• substantivalism
    Tell you what, I've repeatedly offered what I take valid empirical science to be. You, so far, have not offered any definition of what you take it to be - and examples of what "science says" do not come close to delineating what is and is not science.javra
    That is sort of why I've been speaking about it in a rather indirect manner and, if I haven't then its implied in previous replies, that the word 'science' is taken as not more than a label of notoriety. Sort of how the title of philosopher has been stretched into such a high colloquial usage with such vastness that its meaningfulness has been rather diluted.

    The main issue I see is that whatever definition you come up with could be atomized into different purposes, methodologies, conceptual tools, and colloquial images of 'manifest science' that could be neither sufficient nor altogether necessary.

    One can observe nature and yet not be considered a scientist. Someone can observe and manipulate nature according to pragmatic ends with a fallibilist mindset yet be declared a mere industrialist or engineer rather than a physicist. One can observe and speculate on nature but would be found to be a naturalist metaphysician and not a physicist simpliciter.So what is supposed to distinguish the person who uncovers nature as a scientist but is not so speculative while being distinguished from the mere pragmatic naturalist manipulator of it? Since those conceptual tools and practices can be used by ALL.

    Perhaps, its their purpose? Then that makes it too subjective and tied in with socialized views of scientific work or progress which are rational analyses of what's been called science but shouldn't be included in its definition. A definition that shouldn't be subjective really in any degree or as distant as possible according to colloquial images of 'manifest science'.

    This notion of science also restricts or serves to restrict what allowable language is used to talk about nature. Metaphorical, analogical, and indirect language may be pragmatically useful or common but perhaps it shouldn't be considered scientific given its subjective status. Therefore any talk of preons, the sub-atomic, atomic, and other such quantum weirdness or spacetime bending is to be seen as playful poetic language outside the purview of objective science. Objective science demands clear and directly meaningful statements of which symbolism combined with direct observable language without theoretical entities would suffice. I.E. realism in science is dead and anti-realism of a post-positivist /instrumentalist/operationalist/epistemological idealist sort rules.

    I don't think you'd really say science was altogether that different or inconsistent with what is bolded above already but its common to speak highly of the consequences of theories or of the entities they postulate upon the external world. To talk about laws of nature or particle interactions which defy nature's causal connectiveness and connect distant parts of spacetime as a bent sheet. Should these diatribes be considered scientific or philosophical because of their poetic/metaphorical/analogical and indirect language?

    I would say these postulations aren't merely 'possible of being disproven' which lends them more credence than an anti-realist would yield them. They aren't mere postulations a new test can upheave. . . THEY ARE MEANINGLESS because they aren't part of an objective direct observer language. Fallibilism yields them more credence as to their mind-independent meaningfulness as statements about the world. It tricks you into thinking they even have a truth value to be given in the first place even if that truth value is declared as 'unknown' or indeterminable. Rather we should join similar minded anti-realists as those fictionalists and declare such talk as no different in nature than the highest fantasy novels Human's have created.

    Regardless of any objective untangling of the supremely successful social endeavor we call science any objective bullet point of a pure idea of science separate from that should learn from that mistake or solve it. Is there any meaningfulness to be given to analogical/metaphorical statements about the external world? Is objective science only an anti-realist one in a pragmatic or even non-pragmatic sort?

    Further, I'm not confident however that one could separate an idea of science from its pragmatic usage or the purposes of acting 'scientists'. Not without creating some strange platonic science from no where and from which no one performs it nor could anyone be declared a part of it.
  • substantivalism
    @javra I don't know what I'd consider science precisely but months of research to narrow in on such a definition would contain many references/citations from socialist views of science as well as anti-realist ones.

    My 'objective' science would be rather boring and not filled with the sort of flair of black holes, time travel, or spacetime warping. Rather, statements about methodological practice, instrumental usage, and direct observer language with some poetic flair merely to make it more palatable to read.
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