:rofl:

My brain tells me that I'm thinking.

Harman rejects Whitehead’s relationalism for two reasons: 1) he worries it reduces ontology to “a house of mirrors” wherein, because a thing just is a unification of its prehensions of other things, there is never finally any there there beneath its internal reflections of others;

I've only read one of Whitehead's books, but this does seem to be a problem for process philosophy in general. Of course, simply positing objects and essences does very little to fix the issue either. If the question: "why do some sorts of processes just happen to occur?" is problematic (which I'd agree it is), it seems the same sort of question would be problematic for objects, which was Srap's point earlier.

However, this is not a problem supposing objects with nature's/essences that are (perhaps relatively) intelligible in themselves and self-determining (if not self-subsistent). However, such things, being in the order of becoming, are in some sense processes as well, although processes with an intelligible locus.

“The ontological structure of the world does not evolve…which is precisely what makes it an ontological structure” [GM, 24]

This is a deeper problem for process theologians from what I've seen, the inability to avoid self-refutation by making everything mutable. Also, there is a sort of move from the directed procession of the Absolute in Hegel to an arbitrary progression (because arbitrariness is "more free" and "creative."

Why is it that people agree on so much? I think this comes down to how norms of judgement are generated. Peoples' eyes agree on object locations very durably, so location within a room works like that. Even if they might disagree on the true locations of objects when the rulers come out - like if my coaster is 30cm or 30.005cm from the nearest edge of my desk to me. If correct assertibility is an assay, truth is crucible.

This seems to require that what you're saying about how people's eyes and measurements agree is actually true. If it's "norms of assertibility all the way down," then everything you've just claimed is only true relative to some contexts. Is this context universal even for all human beings? Well, according to the radical skeptics, the cognitive relativists, etc. it isn't. They reject your norms because they reject your judgements.

When people share the same contexts, the overwhelming majority of conduct norms about such basic things are very fixed like that. That includes various inferences, like "if you put your hand in the fire, you'll burn it", "don't put your hand in the fire" comes along with that as the judgement that burning your hand in the fire for no reason is bad is very readily caused by the pain of it.

Yes, but this doesn't speak to the very many cases where people don't agree, and have radically different assertibility criteria. Consider for instance, the difference between a radical fundamentalist, who thinks their literalist interpretation of the Bible or Koran is the ultimate standard of truth versus an follower of atheistic scientism. They have incommensurate assertability criteria. Are they then both speaking truth when they assert contradictory claims that meet their disparate criteria?

In the latter regard, there's a room for a moral realism in terms of correct assertibility, since the conventions are so durable and there's room to claim that "needless harm is bad" is true.

Sure, there is room to "claim" that "raping and torturing like the BTK killer is bad" is true. But there is clearly room in our modern discourse to claim the opposite, i e., that moral nihilism or extreme relativism is the case. Indeed, people claim these sorts of things all the time; they are extremely popular assertions in the context of our current norms.

So is torturing children for fun bad? Is the truth of this something that changes from time to time and place to place, based on the norms in vouge? If norms decide this, then it obviously does, since norms concerning child slaves were extremely permissive through much of human history.

@Count Timothy von Icarus what do you think of what I said ?

I'm not really sure what point you're trying to make. A blanket renouncement of figurative language and metaphor? I don't know the context of the quote, but it certainly seems like it could be plenty meaningful, and an indictment. There is much in correlationism and representationalism's skepticism that might rightly fall into what Hegel terms the "fear of error become fear of truth," in the Preface to the Phenomenology.

Of course, as this thread is well an example, skepticism, doubt, and an aloofness from wonder and truth, once philosophical vices, have become a virtue in our era, the highest virtue being the "tolerance" of "bourgeois metaphysics." I don't think this is "howling in a bear trap," so much as being happy to sit in the trap, even as gangrene sets in.

A metaphorical critique can work here. For instance, the first of the damned that Dante and Virgil encounter in the Commedia are the souls of those who refused to take any stand while on Earth. Barred from Heaven, they are also rejected by the rebellious demons of Hell and forced to spend eternity aimlessly chasing a banner that flees arbitrarily ahead of them all around Hell's vestibule, their ceaseless pace a parody of the vigor and conviction they lacked in life.

