Time doesn't exist. — Corvus

I don't want to be that kind of person but what does it mean to say it does or doesn't exist? Are you talking about existence as coincident with physicality/material constitution then lots of concepts have more to do with generalizations of real things than a particular real thing that it designates.

However, we could loosen the word 'real' or 'exist' to mean whatever significant properties or concepts are required for us to make sense of the world around us.

You may not be able to point to time but all the interconnected concepts that it concerns itself with as such: Physical change, past/future as well as their asymmetry, metrical notions of temporal progression, existence or non-existence, etc.

Are concepts that I don't think a physicist let alone a laymen could do without as its seemingly rather baked into our cognition.

Only space and objects exist. — Corvus

Well, what does it mean to say certain objects exist and why space?

There are void conceptions of space, although not as popular these days, which have been advocated in which the notion of space is understood in purely negative language. So space is a sort of abstraction that one can entertain and can't do away with because whenever you have a positive property we can always add on the word 'not' or negate it to get a perfectly reasonable concept as well. So if you can have things that are colored then clearly there could be un-colored things or if things are charged then they can be uncharged things. You can continue this little game until you are left with only 'pure extension' but while it would be rather peculiar to suppose that there is no space it seems also that this notion is heavily abstracted away from physical things so as to be 'less real'. It's only purpose or property being to separate things and nothing else but because it almost usually approached in such highly negative terms why add it into the 'physical' category?

An article that I found on JSTOR by John E. Boodin all the way from 1906 advocates for this in his second article talking about space & time.

When I try to perceive time, the perception is empty. — Corvus

Lots of things lack our ability to imagine them but that doesn't make them unintelligible or nonreferential.

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I'd again emphasize that the notion of time is a horrible cluster concept. The notions of past or the future could be subsumed under our psychological proclivities but so could so many other aspects of what people take to be illusory but real physical manifestations in the world.

The concept of time is usually also includes the notion of the present which is tied up with the notion of existence and clearly there is a difference one could say between change as well as the physical thing that is changed.

Then there is the designation of metrical measures of time either by extrinsic means (clocks or arbitrary comparative convention) or intrinsic means so the statement 'this process is faster than that one' is a statement that nature would take as meaningful. That there is some physical connection or series of properties that allow for this to make sense. Some who says, as you may, that nature has only extrinsic metrics of time so we 'invent' them so to speak would mean that nature can't actually tell the difference between short or long processes.

If time doesn't exist then does that mean there is no present and so our intuitions about existing things independent of our perception of them is to be thrown out as well? Are we to also think that nature can't tell the temporal difference between a stars life and our own in terms of temporal length given the past/future are fictions together with the fact that no non-existent thing can ground a measure for things?

Are willing to stomach those conclusions above? If not, what are you keeping and what intuitions are you choosing to get rid of?

If you're interested, I've published a paper about this exact problem (the one about tables, not the one about time). It's free to download. Send me a PM and I'll gladly share it with you.

2nd reason: if a table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then if you remove a single atom, you're no longer dealing with the same table, since if you represent both cases using sets, it turns out that the set of n atoms is not identical to the set of n-1 atoms — Arcane Sandwich

I agree with your first reason, but not your second. It's still a table when you remove a few atoms. Not the SAME table but there's still a table there.

A table is an object composed of various physical objects arranged in a way to fit its intended purpose. One could dismantle it, and all the parts would still be there, but you couldn't use it as a table.

Nice.

...the table and the atoms that compose it have different properties. — Arcane Sandwich

Yep. Different properties may be attributed to the same individual under different descriptions.

Leibniz's Law says that two things that have the same properties are the same thing. It does not say that if something has different properties it is a different thing. You are using the inverse of Leibniz's Law, wanting to argue that if something has different properties, it is a different thing.

In one description the table is brown and solid, in the other it is cellulose and space. These two different descriptions are both true of the table. They are compatible. In order to show that there are two different things, one would need to show that the very same object could not be brown and solid and cellulose and mostly space. But of course you can't do that becasue the table is wn and solid and cellulose and mostly space.

2nd reason: if a table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then if you remove a single atom, you're no longer dealing with the same table — Arcane Sandwich

Yeah, it is. It is the same table if I gouge out my initials in the woodwork. Removing a few atoms will not make it cease to be that table. We use such terms in suitable vague ways quite successfully.

Both examples attempt to be overly precise.

