For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa. — Wayfarer

Sorry Wayfarer, I just noted your reveal. Thank you. And I see that you might note (not unlike Gnoman) that The "division" is not ontological, between Will and Suffering, but rather a "choice." Suffering does "emerge out of" the Will, but one might "attempt" to "avoid" it by negating the will.

I would only suggest that negating the will (ground of being) does seem impossible (as Schopenhauer the forum member has been pressing with kindness). It would make more sense if the "resolution" to suffering is negating the projections which (I believe to be) its "locus."

But things are more clear now in that I understand where I diverge.

In the OP, ↪Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. — Gnomon

Yes, I would like to elaborate on why I find it unacceptable. How is one to deny the will to live? Doesn't this imbue a persons life or deny their adaptability to the environment they are in?

Compare and contrast the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest with Schopenhauer's notion of the denial of the will to live?

Not exactly, look at our conversation right above: — schopenhauer1

Below is from your conversation above. That is the very point I "think" I am concerned about. Seems to me I should pause again. :smile: Sorry.

But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1

Genius poor guy.
15m — frank

No doubt

I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind? — ENOAH

I think that is a great point, and I think it valid. I think the question is a legitimate one that stands.. And goes right back to a conversation I had with Wayferer in a previous thread... I'd have to look to find it, but it was the one I sent you a little while ago.

It does seem like if Schopenhauer is offering a dual-aspected world, that indeed, Will is not the "true" or "primary" but simply the "flip-side", but he keeps discussing the Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same.

This can perhaps recovered in a couple ways, but these attempts are more just hypothesis...And it may answer my previous question about "denial" to @Wayfarer just above...

First off, no ONE manifestation/representation can ever be "Will itself", as Will is the WHOLE superstructure.. All that exists.

However, perhaps as a manifestation of Will, one can become a sort of Will-less individual. Don't ask me what or how that looks.. It seems impossible, bit would be something like an individuated aspect of Will knowing its own nature first-hand, without the mediation. Again, I have no idea what that really means.

So "denying" the will is "more weighted" of the noumenal understanding rather than the phenomenal presentation. It isn't "becoming one with Will" per se, because that is an impossibility.. It is the manifestation, understanding its own nature as much as a manifestation can.. I guess. And if that sounds really woo woo.. it is to me as well.. I'm just trying my best to work with what a I got in terms of Will and "denial of Will" ... and what that means.

Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same. — schopenhauer1

I get why ultimately they must just be Will (I have in mind, none of the nuances peculiar to each philosopher. Most basic: will=ground of being; representation=those projections emerging there"from").

But.

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
?

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
? — ENOAH

That is indeed a way to look at it, but I have problems with it...

Whence the illusion? If you say that it is secondary, and not somehow, ONE AND THE SAME, then you are trying to say that there is some sort of temporal and causal succession (first there was Will, and then there was Idea/Representation). That doesn't seem to make sense.

It also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation, as causation is purely in the phenomenal world of Representation, but cannot be said of Will itself.

also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation — schopenhauer1

Totally agree. I thought I was framing it in a way conceding to an orthodox view. Causation is misapplied. (But there is the added problem which I concede that this applies not just to applying "cause" to any relationship with Reality, but to everything expressed, rendering all of this moot.)

Whence the illusion? — schopenhauer1

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real.

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real. — ENOAH

This all sounds like an attempt to square the circle here. Something I also struggle with in Schopenhauer. That is, how is the multiplicity the same as the unity. It just starts sounding more absurd.. I proposed a Higher Will (will denied), and Lower Will (will manifested), but this makes no sense if all is One Will.

Then it also starts looking like early forms of trinitarian justifications.. same substance different modes, or whathaveyou. This also will not do.

Rather, the only way I can interpret it is that Will literally IS the illusions. It is NOT primary/originary/more REAL than the illusions. Rather, illusions simply IS WILL as it is carried out.

However, I still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. "What" that is, is beyond me. But it's the same problem as Buddhism's desire for no desire. And I am sure there are plenty of clever ways to get around it..

Will literally IS the illusions. — schopenhauer1

Hard pill to swallow...hence the squaring of the circle. You may be right, more universally than just this.

still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. — schopenhauer1

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right?

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right? — ENOAH

I just don't even know what "denial of the Will" even means in this context. There is no fit.

This is why I said it is something akin to the Representation knowing its essence more familiarly? So where the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether.

It's not a satisfying answer though.

But as to Will BEING Illusion (not prior to it or more Real than it), I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out.

Edit: The only way I can characterize it is that it is "double-aspected" like the double-aspect theories of consciousness contend that material is mental to some extent, not that material causes mental.

