thirst? Surely it is entirely rational and choiceworthy to want to eat and drink, even though it is not choiceworthy to do either to excess or to consume inappropriate solids or liquids. The trouble is, IMO, that we look for something that is guaranteed to be right and call it reason. We ought to be consistent and say that our intellect, like our appetites and emotions, is sometimes right, and sometimes wrong.

That's what the entire model of reflexive freedom and self-determination hinges on, the idea that we can shape our own appetites, that reason can (and ought be) the master of the passions and appetites. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Integration of the personality is certainly very desirable. But I'm not sure that the model of a charioteer is the only possibility. How about a partnership? That could achieve the same end.

This is obviously very different from modern views where "no desire is bad, only acts," — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with that. Although, I would usually say that the mere desire to do something bad, is almost always bad, but not as bad as doing it.

We should not expect that ethics can be reduced to general maxims or any great deal of precision (Aristotle for his part warns against this at the outset of the Ethics). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with that. One of many nails that A hits right on the head.

This doesn't save Hume though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not necessarily aiming to save Hume. Understanding him would be sufficient.

However, if Hume is not to be an implicit anti-realist (or at least a skeptic) he is in the position of having to argue that we can know, as a fact, through reason, that "x is truly most choice-worthy," but must then turn around and claim that "x is most choice-worthy" does not ever imply "choose x," which is absurd. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why can't Hume be an anti-realist?

My rejoinder would be that paralysis over fear of error can often be every bit as damaging as fear of error itself. There is what Hegel termed in the preface to the Phenomenology, "the fear of error become fear of truth." — Count Timothy von Icarus

True, very true. Both kinds of error are errors. I'm only recommending what Hume recommends - "judicious scepticism".

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. — Yeats - The Second Coming

I have little idea what Yeats had in mind and suspect that I wouldn't approve of it. Nonethless this, sadly, seems to be a suitable motto for our times.

I've hesitated about posting this. But it shows Hume as more complicated than he is usually thought to be. He wrote his essay Of the Standard of Taste in haste as a filler for a book that needed more heft to qualify for publication. So it isn't something he was particularly proud of. It seems officially to be about art. But Hume understands taste to be wider than that. For him, “taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty” assigns either “approbation” or “disapprobation” (or some combination of both) to objects of taste. So what he has to say in this essay is relevant to understanding the basis for his ethics.

Hume's analysis of moral judgements as based on "sentiments" (feelings or emotions) is normally classified as subjectivist. But in developing the idea of a standard of taste, he seems to escape from that classification and to allow at least some objectivity to them. But his standard of taste is not really objectivist either. He requires it to give rules for "confirming one sentiment and condemning another." But it must also explain why some sentiments are better and some are worse (NOT true or false). He gives five criteria for identifying people who are capable of doing this - “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice ..." So the standard of taste is the consensus of those who are qualified to pass judgement. But such people are rare, and consensus over time is crucial to avoid mistakes.

SEP - Hume's Aesthetics has more details.

I'm not sure what to make of it. It has a certain realism to it, because we don't arrive in the world with our tastes settled, but develop them from what we encounter and what other people think. Despite Cicero's opinion that one cannot argue about tastes, we argue persistently about them and are sometimes persuaded to change our mind or reconsider our opinion. But this is not the same as arguing about tomorrow's weather.

Hume understands taste to be wider than that. For him, “taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty” assigns either “approbation” or “disapprobation” (or some combination of both) to objects of taste. — Ludwig V

That's how I understand taste, too.

That is, even if there are moral truths, it seems most human beings -- if they operate according to any kind of reasoned path at all -- operate in accord with a sort of aesthetics of morality. Passion isn't some nullification of morality or reason, but simply the answer to how human nature does it.

And it can be taken in either realist(naturalist) or anti-realist(phenomenology-as-ontology) ways -- I don't think he was clear on that because that's kind of an our-time question. He's dealing with an entirely different set of problems.