You are using the inverse of Leibniz's Law, — Banno

Sure, but the distinction between LL and the contrapositive of LL is inessential to my argument. In second order terms:

∀x∀y((x=y) → ∀P(Px↔Py))

Being able to persist while going through the woodchipper is a property that the collection of atoms has, and the table does not have this property. In other words, they have different persistence conditions, and by LL (or its contrapositive), it follows that they're not identical to each other.

Yeah, it is. It is the same table if I gouge out my initials in the woodwork. Removing a few atoms will not make it cease to be that table. — Banno

I personally agree, but that contradicts this other claim that you made:

The table is the exact same object as the atoms that compose it. — Banno

Then you say:

Both examples attempt to be overly precise. — Banno

And that's a bad thing? How would less precision be a good thing here?

Being able to persist while going through the woodchipper is a property that the collections of atoms has, and the table does not have this property. — Arcane Sandwich

The obvious reply is, that pile of wood chips is the table.

The obvious reply is, that pile of wood chips is the table. — Banno

There's two problems with that, IMHO:

Problem one: it's counter-intuitive. Obviously our intuitions can be wrong, so perhaps this is more of an aesthetic problem.

Second problem: if you say that the pile of wood chips is identical to the table, then your ontology can't explain artifact destruction (or artifact creation). When the collection of atoms existed as a living tree, was it also a table in that case? Of course not. But if you say that the table is identical to the atoms that compose it, then it follows that the table existed before being a table, in the form of a tree.

I don't agree that it is counter-intuitive. If the owner came along and asked where their table is, we might well point to the wood chips.

if you say that the pile of wood chips is identical to the table, then your ontology can't explain artefact destruction (or artefact creation). — Arcane Sandwich

Well, obviously.

There's a play on what it is to be an individual here, that harks back to my initial point, that the table and the atoms are the same. When the collection of atoms existed as a living tree, it wasn't a table, yet it was the table, just as the wood chips are the table.

The table is an individual, and as such may be rigidly designated regardless of the properties attributed to it. It can be parts of a tree, or a pile of wood chip, and yet remains the table. But as the parts of a tree, or as wood chip, it is not a table.

If our aim were to explain the composition of the table, it would be better to start with a different set of individuals, perhaps the cellulose fibres. These can be arranged into a table, a tree or a pile of wood chips.

Which is were we started. The table is the collection of cellulose fibres. It's not as if one arranges the cellulose fibres and then adds something else, the table.

Let's say that we chop up the table into a fine sawdust. And let's say that we scatter this sawdust in several different countries. If we say that this sawdust is "the" table, instead of being "a" table, then we're saying that scattered objects exist. And if this is so, then there's no reason that stops us from saying that strange mereological fusions (such as @Count Timothy von Icarus example of fox-trouts, i.e. flouts) exist as well.

Start with a dinner table, then disassemble it. All the parts are still there, but you no longer have a table.

An object is more than the set of parts that compose it. It's the composed parts + the way they are arranged that makes it something more.

There remains a difference between this table, which is a rigid designated individual, and a table, which is one of a type. What is it that is ground up and distributed across several countries? This table. Sur, it's no longer one of the things that we might count as a table, as of that type.

And yep, we can talk of have fox-trouts if we want.

Start with a dinner table, then disassemble it. All there parts are still there, but you no longer have a table. — Relativist

Yep. Again, there is a difference between the type, "table" and the individual, "This table".

An object is more than the set of parts that compose it. It's the composed parts + the way they are arranged that makes it something more. — Relativist

So you would include some sort of form - we don't only take the parts and arrange them in a table-like fashion, we need to add, in addition, tableness?

I won't be agreeing with that.

Heidegger’s notion of temporality deconstructs both subjectivity and objectivity, replacing the subject-object binary with Dasein’s being in the world. — Joshs

But would he agree that time is inseparable from lived experience?

Aren't you discussing the Ship of Theseus?

When the collection of atoms existed as a living tree, it wasn't a table, yet it was the table, just as the wood chips are the table. — Banno

Fortuitous example, considering that the 'hyle' in hylomorphism is precisely 'lumber' or 'timber'.

Cool. The "form" seems to be a misunderstanding of what happens when we decide to count the newly bonded timber as a table - an hypostatisation of a bit of language use.

The "form" seems to be a misunderstanding of what happens when we decide to count the newly bonded timber as a table — Banno

It's not a misunderstanding, but an actualisation of potential, at least as I understand it. Form is intrinsic to identity - matter must exist as form in order for it to be intelligible, identifiable as a table. Furthermore a table is an artefact, it is composed according to a design to fulfill a function.