Pointedly, none of these are named; they have no legacy. One might be Saint/Pope Celestine, who abdicated the papacy, but I find it more probable and poetic that the one who "made the great refusal," is supposed to be Pontius Pilate, who, to dodge responsibility for killing an innocent man, responded to Christ—the Logos and the "Way the Truth, and the Light" itself—"but what is truth?"

See, plenty of good work to be done by metaphor and image!

I'm not really sure what point you're trying to make. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure either, that's why I'm asking for your help. Thank you for taking the time to helping me.

A blanket renouncement of figurative language and metaphor? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, in some sense. In some contexts, at least. Please hear my argument. When you go to a public library, and you go to the room or area called "silent reading room", you can't raise your voice. You can't talk like you would talk at the coffee shop down the corner. Why not? Because you can't, it's one of the rules. Is it physically impossible to raise your voice in that situation? Of course not. But we have to agree on some very basic social rules here, as a society. In that sense, I would echo Eco (see what I did there?) when he told Rorty that things cannot be pragmatism and convention all the way down. I would say here: things cannot be figurative language and metaphor all the way down. Right?

I would say here: things cannot be figurative language and metaphor all the way down. Right?

Sure. However, a concern with that might denote a conflation of the means of knowing and communicating with what is known and communicated. When we read a book about insects or French history, do we only learn about words since that is all the books contain?

To be sure, there can be figurative language that is more or less empty, but it is not all empty. Plato and Dante are two of the finest philosophers in history and both make extensive use of imagery and present their works in narratives packed with symbolism and drama. They are successful, in part, not in spite of this technique but because of it.

Indeed, both suggest that what they most want to speak about cannot be approached directly, through syllogism and dissertation, but must "leap from one soul to another, as a flame jumps between candles."

IMO, one of the great losses in modern philosophy is its move away from drama and verse. Nietzsche is a standout for this in our own epoch, and yet many of the older great works, from Parmenides, to Plato, to St. Augustine, to Boethius, to Dante, to St. John of the Cross to Voltaire are filled with it. Camus and Sarte it seems, were not enough to start a trend.

When we read a book about insects or French history, do we only learn about words since that is all the books contain? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think so. It depends on what genre of literature you're reading that in. If it's a work of fiction, then I wouldn't take it seriously in that sense. If it's non-fiction, that's a different story. If it's non-fiction, is it a scientific book? And if it is, who is the publisher? Is it an academic or a non-academic publisher? If it's a non-academic publisher, was the book peer-reviewed before publishing? If the book has no credentials, but it tells you basic facts, such that insects have six legs or that Paris is the capital of France, does that mean that we shouldn't believe what the book is claiming? Etc.

To be sure, there can be figurative language that is more or less empty, but it is not all empty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

Plato and Dante are two of the finest philosophers in history and both make extensive use of imagery and present their works in narratives packed with symbolism and drama. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

They are successful, in part, not in spite of this technique but because of it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

Indeed, both suggest that what they most want to speak about cannot be approached directly, through syllogism and dissertation, but must "leap from one soul to another, as a flame jumps between candles." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

IMO, one of the great losses in modern philosophy is its move away from drama and verse. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

Nietzsche is a standout for this in our own epoch, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

many of the older great works, from Parmenides, to Plato, to St. Augustine, to Boethius, to Dante, to St. John of the Cross to Voltaire are filled with it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree.

Camus and Sarte it seems, were not enough to start a trend. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, they tried, and the best that they managed to produce is people wearing black clothes, that talk at coffee shops, and smoke cigarettes. That's not good enough for me. It's actually bad for me, since I don't smoke (I did smoke, and I managed to quit, but it was incredibly difficult) and I rarely drink coffee.

Well, it seems like there's quite a lot of agreement between us, @Count Timothy von Icarus. That being the case, I don't see why we can't seem to settle the philosophical point about "The Letter of the Law" versus "The Spirit of the Law". I see that debate in a reductionist way, it boils down to the following choice: literalism or spiritualism, you can't have both. Right? Or do you disagree?