And, arguably, an entirely different set of problems from his time, since his Treatise was not well received in his time. Though the influence on Kant I think cements him as an important figure (and on that I tend to think of Kant and Hume as closer than often depicted)

That's how I understand taste, too. — Moliere

It seemed rather odd to me, at first. Then, I realizes that I should have seen it all along. It's one of those switches in perception that happen from time to time. It seems very odd at first, but then one realizes that the writing off of taste as just arbitrary choices is completely inadequate.

That is, even if there are moral truths, it seems most human beings -- if they operate according to any kind of reasoned path at all -- operate in accord with a sort of aesthetics of morality. — Moliere

We are so used to thinking of reason as about truth, by definition, that it takes a jolt to realize that there could be varieties - domains that should be included in it. There's more to life than truth.

Passion isn't some nullification of morality or reason, but simply the answer to how human nature does it. — Moliere

Yes. My asking why philosophers are so dismissive of appetites left out the passions. The same question applies. Neither appetites nor passions are optional extras.

And it can be taken in either realist(naturalist) or anti-realist(phenomenology-as-ontology) ways -- I don't think he was clear on that because that's kind of an our-time question. He's dealing with an entirely different set of problems. — Moliere

That's fair enough. It seems to me another application of his approach to philosophy. Faced with scepticism, he simply refuses to argue, but points out that we will not really accept the conclusion. We will carry on believing in causation and so much the worse for the sceptics' reason. Here, he transforms the subjectivism that the new science imposes on morality and aesthetics into an account of how we do it. To adapt W, "this is what we do".

And, arguably, an entirely different set of problems from his time, since his Treatise was not well received in his time. — Moliere

Yes, it would be interesting to know why nobody liked it. People still seem to prefer the Enqiry but I'm not clear why.

Though the influence on Kant I think cements him as an important figure (and on that I tend to think of Kant and Hume as closer than often depicted) — Moliere

Yes. I don't think it is all that strange that they are close. One's philosophical enemies should, arguably, be kept even closer then one's friends. I believe that he cites Berkeley as well.

It seemed rather odd to me, at first. Then, I realizes that I should have seen it all along. It's one of those switches in perception that happen from time to time. It seems very odd at first, but then one realizes that the writing off of taste as just arbitrary choices is completely inadequate. — Ludwig V

:)

I'm very happy to see someone "get it" -- it took a long time for me too. I dove into Kant after Hume because I was like "There is no way this is true...", and here I am...

We are so used to thinking of reason as about truth, by definition, that it takes a jolt to realize that there could be varieties - domains that should be included in it. There's more to life than truth. — Ludwig V

Yes!

Philosophy is more than the study of the predicate "...is true", to put it into OLP terms.

Philosophy is more than the study of the predicate "...is true", to put it into OLP terms. — Moliere

Truth, Goodness and Beauty would be usual list. One might expand it in various ways. But, because I was introduced to philosophy via Socrates, I've always thought that the activity is really the thing. Study is all very well, of course. But it is a mostly a solitary occupation. Dialogue (with others) is not merely desirable, but of the essence.

He requires it to give rules for "confirming one sentiment and condemning another." But it must also explain why some sentiments are better and some are worse (NOT true or false). He gives five criteria for identifying people who are capable of doing this - “Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice ..." So the standard of taste is the consensus of those who are qualified to pass judgement. But such people are rare, and consensus over time is crucial to avoid mistakes. — Ludwig V

There is one problem here that I can't get past. Hume's account is right to say that it is not the case that everybody's opinion is of equal value (although everybody is entitled to an opinion) but his account of the standard of taste seems elitist (and I suspect was intended to be elitist in its application). I can't let that go. So my application of this account allows that anyone may acquire the qualfications simply from being interested and opinionated and talking to other interested and opinionated people about what they see and hear.

