Same point as? — javra

The point about the importance of detachment. The context is:

I always say that every person on this earth has the freedom to practice or not practice religion. It is all right to do either. But once you accept religion, it is extremely important to be able to focus your mind on it and sincerely practice the teachings in your daily life. All of us can see that we tend to indulge in religious favouritism by saying, "I belong to this or that religion", rather than making effort to control our agitated minds. This misuse of religion, due to our disturbed minds, also sometimes creates problems.

I know a physicist from Chile who told me that it is not appropriate for a scientist to be biased towards science because of his love and passion for it. I am a Buddhist practitioner and have a lot of faith and respect in the teachings of the Buddha. However, if I mix up my love for and attachment to Buddhism, then my mind shall be biased towards it. A biased mind, which never sees the complete picture, cannot grasp the reality. And any action that results from such a state of mind will not be in tune with reality. As such it causes a lot of problems.

According to Buddhist philosophy, happiness is the result of an enlightened mind whereas suffering is caused by a distorted mind. This is very important. A distorted mind, in contrast to an enlightened mind, is one that is not in tune with reality. — H H The Dalai Lama

Isn't he saying here that 'attachment' is what introduces 'bias'? That it prevents seeing 'what is', because it skews judgement? That is very much what I was driving at.

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One general point I've been mulling over is when philosophers speaks portentiously of 'reality' or 'the nature of reality'. I feel the better expression is that philosophy considers the nature of being. 'Reality', after all, is based on the latin root 'res-' meaning 'thing'. And I believe that is the province of the objective sciences. Whereas 'being' is, in a way, a less specific term, as it pertains to human beings, and sentient beings generally //as well as the question of the meaning of 'being'//. I don't intend to devote any time to discussing Heidegger, but I recognise that his concern with the meaning of being and the unconcealment of being is near to what I mean.

Aren't exploration of those sorts of questions fundamental to philosophy proper? I know the analytical-plain language types don't think so, but then, they didn't feature in the original post. — Wayfarer

I don't believe there is any "philosophy proper"—philosophy is a multifarious thing. We have the diverse field of traditional metaphysics, we have post-Kantian metaphysics and critical philosophy, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, Pomo and so on.

I think Kant put paid to the idea that metaphysical truth in the traditional sense is attainable. Metaphysical questions as traditionally understood are undecidable, because there are no answers for which cogent evidence can be marshaled, and because there are no answers which are logically self-evident. So, answers to metaphysical questions are down to personal conviction, to one's own assessment of what seems most plausible or parsimonious.

I have no problem with speculative philosophy in the creative sense that it may present us with novel ways of thinking about things. Nothing wrong with exploring the imaginable possibilities, but I think intellectual honesty demands that we acknowledge that the truth of such speculations cannot be known.

It's really down to Kant's "limits of knowledge", that Wittgenstein also echoed. Some would say that even Kant transgressed his own principles in claiming to know things which the logic of his own system, if followed consistently, denies the possibility of knowing.

Isn't he saying here that 'attachment' is what introduces 'bias'? — Wayfarer

"Attachment" is not expressed in the passage, but "biased toward" is. To reiterate what I previously expressed, I'm all for the ideal of a mindful (as in "mindfulness"), compassion-infused detachment (aka lack of bias toward). Yet, again, when one loves, one is necessarily attached - and compassion devoid of all forms of love is ... not compassion.

Yes, under the philosophical microscope, love too is a bias. One that can be quite egotistically limited to specific others (my child, or parent, or lover only, and fu*k the rest) or else which can extent to humanity, the world in this sense, at large. And, often enough, one can hold varying extents of both forms simultaneously. But I gravely doubt that the Dalai Lama is claiming that such love-resulting favoring of those which one loves is a vice.

It is a complex topic. Charles Manson, given as an example of extreme vice, did undergo far more childhood abuse than many of us want to comprehend. There can then be compassion for him as an adult in this. But, notwithstanding, though this would preclude any feeling of glee in his suffering while incarcerated, it would not equate to either a) not wanting him incarcerated or else b) feeling compassion for him in the vice filled deeds, murdering, which he orchestrated. Here there is attachment, bias, to the ideal of equitable justice for all, for example. Something which all religions I can currently think of uphold in their theorizing (though not in uniform practice, lets say). An "attachment/bias" which I likewise gravely doubt the Dalai Lama would in any way denounce.

What being unbiased signifies is not being devoid of favoring equitable justice for all, but in keeping true to this by not favoring one individual other others when the same deed is done. For example, not excusing the billionaire when they double park on account of his status when holding average joe shmoe accountable for the same deed.

On a less mundane level, I'll uphold that the Dalai Lama, as with the original Buddha, is extremely attached/biased toward what some in the West term the Good. And that, in so being, he then becomes detached from / unbaiased in relation to all direct and inderect forms of nepotism, etc.

