I'm not sure that he ever wrote about it. But my surmise is that the freedom that he was concerned with is peculiarly human in that it involves the complexities of language and the concept of self. That is to say that the essence of a human is something that develops out of language interaction such that one declares to oneself what one is and shall be. And that declaration gives rise to the possibility of living in good or bad faith with that declaration.

But I could be wrong.

I asked Google, "What does sarte say about beasts?" and their AI gave me a nice answer.

Jean-Paul Sartre's views on animals include:

Consciousness
Sartre believed that animals that can register our presence are conscious, while others are not. For example, clams do not seem to register our presence, and we don't have a strong sense of obligation to them.

Metaphorical use
Sartre sometimes used animals metaphorically to clarify a point in his thesis.

Indifference
Sartre was indifferent to animals, rather than hostile. He was not interested in animals themselves, nor in the moral issues surrounding how we treat them.

Authenticity
Sartre believed that authenticity is central to his moral preconceptions. He believed that some people are more "crab-like" than others, and that this is the opposite of authenticity. — GoogleAI

I liked that last part. Some people are more crab-like. Lacking in consciousness, not worth our regard.

Now this is funny. A discussion of Sarte's view of animals called, "Hell is Otter People." Perhaps you'll find some clues in here. pdf link.

Hell Is Otter People: Locating Animals In Sartre’s Ontology

If God does not exist, brutes also have no nature before they exist (this is especially obvious in the case of species that existed before humans, such as dinosaur species) and therefore they also ought to be free. — Jedothek

however, animals don't have the same capacity to reflect on existence and decide on a course of action, so the question - in fact, a question of any kind - doesn't arise for them.

My favourite two Sartre stories are: he once launched into a diatribe sorrounded by all his usual friends and foils who, after some time, decided to go out for coffee, leaving him alone in the flat. They came back some hours later, and he was still talking.

The second one was the unfortunate soul who fell into his open grave at the burial. Seemed macabre but appropriate.

I never thought of it, but plants and animals do seem to present a wrinkle here.

IIRC, didn't Sartre himself walk back this position later?

An artefact such as a letter opener has an essence before it exists, for a human being must have conceived it before it came into existence, and this conception is the essence or nature of the thing. — Jedothek

That is the purpose and utility of the thing. It has no 'essence' and its nature is determined by its design, the material from from which it was made and the skill with which it was crafted.

Since there is no God, there is no one to conceive humanity before it exists, thus the human being has no nature before he ... exists. — Jedothek

He has no pre-designated purpose or utility. His nature is determined by the material from which he is made, the environment and evolution that produced him.

If God does not exist, brutes also have no nature before they exist — Jedothek

They, too are products of environment and evolution; they also have no pre-designated purpose or function.

Therefore, he is free to do has he chooses. — Jedothek

Within the confines of his physical nature, his needs, his condition, his environment and his capabilities. Both he and the beast are constrained in the same ways.
Nature is dependent neither on God nor on Sartre.

Since there is no God, there is no one to conceive humanity before it exists, thus the human being has no nature before he (I write as sexistly as Sartre) exists. Therefore, he is free to do has he chooses. — Jedothek

I'm free to do as I choose, regardless.

That's close to my understanding of Being and Nothingness's description of bad faith. Bad faith seems to me to be a uniquely human phenomena, or at least described from that vantage point in the book, because it's all about wondering how a singular self can lie to themself -- if one says to themself that they perform like a waiter because they are a waiter is to reduce oneself to an object-like thing, which is to not recognize one's freedom as a reflecting conscioussness -- or, to frame the explanation that explicitly ignores being-for-itself in favor of being-in-itself, to use the basic metaphysical terms he's developing.

The beasts aren't being considered in the book, at least with where I'm at now. (I just finished the bit on bad faith)

At least in Being and Nothingness Sartre doesn't begin with whether or not God exists as a basis for our freedom. It's a metaphysical question which calls into question Descartes' Cogito by developing a distinction which separates the reference of "I" in "I think" from the reference of "I" in "I am" (rendering "I think, therefore I am an equivocation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself)-- so insofar that animals could use language to confuse themselves into think they are either purely an object or purely a thinking creature and therefore not responsible for their actions because of either belief then we'd be talking about bad faith and the curiosities that Sartre brings up about a being who is in conflict with itself as its being.

