Well done. I especially appreciate the distinction between being 'materialistic' and being a 'materialist'. :up:

As for 'the fundamental unity', Einstein famously favors Spinoza's natura naturans (i.e. substance) and later quantum field theory corresponds, imho, to Democritean-Epicurean void. I think the Cartesian-Kantian (& Planckian) mistake of prioritizing epistemology (i.e. what humans can know directly) over above ontology (i.e. what subjectivity / what knowing necessarily presupposes, and therefore, can only be inferred) – or, worse: reducing the latter ("what is") to the former ("what i know") – leads to subjectivist / idealist / phenomenalist antireality (e.g. immaterialism, supernaturalism) that is implicitly assumed by "evil demon" & "brain-in-a-vat" (à la gnostic) thought-experiments which invariably yield "transcendental illusions" as Kant points out.

Anyway, my own position is philosophical naturalism (which, as I conceptualize it, begins with a hybrid 'Epicurean-Spinozist' immanentist ontology) and, in sum, proposes this: nature is the aspect of reality that limits (like the encompassing horizon) what we natural beings can know about reality given only natural capabilities for knowing (i.e. explaining) reality. As (pragmatic) epistemic shorthands about nature, 'material' means embodied (data), 'physical' means informational (model) and 'a truth' means a good explanation (a rigorously well-tested, fallibilistic model aka "theory") ... constitutive of A View From Everywhere (i.e. more-than-subjective) rather than "the view from nowhere" (or god's eye view).

Nicely put and helpful. Especially this :

my own position, or commitment, is philosophical naturalism (which, as I understand it, begins with a hybrid 'Epicurean-Spinozist' immanentist ontology) and, in sum, proposes this: nature is the aspect of reality that limits (like the encompassing horizon) what we natural beings can know about reality given only natural capabilities for knowing (i.e. explaining) reality. A — 180 Proof

which makes the point that materialism is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but may not be true, just as Newtonian Physics is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but is not true. — Art48

It's interesting to me that humans make sense of the world with narratives and models which may often be useful but not be true. Philosopher Hilary Lawson (a minor figure in the world of ideas) says that we create models for intervening in the world which are effective but never describe reality. This process is iterative. The quest to find reality is like a substitute for god.

Hey Art - now I see your name on that Youtube preso (which I haven't got around to viewing yet) I realise we corresponded in the 1990's.

which makes the point that materialism is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but may not be true, just as Newtonian Physics is a good (even indispensable) theory for making sense of the world but is not true. — Art48

Right. Scientism is the result of attempting to apply scientific methods to philosophical problems.

An interesting, well-made video. You've covered many of the bases that need to be covered. I do have one disagreement. Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong. This is a drum I've pounded here on the forum many times. As you note, materialism can be very useful as a way of looking at the world. I've read that most physicists are materialist, which makes sense. But it's not the only useful metaphysical approach, e.g. I've read that most mathematicians are idealists. Ontology is not an all or nothing thing. We can use different approaches in different situations and at different times, depending on which is more useful in each set of conditions.

Also - I think your comparison of materialism and Newtonian mechanics is misleading. Newtonian mechanics is a set of scientific theories. I don't think it's correct to call it "wrong," it's just that it's limited. But for most uses in our everyday world, it's adequate to give us good answers. I can make accurate predictions about events here on Earth using Newton's principles. I can't make any predictions with metaphysics - that's just not how it works.

It's interesting to me that humans make sense of he world with narratives and models which may often be useful but not be true. — Tom Storm

It seems "narratives and models" are "useful" in the broadest scope only, in fact, when they are approximately true. Maybe not but I can't think of any counter-examples which you & @Art48 might be talking about.

Thanks for sharing.

Have you considered putting this on a radio program?

I enjoyed listening because you gave a fair presentation of ideas with a passion for them. It's great.

Right. Scientism is the result of attempting to apply scientific methods to philosophical problems — Wayfarer

I would argue that scientism involves the belief that the science-philosophy separation you’re suggesting is even possible.

It's unclear to me whether what's being referred to as "The One" is meant to be supernatural (outside of or apart from nature) or a part of nature (the universe). If it's supernatural, it seems to me to suffer from the problems which result when a transcendence is assumed rather than immanence--I don't think we can know anything about what's "outside" of nature/the universe. But if some aspect of nature/the universe is being referred to, why can't that be a kind of materialism (in which what is "material" would include all of the universe)?