Again, its what "detachment" / "attachment" is being proposed to ideally be that I'm currently questioning - and not the favorably of detachment/attachment in general when understood to necessarily entail compassion (something that we so far seem to see eye to eye on).

I think Kant put paid to the idea that traditional metaphysical truth is attainable — Janus

He did so by re-defining its scope, not declaring it otiose, in the way that positivism did. Remember one of his key works is Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, so he clearly believed there could be such a subject.

I think intellectual honesty demands that we acknowledge that the truth of such speculations cannot be known. — Janus

As has already been pointed out:

Your idea that it is impossible to provide evidence for non-standard forms of knowledge is simply not true. — Leontiskos

I'll also add something I've learned from John Vervaeke's lectures, about the different kinds of knowing:

Propositional knowledge is the knowledge of ‘facts’ or other ‘truths’ expressed in clear statements. It’s all about propositions. It’s the sort of logical and theoretical side of knowledge.

This type of knowledge answers the “what” questions about the world. For example, knowing that “the Earth orbits the Sun” is a piece of propositional knowledge.

These types of knowledge can be easily written down and communicated, making them the most familiar and widely studied form of knowledge in traditional educational systems.

I think that is the domain that you're referring to, as defining the entire scope of knowledge, and anything beyond that being 'speculative'. But it goes on:

Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to do specific activities and sequences of activities.

This type of knowledge explores the “how” of things. It is the knowledge of processes and skills, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle or play a musical instrument. Reading a book on riding a bike will give you the propositional knowledge about it, but won’t actually help you do it.

This type of knowledge is often implicit and gained through practice and repeated actions rather than through verbal instruction. It’s what is often referred to as “know-how,” as opposed to the “know-what” of propositional knowledge. [Note: this was something emphasised by Michael Polanyi in his 'tacit knowledge']

Perspectival knowledge is about knowing what something is like from a certain angle or perspective or context. It’s about being able to see it in a certain way, potentially from someone else’s view point, through a certain lens.

This type of knowledge might be subjective and grounded in the first-person. It’s the knowledge of “what it is like” to be in a certain situation.

For instance, knowing how it feels to be in a crowded place or understanding one’s emotional response during a stressful event are both forms of perspectival knowledge.

Perspectival knowledge is about having a particular standpoint or perspective and is intimately tied to our individual perceptions, experience of the world and cognitive state. These are not things that we can fully learn through propositions and processes.

Participatory knowledge is the knowledge of what it’s like to play a certain role in your environment or in relationships.

Vervaeke considers this to be the most profound of the four types of knowledge. It involves being in a deep, transformative relationship with the world, participating fully in something greater than yourself.

It is not just knowing about, but knowing through active engagement and transformation within specific contexts or environments. It shapes and is shaped by the interaction between the person and the world, influencing one’s identity and sense of belonging.

This kind of knowledge is experiential and co-creative, often seen in the dynamics of relationships, culture, and community participation.

source
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I much prefer the current Dalai Lama's underlying tenet that Buddhism is a faith grounded in reason. — javra

An important point. Whilst Buddhist philosophy is rational, it has also been recognised from the outset that there are also states of being beyond the scope of reason.

These are those dhammas, bhikkhus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized for himself with direct knowledge, propounds to others; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak. — The Brahmajala Sutta

It's important to distinguish what is beyond reason from the merely irrational, which is not an easy distinction to grasp. But then, I think that is also understood in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, in that he believes that there genuinely 'revealed truths'.

It's important to distinguish what is beyond reason from the merely irrational, which is not an easy distinction to grasp — Wayfarer

Of course. The very occurrence of being (else Being with a capital "B") is arational. Just about the only exception to the law of sufficient reason. And the occurrence of being is experienced, of itself experience, not something rationally derived or alternatively inferred.

Yet, again, when one loves, one is necessarily attached - — javra

Ah. Interesting. I recall the folk wisdom often quoted at wedding ceremonies, about the different kinds of love - eros, philia, agapē, storge and so on (there's eight). I think in English all of these tend to be congealed together under the heading of romantic attachment. Whereas the Buddhist 'karuna' or 'mudita' is perhaps closer to the Christian agapē, which 'pays no regard to persons'.

I'll uphold that the Dalai Lama, as with the original Buddha, is extremely attached/biased toward what some in the West term the Good — javra

Then I don't know if that is seeing the point! This is something often grappled with by Zen Buddhist aspirants - on the one hand, they are constantly urged to make a supreme effort, and the effort demanded of Zen students is arduous in the extreme. But at the same time, they're told that any effort arising from wanting some result or getting somewhere is mere egotism! The theory is that renunciation includes complete detachment from oneself, from trying to be or to get. That is the 'gordian knot' of life in a nutshell, and the reason that Zen Buddhism in particular is well-known for being a highly-focussed discipline. Krishnamurti would often say 'It is the truth that liberates you, not the effort to be free'. Not that this is in the least easy to understand or to fathom, because it's definitely not, to my mind.