I've only read one of Whitehead's books, but this does seem to be a problem for process philosophy in general. Of course, simply positing objects and essences does very little to fix the issue either. If the question: "why do some sorts of processes just happen to occur?" is problematic (which I'd agree it is), it seems the same sort of question would be problematic for objects, which was Srap's point earlier. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Harman is "democratic" with his objects- what he calls "flat ontology". All objects are of equal weight as far as how relations are concerned. That is to say, all objects present a "vicarious/sensational causation" whereby one object is "translated" with another. That is to say, everything cannot reducible to simples, or overmined as parts of an anthropic-only perspective, or composed simply of their parts. Even if a log is burned, the log's essence is still withdrawn and ever-present in this theory. This notion of objects even applies to non-physical objects like abstract concepts, fictional characters, and the like. They all have a unity, irreducibility, and can enter into relations with other objects. This allows for objects to persist beyond simply their reduced parts, or simply their relations/processes. He is even "democratic" about objects being of equal existence whether real or fictional. As for the question, "Why these objects?", I am not sure his take other than it's a brute fact of his metaphysics.

Harmon is "democratic" with his objects- what he calls "flat ontology". All objects are of equal weight as far as how relations are concerned. That is to say, all objects present a "vicarious/sensational causation" whereby one object is "translated" with another. Even if a log is burned, the log's essence is still withdrawn and ever-present in this theory. These even go down to non-physical objects like abstract concepts, fictional characters, and the like. They all have a unity, irreducibility, and can enter into relations with other objects. This allows for objects to persist beyond simply their reduced parts, or simply their relations/processes. As for the question, "Why these objects?", I am not sure his take other than it's a brute fact of his metaphysics. — schopenhauer1

Here's Mario Bunge's answer to that question:

In ordinary language, the word “object” denotes a material thing that can be seen and touched. By contrast, in modern philosophy “object” (objectum, Gegenstand) stands for whatever can be thought about: it applies to concrete things and abstract ones, arbitrary assemblages and structured wholes, electrons and nations, stones and ghosts, individuals and sets, properties and events, facts and fictions, and so on. The concept of an object is thus the most general of all philosophical concepts. — Mario Bunge (2010)

EDIT: And here is what Harman says in his book Guerilla Metaphysics:

This book calls for what might be termed an object-oriented philosophy, and in this way rejects both the analytic and continental traditions. The ongoing dispute between these traditions, including the sort of “bridge building” that starts by conceding the existence of the dispute, misses a prejudice shared by both: their primary interest lies not in objects, but in human access to them. The so-called linguistic turn is still the dominant model for the philosophy of access, but there are plenty of others—phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, philosophy of mind, pragmatism. None of these philosophical schools tells us much of anything about objects themselves; indeed, they pride themselves on avoiding all naive contact with non human entities. By contrast, object-oriented philosophy holds that the relation of humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, or windmills is no different in kind from the interaction of these objects with each other. For this reason, the philosophy of objects is sometimes lazily viewed as a form of scientific naturalism, since it plunges directly into the world and considers every object imaginable, avoiding any prior technical critique of the workings of human knowledge. But quite unlike naturalism, object-oriented philosophy adopts a bluntly metaphysical approach to the relations between objects rather than a familiar physical one. In fact, another term that might be employed for object-oriented philosophy is guerrilla metaphysics—a name meant to signify that the numerous present-day objections to metaphysics are not unknown to me, but also that I do not find them especially compelling. — Graham Harman (2005)

The so-called linguistic turn is still the dominant model for the philosophy of access, but there are plenty of others — Graham Harman (2005)

I think this is significant. For the speculative realists, "correlationism" or the idea that the world cannot be accessed outside a human/animal perspective, is the enemy.

By contrast, object-oriented philosophy holds that the relation of humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, or windmills is no different in kind from the interaction of these objects with each other. For this reason, the philosophy of objects is sometimes lazily viewed as a form of scientific naturalism, since it plunges directly into the world and considers every object imaginable, avoiding any prior technical critique of the workings of human knowledge. But quite unlike naturalism, object-oriented philosophy adopts a bluntly metaphysical approach to the relations between objects rather than a familiar physical one. — Graham Harman (2005)

This is also important in understanding this metaphysics. In his particular flavor of speculative realism, it seems objects have ways of either translating or not translating their being to each other. I don't get though, how something fictional can be anything outside of a human interaction. How can Gandalf be anything but human-based? According to this theory, it would seem that even if humans were necessary for Gandalf to exist, once created, Gandalf is its own object, with its own withdrawn and mysterious essence that can only be translated with other objects, including humans.