There is one problem here that I can't get past. Hume's account is right to say that it is not the case that everybody's opinion is of equal value (although everybody is entitled to an opinion) but his account of the standard of taste seems elitist (and I suspect was intended to be elitist in its application). I can't let that go. So my application of this account allows that anyone may acquire the qualfications simply from being interested and opinionated and talking to other interested and opinionated people about what they see and hear. — Ludwig V

There we agree.

I wondered if it was because he was a noble that these were his prejudices -- but reading the wikipedia page on his life it looks like he's more of an elitist because he was just that smart: "there is nothing to be learnt from a Professor, which is not to be met with in Books" :D

I wondered if it was because he was a noble that these were his prejudices -- but reading the wikipedia page on his life it looks like he's more of an elitist because he was just that smart: — Moliere

Oh, I think there was more than that to it - not that he wasn't smart! But you are right that it's people like himself that he thinks can make "critics" worthy of the name. But "people like himself" did not necessarily include the nobility. (Actually, his father was a professional lawyer, although both his parents had noble connections). But his older brother inherited most of the money, so he had to make a living. He rejected conventional careers as a lawyer or merchant in favour of a "literary" life. In his autobiography, he boasts that there were only two years in which his studies were interrupted - though they did give him just enough money to be independent (i.e. to live on the interest). He went on to make a real fortune (giving him an income of £1,000 a year) through his "History of England". So "people like himself", for him, meant people pursuing a "literary" life.

Ahhh OK. That makes sense. Thanks.

Would it shock you to learn that I find Hume's aesthetics to be horrifically deflationary as well? :rofl:

Now Jacques Maritain, he outlines an approach I think bears a good deal more fruit.. I can get behind:

The moment one touches a transcendental, one touches being itself, a likeness of God, an absolute, that which ennobles and delights our life; one enters into the domain of the spirit. It is remarkable that men really communicate with one another only by passing through being or one of its properties. Only in this way do they escape from the individuality in which matter encloses them. If they remain in the world of their sense needs and of their sentimental egos, in vain do they tell their stories to one another, they do not understand each other. They observe each other without seeing each other, each one of them infinitely alone, even though work or sense pleasures bind them together. But let one touch the good and Love, like the saints, the true, like an Aristotle, the beautiful, like a Dante or a Bach or a Giotto, then contact is made, souls communicate. Men are really united only by the spirit; light alone brings them together, intellectualia et rationalia omnia congregans, et indestructibilia faciens. 74

Art in general tends to make a work. But certain arts tend to make a beautiful work, and in this they differ essentially from all the others. The work to which all the other arts tend is itself ordered to the service of man, and is therefore a simple means; and it is entirely enclosed in a determined material genus. The work to which the fine arts tend is ordered to beauty; as beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it suffices of itself; and if as work-to-be-made, it is material and enclosed in a genus, as beautiful it belongs to the kingdom of the spirit and plunges deep into the transcendence and the infinity of being.

There is much to like too in the more cosmic view of Beauty found in the likes of Saint Maximus the Confessor, or in the Romantics, in Schelling, Goethe, Schiller, etc., or in Morrison or Kundera in more recent times.

I really do think dominant theories of aesthetics affect art too. The Romantic period is full of great art.

Would it shock you to learn that I find Hume's aesthetics to be horrifically deflationary as well? :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not particularly shocking. Why would it be? I'm well aware that there are people who think that.

I really do think dominant theories of aesthetics affect art too. The Romantic period is full of great art. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course how people think of, and approach, the art they create affects what they create. What's noteworthy is that they all seem to manage to produce beautiful works of art. Which makes one wonder how relevant those theories are. But of course they are, because they set the criteria by which we can appreciate their beauty. We have to learn that; it doesn't just appear automatically.