Then I don't know if that is seeing the point! This is something often grappled with by Zen Buddhist aspirants - on the one hand, they are constantly urged to make a supreme effort, and the effort demanded of Zen students is arduous in the extreme. But at the same time, they're told that any effort arising from wanting some result or getting somewhere is mere egotism! The theory is that renunciation includes complete detachment from oneself, from trying to be or to get. That is the 'gordian knot' of life in a nutshell, and the reason that Zen Buddhism in particular is well-known for being a highly-focussed discipline. Krishnamurti would often say 'It is the truth that liberates you, not the effort to be free'. — Wayfarer

My honest hunch is that Zen Buddhism is somehow often misconstrued, even among certain self proclaimed Zen Buddhism teachers/masters/experts which further the misconstrued. I've of course no facts to this effect, but it's certainly not beyond the realm of possibilities.

"It is the truth that liberates you, not the effort to be free" could be interpreted in myriad ways, some of which might be on track. But embedded right into this is the implicit and quite stringent affirmation that "liberation is good". Hence, the attachment/bias/favoring of that which is good - here, namely liberation from illusion - by any Zen Buddhist, and this irrespective of what is said, and the disfavoring of remaining "un-liberated" from, or enslaved to, illusion.

Whereas the Buddhist 'karuna' or 'mudita' is perhaps closer to the Christian agapē, which 'pays no regard to persons'. — Wayfarer

I neglected this part, Can you unpack what an agape that pays no regard to persons signifies to you?

Agape, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented at any person(s)?

My honest hunch is that Zen Buddhism is somehow often misconstrued, even among certain self proclaimed Zen Buddhism teachers/masters/experts which further the misconstrued. — javra

Oh, no doubt. I'm one of that generation that used to sit around reading Alan Watts and D T Suzuki and believing that you could just 'get it'. But I realised quite early on that the reality is very different to that, the actual life of Zen monks is like being in the Army (even tougher, in lots of ways. There's no leave.)

But I'm also sure the orientation to the Good, or the 'will to truth', is not a matter of preference, of like or dislike. I think it manifests rather as a moral imperative, as an implicit awareness of something that must be heeded. Bringing the will in accordance with it is the supreme challenge for any of the perennial philosophies.

There is a saying I've heard from time to time 'the good which has no opposite'. The point being, what we think of as good is usually defined in opposition to what is not - pleasure as distinct from pain, health as distinct from illness, wealth as distinct from poverty. That is naturally what is subject to like and dislike. Whereas, for example, the Good (to agathon) in Greek philosophy, is not one pole in a duality but the ground of Being itself. Plotinus’ One, for instance, is purely Good—not because it is opposed to evil but because it precedes the level of reality where such oppositions arise. (Hence also 'evil as privation of the Good'.) But again, the challenge is to be able to see (or be) that, not to form a concept about it. (Hence the 'participatory knowing' aspect. And again, not at all easy to fathom, not in the least.)

Agapē, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented any any person(s)? — javra

Matt. 5:45 'He causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good'. Doesn't that underwrite the Christian attitude of brotherly love, charity to the dispossessed and despised?

I recall the folk wisdom often quoted at wedding ceremonies, about the different kinds of love - eros, philia, agapē, storge and so on (there's eight). I think in English all of these tend to be congealed together under the heading of romantic attachment. Whereas the Buddhist 'karuna' or 'mudita' is perhaps closer to the Christian agapē, which 'pays no regard to persons'. — Wayfarer

This is good. I would amend it slightly to say that "love" in English also tends to be construed as family love (storge), not just eros. The "impersonality" of agapē can perhaps best be seen as the crucial step in the widening of the circle of compassion/connection. Romantic love for an individual, family love for your kin, loyalty to your tribe/community/nation -- these are increasingly more general, until finally we arrive at agapē, which loves without condition. I also very much value a further extension -- did the Greeks have a word for it? -- that would refer to love of Creation itself, and all the beings, not just humans.

But I'm also sure the orientation to the Good, or the 'will to truth', is not a matter of preference, of like or dislike. — Wayfarer

Ah. OK. I see things differently here. There's the "good" of not suffering, which I take all to consciously or unconsciously be oriented toward without exception (this as you here say, and as typical Buddhism upholds), but then there is also the Good as ultimate, existentially fixed telos. Skipping the rational to this, which is not readily expressible in soundbite form, I then find that many are, consciously or not, quite adverse to the Good: holding fear for it rather than love/affinity toward it. When a person indulges in the tyrannical pleasures of raping another, this, as one example, is not done with a "will to truth".