He's not saying this law is a feature of the universe, it's a feature of thought. We can't think beyond it, so it's like a signpost of the border of thought. — frank

That is along the same lines as the 'critical reflection' in the SEP entry that I mention above. But I'd say, it's deeper than a feature of thought, it is inextricably part of organic life, as all living things strive to survive (although only humans come along and ask why.)

definitely he (Schop.) places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being). — ENOAH

I'd be very careful at this point. First, 'Buddhanature' was not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. Second, look again at the reply to S1 above, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer. It suggests he's not really positing 'Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why.

Without getting into all the intricacies of Buddhist philosophy, which are considerable, one of the basic formulations is called the 'chain of dependent origination' (Pratītyasamutpāda), shared by all schools. The driving factors are ignorance, greed and hatred (depicted iconographically as a rooster, pig and snake chasing each other in a circle). So ignorance is what causes beings to be born in the realm of Saṃsāra (with the caveat that in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the bodhisattva may be voluntarily born out of compassion for the sake of suffering beings). But ignorance has no intrinsic reality. And that actually converges (oddly enough) with a religious teaching associated with Augustine, 'evil as privation of the good' - in the same way that illness is simply the absence of health, or a hole the absence of ground, evil or ignorance has no intrinsic being, although it appears totally real to those afflicted by it.

the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether. — schopenhauer1

That is definitely the most Reasonable view. You cannot achieve anything outside of the phenomenal because there is no refuge in so called reality. The two are inextricably one. Thus, enlightened necessarily is enlightened as to the predicament, and willing (deliberate use) to carry on as unattached as possible (ironically using that very willing to detach from willing. A problem I see resolved differently).

But we share in the pith of it. Wu Wei.

I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out. — schopenhauer1

:up:

it is that it is "double-aspected" — schopenhauer1

And I would see that ("double-aspected") as an "aspect" of the projections, rooted in a primeval structure, difference. Because Mind exploded once difference became habituated into real consciousness*, we have this problem to grapple with in the first place. Not this but that is recognized as the root of the projections (representations) by Vedanta/ Mahayana (I can't speak of Theravada) and Western philosophy.

What is the "nature" of this will/representations dichotomy? Right? You say "double-aspected" which is consistent with Schopenhauer and, I might concede conventional reasoning. It applies the autonomous requirement of difference. Not this but that.

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue.


*(I'll use the language I'm familiar with. Know that I am aware of their "flaws" within the context of this discussion)

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue. — ENOAH

But then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something. This is all language of the phenomenal which would be inappropriate as it is the language of causation, duration, temporality, and causality. This is the language of the Phenomenal world applied to the Noumenal.

Rather, it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know except by way of intellectualization. I guess the Enlightened person "knows" it in some mystical sense.

not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. — Wayfarer

Ok. Ive never considered that for Schopenhauer, yet I sensed he wasn't a Buddhist Scholar or anything even for his time. But maybe from what you've made clear, he was well versed given the resources.

Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why. — Wayfarer

Ok. Yes. You are correct to clarify. I originally "brought" his "will" into a category with Being recognizing I wasn’t being true to Schopenhauer but neglecting to be clear.

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive? — ENOAH

Well, Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. Boredom isn't such a negative thing with how this whole industrialized psychological programming went crazy with advertisements and our beloved dopamine nation. Endless, really.

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive? — ENOAH

They're difficult questions, but I'd be careful about reification. Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment. Perhaps more like a 'principle'. Buddhism in particular is very sensitive to 'objectification'. So, 'will is not a being but a drive' is much nearer the mark.

then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something — schopenhauer1

Right. Words are inevitably problematic. All the more so when I do not share your knowledge of the technical. Projections is misleading. Here's an oversimpified description of the process. Representations are constructed by the Body to trigger feelings and actions. The feelings and actions are real but we are attuned to the representations as though they are real.
In the spirit of further oversimplifying, one time, hypothetically before thd hypothetical emergence of mind, the brain would construct a representation of a tiger when a certain twig snapped to trigger the Body to run. Mind is a universe of such representations.

it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know. — schopenhauer1

It might. If I am stretching, then it would. If I am not, that it resolves the cannot know with the answer, well "know" is not a category of truth anyway, that's why it can't be known.

Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment — Wayfarer

Understood. So for Schopenhauer there is nothing like Brahman or another monistic ultimate reality besides Will which is more like a drive? Sorry, that's what I was wondering.

Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. — Shawn

Oh. Would Schopenhauer have seen the Will as Freud's ID?

If so, there is nothing redeeming in us at the root? But where does reason or rationality fit in?

I think that’s about right.
//
What I’ve read about Schopenhauer’s influence on Freud is that both he and Kant anticipated the discovery of the unconscious.

I bow to your expertise on all things Schopenhauer. And thanks for not rippin’ me a new one for misconstruing his philosophical value.
————-

Y….is mediated reality. X…..is direct reality.

