The word "scientism" originally had a negative connotation, and then some people (like Mario Bunge) started using it in a positive sense. For example, take a look at the title of one of his articles: In Defense of Realism and Scientism — Arcane Sandwich

Cool, I'll check it out. As a lark, @Wayfarer should take a look.

So, I would say that nothing "becomes" an object in the strict sense for OOO, I would say that objects instead emerge according to OOO. — Arcane Sandwich

This just seems to open up more problems, no? For example, is Gandalf not Gandalf at time 1, but is at time 2? What is the proto-object that "emerges" in the transition stage between non-object and object? Is that proto-object an object? This suggests to negate essentialism as a continuum, more a non-discrete field or spectrum.

Again, your argument is not with me then, but with Harman himself. My theory of fictional characters is mostly inspired by Bunge, not Harman. There are other parts of my personal philosophy that are more inspired by Harman than Bunge, but this is not one of them. — Arcane Sandwich

I am not arguing with your theory but Harman, and am seeing if you also agree with my objections, nothing more. The problem with essentialist theories is where the delimiters are for certain objects. You can get away with it perhaps if you are a materialist because then you can delimit where the boundaries are by some sort of material composition. However, if you give all potential things status of objects, it can be stretched out to a continuum, and thus not an object so much as a continuous monism of indefinite beginning or end, as is the problem with something like Gandalf.

This just seems to open up more problems, no? For example, is Gandalf not Gandalf at time 1, but is at time 2? What is the proto-object that "emerges" in the transition stage between non-object and object? Is that proto-object an object? This suggests to negate essentialism as a continuum, more a non-discrete field or spectrum. — schopenhauer1

But these problems are not exclusive to Object-Oriented Ontology, they also arise in the analytic metaphysics of Ordinary Objects.

And they also arise in the context of Bunge's ontology.

and am seeing if you also agree with my objections, — schopenhauer1

I don't know if I agree with them or not, I would need more details from you. I'm not even sure what your objections are to begin with.

The problem with essentialist theories is where the delimiters are for certain objects. You can get away with it perhaps if you are a materialist because then you can delimit where the boundaries are by some sort of material composition. However, if you give all potential things status of objects, it can be stretched out to a continuum, and thus not an object so much as a continuous monism of indefinite beginning or end, as is the problem with something like Gandalf. — schopenhauer1

This is the problem that I personally call "The Hard Problem of Identity". Think of it like the "Hard problem of consciousness", but in metaphysics instead of philosophy of mind. One possible candidate for identity, is spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal. That solution, however, crashes into the problem of Material Constitution, particularly with the case of the Ship of Theseus (I think that the Ship of Theseus paradox should be classified as a problem of indeterminate identity, not as a problem of material constitution, but that's beside the point).

This is the problem that I personally call "The Hard Problem of Identity". Think of it like the "Hard problem of consciousness", but in metaphysics instead of philosophy of mind. One possible candidate for identity, is spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal. That solution, however, crashes into the problem of Material Constitution, particularly with the case of the Ship of Theseus (I think that the Ship of Theseus paradox should be classified as a problem of indeterminate identity, not as a problem of material constitution, but that's beside the point). — Arcane Sandwich

I'd agree that indeterminate identity does become a problem when delimiting where "objects" begin and end. I don't think this is as much a problem with other forms of metaphysics like process philosophy. But I get the reasons for wanting an object-oriented metaphysics, giving objects-proper ultimate priority, and irreducible to simples.

:up:

I found a really useful text for your thread: Paul Vincent Spade's, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes."

It is a professor's informal introduction to Aristotelian essentialism for his students, using Quine and modalism as a jumping-off point. He construes modern approaches and bundle theories as a form of Platonism vis-a-vis the Timaeus (which makes sense). He then contrasts Aristotle's approach to the Platonic approach, which reveals the two deep metaphysical approaches on offer.

Beyond that, I think the focus on Assemblage Theory in this thread has functioned as an elaborate excuse to avoid the issues of the OP, despite the fact that there are <ways to engage the OP with approaches like Deleuze's>.