But I'll for my part leave this disagreement of opinion as is.

Agapē, commonly understood as "selfless brotherly love", that is not oriented any any person(s)? — javra


Matt. 5:45 'He causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good'. Doesn't that underwrite the Christian attitude of brotherly love, charity to the dispossessed and despised? — Wayfarer

The passage could be interpreted in various ways. I still don't understand by it what you interpret as an agape that pays no regard to persons.

Since what was addressed were aspects of the Abrahamic ethos, loving thy enemy (holding agape / compassion for one's enemy) is yet, to me, relative to person(s).

I also very much value a further extension -- did the Greeks have a word for it? -- that would refer to love of Creation itself, and all the beings, not just humans. — J

Didn't that come about to some extent with the Bible? God seeing the world as 'good'? I believe Plotinus expressed a similar idea - his main opposition to the Gnostics was that they despised the world.

I still don't understand by it what you interpret as an agapē that pays no regard to persons. — javra

There's a Biblical text, 'God is no respecter of persons' (here am I quoting the Bible twice. I'm honestly not trying to evangalise Christianity in particular, but to draw out a point.) I think it's a very difficult saying in today's culture in which the individual is central. But the meaning of 'person' is derived from 'persona' which were the masks worn by the dramatis personnae in Greek drama. Wouldn't that be approximately equal to what we mean by ego, the self's idea of itself? But there are other levels of being or consciousness than the egoic consciousness. That is what I believe those kinds of sayings in the Bible are indicating. Another saying being 'He who saves his life will lose it' which I interpret to mean 'acting out of self-interest'. So, the principle is that agapē operates on a level other than that of the ego-persona and in that sense is impersonal - which again is supposed to be represented in the Christian ethos of 'loving the enemy'. (I think all of this is reasonably orthodox from a Christian point of view.)

OK. Thanks for the answer.

Your claim that I want to claim that there is only one kind of knowledge is false, and you should know better if you ever read what I write on these forums. I'm not denying that there are those other kinds of knowledge—I've said so on these forums many times myself. It is only propositional knowledge which is intersubjectively decidable or testable in terms of truth.

Procedural knowledge is not a matter of truth but of skill. Of course, that said whether or not someone possesses a skill is demonstrable if the ability in question is observable. In other words, whether one can ride a bike or perform open heart surgery is testable, but whether or not one knows the truth about the nature of reality is not. In fact, even whether or not one is in an altered state of consciousness is not definitively testable—because it relies on testimony, and it could be faked.

Perspectival knowledge is just knowing what logically follows from whatever presupposition are in play. If we assume that God created the world and that it is all good, all knowing and all powerful then...If there is no God and all of reality is just material, then...And so on...

Participatory knowledge is just knowing what this or that involvement or activity feels like. We cannot know what things feels like for others beyond what we can glean form their behavior and testimony. To say we know always presupposes self-knowledge and honesty on the part of those reporting their experience. The possibility of faking or self-delusion is always there. I can know what things feel like for me, of course, but that cannot really be rigorous intersubjective knowledge.

One of the points I've made to you more than a few times is the case of Osho. As I've said I've employed several sannyasins and also been friends with a few others, and acquainted with some through other friends. They make all the same arguments about Osho being enlightened as you would about the Buddha, the difference being that they actually knew the man himself. And yet you think he was a phony despite (I assume, perhaps incorrectly) never having met him.

So, all you have to go by are your own intuitions. What leads you to assume that your intuitions are better than the equally intelligent people I have met who were convinced he was the real thing? I predict you won't attempt to answer that question, and I think it is because you don't want to admit I am right. Your inability to answer that shows that personal intuitions are not intersubjectively testable knowledge of any kind, even though we might say they are perspectival and participatory (subjective) knowledge

What leads you to assume that your intuitions are better than the equally intelligent people I have met who were convinced he was the real thing — Janus

Nothing whatever. I present ideas and texts, and then discuss them. If they irritate you, which they apparently do, then by all means don't participate.

Nothing whatever. I present ideas and texts, and then discuss them. If they irritate you, which they apparently do, then by all means don't participate. — Wayfarer

What irritates me is that you present your beliefs as if they are Truth, I make what I honestly believe are valid objections to your apparent belief that you can know what you apparently think you do, that it is something more than just your personal conviction, and then instead of attempting to address those telling objections you deflect, simply ignore them or pretend that you have already answered them when you most obviously have not. If you presented your beliefs and just said "this is what I believe although I realize it may well not be true" then I would have no reason to complain.