Another oddity in the theory would be, if anything can be an object, what then would not count as an object? If Gandalf, the number 3, the type "dog", a particular dog named Rex, Narnia, Middle Earth, a subatomic particle, and a brown hat are all their own individual, essentialized, independent objects, what is not an object?

I don't accept the pertinence of schools as presented here but do credit Harman for giving an excellent rant.

I don't accept the pertinence of schools as presented here but do credit Harman for giving an excellent rant. — Paine

I don't agree with you, but it doesn't matter (our disagreement here doesn't matter, that is). Harman has some of, if not the, best skills as a writer in 21st Century philosophy. He was a professional sportswriter in the past. It's obvious that the rest of us, his colleagues in the world of professional philosophy, don't have such a high-level prose. That's just a brute fact as far as I'm concerned. Here's an example:

The carnival tent rustles in the evening breeze, disturbing the moods of those who approach. Inside the tent are swarms of humans and trained ani­mals; there are jarring sounds, strange ethnic foods, and shadows. For a few moments the music of a concealed organ is countered by the rumble of thunder, as emaciated dogs begin to whine. A small fight breaks out, soon to be halted by a sneering, scar-faced man. Suddenly, hailstones strike the roof of the tent like bullets, frightening everyone: the visitors, the for­tunetellers, the unkempt and corrupted security guards, the monkeys sparkling with costume jewelry. At long last, the organ player's morbid inner anger takes command, and he begins an atonal dirge that will last throughout the storm.
All of this can be explained by atoms. — Harman (2005)

I don't agree with you — Arcane Sandwich

About the remark about schools of thought?

About the remark about schools of thought? — Paine

Yup. I think he's right about that (and about other things as well).

I have a problem with the encyclopedic approach to expression of ideas. Half of me roots for Harman's language while the other half objects to another victim of an accepted practice.

I think this is significant. For the speculative realists, "correlationism" or the idea that the world cannot be accessed outside a human/animal perspective, is the enemy. — schopenhauer1

Not really. Good ol' fashioned relationism poses a greater philosophical problem for speculative realism. Besides, Meillassoux and Harman criticize correlationism for different reasons. They don't agree as to what it is that correlationism gets wrong. Meillassoux sees flaws where Harman sees virtues, and Harman sees flaws where Meillassoux sees virtues.

This is also important in understanding this metaphysics. In his particular flavor of speculative realism, it seems objects have ways of either translating or not translating their being to each other. I don't get though, how something fictional can be anything outside of a human interaction. — schopenhauer1

You have to be more Latourian about that, in order to understand Harman's point, because Harman himself is a Latourian (though he doesn't agree with Latour on that specific point, yet you need to take into account what Actor-Network Theory says about that in order to understand how Object-Oriented Ontology differs from ANT in that regard).

According to this theory, it would seem that even if humans were necessary for Gandalf to exist, once created, Gandalf is its own object, with its own withdrawn and mysterious essence that can only be translated with other objects, including humans. — schopenhauer1

Not sure if this is correct, but if that's your theory, OK.

Another oddity in the theory would be, if anything can be an object, what then would not count as an object? If Gandalf, the number 3, the type "dog", a particular dog named Rex, Narnia, Middle Earth, a subatomic particle, and a brown hat are all their own individual, essentialized, independent objects, what is not an object? — schopenhauer1

Qualities. For Harman, qualities are not objects, though he suggests that under certain conditions, a quality can become an object. But that's beside the point here, because his ontology can be characterized as a four-fold: two kinds of objects, two kinds of qualities, like so:

Sensual Qualities - Real Qualities
Sensual Objects - Real Objects

These can be combined in many different ways. For example, a fictional character is a sensual object that has a real quality. Éowyn and Aragorn exists as sensual objects, not as real objects. However, they have real qualities, since, for example, they are copyrighted characters, you cannot use them in your own novel. That is in fact why the Tolkien foundation sued TSR (the old Dungeons & Dragons company) way back in the day. IIRC, a judge ruled that the word "hobbit" was copyrighted. So, instead of using the word "hobbit", TSR used "halfling".

I have a problem with the encyclopedic approach to expression of ideas. Half of me roots for Harman's language while the other half objects to another victim of an accepted practice. — Paine

I suppose that's understandable.