KANT: Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y) — ENOAH

The others I leave to others, but in Kant, while phenomena as mediated reality is correct, it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t.

“…. In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities….”

“…. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction (…) but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but….solely through the pure understanding…..is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”.

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? Everybody talks of noumena as a general kind of thing but no one ever gives a name to what a particular noumenon might be. Because no one can, under the auspices of Kantian transcendental idealism pursuant to a posteriori cognitions, re: experience.

Anyway….in trying to help sort it out I might have just made it worse.

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? — Mww

You know that Schopenhauer criticized Kant's use of the term 'noumenal', right? According to a passage in World as Will and Idea:

The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as φαινόμενα [phainomena] and νοούμενα [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms φαινομένα and νοούμενα were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.

The Wikipedia entry on Noumenon, from which that is copied, also says

The Greek word νοούμενoν, nooúmenon (plural νοούμενα, nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of νοεῖν, noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word νοῦς, noûs, an Attic contracted form of νόος, nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind'. A rough equivalent in English would be "that which is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".

So, from that, I would have surmised that the ideas, in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense, might be regarded as 'noumenal objects' insofar as they're apprehended directly by intellect. Lloyd Gerson says in his essay Platonism and Naturalism:

in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. ...Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

A related comment from Ed Feser:

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. — Edward Feser

Now, I know these are all very knotty philosophical problems, in no way am I trying to resolve them. It's just that it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. I sometimes wonder if Kant put too much emphasis on the necessity of empirical validation, as there are whole fields, such as pure mathematics, which seem to me to constitute real knowledge, but which are not empirically realised.

And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1

...although Schop himself used Greek terms some of the time, e.g. (I hope relevantly, I mainly know about Schop in relation to music not metaphysics):

the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ἀταραξία [ataraxia]. — Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88

I appreciate your comment, and I offer these rejoinders just to demonstrate a conformity.

S says…..The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks…..
K says……(to cognize) as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason…..

To cognize by experience is intuitive; to cognize by pure reason is abstract, hence the difference is not entirely overlooked.
———-

S says….the opposition and incommensurability between these terms….
K says…. inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think…

One says they are opposed and incommensurable; the other had already acknowledged the case and says why it is so.
———-

Wiki says…..the object of an act of thought….
K says….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object (…) must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence….

One must already grant that understanding just is the faculty of thought, without which the comparison doesn’t work.
————

Feser says…..For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one….

K says….. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. (…) the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere.

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions.
———-

it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. — Wayfarer

“…. The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis…”

“…. I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients—an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling….”

Kant wanted noumena to be understood only as intelligible objects, and the conception of strictly intelligible objects in general does make sense, insofar as Kant was an admitted dualist, so if we can come up with this, then we damn well better be able to come up with non-this but that, other than as a form of mere negation. But the fact remains, it is impossible to cognize a noumenal object, no matter how much sense the notion makes.

I always wondered….who is doing the quibbling? Those who question his use of the terms, or himself for using them as he does?

it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t. — Mww

Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

Kant was an admitted dualist — Mww

What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism?

That is along the same lines as the 'critical reflection' in the SEP entry that I mention above. But I'd say, it's deeper than a feature of thought, it is inextricably part of organic life, as all living things strive to survive (although only humans come along and ask why.) — Wayfarer

You're doing what Witt warned against: you're giving in to the desire to see the world from a vantage point you can't have. But there wouldn't be much philosophizing going on if everyone took Witt's point. :razz:

You're doing what Witt warned against: you're giving in to the desire to see the world from a vantage point you can't have. But there wouldn't be much philosophizing going on if everyone took Witt's point. :razz: — frank

It's nonsense to speak of nonsense, because it is precisely defining what "is" that we are doing, and thus, what is legitimate for there to have a "sense" about.. I feel Witt's understanding is asinine, and playing to a certain crowd that wanted to remove itself from metaphysical speculation. He was doing metaphysical speculation himself, but then playing cutesy at the end by saying "Just lift up the ladder now that I showed it to you!" .. No, you are not immune either, bro. Just one of many speculators.. Take a number.

...although Schop himself used Greek terms some of the time, e.g. (I hope relevantly, I mainly know about Schop in relation to music not metaphysics):

the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ἀταραξία [ataraxia].
— Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88 — mcdoodle

True! I was being cheeky there because it seems that every time there is some contradiction or paradox in Schopenhauer's Will, a Sanskrit and/or Pali word is thrown out there to show that there is this other concept inserted that can save it.

No, you are not immune either, bro. — schopenhauer1

I agree. I have my biases. For me, it's a step in the right direction to at least recognize that. It makes you more mentally flexible. It allows you to step into the shoes of those who believe the opposite. From there, you can more clearly see the weaknesses of your own position, you know?