You simply ignored all the points I made about the different kinds of knowledge, points which were in response to your attempt to paint me as reductively refusing to recognize more than one kind of knowledge. If you disagreed with what I said and had valid reason for disagreement then charitability would have dictated that you should address the points I took the trouble to make, and if you realized that I was right in what I wrote then intellectual honesty should have dictated that you admit as much.

And note, I have not been addressing you because you said you were going to ignore me. In this instance, it is you who responded to something I wrote which was addressed to someone else.

I also very much value a further extension -- did the Greeks have a word for it? -- that would refer to love of Creation itself, and all the beings, not just humans.
— J

Didn't that come about to some extent with the Bible? God seeing the world as 'good'? — Wayfarer

Certainly you can find that in the Bible, but in general Christianity has tended to stop at "loving humans" and not considered what it might mean to actually love animals -- or the environment in general, as we are now seeing, to our dismay. Or maybe we should say: Far too much traditional Christian doctrine places humankind at the pinnacle of creation -- made in God's image, dontcha know -- and sees nothing inconsistent with preaching agapē while at the same time claiming the right to use other animals for our own purposes, no matter the pain this may cause. This is a terrible failing. And I speak as a Christian.

I'm not denying that there are those other kinds of knowledge—I've said so on these forums many times myself. It is only propositional knowledge which is intersubjectively decidable or testable in terms of truth. — Janus

You're limiting valid knowledge claims to the propostional, even while denying it!

Two of the three points you make are in the form of 'this type of knowledge is just... - if that is not reductionist, then what is it? You are literally explaining them away. So, what's to discuss?

It is my conviction that there is a vertical axis of quality, along which philosophical insight can be calibrated. It is distinct from the horizontal plane of scientific rationalism. That is 'where the conflict really lies'.

Certainly you can find that in the Bible, but in general Christianity has tended to stop at "loving humans" and not considered what it might mean to actually love animals -- or the environment in general, as we are now seeing, to our dismay. — J

I suppose. But I went to a seminar once, where there was a discussion of whether traditional Buddhism had any kind of environmental awareness in the modern sense of respect for the environment. The view was pretty much, no, it is not something that Buddhism ever really thought about, in the pre-industrial age. And in defense of Christian social values, surely the idea that humans should be custodians of the environmental order can't be bad one.

You're limiting valid knowledge claims to the propostional, even while denying it!

Two of the three points you make are in the form of 'this type of knowledge is just[/...] - if that is not reductionist, then what is it? You are literally explaining them away. So, what's to discuss? — Wayfarer

I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief.

Also, If I've said, "this type of knowledge is just...", and you disagree then the proper response would be to make an argument that shows that this type of knowledge is not just whatever. There is no point saying I'm being reductive without counterargument to what I've said. Also, I'm not explaining them away—I think those different kinds of knowledge are really validly distinguishable different kinds of subjective know-how and/ or experience.

It is my conviction that there is a vertical axis of quality, along which philosophical insight can be calibrated. It is distinct from the horizontal plane of scientific rationalism. That is 'where the conflict really lies'. — Wayfarer

You are entitled to that conviction, and I'm entitled to lack it, and I've never said otherwise. It is an impossible conviction to argue for, though, or at least I've never seen an argument for it, from you or anyone else, that would convince the unbiased.

I suppose. But I went to a seminar once, where there was a discussion of whether traditional Buddhism had any kind of environmental awareness in the modern sense of respect for the environment. The view was pretty much, no, it is not something that Buddhism ever really thought about, in the pre-industrial age. — Wayfarer

It wasn't thought about because the science had not yet been developed. Also, the shit was not about to hit the fan as it is now.

I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief. — Janus

That’s what I mean by ‘subjectivising’ - that you regard such claims as possibly noble, but basically subjective. Whereas I don’t think they are *either* claims of fact, *or* articles of personal belief. It’s too narrow a criterion for questions of this kind.

It is an impossible conviction to argue for, though, or at least I've never seen an argument for it, from you or anyone else, that would convince the unbiased. — Janus

Do you believe yourself to be someone without bias?

If someone could make, not just one or two accurate predictions, but could consistently make accurate predictions that were not based on observation and calculation, then we might assume they had some hidden way of knowing what will happen. I know of no such case, so it is just speculation, unless you can present a well-documented case. — Janus

I've pointed to the psychics that the FBI uses any number of times now.

The claims they make are not testable predictions — Janus

Sure they are. I've already shown that. You just keep asserting the contrary. Again:

If someone claims to have special knowledge, and that knowledge is in no way confirmable by any other person, then their knowledge cannot be confirmed. But that case seems like it would be quite rare. — Leontiskos

Imagine yourself in the ancient world with your thesis, "Okay, so you can reliably predict eclipses, and no one else can do this. But that doesn't mean you have special knowledge of nature." Of course it does! You are drawing up some fiction where someone is supposed to have a special ability which is in no way verifiable. What is an example of that? As far as I can tell, if a putative ability is in no way verifiable, then it isn't an ability at all. It certainly isn't an ability to do anything.