Said like an entry in a text that does not concern you.

Said like an entry in a text that does not concern you. — Paine

What do you mean?

I suppose that's understandable. — Arcane Sandwich

So? How is that like an entry in a text that does not concern you?

Is not the Harmann quote appealing to those who have nothing to gain from the outcome?

No idea. I don't know who the real target audience of Guerilla Metaphysics. That's by design.

Not really. Good ol' fashioned relationism poses a greater philosophical problem for speculative realism. — Arcane Sandwich

It doesn't seem to be as much a problem except for Harman who focuses on objects contra process/qualities-only.

Besides, Meillassoux and Harman criticize correlationism for different reasons. They don't agree as to what it is that correlationism gets wrong. Meillassoux sees flaws where Harman sees virtues, and Harman sees flaws where Meillassoux sees virtues. — Arcane Sandwich

Meillassoux focused more on correlationism, and found that it kept people in an epistemic circle and thus "speculative realism" is an attempt to break it, philosophically. Harman agrees partly that correlationism has some truth to it as far as how humans relate to objects, but he democratizes it such that all objects have the ability, via vicarious causation to perceive to sense the object (i.e. sensual object), via the object's translated, sensual qualities (i.e. the qualities of an object as sensed by another object). A tree and wind have an interaction that is different than a tree and a human, for example. For Harman, relations are what matters. However, it is not all relations. It may even transform its appearance, but retains its essence (like the burned log). Each object, has an essence that is withdrawn or hidden, and thus retains its independence from complete reduction to its qualities, causal factors, or behaviors.

Not sure if this is correct, but if that's your theory, OK. — Arcane Sandwich

I am interpreting Harman, so not my own theory per se.

Qualities. For Harman, qualities are not objects, though he suggests that under certain conditions, a quality can become an object. But that's beside the point here, — Arcane Sandwich

It's actually quite the point. If Gandalf is purely from human imagination, that would seem to undermine his attempt at saying objects have independence. Also, what is the mechanism that makes the object an object at that point? Why is it not then something else- an idea, an abstraction, etc. This then becomes a slippery slope whereby objects are so ill-defined as to not matter in any useful sense.

Sensual Qualities - Real Qualities
Sensual Objects - Real Objects

These can be combined in many different ways. For example, a fictional character is a sensual object that has a real quality. Éowyn and Aragorn exists as sensual objects, not as real objects. However, they have real qualities, since, for example, they are copyrighted characters, you cannot use them in your own novel. That is in fact why the Tolkien foundation sued TSR (the old Dungeons & Dragons company) way back in the day. IIRC, a judge ruled that the word "hobbit" was copyrighted. So, instead of using the word "hobbit", TSR used "halfling". — Arcane Sandwich

I think you are misapplying Harman's notion of sensual object/qualities here. Sensual qualities, as far as I see, are only tied with sensual objects. Sensual objects are "tree-for-x" (human let's say). The sensual qualities would be the appearance of the tree-for-x (rough, brown, tall, etc.). The real object is the tree's essence which is withdrawn, independent of relations with other objects, and not fully comprehensible. The real qualities, might be things selected out as what composes the real object (but apparently never exhaustive), like the molecular structure let's say. Whatever form that particular tree takes in its relations with others, the essence always holds, though not fully knowable, though some real qualities can be picked out.

Thus Gandalf and Eowyn and Aragorn are always sensual objects with sensual qualities, as they are objects only ever relational to humans.

Coupling Heidegger's tool analysis with the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Harman introduces two types of objects: real objects and sensual objects. Real objects are objects that withdraw from all experience, whereas sensual objects are those that exist only in experience.[30] Additionally, Harman suggests two kinds of qualities: sensual qualities, or those found in experience, and real qualities, which are accessed through intellectual probing.[30] Pairing sensual and real objects and qualities yields the following four "tensions":