It's unclear to me whether what's being referred to as "The One" is meant to be supernatural (outside of or apart from nature) or a part of nature (the universe). If it's supernatural, it seems to me to suffer from the problems which result when a transcendence is assumed rather than immanence--I don't think we can know anything about what's "outside" of nature/the universe. But if some aspect of nature/the universe is being referred to, why can't that be a kind of materialism (in which what is "material" would include all of the universe)? — Ciceronianus

I agree with this. There is more than one conception of the natural and the material. If a particular variety of materialism seems too reductive, it is not necessary to go in search of an extra-material ground. Rather, one can do what the New Materialists have done, transform our understanding of material reality so it has room for consciousness and linguistic conceptualization, uniting what Sellars called the manifest and the scientific image without making one the foundation for the other.

Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong… Newtonian mechanics is a set of scientific theories. I don't think it's correct to call it "wrong," it's just that it's limited. But for most uses in our everyday world, it's adequate to give us good answers. I can make accurate predictions about events here on Earth using Newton's principles. I can't make any predictions with metaphysics - that's just not how it works. — T Clark

Yes, materialism is a philosophical perspective. Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss.

Yes, materialism is a philosophical perspective. Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. — Joshs

This is a good way of putting it and I agree.

The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs

This is something I've thought about a lot, which is made harder because I often struggle with quantum mechanical concepts. You say "the qualitative meaning has shifted." I don't know about that. There are a lot of arguments about different interpretations of QM. They have always seemed pointless to me if different ways of looking at it don't lead to questions that can be answered empirically. I think it's still an open question whether or not that's possible. From my reading, it seems like much of the dissatisfaction with the Copenhagen interpretation is that it doesn't provide new ontology. That has always seemed like an pointless criticism to me. Science isn't required to provide we mortals with ontology.

Maybe that's the new metaphysics of QM - no ontology. I'm comfortable with that.

An interesting, well-made video. You've covered many of the bases that need to be covered. I do have one disagreement. Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong. This is a drum I've pounded here on the forum many times. As you note, materialism can be very useful as a way of looking at the world. I've read that most physicists are materialist, which makes sense. But it's not the only useful metaphysical approach, e.g. I've read that most mathematicians are idealists. Ontology is not an all or nothing thing. We can use different approaches in different situations and at different times, depending on which is more useful in each set of conditions. — T Clark

So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose?

I admit it can get rather tiring making explicit what senses and brain states lead to such an' such a mathematical/abstract realization so the majority of such thinkers use certain vernacular as wide/generalized shorthand. Course, then all that philosophical seriousness about the choice between these shorthand languages is beaten into meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism.

Right. Scientism is the result of attempting to apply scientific methods to philosophical problems
— Wayfarer

I would argue that scientism involves the belief that the science-philosophy separation you’re suggesting is even possible. — Joshs

But don’t you see a distinction between legitimately empirical questions that are answerable in terms of data and measurement, and philosophical questions that can’t be addressed in those terms?

For instance:

Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs

Both Newtonian and quantum mechanics can be utilised successfully to achieve various goals - his development of calculus was later used to improve the accuracy of artillery fire. And as is well-known quantum mechanics plays an indispensable role in the technology we’re all using to conduct this conversation. Hence the well-known advice for those working in physics not to pursue the puzzling questions it seems to imply, but to ‘shut up and calculate’.

But what physics means is not itself a question for physics. ‘Scientism’ comprises not recognising that, or ignoring the fact that the meaning of scientific theories is not itself a scientific theory, or believing that science will “one day” explain the meaning.

The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs

The OP, or rather the attachment to it, seems to me to err by contrasting "what works" with "what's true"--e.g., Newtonian physics may work, but it's not true. It reminds me of Russell's criticism of Pragmatism, or more accurately the straw man he called "Pragmatism." The notion that what's true is different qualitatively from what is established by our day-to-day interaction with the rest of the world minimizes the significance of our lives as part of the world, and separates us from what is significant, what is "true."

But don’t you see a distinction between legitimately empirical questions that are answerable in terms of data and measurement, and philosophical questions that can’t be addressed in those terms? — Wayfarer

I can only imagine that it might be argued that the distinction between empirical questions and philosophical questions may not be as certain as our models have historically suggested. We can say that measurement and empirical data are influenced by (produced by?) philosophical assumptions and interpretive schemas. Philosophical approaches serve to set the agenda around what counts as data, the way we might measure it, along with our approaches to interpretation.

The notion that what's true is different qualitatively from what is established by our day-to-day interaction with the rest of the world minimizes the significance of our lives as part of the world, and separates us from what is significant, what is "true." — Ciceronianus

I really like the way you've put this.

So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose? — substantivalism

Hmmm. Is that what I mean? Maybe I would say that metaphysics is conceptual simplicity for a particular role/purpose.