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I think that is the domain that you're referring to, as defining the entire scope of knowledge, and anything beyond that being 'speculative'. But it goes on [to procedural, perspectival, and participatory knowledge]... — Wayfarer

I think this is sort of the mirror error of @Janus'. These other forms of knowledge are not unverifiable or unconfirmable. If someone says that they have a special form of knowledge but there is no way for anyone else to confirm that they have a special form of knowledge, then they are probably flubbing. This applies to all knowledge, including procedural et al.

So perhaps you have consistently proposed forms of knowledge that are unverifiable, and Janus has been led to believe that such a thing makes sense. Or rather, in reaction to this sort of claim Janus goes to the other extreme and claims that anyone who claims to have special knowledge or special abilities can by definition provide no way for others to verify those abilities.

This is entirely wrong, and counterexamples abound. To take a single example, why does God give Moses the ability to turn his hand leprous and turn his walking staff into a snake? Because Moses knows that no one will believe that he has been sent by God if he can provide no evidence for that claim. These abilities are a direct response to Moses' claim:

Then Moses answered, “But behold, they will not believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say, ‘The LORD did not appear to you.’ ” — Exodus 4:1, RSV

Our culture is really, really averse to signs, and there are all sorts of complicated reasons for that. But the basic logic nevertheless holds: abilities produce acts (or as Aristotle says, the power is known through the act). To claim an ability without any accompanying act is to admit that there is no ability. To claim knowledge without being able to demonstrate the proper effect of that knowledge is to admit that there is no knowledge.

I've pointed to the psychics that the FBI uses any number of times now. — Leontiskos

I have no idea whether that is well-documented or not.

The claims they make are not testable predictions
— Janus

Sure they are. I've already shown that. You just keep asserting the contrary. Again: — Leontiskos

I have already told you I am not concerned about claims that could be verified by observation. I'm talking about claims like 'the Buddha was enlightened, whereas Osho was not' or 'god exists' or 'the soul is reincarnated' or ' there is a spiritual realm that we all go to when we die' and so on.

I don't know why you keep addressing what I've already told you is not my target.

That’s what I mean by ‘subjectivising’ - that you regard such claims as possibly noble, but basically subjective. I don’t think they are *either* claims of fact, *or* articles of personal belief. It’s too narrow a criterion for matters of this kind. — Wayfarer

If claims are not intersubjectively verifiable and yet not "articles of subjective belief" then what are they? You are not actually saying anything that I could either agree or disagree with.

If someone says that they have a special form of knowledge but there is no way for anyone else to confirm that they have a special form of knowledge, then they are probably flubbing. This applies to all knowledge, including procedural et al. — Leontiskos

I would have thought, with your interests, that you would recognise that there are domains of discourse within which specialised forms of philosophical knowledge were recognised. I have noted, for example, in some of your exchanges with Count Timothy, a specialised degree of knowledge of the philosophy of Aquinas. I, of course, cannot judge the veracity of your knowledge, not possessing that knowledge myself, but I’m sure you would agree that there would be some who could. And the same applies to other domains of discourse, which may exist in various cultural forms, and within which what is nowadays called ‘inter-subjective validation’ might be available, even if not conforming to the standards of modern empirical science.

And in defense of Christian social values, surely the idea that humans should be custodians of the environmental order can't be bad one. — Wayfarer

It's a very good one. But we'd have to say that either 1) institutional Christianity has paid little attention to it, or 2) institutional Christianity regards the wholesale slaughter and torture of billions of animals annually, along with the destruction of our planet's resources, as exemplifying being "custodians of the environmental order." That is taking Newspeak way too far, in my opinion.

In fairness, there are Christians, and Christian communities, who take seriously the idea of stewardship of the environment, but they are a small minority, and even they usually draw the line at saying that we don't have a God-given right to use animals for our own purposes.

Regrettably you’re correct.

If claims are not intersubjectively verifiable and yet not "articles of subjective belief" then what are they? You are not actually saying anything that I could either agree or disagree with. — Janus

Note, I said 'subjectivizing'. That is different to 'inter-subjective validation'. What you are saying is that what I'm tagging 'higher knowledge' can only be subjective or personal, as it can't be objectively measured or validated:

I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief. — Janus

I guess by 'rigorously tested' you mean subjected to empirical testing. This is what I mean when I said you are appealing to positivism, as it is what positivism says.