Real Object/Real Qualities (RO-RQ): This pairing grounds the capacity of real objects to differ from one another, without collapsing into indefinite substrata.[31] This tension thus refers to "a real or indescribable object" encrusted with "real properties" that cannot be experientially understood.[32] Harman refers to this as "essence".[33]
Real Object/Sensual Qualities (RO-SQ): As in the tool-analysis, a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a "surface" accessed by thought and/or action.[31] This tension thus refers to "the multiple facets [an object] displays to the outer world, and whatever [real, withdrawn] organizing principle is able to hold together [those] features."[34] Harman identifies this as "space".[35]
Sensual Object/Real Qualities (SO-RQ): The structure of conscious phenomena are forged from eidetic, or experientially interpretive, qualities intuited intellectually.[31] This tension thus refers to "a perfectly accessible [object] whose features are withdrawn from [total] scrutiny",[34] Harman dubs "eidos"[36]
Sensual Object/Sensual Qualities (SO-SQ): Sensual objects are present, but enmeshed within a "mist of accidental features and profiles".[37] This tension thus refers to "an enduring sensual object and its shifting parade of qualities from one moment to the next", which Harman identifies as "time".[38]
To explain how withdrawn objects make contact with and relate to one another, Harman submits the theory of vicarious causation, whereby two hypothetical entities meet in the interior of a third entity, existing side-by-side until something occurs to prompt interaction.[39] Harman compares this idea to the classical notion of formal causation, in which forms do not directly touch, but influence one another in a common space "from which all are partly absent". Causation, says Harman, is always vicarious, asymmetrical, and buffered:
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology

It doesn't seem to be as much a problem except for Harman who focuses on objects contra process/qualities-only. — schopenhauer1

Exactly, which is why Speculative Realism is not a homogeneous set of basic beliefs. There are core differences between its "Founding Fathers", if you will. For example, the reason why Meillassoux rejects correlationism is not the same reason why Harman rejects it. To say that they are united against correlationism is like saying that materialism and idealism are united against absolutism.

Meillassoux focused more on correlationism, and found that it kept people in an epistemic circle and thus "speculative realism" is an attempt to break it, philosophically. Harman agrees partly that correlationism has some truth to it as far as how humans relate to objects, but he democratizes it such that all objects have the ability, via vicarious causation to perceive to sense the object (i.e. sensual object), via the object's translated, sensual qualities (i.e. the qualities of an object as sensed by another object). A tree and wind have an interaction that is different than a tree and a human, for example. For Harman, relations are what matters. However, it is not all relations. It may even transform its appearance, but retains its essence (like the burned log). Each object, has an essence that is withdrawn or hidden, and thus retains its independence from complete reduction to its qualities, causal factors, or behaviors. — schopenhauer1

So what's your point here? It went over my head, if there was indeed a point to be made here. To me it sounds like you're just describing a state of affairs, and you're doing so in a neutral way.

I am interpreting Harman, so not my own theory per se. — schopenhauer1

But maybe your interpretation is different from mine.

It's actually quite the point. If Gandalf is purely from human imagination, that would seem to undermine his attempt at saying objects have independence. Also, what is the mechanism that makes the object an object at that point? Why is it not then something else- an idea, an abstraction, etc. This then becomes a slippery slope whereby objects are so ill-defined as to not matter in any useful sense. — schopenhauer1

I have published a paper where I say that for Harman, all ideas are sensual objects, but not all sensual objects are ideas. He doesn't say that himself, but in one of the emails that he sent me, he seemed to agree with what I said about him on that specific point.

I think you are misapplying Harman's notion of sensual object/qualities here. Sensual qualities, as far as I see, are only tied with sensual objects. — schopenhauer1

You'd be wrong. A real object can have sensual qualities, just as a sensual object can have real qualities. There's an article that Harman himself published in response to one of my own articles. In my article, I press him on the topic of hobbits vis a vis the topic of matter, and he explicitly says, in print, that hobbits are sensual objects that have real qualities, and that the same is true of matter, in his view.

Sensual objects are "tree-for-x" (human let's say). The sensual qualities would be the appearance of the tree-for-x (rough, brown, tall, etc.). The real object is the tree's essence which is withdrawn, independent of relations with other objects, and not fully comprehensible. The real qualities, might be things selected out as what composes the real object (but apparently never exhaustive), like the molecular structure let's say. Whatever form that particular tree takes in its relations with others, the essence always holds, though not fully knowable, though some real qualities can be picked out.

Thus Gandalf and Eowyn and Aragorn are always sensual objects with sensual qualities, as they are objects only ever relational to humans. — schopenhauer1

Then your argument is with Harman himself, not with my interpretation of his philosophy.