The question of animals would be an empirical one, I believe.

I'm not sure. I've heard it claimed that he walked back his position from Being in Nothingness in Existentialism is a Humanism because the existentialism of B&N is not as soft or warm and inviting -- i.e. humanistic -- as the existentialism of EiH. Thus far I agree, but I'm also at the beginning parts which are all about the self reflecting on the self, and harsh ("authentic") self-analysis is kind of the uniting theme of the beginning of the book. But there are later chapters which deal with Being with Others which I'm curious if they slot in with EiH.

An artefact such as a letter opener has an essence before it exists, for a human being must have conceived it before it came into existence, and this conception is the essence or nature of the thing. It behaves (passively) in a determined manner in accordance with its nature; whereas

Since there is no God, there is no one to conceive humanity before it exists, thus the human being has no nature before he (I write as sexistly as Sartre) exists. Therefore, he is free to do has he chooses.

Anyhow, this is interesting because it seems to imply that a thing must be given its telos from some external source. However, in the Physics, Aristotle calls in the idea of things possessing a telos and "nature" specifically to explain motion and the sense in which humans, animals, and plants are self-moving, working to accomplish the maintenance of their form (Sach's translation of what is normally translated as "actuality," "being-at-work-staying-itself" is useful here).

That is, the artefact would be a special case. In nature, a thing's essence or telos is internal to "what it is."

And I guess the problem I see here is in having "freedom" sit prior to form. It seems to me that people are only capable of self-determination because they are people. Rocks lack a capacity for self-determination and self-government. Plants have some, but less than people. Fetuses have less freedom than toddlers, who are less self-determining than competent, healthy adults.

Or to think about it another way, something that is "self-organizing," is still a specific sort of organization.

Now, I am aware that Sartre is using the term "essence" differently, but the question of animals does seem particularly relevant because how do we explain why livestock are not capable of human freedom? Well, the most obvious way I can think of would be to appeal to the idea that they differ from man by nature, according to what they are. Now we could try to avoid essence and instead appeal to the idea that man exists "for-itself" (pour-soi), but this just seems to circle back around to the same question, since we would then have to ask "why does man exist in this way and poultry does not?" IIRC the relevant term here is "mode of existence," but then this starts to look a lot like essence or "essential nature" if it is called upon to explain the relative capacity for self-determination for different substances.

This is supposing that "chickens and cows destined for the slaughterhouse are acting in bad faith," is off the table :rofl:

the existentialism of B&N is not as soft or warm and inviting -- i.e. humanistic -- as the existentialism of EiH. — Moliere

Being and Nothingness comes out of the occupation of France by the Nazis. There is nothing soft or warm in the kind of freedom that survives under a totalitarian regime.

Resistance is the secret of joy — Alice Walker

That is the purpose and utility of the thing. It has no 'essence' and its nature is determined by its design, the material from from which it was made and the skill with which it was crafted. — Vera Mont

Would that not depend on the definition being used for 'essence'?

I think that the essence of a knife would be the steel used to make it and that the purpose and utility is given it by man.

I think that the essence of a knife would be the steel used to make it and that the purpose and utility is given it by man. — Sir2u

I think you have that the wrong way round. the existence of the steel is what precedes the essence (being) of the knife as a sharp edged form thereof.

Would that not depend on the definition being used for 'essence'? — Sir2u

If it were a food flavouring, yes. I suppose you can apply it to a tool, meaning either its character (function, rather than personality) or its substance (what it's made of and how it's made). But how would that be distinct from purpose or nature?

I think you have that the wrong way round. the existence of the steel is what precedes the essence (being) of the knife as a sharp edged form thereof. — unenlightened

If it were a food flavouring, yes. I suppose you can apply it to a tool, meaning either its character (function, rather than personality) or its substance (what it's made of and how it's made). But how would that be distinct from purpose or nature? — Vera Mont

High quality steel can be made into a fork, a knife, a plate or even a plow. The steel would be the essence, the substance of the object. The use or purpose given the object by man are not actually properties of the object except in the sense of design for purpose.