That's verging on word salad.

When the table is chipped into sawdust and scattered, the functional structure is gone. So, in one sense, it’s no longer "a table" (a functional object), but in another sense, it’s still "this table" (the individual thing that once was a table).So Identity doesn’t depend purely on form. If it did, then the table would cease to exist the moment it stopped being functional as a table. Instead, identity seems to track something deeper—perhaps continuity of language, history, and the way we rigidly designate things.

Aren't you discussing the Ship of Theseus?

When the collection of atoms existed as a living tree, it wasn't a table, yet it was the table, just as the wood chips are the table. — Banno


Fortuitous example, considering that the 'hyle' in hylomorphism is precisely 'lumber' or 'timber'. — Wayfarer

Great question. As I understand it, no. The problem of the Ship of Theseus, in my view, is about indeterminate identity. What I'm asking Banno is a different question, a different problem. I should know, since I'm the one that has invented it (but there are some precedents in the literature). I call it "The Argument From Addition". For what? For the elimination of ordinary objects. It also works for the elimination of extra-ordinary objects. I've published a paper about this, in an Australian journal. It's the one that I was talking with Banno a few comments ago. Since I don't want to break the Forum's rules, if you're interested, send me a PM and I'll link it to you.

Yes, there's a "form", in a physicalist (not platonic) sense: the parts exist with relations to the other parts: legs a certain distance apart, with a roughly 90 degree angle to the table top.

So I'm not saying "table" is some ontological category.

I think you can post a link, can't you? It's not self-promotion if it's a philosophy article in a journal. Anyway, by all means PM.

Identity doesn’t depend purely on form. If it did, then the table would cease to exist the moment it stopped being functional as a table. — Banno

Which, of course, it does. When the object is dissassembled to its parts, the object no longer exists. Plain language, not 'word salad' :brow:

identity seems to track something deeper—perhaps continuity of language, history, and the way we rigidly designate things — Banno

But whatever that might be, it is not inherent in the object. There is no use looking for a table in the sawdust, that is just a desparate attempt to maintain some kind of objective referent.

I think you can post a link, can't you? It's not self-promotion if it's a philosophy article in a journal. — Wayfarer

Yeah well, I'd rather err on the side of caution. Good rule for online Forums, good rule for ordinary life. The obvious question here is,

is there an extra-ordinary life?

I can't see how to make sense of that.

Not a table, then?

Not a table, then? — Banno

It's a low blow. A Deleuzian low blow from a Wittgenstein fan. Deleuze hated Wittgenstein.

Here's the thing, People (of this Forum):

@Banno is not an atheist. He's a Spinozist.

Then it seems to me you did not follow the discussion above. That pile of chip is the table. It is not a table.

Here the logic used is Kripke's, seen in Identity and Necessity.

Deleuze hated Wittgenstein — Arcane Sandwich

Wittgenstein didn't care. :smile:

Wittgenstein didn't care. :smile: — Banno

Ok, then on the Good-Evil Axis, you're a Neutral.

Ok, then on the Good-Evil Axis, you're a Neutral. — Arcane Sandwich

Now you explain to me what the blimey this got to do with a Thread called "Ontology of Time". And explain that to me rationally.

You don't want to mess with me, @Banno. I'm from Argentina. I grew up among Eucalyptus trees.

Spinozist — Arcane Sandwich

Only on Sunday.

what the blimey this got to do with a Thread called "Ontology of Time". — Arcane Sandwich

This follows on from my first post, in which I pointed out that the OP was then 19 hrs old.

The line of thought is that there is something amiss with an argument that claims to show that time, which is pretty foundational, does not exist. It misuses "time", or "exits", or both.

Only on Sunday. — Banno

Today is Sunday (in Argentina).

what the blimey this got to do with a Thread called "Ontology of Time". — Arcane Sandwich


This follows on from my first post, in which I pointed out that the OP was then 19 hrs old. — Banno

Nonsense. Appeal to the stone, yadda yadda (on my part), I don't care. What you just said there sounds like nonsense (at least to my ear). It's not good common sense. It's pseudo-science.

The line of thought is that there is something amiss with an argument that claims to show that time, which is pretty foundational, does not exist. It misuses "time", or "exits", or both. — Banno

But that contradicts what you just said in your previous thesis. It's like you want to uphold a Deleuzian thesis and a Wittgensteinian thesis at the same time, and it just makes no sense.