So what's your point here? It went over my head, if there was indeed a point to be made here. To me it sounds like you're just describing a state of affairs, and you're doing so in a neutral way. — Arcane Sandwich

Yep.

I have published a paper where I say that for Harman, all ideas are sensual objects, but not all sensual objects are ideas. He doesn't say that himself, but in one of the emails that he sent me, he seemed to agree with what I said about him on that specific point. — Arcane Sandwich

:up:

You'd be wrong. A real object can have sensual qualities, just as a sensual object can have real qualities. There's an article that Harman himself published in response to one of my own articles. In my article, I press him on the topic of hobbitsvis a vis the topic of matter, and he explicitly says, in print, that hobbits are sensual objects that have real qualities, and that the same is true of matter, in his view. — Arcane Sandwich

Fair enough, but then:

Then you're argument is with Harman himself, not with my interpretation of his philosophy. — Arcane Sandwich

And that would be true, but are you defending Harman with these objections or do you see them as well?

And that would be true, but are you defending Harman with these objections or do you see them as well? — schopenhauer1

My sentiments on Harman's philosophy (and he knows this himself, since we've been exchanging emails for almost 10 years now) are mixed, precisely because I'm a materialist and he is not, and because I endorse scientism and he does not. He values science, but he places no stock in scientism. I, on the other hand, place stock in both. Despite these differences, Harman and I are realists. So there is important common ground there. And there are many more similarities and differences, but those that I just mentioned would be the core differences between us.

My sentiments on Harman's philosophy (and he knows this himself, since we've been exchanging emails for almost 10 years now) are mixed, precisely because I'm a materialist and he is not, and because I endorse scientism and he does not. He values science, but he places no stock in scientism. I, on the other hand, place stock in both. Despite these differences, Harman and I are realists. So there is important common ground there. And there are many more similarities and differences, but those that I just mentioned would be the core differences between us. — Arcane Sandwich

Interesting. I rarely see people "embrace" the label "scientism". What is that definition for you? There was a thread about this not too long ago:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15525/the-empty-suitcase-physicalism-vs-methodological-naturalism/p1

But as far as what I brought up, do you know of his answers, or would you have a defense? Specifically I am talking about how and when something becomes an object. It seems like a Deus ex machina to say Gandalf is thus an object. Is Gandalf an object at the first thought of a Gandalf-like character? The name Gandalf? The writing of pen to paper about Gandalf? The neural connections? It just seems oddly misplaced to call it an object even with the appellate "sensual". It also has to me, obvious connections to the essentialism of Kripke in Naming and Necessity, and Putnam with ideas of scientific kinds. Does Gandalf obtain in all possible worlds? Etc.

Interesting. I rarely see people "embrace" the label "scientism". What is that definition for you? — schopenhauer1

The word "scientism" originally had a negative connotation, and then some people (like Mario Bunge) started using it in a positive sense. For example, take a look at the title of one of his articles: In Defense of Realism and Scientism

But as far as what I brought up, do you know of his answers, or would you have a defense? Specifically I am talking about how and when something becomes an object. — schopenhauer1

In one of his last emails, Harman suggested to me that perhaps there is no change at all. Here is a fragment from his email, I don't think he would have any objections against me sharing the following specific line with you. Here is what he told me:

(...) For me, of course, all change is purely sensual, and involves shifting qualities. What I think happens is not change, but composition or synthesis between previous separate entities. (...) — Harman (personal communication)

So, I would say that nothing "becomes" an object in the strict sense for OOO, I would say that objects instead emerge according to OOO.

It seems like a Deus ex machina to say Gandalf is thus an object. Is Gandalf an object at the first thought of a Gandalf-like character? The name Gandalf? The writing of pen to paper about Gandalf? The neural connections? It just seems oddly misplaced to call it an object even with the appellate "sensual". It also has to me, obvious connections to the essentialism of Kripke in Naming and Necessity, and Putnam with ideas of scientific kinds. Does Gandalf obtain in all possible worlds? Etc — schopenhauer1

Again, your argument is not with me then, but with Harman himself. My theory of fictional characters is mostly inspired by Bunge, not Harman. There are other parts of my personal philosophy that are more inspired by Harman than Bunge, but this is not one of them.