It's an accurate painting of the front of your house on a rainless day. — Michael

I would say that what you described as a "property" of a painting is more accurately described as a relation between a painting and something else that holds in a certain way and under certain conditions.

being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3 — Michael

"greater than" is a relation between two integers; it is an arity-2 predicate from which you have produced the arity-1 predicate "greater than 3" by fixing the second value.

(And, not for nothing, but were you tempted to try to formulate this in terms of numerals rather than numbers? Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with?)

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape.

As in, as a straightforward account of English grammar we say “the sentence is true” and “the painting is accurate”; we don’t say “the rain is true” or “the landscape is accurate”.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error, just as talk of accuracies without paintings is a category error. Without sentences and paintings there’s just rain and landscapes.

Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with? — Srap Tasmaner

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism.

True or false?

Yes, well, everyone seems to think plain common sense supports their position. What fun.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error — Michael

Truth is about what is the case. The fact you need sentences to assert what is the case is incidental to what actually is the case in the world. A true sentence is one where - what the sentence is about actually is the case.

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism. — Michael

For me, there is no dividing line between abstract objects like numbers and abstract objects like sentences or chairs or points. All our concepts are abstract in some sense given our cognitive abilities to attend or engage with some distinctions and ignore others. For me, if all concepts we use to engage with the world are in some sense abstract, there is no point in trying to gerrymander things to do away with some concepts and not others, with bizarre consequences. From the perspective of the brain there is no fundamental distinction between different concepts because they are constructed and used in the same way by the same set of neural machinery. Sure, there is a meaningful distinction between numbers and chairs in the sense I am inclined to say one is more physical and the other is not; but there are a huge number of these abstract distinctions you can possibly make about anything. The physical is like anything else a concept which is difficult to define but can nonetheless abstract from our sensory information caused by the world.

Truth is about what is the case. — Apustimelogist

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain.

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain — Michael

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate.

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate. — Richard B

Just say "it is raining".

Phrases like "it is the case that" and "it is true that" don't add anything to the above; they're vacuous, not actually referring to some entity ("it") having some property ("true"/"the case").

Sure, and being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3, but being an integer greater than the number 3 isn't a property of the number 3; it's a property of the numbers 4 and 5 and 6 and so on. — Michael

"Greater than" (>) is a relation.

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape. — Michael

You have this weird idea that truth and accuracy can only be properties and cannot be relations. Historical philosophy says otherwise.

The picture theory of meaning? Do you really want to invoke that?

The left side of a T-sentence is about the sentence. The right side is about how things are. <"The cat is on the mat" is true> is about the sentence "The cat is on the mat". <The cat is on the mat> is about the cat , not about the sentence "The cat is on the mat", and not about any picture of it raining, mental or otherwise.

<"The cat is on the mat" is true> has the form f(a), were "f" is "is true" and "a" is "The cat is on the mat". A single-place predication. Relations have the form f(a,b). Truth is not a relation.

Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation>? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, no. The interpretation is not a part of the sentence. In formal systems the domain is not a part of the sentence, but is part of the way the sentence is used - it's in the semantics, not the syntax. The interpretation assigns elements of the domain to the various variables. "The cat is on the mat" is true only if the cat is one of the things that is on the mat. The domain and interpretation are not part of the true sentence but part of the language in which the sentence occurs, or better, the use to which it is put. That use is what "binds" the cat to "the cat". There is no need here for a picture-of-cat that sits between the cat and "the cat".

"greater than 3" isn't. Any relation can be reinterpreted as a single-place predication.

"Greater than" (>) is a relation. — Leontiskos

4 is greater than 3.
3 is smaller than 4.

The same relation is described even though "greater" does not mean the same thing as "smaller". Being greater than 3 is a property of 4 and being smaller than 4 is a property of 3.

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain. — Michael

Yes but, to be fair... satisfaction of "it's raining" is a property of the weather event, not a property of the sentence.

:joke:

The picture theory of meaning? Do you really want to invoke that? — Banno

That would be Michael. Ask him.

the use to which it is put — Banno

This is what I was getting at.

The what did you mean with the following?

Is it? Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation>? (Or a triple that includes as well a world.) — Srap Tasmaner

We use "true" as a predicate for sentences, propositions, and so on. The interpretation is not a part of the sentence, so much as something we can do with the sentence. Was that your point? That a sentence is true only under some interpretation? If so, then sure, but it is the sentence that is true or false, not the interpretation. An interpretation does not have a truth value.

what did you mean with the following? — Banno

Consider that question for a moment, and then tell me again how it's the bare sentence and not the use made of it that matters.

Look, you can treat "is true" or "is greater than 3" or "is holding" each as attributing a property to an object, and the surface grammar agrees with you.

I'm just not that impressed by the surface grammar. "4 > 3" says something about 3 and about 4, and about ordering. "The paperclip is holding" says something about the whole Jerry-rigged business. And "What you say is true" is not just a statement about your words.

Or so it seems to me.

Sure, all that. "...is true" is predicated to sentences, in a context that gives that sentece an interpretation. But the interpretation is not part of the syntax, it's part of the semantics.

Perhaps that's the issue - the difference between being a predicate and being a property. Would you have been happy if Michael had instead said "Truth is a predicate of sentences"? Calling it a property has implications of hypostatisation? Incipient Platonism?

Yes, well, everyone seems to think plain common sense supports their position. What fun. — Srap Tasmaner

In that case there must be a few different versions of commonsense. Some less common than others?

Something that is true is something that is the case. That something is the case is not just a property of a sentence. It is referring to things in the world.

Just say "it is raining".

Phrases like "it is the case that" and "it is true that" don't add anything to the above; they're vacuous — Michael

But you use them all the time and its very hard not to. You even tried replacing "truth" with "correct description" even though "correct" is more or less just a synonym for "true".

I think it may be fair to say that truth is vacuous in the sense that we use words like "truth" or "correct" just to assert something. But then what we are left with is our attempts at referring to what is the case based on our encounters with the world. If "truth" adds nothing on top, then clearly all that it is doing is servicing the same attempts at referring to what is the case.

I'll just have to accept this is what you find perhaps intuitive while I do not.

Consider that question for a moment, and then tell me again how it's the bare sentence and not the use made of it that matters. — Srap Tasmaner

You can have a Davidsonian theory of meaning where the meaning of a sentence is it's truth conditions. That takes care of use. The truth bearer is still just the sentence.