But notice that I have nowhere in this thread mentioned those as facts. What I've referred to are some specific Buddhist texts (among others) on the meaning of detachment. But the terms 'karma', 'rebirth' were introduced to the discussion by you, and 'God' in the context of the writings of Meister Eckhardt (who was a Christian theologian).

I've only just now noticed your questions from the other day and I will try to address them.

The real point at issue for Wayfarer is the possibility of "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition. Is it possible to have such knowledge of reality? Obviously, he believes it is possible, and that some humans have achieved such enlightenment. The problem is that if it is possible, you would have no way of knowing that unless you had achieved it yourself. — Janus

I agree that in one sense, it can only be known 'each one by him or herself'. But in the long history of philosophy and spirituality there are contexts within which such insights may be intersubjectively validated. That is the meaning of the lineages within such movements.

But there's also a very real element of that in the classical philosophical tradition Figures such as Parmenides were believed to possess insights that were not obtainable to the great mass of people. Studying philosophy was believed to be a way to understand those insights. That was the point!

And even then, how could you rule out the possibility of self-delusion? — Janus

With difficulty! Delusion and mistakes are definitely hazards and there are many examples, which fake gurus are quick to exploit.

I'm not ruling out the possibility of a "much deeper understanding of reality", but I have no idea what it could look like, and if it were not based on empirical evidence or logic, then what else could it be based on? — Janus

Metacognitive insight - insight into the mind's own workings and operations. After all one of the foundational texts of Western philosophy is about Socrates' 'know thyself' and he was keenly aware of the possibility of self delusion. A lot of his dialogues were focussed on revealing the self-delusions of those to whom he spoke.

People who think like Wayfarer believe that such an understanding existed more in the past than it does today, but they would not call it science, unless by 'science' is intended something like the original meaning of simply 'knowing'. — Janus

It's not unique to me. And I'm not condemning modernity. What I've said that is objectivity has a shadow. There is something that exclusive reliance on objective science neglects or forgets. And I'm far from the only person who says this. You probably have read more Heidegger than have I, but this is a theme in his writing also, is it not?

Really recommend John Vervaeke's lectures in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis on all this.

Philosophy comprises discourses dedicated to the delineation of truth, its separation from falsity or illusion, and the forms of the subject’s access to truth: ‘We will call “philosophy” the form of thought that asks what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth’ (Foucault see below). Spirituality, on the other hand, comprises the discursively mediated acts, practices, and exercises through which certain individuals seek to transform themselves into the kind of subject or self that is capable of acceding to philosophical truth:

… I think we could call “spirituality” the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. We will call ‘spirituality’ then the set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth (Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject)

The decisive distinguishing feature of Western philosophical spirituality is that it does not regard the truth as something to which the subject has access by right, universally, simply by virtue of the kind of cognitive being that the human subject is. Rather, it views the truth as something to which the subject may accede only through some act of inner self-transformation, some act of attending to the self with a view to determining its present incapacity, thence to transform it into the kind of self that is spiritually qualified to accede to a truth that is by definition not open to the unqualified subject. — Spiritualilty and Philosophy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter

“….It is the highly distinctive spirituality of Kant’s philosophy that provides its transformative force, its cultural gravity, and its historical specificity. At least that is what I shall argue in the following entirely provisional and experimental outline of the forms of spirituality present in the Critique of Pure Reason….”
(Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 8)

Sure, just about any text can be interpreted to suit the reader….
————-

…..even if almost always at the expense of the author:

“….. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.

Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions….”
(A345/B403, in Kemp Smith, 1929)
—————-

Because of this….

“…. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious—as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public.…”
(Ibid Bxxxv)

….in which spirituality, being conspicuously absent hence apparently not universally injurious, seemingly warrants it as not only provisionally and experimentally discoverable somewhere in the text, but possibly useful, in direct opposition to the author’s declaration of the soul’s nature as “….purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious…” (A799/B827, in Miekeljohn, ca1852)

What you are saying is that what I'm tagging 'higher knowledge' can only be subjective or personal, as it can't be objectively measured or validated: — Wayfarer

That's right. It's like aesthetic quality in that sense. We experience the beauty and profundity of works, but we have no way of confirming that those are objective qualities.

I guess by 'rigorously tested' you mean subjected to empirical testing. This is what I mean when I said you are appealing to positivism, as it is what positivism says. — Wayfarer

Empirical testing is definitive only in cases of observational propositions, not in the case of scientific hypotheses. The fact that the predictions that are made on the basis of an hypothesis can be observed to obtain does not prove the hypothesis to be true. So, the 'verification' principles of positivism I don't hold.