There is much to like too in the more cosmic view of Beauty found in the likes of Saint Maximus the Confessor, or in the Romantics, in Schelling, Goethe, Schiller, etc., or in Morrison or Kundera in more recent times. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Liking sounds remarkably like something Hume would approce of. Are you in pursuit of Beauty? or Truth? Here's my problem. How do you know you have found those good things, and are they Good? I find myself so much in awe of their transcendent magnificence that I feel it would be arrogant to think that I have. I've seen the disastrous cruelties that people who think that they know what they are can commit to feel that my attitude is more reasonable.

You will, I hope excuse me if I admit that I have not read those 100 pages, though I will add them to my reading list. From the sample you provide, I can see, and like, the appeal of his rhetoric (for I do not find any arguments there). Does that "reduce" what Maritain is claiming? Sadly, I find myself deeply suspicious of those feelings, because I find truth and goodness and beauty in my everyday life and do not fully grasp the significance of those transcendent magnificences that Maritain conjures up. So I think I will stay with what I know.

Here's the problem. We can present our positions to each other. We can acknowledge that our positions are different and, perhaps, respect them. But that's all there is!

How can we find common ground for a discussion, in which we both make our positions vulnerable in order to achieve a common understanding? Not by writing in the way that Maritain does in that passage - or by writing in the way I've written this reply.

I've been hesitant to reply because I think 's response is better than I can muster.

But the OP isn't around and it's been three days and I'm still thinking about it, so I'll post anyways.

This is the bit I take the most umbrage to:

It is remarkable that men really communicate with one another only by passing through being or one of its properties. Only in this way do they escape from the individuality in which matter encloses them. If they remain in the world of their sense needs and of their sentimental egos, in vain do they tell their stories to one another, they do not understand each other.

And I feel I'm threading a needle here; there's the sense in which I do not want to deny Maritain at all.

And there's that quote up there that uses "only in this way..." -- and I think that's what philosophers often get wrong.

There are people who dedicate their lives to dancing, for instance. There aren't even stories to tell at that point, but dances to dance. It is only the philosopher who doesn't see this as a form of understanding, among all the various other ways people do, in fact, really communicate with one another without passing through being or one of its properties.

The "on the other hand..." is that I don't want to say that the monastic life is lesser than the dancers -- but it strikes me that the monastics tend to want to say that their life is better than the performers who don't commune, who are "lost" in the sounds of "bar bar bar"

(Also hesitant because this takes us astray from the OP... but, again the OP has been silent, and my mind keeps thinking...)

It is only the philosopher who doesn't see this as a form of understanding, among all the various other ways people do, in fact, really communicate with one another without passing through being or one of its properties. — Moliere

Men are really united only by the spirit; light alone brings them together, intellectualia et rationalia omnia congregans, et indestructibilia faciens.

This reads as a version of what the monastics are trying to claim when they say their way of life is better than the dancer's. In one way, it's only natural to feel that one's own way of life is better than any other and it may well be better for those who pursue it. But I don't think it is therefore necessarily better for everyone, nor that there is no possibility of communication between those who pursue different ways of life. We're all human beings, after all. Surely that is sufficient ground for at least recognizing each other.

It seems likely to me that "passing through being or one of its properties" is only really comprehensible in a specific philosophical framework, which, it seems, neither of us share with the author. My way of understanding at least some of this is this:-

Whenever I am occupied with even the tiniest logistical problem, e.g. trying to find the shortest axiom of the implicational calculus, I have the impression that I am confronted with a mighty construction of indescribably complexity and immeasureable rigidity. This construction has the effect on me of a concrete tangible object, fashioned from the hardest of materials, a hundred times stronger than concrete or steel. I cannot change anything in it; by intense labour, I merely find in it ever new details, and attain unshakable and eternal truths. Where and what is this ideal construction? A Catholic philosopher would say: it is in God, it is God’s thought. — J. Lukasiewicz, quoted in 'A Wittgenstein Workbook'

This seems to me to describe a way of thinking as a phenomenon without committing to a whole philosophical framework.