I admit it can get rather tiring making explicit what senses and brain states lead to such an' such a mathematical/abstract realization so the majority of such thinkers use certain vernacular as wide/generalized shorthand. Course, then all that philosophical seriousness about the choice between these shorthand languages is beaten into meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism. — substantivalism

I'm not sure I understand what you're trying to say. I don't see the value in talking about senses and brain states, at least not in this context. As for "meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism," I resemble that remark. I have been called a pragmatist and have accepted that label.

180 Proof: If you agree hard solipsism cannot be disproven, then wouldn’t the minimum that we must necessarily presuppose be our consciousness and sensations, and nothing else? Of course, the evidence for an external material world is very, very strong but the point of the video is that the evidence does not prove materialism.

Tom Storm: Even if we can never perfectly describe reality, I’d say that any particular narrative and model (e.g. Newtonian Physics) can be closer to reality than another (e.g., Alchemy).

T Clark: Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false? (Why? Because such positions go beyond the evidence and therefore their truth/falsity cannot be determined?)
Also, I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality.

Moliere: I wouldn’t know how to make a radio program of it. Maybe it could be made into a podcast but I’m not very familiar with podcasting.

Ciceronianus: I believe “supernatural” is a vacuous term because we do not yet know the limits of the natural world. Once, lightening was considered supernatural. I get in my car, talk into a little handheld device, and it directs me to a destination 100 miles away (i.e. mobile phone and GPS) or allows me to talk to someone on another continent. A few centuries ago, that would have been called supernatural.

But what physics means is not itself a question for physics. ‘Scientism’ comprises not recognising that, or ignoring the fact that the meaning of scientific theories is not itself a scientific theory, or believing that science will “one day” explain the meaning. — Wayfarer

I see what you’re saying, but I am inclined to think that the failure to think reflexively about what science does, and the methods a particular science uses, is not a limitation of a thing called science meant in some universal, ahistorical sense, but of a certain era of science which doesn’t recognize human becoming, including the wives we create, as open-ended, historical, and contextual. This is where newer sciences, like enactivism , hold the promise of taking this historicality and situatedness into account.
Hanne De Jaegher explains:

. Enaction is a particular kind of nonreductive naturalism, one that stresses the continui­ties but also the innovations that occur between natural pro­cesses, life, mind, language, and human communities; as much an approach to embodied minds as a rethinking of
nature. Dichotomies become ambiguous in this approach,
such as that between descriptive and the normative dis­course (a distinction more normative than descriptive in its
deployments). A lesson that refectively emerges from enac­tive epistemology is that theorising of any kind, a fortiori
theorising about human beings, is never purely descriptive.
From the choice of technical language to decisions about
perspective and relevance, awareness of implications, and concern for potential uses, theorising is always an ethical
engagement, situated in a community of embodied research­ers and institutions. This is not to say that normative ques­tions can be exhausted by any kind of theorising, enactive or otherwise.

I see what you’re saying, but I am inclined to think that the failure to think reflexively about what science does, and the methods a particular science uses, is not a limitation of a thing called science meant in some universal, ahistorical sense, but of a certain era of science which doesn’t recognize human becoming, including the wives we create, as open-ended, historical, and contextual. — Joshs

:100: That's where science, philosophy and culture are all going through massive changes. Science is becoming self aware! :party: The zenith of 'scientism' per se was probably around the end of the 19th to the middle of the last century. It still has considerable influence, but the times they are a'changin'.



wives...? :chin:

oops. meant lives

Tom Storm: Even if we can never perfectly describe reality, I’d say that any particular narrative and model (e.g. Newtonian Physics) can be closer to reality than another (e.g., Alchemy). — Art48

I think that goes without saying. My curiosity is with the notion that there is a 'reality' out there to be discovered and described - when it seems to me much of this is predicated on, or a by-product of, contingent factors like the human cognitive apparatus. It seems to me we just keep developing models that seem to do a better job of supporting us to manage our environment.

T Clark: Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false? (Why? Because such positions go beyond the evidence and therefore their truth/falsity cannot be determined?) — Art48

R.G. Collingwood wrote, and I agree, that metaphysics is the study of the (conscious or unconscious) underlying assumptions, what he calls absolute presuppositions, of our understanding of the world. Let's take materialism, since that's what this thread is about. What are some absolute presuppositions of materialism. Let's try these:

[1] The universe is uniform, i.e. the rules that apply to the behavior of matter and energy are the same anywhere in the universe and at all times.

[2] Every event has a cause.

Now tell me, how would you set out to test these assumptions empirically? My answer - can't be done.