When we talk about people, "He is essentially a good person", we talk about the things that make him good. In this sense we talk what makes up the personality, the elements of it.

High quality steel can be made into a fork, a knife, a plate or even a plow. The steel would be the essence, the substance of the object. — Sir2u

Okay. I have no problem with substance, which is just raw material. Everything that has a physical form has substance. Why raise that to some kind spiritual level?

When we talk about people, "He is essentially a good person", we talk about the things that make him good. — Sir2u

Which is not about substance. Good or bad, a person is made of biomass. But is that what you mean by essence? Is it the person's essence you're discussing or the essence of goodness - which has no physical substance? In that sentence, 'essentially' is used in the sense of 'basically'; at the foundation of his personality - which also has no physical substance. 'Essence' is non-material attribute. I see no reason to stick it on inanimate objects.

You use the words how you want, but we are discussing Sartre's usage as translated. The way he talks - "Existence precedes essence" - So my existence as physical human flesh precedes my essence as irritating old fart. And likewise the existence of the steel precedes the essence of knifliness into which it is then formed.

The essence of knifliness is sharpness and cutting not steel, because a knife can be bronze or ceramic or flint.

Makes sense. Truth be told I'm not sure EiH is exactly any of those either or if it's just a softer expression of the same. Part of why I'm revisiting him is to get a clearer understanding between this aspect of existentialism and the phenomenology of Levinas who is softer, but is also linked to Heidegger

(plus I think Sartre's metaphysics get along with absurdism fairly well -- the being-for-itself as human world, and being-in-itself as the absurd, meaningless plenitude)

There is a time for harshness on the path to kindness, I think, so these things aren't totally at odds. What if I'm a natural asshole and it feels good to be an asshole, after all? Then we could say that insofar that we are an authentic asshole we are in good faith. But insofar that this criticism puts kindness above authenticity then the harshness needs to be directed towards that impulse of cruelty.

A quote buried in II. THE FACTICITY OF THE FOR-ITSELF that seemed to relate to the original question

...
The billiard ball which rolls on the table does not possess the possibility of being turned
from its path by a fold in the cloth; neither does the possibility of deviation belong to the cloth; it can be established only by a witness synthetically as an external relation
...

My thinking here is that insofar that you could establish that a given beast can establish the possibilities of objects like above then perhaps then we'd be dealing with the class of mind to which Being and Nothingness applies. But then there's a part of me that realizes this part is deeply respondent to Descartes, given the context, which makes the question of beasts pretty interesting.

But I think it'd be the sort of thing that needs further research to really ascertain. It's not an easy question you can just look up the answer to.

I am unsure at several points in your communication whether you are expressing your own view or attempting to paraphrase Sartre. Obviously, you are entitled to your views, and we can debate them as such. But if your post is intended as a paraphrase of Sartre, then I think you err at a couple points.

VM: [a letter opener] has no ‘essence’
“Let us say, then, of the paperknife that its essence [l'essence]– that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible – precedes its existence” -- existentialism is a Humanism

VM: [the human being’s] nature is determined by the material from which he is made, the environment and evolution that produced him.
J: No, for Sartre, there is no human nature, certainly not one determined by material. (I may have used the word “nature” when I should have said “essence,” though many writers have treated the terms essence and nature as synonyms.) When you refer to material, environment and evolution, you may be thinking of the human condition.

No. They're usually in the neighborhood of $20/dozen.

I am unsure at several points in your communication whether you are expressing your own view or attempting to paraphrase Sartre. — Jedothek

Invariably expressing my view and paraphrasing nobody - except occasionally in jest or irony and that's more likely to be poets or scriptwriters than philosophers.

When you refer to material, environment and evolution, you may be thinking of the human condition. — Jedothek

Nope. The human body, without which there is no human essence, spirit, nature, character, circumstance or condition.