But notice that I have nowhere in this thread mentioned those as facts. — Wayfarer

The problem is that if someone says that rebirth or afterlife or God is real, then they are claiming that they are facts. If you want to say such things and yet also say that they are not facts, then what would you be saying? It seems to me you would be saying nothing cogent, or else you would be contradicting yourself. If you merely want to say that those things are believed, then if true (and we obviously know it is true) it would be a fact that they are believed—but what would be the point since we already know that.

What I've referred to are some specific Buddhist texts (among others) on the meaning of detachment. But the terms 'karma', 'rebirth' were introduced to the discussion by you, and 'God' in the context of the writings of Meister Eckhardt (who was a Christian theologian). — Wayfarer

As I've said many times, I have no issue with ideas like detachment or Stoic acceptance—I think they are commonsense principles for the attainment of peace of mind. My whole argument is just that the so-called enlightened do not know anything demonstrably true about the nature of reality or the meaning of life. The teachings are only valuable insofar as they may help people gain peace of mind. If you need to believe in God to gain peace of mind there's nothing wrong with that. But trying to prove that God exists to others is futile, and also, I don't think it's a good way to attain peace of mind.

I don't deny the reality of so-called 'spiritual experiences'—the experiences are real, but the conclusions people draw on account of those experiences are subjective. I think it's important to get that clear, or else the door to fundamentalism and ideology and abuse swings wide open.

I agree that in one sense, it can only be known 'each one by him or herself'. But in the long history of philosophy and spirituality there are contexts within which such insights may be intersubjectively validated. That is the meaning of the lineages within such movements. — Wayfarer

It's like how people within art or literary or musical movements intersubjectively validate their mutual aesthetic judgements. It only works if you're already converted, so to speak. There can be definitive intersubjective validation of the kind that would convince the unbiased.

With difficulty! Delusion and mistakes are definitely hazards and there are many examples, which fake gurus are quick to exploit. — Wayfarer

Sure, but you have no definitive way of determining who is fake and who is not. Otherwise, intelligent, even highly intelligent, individuals could not be deceived, as they apparently very often are.

I'm not ruling out the possibility of a "much deeper understanding of reality", but I have no idea what it could look like, and if it were not based on empirical evidence or logic, then what else could it be based on?
— Janus

Metacognitive insight - insight into the mind's own workings and operations. After all one of the foundational texts of Western philosophy is about Socrates' 'know thyself' and he was keenly aware of the possibility of self delusion. A lot of his dialogues were focussed on revealing the self-delusions of those to whom he spoke. — Wayfarer

Introspection is notoriously unreliable. Also, I was talking about the nature of reality in the universal sense, not just of the human condition. Socrates claimed to know nothing other than that he knew nothing. The Socratic dialogues seem to be mostly concerned with showing people, via critical examination, that they do not know what they think they do about things like justice, virtue, the good and so on. I'm attempting to do a similar thing here.

It's not unique to me. And I'm not condemning modernity. What I've said that is objectivity has a shadow. There is something that exclusive reliance on objective science neglects or forgets. And I'm far from the only person who says this. You probably have read more Heidegger than have I, but this is a theme in his writing also, is it not?

Really recommend John Vervaeke's lectures in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis on all this. — Wayfarer

I think it's obvious that we cannot rely on science when it comes to aesthetic and ethical judgements. Humans understand one another in terms of reasons, not in terms of causation, so science is of little use in our everyday attempts to understand one another. Heidegger counts science ( 'present at hand' enquiry) to be secondary to and derivative of lived experience, and I think that is true. But he cautioned against 'ontotheology' which I understand to consist in the absolutization of the human undertsnding of being. I think it is what you get when you say that because nothing is experienced and judged without the mind, that therefore nothing exists without the mind. I think this confuses knowledge and understanding with being.

I have watched about 30 episodes of Vervaeke' lectures, and I found them quite interesting. I didn't find much there to disagree with if I remember rightly (I watched them over a year ago now).

this fourfold OP is not dissimilar to poetic tones of (the later) Heidegger, an attempt to make a distinction between calculative thinking and meditative thinking, and by implication the distinction between the correspondence theory truth and, truth as unconcealment/disclosure- Aletheia (ἀλήθεια) . Note that Heidegger argues that these are not oppositional binaries nor a rallying call to undermine science, but a more modest claim that the latter is forgotten, made indifferent, symptomatic of the technological utility driven epoch we are now dwelling:
Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. There are, then, two kinds of thinking, each justified and needed in its own way: calculative thinking and meditative thinking…
…Yet anyone can follow the path of meditative thinking in his own manner and within his own limits. Why? Because man is a “thinking”, that is, a “meditating being”. Thus meditative thinking need by no means be "high-flown." It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history…
… For the way to what is near is always the longest and thus the hardest for us humans. This way is the way of meditative thinking. Meditative thinking demands of us not to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas. Meditative thinking demands of us that we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go to-gether at all (Discourse on Thinking 1959).