I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality. — Art48

So, let's take the laws of conservation of energy and conservation of matter. I guess they were true until 1905 when Einstein showed that matter and energy are equivalent. Or maybe it was when scientists worked out how to go about actually creating energy from matter in nuclear fission. Now we have the law of conservation of matter and energy. Does that mean the law of conservation of energy is wrong? But scientists and engineers still use it all the time. It works fine except in situations where there are nuclear reactions. My answer - no, of course it's not wrong, it's just limited.

Or how about superconductivity. Superconductivity has so-far been observed only at very low temperatures. That's because at normal temperatures thermal movement of particles overwhelms the physical processes that manifest as superconductivity. Modern theories of superconductivity do not include consideration of physical processes that show up at temperatures we normally see in nature. So, are those theories wrong? Again, no they're just limited to the specific range of size and energy for which they were developed.

180 Proof: If you agree hard solipsism cannot be disproven, then wouldn’t the minimum that we must necessarily presuppose be our consciousness and sensations, and nothing else? — Art48

There are compelling grounds to doubt "solipsism" (e.g. disembodiment, immaterialism, brain-in-vat, etc) which suffice for dismissing it.

Of course, the evidence for an external material world is very, very strong but the point of the video is that the evidence does not prove materialism.

By your own admission, Art, grounds against doubting "materialism" (e.g. embodiment, multiplicity, dis-order) far exceed grounds for doubting it, which suffice for not dismissing "materialism", especially compared to much more doubtful alternatives (e.g. immaterialism, solipsism).

Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false?

It doesn't make sense to ask whether grammar is "true or false" any more than it does to ask this of metaphysics. I think (Western) metaphysics consists in what is necessarily presupposed (e.g. ontology) in order for epistemological statements (e.g. physics (i.e. cosmology)) and axiological statements (e.g. ethics, aesthetics) to make sense as domain-specific criteria for truth and falsity. In other words, physics models computable aspects of nature (just as ethics maps eusocial aspects of human nature) whereas metaphysics indefeasibly describes physics' model-making (& ethics' map-making).

Also, I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong.

Well I say that beyond all doubt, above the Planck scale, shorter than Relativistic distances and slower than Relativistic velocities, "Newtonian Mechanics" is (almost) completely accurate.

I believe “supernatural” is a vacuous term because we do not yet know the limits of the natural world.

Physical laws and constants make explicit (some? many? most?) "limits of the natural world" and, after countless billions upon billions of experimental observations, that there is no evidence of violations of any physical laws is, imo, compelling grounds to doubt your "belief", Art.

It doesn't make sense to ask whether grammar is "true or false" any more than it does to ask this of metaphysics. I think (Western) metaphysics consists in what is necessarily presupposed (e.g. ontology) in order for epistemological statements (e.g. physics (i.e. cosmology)) and axiological statements (e.g. ethics, aesthetics) to make sense as domain-specific criteria for truth and falsity. In other words, physics models computable aspects of nature (just as ethics maps eusocial aspects of human nature) whereas metaphysics indefeasibly describes physics' model-making (& ethics' map-making). — 180 Proof

As I'm sure you know by now, metaphysics is important to me. Of all the people here on the forum, I think your way of seeing it is closest to mine, but you generally have a bit different take and way of describing the subject. I find that helpful.

:cool: Your affinity for daoism speaks to me as well. I also agree our close but differing insights in metaphysics are helpful.

I believe “supernatural” is a vacuous term because we do not yet know the limits of the natural world. Once, lightening was considered supernatural. I get in my car, talk into a little handheld device, and it directs me to a destination 100 miles away (i.e. mobile phone and GPS) or allows me to talk to someone on another continent. A few centuries ago, that would have been called supernatural. — Art48

In an earlier post I noted that I'm uncertain whether what you refer to as "The One"

is meant to be supernatural (outside of or apart from nature) or a part of nature (the universe). — Ciceronianus

For purposes of this thread, that's how I'm using the word "supernatural." Do you think "The One" to be outside or apart from nature/the universe, or a part of nature/the universe?

If you think "The One" is apart from nature, then you may if you wish ascribe to it whatever characteristics you like, and claim that nature isn't really true because only The One is true. That sort of thing's been done by some philosophers and most religious believers who worship a transcendent God for many centuries. It's not a position I can take, as I think there's no basis on which we can know what "transcends" the universe. But if "The One" is a part of nature then I don't think you can distinguish it from the rest of nature because it's the only part that's "true."

Thank you.

"The One" is unbounded nature (or existence) and materialism is one way of talking about, or describing, nature that explicitly excludes "immaterial" entities.